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This thesis aims to explain how British naval power was sustained in the Indian Ocean 
during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. To improve efficiency and 
economy, the Admiralty had to reorganise the management of shore support services, as 
well as to rationalise the bases available to the navy to meet the enemy it faced. The 
basic proposal of this thesis is that British naval power was projected overseas by the 
Admiralty's effective reconciliation of two competing demands, the naval demand for 
strategic deployment and the domestic demand for reform.   
 
The thesis argues that British naval power in the Indian Ocean was increased by the 
acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope and Trincomalee and the naval bases built at 
these locations. The removal of the navy from complete dependence on the East India 
Company for support services was part of a long term policy of increasing Admiralty 
control of facilities in the east. In 1793 Bombay was the main naval base but Madras 
quickly became another hub supporting naval activities in the east. Other locations were 
considered. Calcutta was used and investigations were made into developing Penang as 
a navy base before Trincomalee became part of Britain’s long-term naval infrastructure. 
At the Cape a separate naval command was given responsibility for part of the Indian 
Ocean. Following the capture of Mauritius in 1810 this island was used temporarily as a 
forward support base. 
 
Admiralty control of the naval support services delivered to the squadrons at the Cape 
and in the East Indies was dramatically improved by the appointment overseas of 
resident commissioners from 1809. This resulted from the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Commission of Naval Revision, first suggested by the 
Commissioners on Fees in 1788. Resident commissioners ensured Admiralty 
instructions and policies were implemented and executed, resulting in improved 
efficiency and reduced costs. 
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In 1810 men were sent from Britain to serve at the overseas naval bases of Bombay and 
Madras. The artificers’ duty was to improve the quality of cordage being manufactured 
at these locations. The British dockyard specialists arrived at Bombay with their 
families in January 1811. What was to happen to the wives of these workmen was to be 
repeated many times at overseas naval bases including 140 years later at Durban. 
Commissioner Dundas, resident commissioner at Bombay, reported to the Navy Board 
that an allowance was required for the artificers to pay for domestic help.
1
 Dundas 
stated that the climate prevented European women from performing domestic duties. At 
a stroke these families moved from the servant providing, to the servant employing, 
class.  
 
In 1951 my mother and brother arrived in South Africa to join my father who was on 
detached duty from Devonport dockyard to Durban naval base. In common with the 
wives of the Bombay artificers our family was to employ servants. The time spent at 
Durban by my mother and father was to leave them with memories that they talked 
about for the rest of their lives. Being born at the Indian Ocean port of Durban, the 
stories of my father’s naval service in that ocean, and his insight into the importance of 
logistics undoubtedly sparked my interest in this subject. 
 
Many people have assisted me in the research and writing of this thesis and it brings me 
much pleasure in acknowledging their contribution. Chief amongst these individuals is 
my supervisor, Dr. Roger Morriss. His expert knowledge, insights, good humour, 
patience and guidance have all shaped this thesis. 
 
I am most grateful to Professor Roger Knight and Dr. Martin Wilcox at Greenwich 
Maritime Institute. They provided me with early access to the ship deployment database 
that had been constructed to support the Leverhulme Trust project on victualling the 
British navy in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Dr. Wilcox also gave me 
access to articles before their publication. Janet MacDonald also assisted by giving me a 
copy of her PhD thesis on the Victualling Board which provided a different view on the 
reforms that took place in the Napoleonic War. Chapter seven on the East Indies 
squadron benefited from conversations with Peter Ward and his thesis concerning 
                                                 
1
 Dundas to Navy Broad, TNA, ADM 106/2009, 14
th
 March 1811. 
16 
Admiral Rainier when commander-in-chief of that force. Support from fellow students 
at Exeter University was most welcome, with Adrian Webb’s contribution proving to be 
particularly valuable. My thanks also goes to Avery Burns, a student at the Royal 
Military College of Canada, for photographing a letter book of Sir Samuel Hood that is 
held at that institution’s library.  
 
I owe a substantial debt to my wife, Lesley. Her encouragement to continue writing this 
thesis when the morale was low has been critical in completing this work. Lesley’s 
reading and corrections of this thesis contributed to the many re-writes that have 
ensued. Her good humour has been the most vital element in supporting me in finishing 




‘The race is not always to the swift nor the 
battle to the strong - but that’s the way to bet’2 
 
Runyon’s play on a passage from the Bible encapsulates the importance of a numeric 
and qualitative advantage over an opponent. It was the purpose of the Admiralty to 
obtain, manage and maintain a navy that provided a competitive edge over enemy forces 
so that command at sea was won before a shot was fired. Following the victory at 
Trafalgar in 1805 the British had obtained this naval supremacy. The historian William 
Laird Clowes dismissed heroism stating: ‘Let us not continue to cherish the incorrect 
belief that Englishmen are, or were, braver than Frenchmen or Spaniards and that we 
owe our naval successes to that cause’.3  If it was not to luck, or a superior national 
character, that gave Britain her naval pre-eminence then what advantages did Britain 
develop to achieve command at sea? 
 
Nicholas Rodger concluded that financial and administrative advances were the most 
crucial developments for the British navy in the eighteenth century, with the Victualling 
Board transforming the reach and effectiveness of Britain’s naval squadrons.4 Daniel 
Baugh in the ‘Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy’ examined the navy’s 
administration in the eighteenth century. His evaluation considered that Britain had 
many advantages compared to her enemies. The twin advantages of numerous facilities 
and skilled labour enhanced the building and repair potential of the royal dockyards and 
private shipyards; a third advantage was superior access to naval materials with 




Traditionally naval historians have concentrated on the demands of operational 
commanders but this thesis demonstrates a coherent strategy by the Admiralty in the 
deployment of vessels to comply with conflicting campaign priorities. The ability of the 
British to retain and expand their trade and empire in war time lay in their capacity to 
isolate European rivals from overseas regions. This was mainly dependent on the 
exercise of maritime power in European waters, but also accomplished by the creation 
                                                 
2
 Runyon, D., Author of Guys and Dolls. The allusion is to Ecclesiastes 9:11: “The race is not to the swift, 
nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of ..., Oxford Dictionary of 
American Quotations in Quotations, accessed 15
th
 May 2011.` 
3
 Clowes, W. L., The Royal Navy From the Earliest Times to the Present, Vol. 5, (London, 1900), vi. 
4
 Rodger, N., The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain. Volume II 1649-1815, (London, 
2004), 583. 
5
 Baugh, D., ‘The Eighteenth-century Navy as a National Institution, 1690-1815’, Hill, J., (ed.), The 
Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, (Oxford, 1995), 130. 
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of local superiority of naval power in remote regions, without reducing the strength 
required in home waters. Among the factors that created this regional advantage was the 
use of local naval bases. This thesis shows the Admiralty increased its control of 
overseas naval bases in the Napoleonic War by appointing all shore civil officers. These 
appointments were previously delegated to the local commander-in-chief. However, 
with the introduction of the recommendations of the Commission of Naval Revision in 
1808, Admiralty control was greatly increased with resident commissioners ensuring 
their policies and directions were executed and implemented. 
 
The infrastructure and management of Britain’s overseas naval bases during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has generally been ignored by historians. If one 
includes the shore support provided to the British naval squadrons in the Indian and 
South Atlantic Oceans then the topic has been almost disregarded. When attention has 
been paid to it, it has been in an ‘á al carte’ fashion with notice either being taken of 
individual locations such as Bombay dockyard or Trincomalee, or as a fringe factor to 
studies of campaigns or operational areas. This approach does not provide sufficient 
information to analyse when, where and why naval bases were necessary, what services 
were delivered, who provided the support and how the bases were managed and 
developed.  
 
This thesis examines these questions, but has focused on the Admiralty’s projection of 
naval power in the Indian Ocean by acquiring bases, and shifting its dependence from 
the East India Company to its own facilities. Two themes emerge in this thesis: firstly, 
how havens for hostile ships were removed from the hands of the enemy and developed 
to enhance Britain’s naval power; and secondly, how the reforms demanded by Britain’s 
parliament in the supply of naval support services were achieved at overseas locations. 
This thesis is especially concerned with the latter. 
 
Mauritius, Trincomalee and the Cape of Good Hope had been naval bases for Britain’s 
enemies in the American War of Independence enabling a French fleet to challenge for 
naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean. The latter two locations were under the 
sovereignty of the Dutch and were both captured by overwhelming British forces in 
1795. Although Trincomalee was retained as a crown colony at the subsequent peace 
treaty in 1802, the Cape was returned to the Dutch resulting in a re-invasion in January 
1806. Both these locations were initially occupied to deny an enemy from using them, 
19 
but this thesis shows that in the Napoleonic War the Admiralty exploited their strategic 
potential by laying plans to turn them into permanent naval bases.  
 
The campaign to blockade and capture Mauritius was undertaken to prevent French 
warships from conducting naval operations from that island. Studies of this campaign 
have concentrated on the naval and military actions and have ignored or criticized the 
contribution of the naval support departments at the Cape. During the blockade the 
commander-in-chief and the resident commissioner had many disagreements on the 
latter’s management of the naval yard, and the measures he was introducing at the 
victualling department and naval hospital. The argument between these individuals is 
examined to reveal the reasons for the Admiralty’s support of the resident 
commissioner’s actions and acceptance of the commander-in-chief’s resignation. This 
thesis demonstrates that the priorities of the commander-in-chief at the Cape were 
subordinated to the Admiralty’s campaign strategy and role for the local base, for which 
the civil commissioner was the primary agent. The Admiralty’s strategy reconciled 
domestic demands for economy with the military demands for effectiveness. 
 
This thesis shows that geopolitical considerations influenced by strategic naval factors 
determined the fate of captured French and Dutch colonies at peace treaties. 
Trincomalee, Mauritius and the Cape of Good Hope were retained but Bourbon and 
Java returned. The three retained bases were in strategic locations and all had safe 
anchorages. Bourbon was without a harbour and hence could never be a home for 
French warships. As part of Britain’s foreign policy the new country of the United 
Kingdom of the Netherlands
6
 was to be an ally and would require the riches of Java to 




This thesis concerns naval bases not located in the British Isles with particular attention 
given to the naval yards, hospitals and victualling organisation supporting the Royal 
Navy in the Indian Ocean. However, to examine this subject many different strands of 
historical research have been pursued.  
 
                                                 
6
 The United Kingdom of the Netherlands was a very short lived entity. The country consisted of the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Duchy of Limburg, but with the Belgium Revolution of 1830 
the kingdom broke up into the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg with Limburg eventually again 
becoming part of the Netherlands. 
20 
The core research concerned civil naval administration and the reforms introduced 
following the end of the American War of Independence. Political, operational and 
campaign histories provided political, strategic and tactical context. This identified the 
bases established and provided another source of publication for research, that of 
individual locations. This latter exercise uncovered many histories of bases relating to 
North American, West Indian and Mediterranean but none in the period for the Cape of 
Good Hope, and few for the East Indies. This was the reason the Indian Ocean 
commands were selected for detailed examination. As this area involved the East India 
Company and the occupation of New South Wales and the Cape of Good Hope, a study 
of the political, strategic and operational landscape was required. Researching the 
reasons for the establishment of the penal colony in New South Wales uncovered the 
search for naval stores and Britain’s dependence on Baltic supplies, particularly Russian 
hemp. This opened a final research topic, the exploitation of resources and the 
shipbuilding industry of the sub-continent. 
 
Until the publication of Ehrman’s The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697 7 in 
1953 the civil administration of the navy had been almost ignored. This was followed in 
1961 by Merriman’s edited collection, Queen Anne’s navy: documents concerning the 
administration of the navy of Queen Anne, 1702-1714.
8
 However, it was with the 
publication of Baugh’s British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole 9 in 1965 
and companion volume, Naval Administration 1715-1750,
10
 that chapters on Britain’s 
overseas naval yards first appeared. These books showed that yards at Jamaica and Port 
Mahon had become an enduring part of Britain’s logistical organisation in peace and 
war, being equipped with standard facilities, and permanent management and 
workforce. Crewe’s Yellow Jack and the Worm - British Administration in the West 
Indies, 1739-1748 
11
 built on Baugh’s work and showed how the naval yard locations 
had a victualling organisation and naval hospital presence, turning an anchorage with 
storehouses and careening wharf into a naval base. Overseas naval shore based hospitals 
were first established at Lisbon, Port Mahon and Jamaica during the War of Spanish 
                                                 
7
 Ehrman, J., The Navy in the War of William III: 1689–1697, (London, 1953). 
8
 Merriman, R. D. (ed.), Queen Anne’s navy: documents concerning the administration of the navy of 
Queen Anne, 1702-1714’, NRS, (London, 1961). 
9
 Baugh, D. A., British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole, (Princeton, N.J., 1965). 
10
 Baugh, D. (ed.), Naval Administration 1715-1750, NRS, (London, 1977). 
11
 Crewe, D., Yellow Jack and the Worm – British Administration in the West Indies, 1739-1748, 
(Liverpool, 1993). 
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Succession as detailed in Harland’s unpublished PhD thesis, ‘The Establishment and 
Administration of the first Hospitals in the Royal Navy 1660-1745’.12  
 
The management and workforce at the overseas naval yards had a similar composition 
to Britain’s home dockyards with these institutions receiving considerable attention 
from historians. Three - Roger Knight, Roger Morriss and James Haas were the 
principal builders on Baugh’s earlier work. Roger Knight’s PhD thesis ‘The royal 
dockyards in England at the time of the American War of Independence’13 provided the 
first in-depth study of Admiralty controlled dockyards. Knight’s companion book 
Portsmouth Dockyard Papers 1774-1783 
14
 shone even more light on dockyard 
organisation and functions with detailed examination of routine work. Roger Morriss 
extended the examination of state dockyards through to the end of the Napoleonic War 
in his book The Royal Dockyards during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.
15
 The 
period covered by Morriss’s book encompassed an era of considerable change with the 
author noting the Navy Office and dockyard officials were different public servants in 
1815 to those in 1793.
16
 Haas in A Management Odyssey, The Royal Dockyards 1714-
1914 
17
 disagreed with Morriss that a silent revolution
18
 occurred in dockyard 
administration from 1793-1815, entitling his chapter on the period ‘Tinkering with the 
System’. Chapter two of this thesis examines the same parliamentary sources as these 
authors, but with the emphasis on overseas naval yards, victualling and hospitals. A 
review of the extent of the re-organisation and cultural change shows the state was not 
tinkering. 
 
The dockyards, under the Navy Board, were but one part of the civil naval departments 
that has been examined by historians. David Syrett’s Shipping and the American War 
1775-83,
19
 and Condon’s PhD thesis, ‘The Administration of the Transport Service 
during the war with Revolutionary France 1793-1802’,20 provided an excellent study of 
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the problems involved in the delivery arm of Britain’s logistics and how they were 
overcome.  
 
Victualling the British navy has received considerable academic interest in the last five 
years with three significant contributions to naval administration during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.  These works cover all aspects of victualling the 
British fleet from central direction, contractual relationships between state and suppliers 
and a micro-study of supplying an important command.  Macdonald has reviewed the 
controlling body, the Victualling Board, in her PhD thesis ‘The Victualling Board 1793-
1815: A Study in Management Competence’;21 Davey has examined the victualling of 
the Baltic fleet in the critical years following the Treaty of Tilsit in his thesis, ‘War, 
Naval Logistics and the British State: Supplying the Baltic Fleet 1808-1812’;22 while 
Knight and Wilcox in Sustaining the Fleet 1793-1815: War, the British Navy and the 
Contractor State
23
 and complementary research website
24
 concentrated on the 
relationship between the public and private sectors in supplying the state. This latter 
publication contained a chapter on Basil Cochrane, the victualling contractor to the 
British Eastern squadron. Martin Wilcox the author of this chapter returned to the 
supply of provisions to this squadron in ‘This Great and Complex Concern: Victualling 
the Royal Navy on the East Indies Station, 1780 to 1815’.25 The findings of this thesis 
merely confirmed Wilcox’s analysis and obviated the need to cover victualling of the 
Eastern squadron in any detail except to look at the effect of the work of resident 
commissioners from 1809. 
 
 How the Admiralty, its sub-boards and the Ordnance Board interacted to produce 
maritime supremacy has been recently explored by Roger Morriss in The Foundations 
of British Maritime Ascendancy: Resources, Logistics and the State, 1755-1815.
26
 The 
focus of this book has been on logistics and how the state improved her administrative 
departments, invested in infrastructure and harnessed private enterprise. A single source 
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on the influence of bureaucratic developments in securing Britain’s global empire by the 
end of the Napoleonic War is difficult to find. 
 
The re-organisation of functions, redefining duties and providing clear role definitions 
and work instructions is the easier part of changing an enterprise. The more difficult 
part is changing the culture of the individuals within, and those interacting with, the 
organisation. Morriss recognises in Naval Power and British Culture, 1760-1850 – 
Public Trust and Government Ideology 
27
 the cultural changes that were required and 
the time needed for introduction and acceptance. 
 
The political imperative to reform how government business was conducted resulted in 
many parliamentary commissions. Breihan’s article ‘William Pitt and the Commission 
on Fees, 1785-1801’28 detailed the political background and work of this commission 
whose recommendations were to change the employment culture of public servants. An 
earlier publication into how the state was financed and organised is examined in 
Binney’s British Public Finance and Administration 1774-92.29 These works surveyed 
the political landscape but were supplemented for this thesis by biographies of William 





The use of biography assisted in an understanding of the politics of naval administration 
and the work of a first lord of the Admiralty and a comptroller of the Navy Board. 
Rodger’s The Insatiable Earl: A life of John Montagu, 4th Earl of Sandwich 32 and 
Talbott’s The Pen and Ink Sailor, Charles Middleton and the King’s Navy, 1778 to 
1813
33
 provide invaluable insight into naval administration.  
 
Biography in its broadest terms also casts insight into other aspects of this thesis. 
Knight’s study of Nelson, The Pursuit of Victory - The life and achievements of Horatio 
Nelson 
34
 provides analysis of Nelson’s career but much more including administrative, 
strategic and operational themes. Ward’s recent PhD thesis concerning the East Indies 
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squadron commander-in-chief, ‘Admiral Peter Rainier and the Command of the East 
Indies Station 1794-1805’35 covers all aspects of Rainier’s duties including the 
administration of shore support and his interaction with the East India Company. 
 
The publications of Julian Gwyn provide considerable analysis of the British navy’s 
presence in North American waters from the early eighteenth century. In The Royal 
Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1736-1752,
36
 Gwyn showed how 
informal use of colonial ports for refitting was supplemented by the provision of a 
purpose built careening yard at Louisbourg. Gwyn’s Ashore and Afloat, The British 
Navy and the Halifax Navy Yard,
37
 surveys the yard from its establishment in the 1750s 
to it being placed in care and maintenance in 1819. This book has set the standard for 
such studies as it not only describes the history of supporting a naval squadron in the 
North America, but how bases were managed, the composition of the workforce and 
their influence on the local economy. Together with the companion volume concerning 
the squadron, Frigates and Foremasts: The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia 
Waters 1745-1815,
38
 the reader has a rounded understanding of the role of an overseas 
command and its logistic requirements in both peace and war. 
 
Other books regarding naval bases in the North American region have been published 
with Kingston on Lake Ontario and Bermuda being particularly numerous. Arnell’s 
article ‘Bermuda as a Strategic Naval Base’39 underlined the work done from 1783 in 
creating the base. Malcomson has been prolific on the Great Lakes detailing in books 
and articles the warships built and the campaigns during the War of 1812 with his book 
Warships of the Great Lakes 1754-1834 
40
 bringing together much of his earlier work. 
These books and articles were useful as they demonstrated the Admiralty’s strategy for 
war with the United States of America during the War of 1812, and the importance of 
naval bases with an attached squadron. In this war Bermuda did not have the facilities 
required to carry out refits but its location and anchorage made it a superb rendezvous 
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and supply base. The discussion on the development history of Bermuda lies in the 
decades following the end of the Napoleonic War. 
 
Books and articles on the Mediterranean bases, Malta and Gibraltar, abound together 
with campaign and operational histories. The bases at Jamaica and Antigua have not 
received the same attention as those in North America or Mediterranean but Jonathon 
Coad’s The Royal Dockyards, 1690-1850: Architecture and Engineering Works of the 
Sailing Navy 
41
 section on overseas yards was able to provide information on Antigua. 
Coad’s book used the surviving architecture of naval hospitals, naval and victualling 
yards in Britain and abroad to illuminate his history. This may be, together with the 
budget required, why Halifax, Kingston (Ontario), Jamaica, Simon’s Town, Bombay, 
Madras and Trincomalee are all missing from the overseas section. All these 
publications contributed to the selection of the Indian Ocean as the focus for this thesis, 
as there is little published information on the logistics required to support the British 
navy during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the east. 
 
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars the British navy used East Indian 
Company ports and facilities with the dockyard at Bombay being of particular 
importance. A history of this dockyard, The Bombay Dockyard and the Wadia Master 
Shipbuilders 
42
 was written by a descendant of the master builders at Bombay. Wadia’s 
book provides details of the Bombay Marine, the ships built and dry docks constructed. 
Wadia also includes information on the organisation of the dockyard, but has continued 
errors from Low’s book The History of the Indian Navy (1613-1863)43 for dates and 
occupants of posts. An updated history of the Bombay Marine and the master attendant 
service at Company ports is much wanted. Richmond’s study of the British navy in the 
east during the American War of Independence, The Navy in India 1763-1783,
44
 
showed the importance of Bombay, but also the problems incurred if Trincomalee was 
in the hands of the French. Colgate, in his master’s thesis ‘Trincomalee and the East 
Indies Squadron 1746-1844’45 explored Britain’s relationship with that port. This 
showed considerable use of the anchorage in peacetime and when the Dutch were 
neutral in wars with France. Colgate’s thesis is superb as a study of Britain’s use and 
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development of Trincomalee. Unfortunately neither Madras nor Calcutta has received 
the same treatment.  
 
Parkinson wrote two books on British maritime affairs in the East Indies: Trade in the 
Eastern Seas 
46
 and War in the Eastern Seas 1793-1815.
47
 Both works are invaluable, 
but in the case of the latter work benefitted from a re-examination of the source material 
concerning the shore departments. Parkinson’s study of the operations leading to the 
capture of Mauritius and Bourbon in 1810 was reassessed in Stephen Taylor’s book 
Storm and Conquest: The Battle for the Indian Ocean, 1809.
48
 Unfortunately Taylor has 
not examined the shore naval departments, but raised the question of supplying and 
refitting the recently captured French frigate Caroline considered her a ‘real plum, the 
finest frigate on the station’. Taylor states the resident commissioner at the Cape refused 
to supply the ship, re-named Bourbonnaise, resulting in her captain having to sail for 
England. This was not the case, stores had not been refused and the frigate required 
considerable repairs to merely allow her to sail for England. Chapter five examines the 
deployment strategy of the Admiralty and the work of the shore naval departments 
supplying the Cape squadron during the blockade of Mauritius. 
 
The relationship between the British state and the East India Company has been 
explored in many books and articles, but the research for this thesis into this association 
was restricted to the interaction encountered from original source material and 
contemporary publications. The only exceptions to this have been Marshall’s ‘The 
British in Asia: Trade to Dominion’,49 Bowen’s ‘British India, 1765-1813: The 
Metropolitan Context’,50 and Keay’s The Honourable Company, A History of the 
English East India Company.
51
 These publications provided a general understanding of 
the Company and its relationship with the British state and complemented Parkinson’s 
book on East Indies trade. 
 
The Company monopoly on trade between Britain and the east had ensured its 
commercial survival and knowledge to exploit the resources of that vast region. The 
building of warships for the British navy by the Company was but one example of using 
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local materials with teak proving to be a superior hull material than oak. The search for 
timber for the British navy has been investigated by many historians starting with 
Albion’s Forests and Seapower: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy 52 and 
extended by Knight and Crimmin.
53
 Ensuring there was no shortage of high quality 
timber resulted in considerable activity, but using fir or unseasoned wood as substitutes 
was acceptable in emergencies. However, finding a substitute for Russian hemp was an 
even more critical problem. Alan Frost’s article ‘The choice of Botany Bay: The scheme 
to supply the East Indies with naval stores’,54 proposed the settlement of New South 
Wales was influenced by a plan to cultivate the indigenous flax to manufacture cordage. 
Frost extended his thesis on the colonisation of Australia in Convicts and Empire: A 
Naval Question 1776-1811 
55
 and The Global Reach of Empire. Britain’s maritime 
expansion in the Indian and Pacific oceans 1764-1815 
56
 by showing how the search for 




The historian is dependent on the survival of archival records, constrained by what is 
available and to some extent the accessibility of the material. This latter factor made 
examination of overseas sources almost impossible and the exploration of East India 
Company records difficult.  
 
The sources used for this thesis were of three types, parliamentary papers, printed 
collections of letters and contemporary publications, and manuscript records of 
individuals and the British government. The digitisation of parliamentary papers and 
books that are out of copyright and not readily available provided considerable 
assistance in researching this thesis.   
 
The reports of parliamentary commissions and select committees have been frequently 
investigated by historians. The reports of the Commissions on Fees, of Naval Enquiry 
and Naval Revision and those of the Select Committee on Finance being particularly 
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important for the study of naval reform in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This 
thesis differs from other research as the focus has been on overseas bases, or foreign 
yards as they are termed in the reports. This has required an understanding of the detail 
in the reports on the home organisations to complement those for the overseas yards, 
hospitals and victualling departments. Not all the reports of the Commission of Naval 
Revision were published by parliament, but a printed copy of the fourteenth report was 
found in The National Archive and manuscript copies of the unpublished eighth and 
fifteenth reports in the National Maritime Museum. Copies of the appendices of the fifth 
report of the Commission of Naval Revision have not been found. This was unfortunate 
as these appendices were forms and would have provided a further insight into the 
operations of the naval yards. Parliamentary papers also gave an insight into the use of 
Calcutta as a refitting yard, and the reasons for establishing an East India Company 
shipbuilding and refit yard at Penang on the same pattern as that at Bombay. 
 
The ability to obtain Theal’s edited collection of the Records of the Cape Colony 57 was 
useful as it not only provided material that was missing from Admiralty manuscript 
records, but also contemporary colonial information impacting on naval affairs. 
However, the core research material for this thesis has been the manuscript records of 
the Admiralty and individuals involved with overseas naval bases. The management 
responsibilities for those present at overseas naval bases gave the structure and focus for 
the research. A considerable number of letters from the commander-in-chief, resident 
commissioner or naval storekeeper to the Admiralty and Navy Board have survived, as 
have the letters of these boards to these officers. Letters to the Victualling or Transport 
Board by the commander-in-chief, resident commissioner or agent victualler and from 
the hospital are missing. This has made the investigation into routine activities of 
victualling and of medical care more difficult and reliant on correspondence of the 
commander-in-chief and resident commissioner. Researching the letters sent by resident 
commissioners at overseas bases to the Admiralty revealed that prior to 1809 very few 
have survived with none before 1803. The great increase in correspondence resulted 
from the implementation of the Commission of Naval Revision’s recommendations 
extending the responsibilities of resident commissioners at overseas bases.  
 
The records of individuals serving as resident commissioners were searched for with 
those for only two being found, William Shield and Peter Puget. Shield was resident 
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commissioner at the Cape of Good Hope from 1809 to 1813 and left in the Devon 
Record Office a personal journal and letter books between himself and the respective 
commanders-in-chief. Letters recording the survey and exploitation of timber at the 
Cape and the miscellaneous correspondence to local individuals have also survived in 
The National Archive. Although Peter Puget was resident commissioner at Madras from 
1811 to 1817 the only letters from him that have been found, other than those in The 
National Archive, were those in the records of Sir Samuel Hood commander-in-chief 




The set of records left by Shield provided a day by day record of activity of the shore 
departments of the navy throughout his appointment. It is difficult to imagine a more 
comprehensive view of an overseas shore base coloured by the introduction of new 
responsibilities. As the period covered was during the operation to blockade Mauritius 
this gave a valuable insight to the role of shore support. Hood’s records confirm the 
findings found in Shield’s correspondence regarding the operation of shore 
establishments. 
 
With the selection of the Indian Ocean naval bases the Admiralty records in The 
National Archive, UK Hydrographic Office and Admiralty library were also able to 
provide information on the construction of Simon’s Town and Trincomalee naval bases. 
 
The Admiralty’s records for overseas bases included naval yard paylists. These were 
surveyed for a number of yards and for the victualling department at the Cape of Good 
Hope to determine organisational structure, changes in number, type and if crown or 
contracted employees. This analytical approach was extended, in the case of the naval 
yard and victualling organisation at the Cape. The naval yard paylists were examined to 
determine the amount of work performed onboard ship which confirmed the purpose of 
these yards and supported the commissioner’s actions. Each agent victualler produced 
cash account books and these were analysed to uncover the various contracting 
activities performed. 
 
To determine where naval and victualling stores were sent, in what quantities and what 
ships would require minor refits, a plan was required. The Admiralty recorded where it 
planned to deploy its ships. Its ship lists were used to show the Admiralty’s strategic 
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thinking, campaign priorities and how they reacted to changing circumstances. Analysis 
of these lists demonstrated that the non-European commands were structured primarily 
for trade protection. 
 
Examination of National Archive records and contemporary publications revealed the 
shipbuilding potential of India, and the possibility of reducing dependence on Russian 
hemp by substituting East Indies materials. The burgeoning ship building industry of 
India was recorded by John Phipps, the head clerk of the Bengal Marine, and William 
Milburn.
59
 These gentlemen recorded the increase in Indian commerce, but William 
Taylor Money, a former superintendent of the Bombay Marine, produced a book 
detailing the advantage to Britain of constructing a teak hulled fleet.
60
 It is in the letters 
of St.Vincent, as first lord of the Admiralty, that the reason for commissioning the East 
India Company at Bombay to build warships for the British navy becomes apparent.
61
 
The subsequent actions of the Admiralty can be traced in The National Archive in the 
reports on shipbuilding in Bombay and Cochin. To discover the background to 
cultivation of Indian hemp for export to Britain from the 1790s the records of the Board 
of Trade were consulted, but it was in the correspondence of the Navy Board, 
commanders-in-chief, resident commissioners and naval storekeepers in the East Indies 




This thesis contains an introduction, seven chapters with a postscript forming the main 
body of the work and a conclusion bringing together the themes explored. The thesis 
demonstrates the expansion of Admiralty control in the Indian Ocean. The seven 
chapters are in two parts. Part one is a general examination of overseas naval bases from 
their origins with the capture of Jamaica in 1655 to the end of the Napoleonic War in 
1815. Part two is a detailed study of the shore support of the two naval commands that 
operated in the Indian Ocean in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.  
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Chapter one surveys the origins, development and expansion of Britain’s overseas naval 
bases prior to 1793. The chapter is structured geographically and thematically. By 
analysing each region where bases were established an understanding of the political 
and strategic reasons for their existence is revealed. Uncovered by this survey was a 
number of common themes in the purposes of the bases in meeting the needs of ships’ 
crews, and the needs of their vessels. The former were met by naval hospitals and 
victualling provisions, and the latter by naval yards with a dedicated workforce, 
careening facilities and attendant buildings. 
 
The naval yard establishments at Halifax, Jamaica, Antigua and Gibraltar are examined 
in the last full year of peace, 1792, as a point of reference to enable developments in 
management and any increase in workforce numbers to be compared. By this year 
Britain’s overseas naval bases had reached maturity after a century of development. 
From their establishment these bases had successfully maintained and supplied vessels 
and their crews, and were a permanent feature in the Admiralty’s logistical strategy. 
However, a determination for economy and increased efficiency was to change how 
these bases were managed. 
  
Chapter two investigates the proposals made to improve the support delivered to 
overseas naval squadrons. Following defeat in the American War of Independence the 
British government undertook a series of parliamentary commissions to improve its 
administrative departments. The civil departments of the navy were examined by the 
Commission on Fees in the 1780s, Select Committee on Finance from 1797, 
Commission of Naval Enquiry (1802-05) and finally the Commission of Naval Revision 
(1805-1809). The various reports of these commissions provide a snap-shot of how the 
home and overseas civil naval departments operated, and what the commissioners 
considered was needed to improve how they functioned. The most significant of these 
bodies were the Commissions on Fees and Naval Revision. The Fees Commissioners’ 
recommendations changed the culture of employment of public servants and the 
Commission of Naval Revision ensured that their recommendations and procedures 
were implemented. This chapter also examines the fourteenth and fifteenth reports of 
the Commission of Naval Revision as they concerned the exploitation of overseas 
timber and hemp, and demonstrates the concern and efforts that were being made to 
reduce dependence on Baltic supplies that are investigated in chapter seven. 
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Amongst the improvements recommended by the Commission on Fees was the 
appointment at overseas bases of resident commissioners with management of the 
victualling and naval yard organisations. Chapter three examines the roles, duties and 
responsibilities of the resident commissioners since the post was created in 1664 and 
how the Commission of Naval Revision introduced an extension of their powers in 
1808.  
 
Chapter three surveys the increase in the number of bases acquired from 1793 to 1815 
to support the increasing reach of Britain’s navy. The British navy reached its zenith in 
number of ships and men in this period in 1809. The composition of the overseas naval 
yard, management and workforce in 1809, together with the refit work performed in one 
month of that year is examined for the four largest overseas establishments, Malta, 
Halifax, Jamaica and Antigua. These locations supported the Mediterranean, North 
America, Jamaica and Leeward Islands squadrons and thus provide a representative 
example of the work performed at overseas naval yards at a time of peak demand. It 
permits a comparison to be drawn with the work of the naval yard at the Cape of Good 
Hope. 
 
Ships en route to the East Indies and on their subsequent return had only four places 
where shore support was available, St. Helena, the Cape of Good Hope, Madagascar, 
and Mauritius. Chapter four examines Britain’s reasons for capturing the Cape of Good 
Hope in 1795 and 1806. Britain’s strategic position following victory at Trafalgar is 
considered in this chapter to provide a context for the relative priority of the Cape and 
East Indies commands. This is done by reference to the deployment of Britain’s army 
and navy from 1805. The organisation, management and work of the naval shore 
departments at the Cape are explored during both occupations to determine the changes 
introduced, particularly following the appointment of a resident commissioner in 1808. 
 
The campaign to blockade Mauritius, leading to that island’s capture by British forces 
from India, was mounted by the naval squadron at the Cape of Good Hope. Chapter five 
investigates the actions of the Admiralty, the commander-in-chief and the resident 
commissioner during this campaign. The actions of the Admiralty and these officials 
reveal the deployment and refit strategy of the Admiralty for overseas naval bases, and 




Following the capture of Mauritius in 1810 and Java in 1811, the French no longer had 
a base from which to operate in the Indian Ocean. This permitted the Admiralty to 
reduce the number of ships in the Cape of Good Hope and East Indies commands. 
Chapter six studies the impact of this reduction in refit work on the naval yard 
establishment at the Cape when it was operating in almost peacetime conditions. Here is 
considered the geopolitical factors for the retention by the British of the Cape of Good 
Hope and Mauritius, with the return of Bourbon to the French and of Java to the Dutch 
at subsequent peace treaties. Chapter six concludes by examining the temporary 
establishment of a forward replenishment base at Port Louis, Mauritius, together with 
the rationalisation of the naval shore facilities at the Cape of Good Hope. This resulted 
in Simon’s Town becoming a home for the British navy until 1957. 
 
By virtue of its geographical area, distance from Britain and the presence of the East 
India Company, the East Indies command was unique in the way ships of the British 
navy were supported. The Admiralty had less autonomy in its shore services than in 
other overseas commands and was dependant on the Company and merchants for 
support throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Chapter seven examines 
the relationship of the British navy with the Company in its provision of facilities, 
management and a skilled workforce. However towards the end of the Napoleonic War 
the Admiralty moved towards independence from the Company. Crucial to this 
evolution was the arrival of resident commissioners at Bombay (1809) and Madras 
(1811).  
 
Integral to this thesis is an examination of the locations of naval bases. They are 
surveyed to determine their respective strengths and weaknesses and this helps to 
explain why a base was built at Penang. Although Trincomalee was captured in 1795, 
plans were not initiated until 1810 to turn this anchorage into a naval yard. Only after 
the end of the Napoleonic War were the facilities at Madras transferred to Trincomalee, 
but chapter seven examines the options considered and the work done to prepare the 
future home of the Eastern squadron. 
 
The dry docks at Bombay and Calcutta were very important to the British navy. They 
permitted ships to receive comprehensive repairs in the India Ocean and removed the 
need for them to return home. The economy of the East Indies provided other 
opportunities for Britain to utilise the resources of the east to contribute to her naval 
strength. The demand for vessels from eastern merchants resulted in a shipbuilding 
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boom in the first two decades of the nineteenth century with Calcutta, Rangoon and 
Chittagong each constructing more ships than Bombay. Chapter seven examines the 
origin of the Admiralty’s orders for ships and the subsequent construction of naval 
vessels in the Company dockyard at Bombay. The availability of shipbuilding materials, 
particularly for ship’s hulls also resulted in plans to obtain naval stores from the east.  
 
The search for timber for hulls, masts and spars in the Indian Ocean region, the supply 
of hemp from India and the local manufacture of cordage and sails are also examined in 
chapter seven. The possibility of breaking the Russian hemp monopoly, especially 
following the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, was to result in Admiralty controlled ropeyards 
being established at Bombay and at Madras and the import of Indian hemp to Britain.  
 
With the end of the War of 1812 and the abdication of Napoleon, the Admiralty was in 
possession of a considerable number of naval bases around the globe. What was to be 
their future? The postscript to this thesis examines the thoughts of the deputy controller 






Britain’s overseas naval bases to the end of the Napoleonic War 
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Chapter one British overseas
62




This chapter surveys the status, how they came into existence and the development of 
Britain’s overseas, or foreign bases prior to the commencement of the Revolutionary 
War. A geographic approach has been taken to provide an understanding of the scale 
and range of the British Navy’s commitments together with recurring themes being 
summarised.  
 
The deployment of British naval squadrons in this period during peace and war can be 
seen in the ship list books of the Admiralty. These ADM 8 books provide information 



















ADM 8 14 19 24 30 35 47 57 68 
Home
63
 6 51 52 0 73 0 53 0 
Mediterranean 9 37
64
 56 6 29 8 6 9 
Jamaica 5 5 26 9 16 16 25 12 
Leeward Is 3 5 14 5 18 12 67 5 
N. America 
Coast 
7 6 7 7 17 27 74 0 
Nova Scotia 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 8 
Newfoundland 2 2 1 2 2 7 6 2 
East Indies 4 0 0 6 21 9 13 9 
African Coast 3 1 0  7 0 0 0 
Convoys and 
Cruisers 
6 6 50 58 50 34 59 44 
Other
65
 35 0 8 38 42 42 93 31 
Totals 80 114 214 96 275 155 396 120 
 
Table 1a: Sample deployments of British squadrons prior to 1793 in peace and war 
 
The years 1745, 1760 and 1781 were war years when the British navy was fully 
committed. 1755 and 1792 were special peacetime years as they were on the cusp of 
major wars and while 1720, 1735 and 1771 occur in peacetime both 1735 and 1771 
show a deterrent policy in place.  The high figure for 1771 was a result of the Falkland 
                                                 
62
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Island crisis of 1770 with the 1735 figure showing the support for the King of Portugal 
during his war with Spain. A feature of peacetime years was the composition of the 
squadrons with few line of battleships being in commission. The overseas commands 
tended to be mainly frigates and lesser unrated ships with a third rate, or more likely a 
fourth rate acting as the flagship. 
 






Figure 1a: Map of the Mediterranean Sea in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
showing bases and relative distances between them 
 
This inland sea bordered by the Ottoman Empire, North Africa and the south coast of 
Europe was a key theatre during the wars of 1793 to 1815. This area highlights the 
move from formal and informal use of other nations’ facilities to the dedicated 
provision of sovereign bases. Therefore for the purposes of this study Lisbon and Cadiz 
on the Atlantic coast have both been included in this section as Britain used both ports, 
when allowed, to support its operations in the western Mediterranean. 
 
Protecting trade was the reason the British navy became involved in the region. Apart 
from seaborne trade with southern Europe that operated since the Middle Ages, a new 
venture commenced for Britain in the late sixteenth century. In 1581 the Levant 
Company was formed to trade with the eastern Mediterranean. This company grew in 
prosperity and drew on support from the English navy in the early seventeenth century. 
During the Protectorate a squadron was deployed in the Mediterranean to protect trade 
38 
from the Barbary States and the Dutch in the First Anglo Dutch War. To operate with 
any success a base was required for these naval operations. In 1656 the Commonwealth 
investigated the capture of Gibraltar but with the Restoration an alternative presented 
itself.  
 
As part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza’s marriage to Charles II came Tangier, 
and it seemed an answer to the search for a naval base with nearby access to the 
Mediterranean had been found. Much effort and expenditure was invested at this port 
but it suffered from many problems, including a poor harbour with foul ground for 
mooring and lack of shelter to westerly gales. However, the chief cause for its 
abandonment in 1683 was the inability of the English to make it militarily secure. 
 
The English squadrons still needed bases for trade protection in the 1680s and this was 
obtained by use of Gibraltar, Cadiz, Leghorn and Port Mahon. Not only did these 
locations provide immediate support but also afforded the opportunity to access the 




It was not just for operations against the Barbary States that other nations’ ports were 
used, as during William III’s Nine Years War support for his naval squadrons was 
provided by Cadiz in 1694.
67
 This was the last time Britain fought in Mediterranean 
waters without a dedicated base of its own during a war. The first decade of the 
eighteenth century, in the War of Spanish Succession, provides one example of a formal 
treaty with a foreign power for access to national facilities and two examples of a 
permanent solution to Britain’s search for a naval base. 
 
Following an English victory off Vigo in 1702 Portugal abandoned its alliance with 
France and entered into the Methuen Treaty with England.
68
 Subsequently Lisbon was 
used as a base by Queen Anne’s navy and served as a refitting base for the British navy 
many times in the next one hundred and fifty years. However, it was with the capture of 
Gibraltar in 1704 and Port Mahon on Minorca in 1708 that provided politically secure 
sovereign bases for the British Navy. 
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Gibraltar was at the junction of the Mediterranean and Atlantic, and provided 
intelligence of enemy maritime movements, plus it was also close to Spain’s major 
dockyard at Cadiz enabling it to support a blockading squadron. Gibraltar could be used 
as a supply and minor refitting staging post into the Mediterranean direct from Britain 
or via Lisbon. Finally, Gibraltar was a toehold in the Mediterranean on which an 
offensive could be built when forced to withdraw from that sea. Minorca, when held, 
was close to the French naval base at Toulon, 240 miles, and hence was vital to support 
a blockading British fleet. The lack of Minorca in the early part of the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars caused Britain’s naval commanders-in-chief to frequently call for 
its capture, or to look for a substitute. Nelson was to comment when commander-in-
chief that Malta and Gibraltar met many needs, but not for operations against Toulon. 
To command the western Mediterranean Minorca was particularly well suited with Port 
Mahon being the best equipped British foreign naval base in the possession of the 
Admiralty. 
 




The Methuen Treaty continued a long association between the British navy and the use 
of Lisbon and the Tagus. Blake had used Lisbon in 1656-7 to refit his ships and naval 
stores were moved there when England abandoned Tangier. The British navy’s formal 
involvement with Lisbon can be seen in its establishment of a naval base at that port 
from 1704 to 1725, 1795 to 1799 and finally from 1808 to 1814 as recorded in the 
National Archive. This shows a formal dockyard was in place in these years but the port 
was also used at other times during the eighteenth century.  
 
Although Gibraltar was taken in 1704 it was unable to provide logistic support so 
Lisbon was used for repair and refit of Queen Anne’s squadrons. The facilities and 
personnel appear to have been inadequate as Vice-Admiral Byng wrote to the Admiralty 
in September 1706 that if a squadron was to remain for the winter at Lisbon another 
hulk was needed together with technical dockyard officers.
69
 The Navy Board’s reply to 
the Admiralty stated they did not know what staff, facilities and stores to send to 
Lisbon, as they did not know the number or type of ships in Byng’s fleet. This letter 
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Lisbon was used by Britain’s navy in war and peace throughout the eighteenth century, 
but at times Portugal was under pressure from Spain and France to withhold assistance 
making access to Gibraltar and Minorca essential. 
 
Gibraltar and Minorca 
 
Britain’s problem of how to permanently support her naval squadrons in the 
Mediterranean seemed solved with the capture of Gibraltar in 1704 and Minorca in 
1708.  The superb harbour of Port Mahon, Minorca had a considerable capacity for a 
fleet of sailing ships with a fortress at the entrance to the anchorage for security, support 
facilities, and a local workforce for refitting and supply of vessels. However, Gibraltar’s 
anchorage was poor and had been considered as such from its earliest occupation; Byng 
stated the roadstead was open to westerly gales and hampered by foul ground.
71
 
Gibraltar was therefore more suited as an observation post and supply depot than a 
repair location. Work was undertaken to improve the anchorage at Gibraltar in the 
1720s. Rocks in the harbour were removed by blowing them up, and the sides of the 
mole were improved so a greater depth of water was available. With occupation of 
Minorca and Gibraltar the British held an advantageous strategic position, but 
maintaining possession proved difficult. 
 
Ensuring military security of Gibraltar required considerable effort in the eighteenth 
century, from its capture it came under siege in 1704-5, again in 1726-7 and more 
notably in the Great Siege of 1779-83.
72
 The strength of the land defences was gradually 
improved and the garrison on the Rock proved adequate to the task, together with the 
presence of ships in the bay to insure against seaborne assault. However, without re-
supply the garrison on Gibraltar could not be sustained. During the Great Siege three 
large supply convoys were sent, Rodney in 1780, Darby in 1781 and finally Howe in 
October 1782 ensuring the Rock was held. 
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Minorca was to prove more difficult for Britain to hold as the defence of the island 
relied on a large garrison and command of the sea to ensure re-supply and to counter 
invasion. Minorca was lost twice in the three wars Britain had with the Bourbon powers 
from 1739. The first capture was in 1756, when Britain lost command of the 
Mediterranean, only for Minorca to be returned in 1763 following an exchange of 
captured islands. During the American War of Independence although Britain held 
Gibraltar she was unable to retain Minorca. 
 
The question of political security can be seen in the return, retention and loss of these 
two bases. Minorca was of no use in the Seven Years War having been lost too early in 
the war. It was not used to its full potential in the next war as a naval force to counter 
the French Toulon fleet could not be sent. Without a bargaining position Minorca could 
not be regained. Gibraltar’s political security was also open to question with the British 
government considering what could be exchanged with Spain for the colony. The sheer 
effort required to retain Gibraltar, together with its recent massive territorial losses, 





Prior to its loss in 1782 Minorca had been provided with the finest overseas repair and 
naval storage facilities in the charge of the Navy Board. From Port Mahon’s capture the 
existing wharf was improved and additional buildings erected for stores. This was 
augmented by other buildings on the north side of the harbour with a masthouse, smiths’ 
shop and boat yard being established.
73
 These facilities were maintained so that when 
war commenced with Spain in 1739 they were able to satisfy the fleet’s needs. The 
careening wharf was by this time able to service three 90 gun ships,
74
 but by 1743 the 
Mediterranean fleet contained 34 ships of the line, seriously overloaded the yard. 
Subsequently by 1745 additional capacity had been created with temporary wharfs 
being built for unloading stores and guns, prior to ships being careened. The principal 
improvement was the construction of an additional careening wharf and workshops. 
 
Britain’s second occupation from 1763-1782 saw the final improvements made for the 
fleet at Port Mahon. This consisted of work done on Saffron Island to supplement the 
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existing facilities together with the building of a causeway to the existing yard. This 
project was nearing completion in 1774 when it was reported that the island had a wharf 
with eight sides, of which five had been equipped with careening pits and capstans, with 
one wharf equipped with shears for replacing ship’s masts. The mainland yard 
contained the storehouses and lodgings for ship’s crews while their ships were 
careened.
75
 These facilities were lost to the British following the capture of Minorca by 
Spain, but during the Revolutionary and Napoleon Wars the British navy was to return 






Figure 1b Port Mahon showing Saffron Island and the eight wharfs 
 
Although Minorca had the finest overseas refitting facilities, Gibraltar was the poor 
relation of Britain’s overseas yards until the late nineteenth century. From its capture, 
ships had their hulls cleaned at Gibraltar, but the existing moles were found to be 
inadequate for this task. The old mole had been built in the 1570s, but was of limited 
use with the new mole constructed between 1616 and 1665 giving shelter for four to 
five large ships. In 1724 the naval storekeeper reported the yard facilities were scattered 
about Gibraltar, with careening gear stored in the soldier’s barracks near the new mole, 
a small store space in the White Convent in the town, and cables lodged in a hired store 
at the old mole. He also reported that it was impossible to secure masts, yards, timber 
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and anchors from damage or being stolen.
76
 Although support buildings were available 
by 1756, with a smiths’ shop, a masthouse, and a pitch house the yard could only carry 
out minor repairs. The careening capacity was limited, and while the Navy Board 
thought the new mole could service two ships at a time, Captain Crookshanks, in 1744, 
considered only one ship could careen at the mole.
77
 Compared to Port Mahon the 
limited facilities of Gibraltar were irrelevant, but when the former was lost, Gibraltar 
was unable to fill the gap.  Lisbon was again resorted to in the following wars with the 
search for support bases in the western Mediterranean. 
 
1.2 The West Indies 
 
1.2.1 Introduction  
 
The Caribbean was of great importance to western European powers in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Their economies and political actions were to some extent 
driven by the great profits that were made by the sugar producing plantations on their 
respective islands. The fear of losing these islands was to be a feature of eighteenth 
century conflicts between France and Britain. The great wealth of the Spanish mainland 
territories and islands also featured in British leaders’ thoughts and war plans. 
  
The British and French entry into this region came a hundred years after Spain and 
hence only occupied the smaller non-Spanish islands. By 1640 England
78
 occupied a 
number of these islands, but in 1655 Jamaica was seized from Spain. Even this large 
island did not match the land acquired by France, with Saint Domingue being the largest 
area under their control. The islands were subject to attack and invasion resulting in 
exchange at subsequent peace treaties. 
 
Michael Duffy described the West Indies as a precarious money-box in his book 
‘Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower’ and illustrated the point in a chapter of that name. 79 In 
1784 Britain’s West Indian colonies exported products to the value of £4.5 million with 
her domestic exports amounting to no greater than £14 million. France’s more 
prosperous West Indian territories contributed even more to her economy. In 1787 
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domestic exports were calculated at £11.5 million with her colonies’ exports being 
estimated at an average yearly amount of £8.25 million. How to defend their scattered 
and distant possessions with a large enslaved population created a problem for the 
European powers.  
 
 




Fortifications, local militias, stationing regular military units on the islands and limited 
arming of their black slaves, formed the common methods employed. Disease and the 
climate also formed a key factor in defence, as an invading force had to achieve the 
surrender of an island before fever decimated the attackers, or the hurricane season 
forced the supporting ships to be withdrawn. This latter factor contributed to the 
different method used by the British in defending their islands by the permanent 
stationing of naval vessels in the region. It was not only the positioning of ships that 
significantly contributed to the defence of her possessions and trade, but the creation of 
careening yards to refit and re-supply the vessels in these squadrons. This policy 
ensured that time lost in transit to and from Britain and the area of operations was 
significantly reduced. It also minimised the number of ships required by eliminating the 
need for their return home for minor refits. 
 
To defend the regions the British Admiralty had two naval commands in the West 
Indies by 1792. A squadron at Jamaica had been in place since the days of Queen Anne, 
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but a separate Leeward Islands station at Antigua had been created in 1743. The reason 
for two separate naval forces was due to the distance between the two areas and the 
prevailing wind direction. Jamaica is to the windward of the Leeward Islands and 
although a force from Antigua could rapidly sail to Jamaica to offer assistance the 
journey from Jamaica was against the prevailing wind.
81
 As Jamaica was Britain’s 
largest possession and was only a short distance to the windward of French Saint 
Domingue it was possible it could be overcome before a squadron from Antigua 
intercepted an invasion. The assemblies of both Jamaica and the Leeward Islands were 
aware of this and successfully lobbied the Admiralty for protection. The Antiguan 
authorities offered land and assistance in creating a careening yard at English Harbour, 
if the Admiralty stationed a squadron at Antigua. Barbados also illustrates the 
importance of the prevailing wind direction as a significant factor in defence in the age 
of sail. This island was the most windward of Britain’s and France’s islands and was not 
troubled by threat of invasion throughout the period. 
 




Since its occupation Jamaica had been the principal British colony and base in the West 
Indies. In the reigns of William III and Queen Anne the naval facilities consisted of a 
small victualling depot with a hulk for naval stores and careening.
 82
  English Harbour, 
Antigua was also used in this period for shelter, provision of water and fuel, but only as 
an informal base for operations. 
 
Following the Treaty of Utecht in 1713 the British continued stationing warships at its 
West Indian colonies. These warship squadrons were for enforcing British interests, 
treaties, laws and to carry out trade protection. To support the squadron at Jamaica a 
naval storekeeper was retained whose tasks were essentially administrative, to verify 
pay books and keep account of stores and refitting costs. Provision of medical services 
and fresh provisions were provided by local contractors, with naval stores being placed 
in a storehouse at Kingston. These naval stores were primarily supplied from Britain, 
being locally supplemented if available and at an acceptable cost.  
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This arrangement was suitable for a small policing squadron, but when Britain went to 
war with Spain in the1720s the facilities were found inadequate for the force dispatched. 
Improving and consolidating facilities at Jamaica was considered by the Navy Board in 
July 1726. This consisted of building a careening wharf at Port Royal and moving the 
store facilities at Kingston to new buildings situated at the wharf.
83
 This was not then 
carried out due to concerns over Port Royal’s disaster prone record during the previous 
thirty years, with an earthquake, fire and hurricane having afflicted the town. 
  
It was instead decided to build a completely new careening base at Port Antonio.
84
 By 
1734 a wharf, hospital, mast-house, boathouse, storehouses and offices had been built at 
Port Antonio, a not inconsiderable investment in time and resources.
85
 It proved to be a 
white elephant, as the naval commanders-in-chief preferred Port Royal, and when 
repairs were required at Port Antonio they were not carried out causing the base to be 
run down. Port Antonio was on the windward side of the island causing difficulties for a 
vessel leaving the port and not having Port Royal’s advantages of being close to local 








Sir Chaloner Ogle, the commander-in-chief, proposed that improvement was made to 
Port Royal in 1734, resulting in both Port Royal and Port Antonio being equipped as 
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 The work at Port Royal was commenced in 1735 and included a 
careening wharf, capstan house, storehouses, and two brick offices with a wall around 
the yard.
88
 As Ogle continued to use Port Royal as his preferred refitting base when the 
inevitable financial cutbacks were required this base was given priority over Port 
Antonia.  
 
At first sight the decision and expenditure for the new base at Port Antonio looks un-
wise and ill thought out, but it showed trust in local authorities in recommending the 
base. Their plan had been to isolate seamen from the harms of rum and social diseases 
at Port Royal. However it should be noted that the error was not reinforced by more 
investment but instead the abandonment of Port Antonio and return to Port Royal. 
 
In the 1740s as Port Antonio was being run down, the Kingston Bay area was increasing 
in importance. Permission to build a second careening wharf at Port Royal was given in 
August 1740 with its availability in 1744. Additional storage space was anticipated as 
being necessary and the Navy Board ordered two prefabricated buildings from suppliers 
at Boston, quickly followed up by ordering another building to serve as a masthouse. 
These buildings were erected at New Greenwich, but the need for additional storage 
space was still required, so the tactic of renting warehouses was re-adopted by hiring 
buildings at Kingston. This was still insufficient for Vernon’s large squadron in the 
early 1740s who de-commissioned ships to act as hulks for stores and careening 
purposes. By the end of the wars of the 1740s the support facilities at Jamaica had been 
scattered around Kingston Bay. The two careening wharfs were at Port Royal, but naval 
stores were at Port Royal, Kingston and New Greenwich, with victualling stores and a 
hospital at New Greenwich and ordnance stores at Mosquito Point.  
 
This inefficient arrangement was drawn to the Admiralty’s attention by Rear-Admiral 
Charles Knowles, the commander-in-chief, in May 1748.
89
 Figure 1e illustrates the 
points he made in his letter with the distances between Port Royal and Kingston for 
stores being seven miles, five miles for provisions at New Greenwich, water at Rock 
Fort twelve miles, and five miles for ordnance stores at Mosquito Point. What was 
particularly revealing by this communication was the recognition that wooden buildings 
and wharfs required constant maintenance as the climate and insects could quickly 
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reduce the facilities to dust. Knowles recommended concentrating resources in the Port 
Royal yard with the buildings at New Greenwich and Kingston being left to rot. By 
1768 this had occurred with the hospital having been abandoned and a masthouse being 









English Harbour, Antigua 
 
Initially the British defended their interests in the Caribbean by the squadron at Jamaica, 
but Antigua was over 1000 miles away. This was compounded by the practice during 
the summer months of moving naval vessels to North American waters to avoid 
hurricanes and sickness. This arrangement saved money and combined the ability of one 
squadron to protect two areas, but it caused the authorities in the Leeward Islands to 
lobby for a permanent naval presence.  
 
The suitability of English Harbour as a repair base was brought to the attention of the 
Admiralty by Captain Robert Clarke, of Adventure (42), in January 1707/08. In a letter 
he described the entrance, depth of water and that although vessels had been cleaning 
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there an advantage would be gained if careening gear was sent out and placed under the 









This harbour was considered a hurricane proof anchorage and it was decided to create a 
formal naval base there in 1728. The Navy Board recommended to the Admiralty in 
1729 that the harbour was ‘a proper place to fix a crab and a capstan on the careening 
wharf at the east side of the harbour, and erect two storehouses there […] for cables, 
cordage, sails and other naval stores, and another […] for lodging men and provisions 
…’94 The appointment of Warner Tempest as the naval storekeeper and muster master 
occurred in the early 1730s and started what can be considered the first signs of being 
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an official Navy Board establishment. Figure 1f shows the arrangement at English 
Harbour, Antigua.  
 
The first part of the establishment created was a careening wharf with a building for the 
capstans and gear, together with a stone storehouse on the eastern side of the harbour. 
By 1733 a watering point was also provided with cisterns for collected water.
95
 Again 
the wooden buildings and wharf required repair with Tempest reporting the latter had 
been re-built three times by 1739. Captain Lisle, the senior officer in the Leeward 
Islands, recommended in 1741 that an additional careening wharf was required and 
considered a stone wharf should be built on the western side of the harbour. He again 
wrote to the Admiralty in October 1742 saying that having only one wharf meant his 
squadron of seven warships and two store vessels required four months to careen, but 
two wharfs could have completed the task in six weeks. The Admiralty agreed with the 
proposal, but Lisle commented he had not received the items required for the new 





Improving the facilities was not in question, but Charles Knowles, in 1743, came to a 
different conclusion. He surveyed the anchorage and stated building a wharf where 
suggested was a mistake as there was an insufficient depth of water for a ship of more 
than 50 guns to reach the western side of the harbour. He proposed that the existing 
wharf on the eastern side was extended by 30 to 40 feet to enable an 80 gun ship to be 
careened. Approval for this work was given by the Admiralty in August 1743. These 
wharfs were wooden with one face of 180 ft. and the other of 150 ft. The old masthouse 
was to be moved to the western side of the harbour and a framed building from New 




By the end of the wars with France and Spain in 1748 the base was well established. A 
wharf capable of heaving down two 60 gun ships at one time on the eastern side of the 
harbour was available. On the western side were storehouses, a masthouse, a boathouse, 
pitchhouses and the naval storekeeper’s accommodation. The provision of 
accommodation for yard workers also appears to have been provided at this point, 
showing a move to a fixed workforce to augment the crews of the ships. 
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A spurt in facility improvement occurred between 1775 and 1778. By 1778 the western 
yard boasted many buildings including storehouses, a double boathouse with a boat-slip, 
a large masthouse, armourer’s and smiths’ shops plus a saw pit. This was supplemented 









In peace and war the British government stationed naval vessels in the north western 
Atlantic to protect her North American colonies and the great fisheries off the coasts of 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia; table 1a shows the importance of the fisheries to 
Britain as a small naval force was always present. Until the removal of the French from 
British North America the colonies of New England, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland 
felt under potential threat from the French based in Canada, and their forces at 
Louisbourg. This fortress was thought to be the key to the invasion of Canada and had 
been subject to attack by the British during the Wars of 1702-1713, 1744-1748 and 
1755-1763. In the latter two wars Louisbourg was captured, with Quebec being taken in 
1759 resulting in the subsequent ceding of Canada to Britain at the Treaty of Paris in 
1763. 
 
The colonial economy of British North America offered an alternative solution to that of 
the West Indies for the repair of British warships. The vessels on the North American 
station could rely on the ports of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk and 
Charleston.
99
  They were able to provide commercial careening wharfs, as well as naval 
and victualling stores from colonial suppliers who had contracts with the Admiralty. 
Competent artisans were also available at these ports, so they were particularly 
attractive as refitting and supply locations.
100
 Naval stores were deposited in 
warehouses rented by the Navy Board and obtained from the American colonies, or if 
too expensive, by items sent from Britain. This latter point was particularly illustrated in 
Nova Scotia were the local economy could provide masts, but very little else. 
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Until 1745 the North American station was not a separate command, but in April of that 
year the Admiralty appointed Warren as commander-in-chief of all HM ships on the 
coast of North America north of Carolina.
101
 Warren had considerable knowledge of 
these waters and ports as he had been captain of ships stationed at New York, South 
Carolina and Boston in the 1730s and, hence, one can assume used these local facilities 
for supply and cleaning. The potential of these North American ports for repair and 
building of ships was frequently raised by Warren to the Admiralty in the early and 
middle 1740s. Warren suggested exploiting the potential of North America to build 
warships for the navy which resulted in two ships, a 44 gun and 24 gun vessels, being 
commissioned. Although this experiment was not continued by the Admiralty on cost, 
administrative and quality grounds, it confirmed the potential, skills and infrastructure 
available in colonial North America to support the British fleet. 
 
Given that the wars with France, for North America, in the first half of the eighteenth 
century were concentrated in the St. Lawrence area, a local base to support a large 
squadron would appear to have been a necessity. However, with the exception of 
Louisbourg for a short time following its capture in 1745, a formal careening yard was 
not established in the region until 1758. This yard was established at Halifax, Nova 
Scotia a mere nine years after Halifax had been founded. 
 




The informal mechanism of using local commercial ports for careening, supply and 
repair was the most logical and economical method, for supporting the small number of 
ships stationed in these waters. However, with the war against France in the 1740s, and 
the creation of a separate naval command for North America, the establishment of an 
official naval base in the area would appear to have been inevitable. Costs may have 
increased, but control of resources was guaranteed ensuring the squadron’s vessels were 
available when required. Warren with his experience of British North America wrote to 
the Admiralty with many suggestions for careening bases. If all his suggestions had 
been acted on the coastline would have been littered with such facilities, but it presents 
an insight into contemporary colonial infrastructure. 
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Warren reported that New York was a suitable place for fitting ships and sent a plan of a 
harbour on Long Island showing the capacity for large ships. The admiral further 
remarked that ships of 50 to 60 guns had in the past careened at New York. His views 
on Boston were less encouraging as although the tides allowed ships up to 50 guns to be 
cleaned, ice formation restricted operations in the winter.
103
 A formal base was not 
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Following the capture of Louisbourg in June 1745 Warren built a careening yard at that 
location. The admiral stated a wharf could be made suitable for heaving down two 70 
gun ships for £2000. He asked for the Admiralty to direct the Navy Board to send out 
suitable careening gear.
105
 Warren did not wait for this equipment to arrive as he wrote 
to the Navy Board in January 1746 stating he had sent for three crabs
106
 from New 
England. By June 1746 a yard had been equipped and was capable of heaving down a 
vessel of up to 60 guns. Warren also expressed the persistent worry that captains and 
commanders had when their ships were under refit, that of desertion. He considered 
that, ‘Louisbourg for some years will be the only place in America that his Majesty’s 
ships can clean at with any dispatch and prevent desertion’.107  
 
This view was not shared by Charles Knowles who had been appointed governor of 
Louisbourg in 1746. He wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, secretary of state (Northern 
Department) in July 1746 advising him of the situation and of the potential of 
Louisbourg. His assessment was negative, considering the commercial potential poor, 
its fortifications badly designed and how the weather limited Louisbourg’s usefulness. 
His opinion of its ship refitting facilities was particularly relevant for this study, ‘There 
is but six weeks in the year that it [careening] can be done here […] Nor are we sure of 
keeping seamen. Experience shows to the contrary, for New England sloops that come 
here with rum [and] secretly carry them away.’108 Knowles also had views on other 
refitting locations in the region, drawing on his knowledge of Boston where, at 
Nantasket Roads in 1747, he had cleaned a large ship. He considered the official 




This brief venture into the establishment of official naval yards paused when 
Louisbourg was returned to France at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1749. It was a 
brief pause as the Admiralty recognised the importance of such a base when it 
commissioned the Navy Board to determine the location and facilities required for ships 
on the North American station, but by 1755 this had still not been decided. With the 
start of the Seven Years War the need to re-establish a base to defend Newfoundland 
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and Nova Scotia and capture Canada was urgently needed. In 1749 Halifax, Nova 
Scotia had been established where the British North American squadron was to find its 
first permanent naval base.  
 
Halifax, Nova Scotia 
 
Initially this location followed the normal practice of the local naval commander using 
the harbour for shelter and supply, but by 1757 Vice-Admiral Holburne had been armed 
with an Admiralty directive to find a suitable location for a careening wharf. In 1758 the 
Admiralty directed the Navy Board to construct at Halifax a naval yard at Gorham’s 
point. This provided deep water close to the shore and was near to a fresh water supply. 
By the summer of 1759 ships had been careened and refitted at the yard and by 1763 
two careening wharfs were available. Many buildings had also been constructed by this 
year such as a masthouse, boathouse, and capstan house together with many 
storehouses. Other facilities such as a smiths’ shop, pitch house and a guardhouse were 
also built by 1760 surrounded by a perimeter fence.  
 
With the end of the Seven Years War the future of the naval yard became open to 
question, but the Navy Board became an advocate for its retention. In December 1762 
the board wrote to the Admiralty on their favourable view of retaining the yard in 
peacetime in the following way: ‘The convenient situation of [the] yard at Halifax, its 
utility for heaving down ships stationed in North America, and supplying them with 
stores, and the preservation of the wharfs, storehouses, and other works erected there in 
the course of the war induce us to believe that the continuance of the naval officer and a 
very few artificers, will be of great advantage to his Majesty’s service.’110  
 
By 1793 the base at Halifax had all the facilities and staff required of an overseas yard 
to support a peacetime squadron with the ability to support the majority of a wartime 
squadron’s needs. The only facility absent compared to a home yard was a dry dock, 
although the need for such a facility had been anticipated in 1771 with Rear-Admiral 




The Halifax naval yard supported the ships stationed in Nova Scotia waters, with St. 
John’s providing logistic support for the smaller Newfoundland station. These seas 
became a strategic backwater, but fishery protection, custom enforcement and 
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maintaining a diplomatic presence were important maritime tasks. An understanding of 
the role and tasks of these squadrons in the aftermath of the American War of 
Independence can be found by reading, British Squadrons in North American Waters, 
1783-1793.
112
 This article also provides an insight into the composition and general role 





Bermuda was available throughout the eighteenth century as a re-supply location and 
anchorage but it was following the loss of her North American colonies that the 
importance of Bermuda as a potential naval anchorage and base was understood. It 









The British presence in the East Indies was dominated by the English Honourable East 
India Company.
114
 Any investigation of British naval presence and shore support in this 
vast area needs to be cognisant of that fact. The Company had been formed in 1600 and 
its chief competitors in its early lifetime were the Portuguese and Dutch, closely 
followed by the French. All these powers had possessions in the Indies with the French 
in the eighteenth century holding Pondicherry in India, and the islands of Mauritius and 
Bourbon
115
 in the Indian Ocean. The Dutch held Ceylon,
116
 some trading ports in India, 
the Spice Islands, Sumatra and Java. The Dutch were at times allies, neutral and 
enemies of Britain in the period. The Dutch therefore at times allowed Britain the use of 
the harbour of Trincomalee when they were either allied or neutral. 
 
The consequence of the gift of Bombay to Charles II was to be of supreme importance 
to Britain, particularly for its influence on its support to the British navy. Bombay is an 
island and hence more easily defended during the early days of Britain’s presence in 
                                                 
112
 Webb, P., ‘British Squadrons in North American Waters, 1783-1793’, The Northern Mariner, Vol. V, 
No. 2, (1995), 19-34. 
113
 See chapter three. 
114
 Hereafter referred to as the Company. 
115
 Now called Reunion. 
116
 Present day Sri Lanka but the colonial name will be used throughout the thesis as contemporary 
documents used that name. 
57 
India. By 1686 Bombay had become the headquarters of the Company and its potential 




The Company formed its own navy as early as 1613 and became known as the Bombay 
Marine.
118
 Equipment for building ships at Bombay was sent from England and by 1716 
the Bombay Marine consisted of a 32 gun flagship, four 28 gun ships and twenty 
vessels of between five and twelve guns, a not inconsiderable force. 
 
Prior to the War of Austrian Succession in the 1740s, the East Indies was not an 
operational area for the navies of Britain and France, with instead, the respective 
national East India Companies defending their trade. It was with the dispatch of a naval 
squadron to the Indies that the British looked for locations to supply and refit its ships. 
The commander-in-chief of the British East Indies squadron had a vast area of 
operations to cover, but its principal concern was in the Bay of Bengal and the coasts of 
Malabar and Coromandel.
119
 To patrol these areas the south west (summer) and north 
east (winter) monsoon seasons were particularly important for ships on the western 
coast of India. During the north east monsoon, logic would indicate that sailing ships 
would look for a sheltered harbour on the west coast, or make for Bombay. This 
Company port become the place where considerable investment was made, creating a 
dockyard that turned Bombay into the major refitting location for the British navy. 
 





 of ships always retiring to Bombay. He 
states that of the forty winters the squadron was present in Indian Seas from 1746 to 
Trincomalee’s capture in 1795, fifteen were spent at Trincomalee, fourteen at Bombay, 
five at Calcutta, with the remaining six in the Eastern Indies or Andamans. By 1762 
Colgate noted that the navy had built a careening wharf at this Dutch harbour, indicating 
the importance of diplomacy.
122
 This need for permission was commented on by 
Admiral Griffin in 1748 for use of Trincomalee, ‘this is still Permission. And I cannot 
help wishing that we had a port of our own, where any English Ship might shelter, in 
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case of Necessity, and might have Magazines of stores and Provisions. In our present 
state we are Obliged to carry all the Stores and Provisions we have in the ships.’123 This 
statement provides an excellent summary of the advantage of sovereign bases compared 
with the use of other nation’s ports. 
 
From 1778 to 1784 British interests in India came under attack from the French, with 
them able to support the fleet they had sent from shore bases and harbours previously 
unavailable to that nation. As the Dutch became enemies of Britain in 1781 the Dutch 
harbours at the Cape of Good Hope, Trincomalee and Negapatam became available to 
the French. This was a severe blow to British interests in the region, as previously the 
Dutch were allies, or at least helpful neutrals, who allowed Britain to use the Cape and 
Trincomalee. However, the use of the Portuguese Royal Yard at Goa was obtained by 
Hughes’ squadron in 1782, the only other yard in these waters that could undertake 
large repairs, indicating the importance of Britain’s relationship with Portugal.124 
 
Other harbours and stores locations were open to the British navy in the East Indies 
before 1792 as the other presidencies in India offered limited facilities. Calcutta was 
Britain’s commercial centre in the east with artificers, victualling and naval stores being 
available and although Madras lacked a harbour it was also able to provide victualling 
and naval stores. However, the dockyard at Bombay was the key asset supporting the 
British navy in the East Indies. 
 
1.4.2 Administration of Bombay Dockyard 
 
To support the Bombay Marine a refit yard was built with the shore organisation 
consisting of a marine storekeeper, Mr. William Minchen, appointed in 1670 and a 
master shipbuilder Mr. Pett. This organisation appears similar to a home royal dockyard 
where a naval storekeeper and master shipwright were key posts. The development in 
the administrative structure was notable for the combination of shore and ship 
establishments. By 1742 the post of superintendent of marine had been created with a 
commodore and seven commanders. The superintendent controlled the dockyard with 
the commodore reporting to him, a purser of marine being in charge of accounts, a 
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master builder, and storekeeper in charge of their departments. A Marine Board was 
formed to manage the dockyard consisting of the superintendent, the commodore and 





1.4.3 The Dry Docks 
 
The development and increase in dry docking facilities at Bombay occurred throughout 
the eighteenth century. The Bombay Council initially considered building a dry dock in 
1687
126
 and again in 1723 but neither was commissioned.
127
 However, in July 1750 a 
dock capable of receiving 50 gun ships for the Company and other users was 
completed.
128
 Apart from the use by its own marine the Company thought of the facility 
as an income generator, with 150 rupees being charged for the first spring tide docking 




The dock proved an early success with the Company and they quickly indicated their 
intention to increase its capability. By 1762 a double dock had been completed allowing 
the inner dock to be dedicated for repairs and refits, leaving the outer dock for routine 
maintenance such as hull cleaning.
130
 This did not end the development on this site as 
the dock was again extended, resulting in the facility becoming a triple dock. Admiral 
Cornish lobbied for this extra dock, as the Bombay Council reported the matter to the 
Court of Directors in April 1762 as being essential for the Royal Navy. This extension 
was completed in 1773 and was large enough to accommodate a 74 gun ship.
131
 
Collectively the facility was known as Bombay Dock, upper, middle and lower. These 
docks were the first of their type built outside of Europe. 
 
Three docks built as a single unit limits their utility. A ship in the outermost dock 
prevents access or exit to and from the inner docks. Adverse tidal conditions could also 
restrain usage. This would seem to be the case as Admiral Hughes, commander-in-chief 
of the British East Indies squadron, wrote to Governor Hornby with suggestions to 
improve operations at Bombay. In April 1781 Hughes acknowledged that the facilities 
at the Bombay yard were, ‘The only port in the East Indies where a ship of the line can 
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be docked and effectively repaired’. However, he pointed out that delays occurred in 
refitting that could be remedied by deepening the outer two docks by 18 inches. The 
problem was that three battleships were each delayed 14 days in dock as a result of tidal 
conditions. By deepening the docks two ships could be moved into and out of dock on 
the same tide.
132
 The two docks were deepened as requested to improve utilization. 
 
In May 1784 Hughes communicated to the Select Committee of Bombay the 
importance of their dockyard to his command.
133
 Hughes had recently defended 
Britain’s interests in the Indies against the strong French fleet under the command of 
Suffren and clearly considered Bombay as essential to Britain. The admiral indicated 
the Bombay Presidency needed to ensure military protection was provided at all times, 
in fact made impregnable so as to act as a base for offensive operations. Hughes also 
pointed out that there was no other port in the possession of Britain where his squadron 
could be refitted let alone repaired; at Bombay there were masts and other stores and ‘a 
great number of expert native artificers’. He further reported that the ships’ companies 
had been reduced by sickness, but after only three months the squadron had been 
completely refitted, re-supplied and the health of the crews restored. Hughes concluded, 
‘The constant exertions of the officers of the squadron, the use of the Docks, supplies of 
all kinds of timber and numerous artificers of Bombay effected this great end and 
without them, I am positive the squadron could not, in any other part of the East Indies 
have been put in a condition to face the enemy with even hopes of success.’134 
 
1.4.4 Shipbuilding and dockyard facilities 
 
The dry docks were the essential difference in this yard compared with the other 
overseas bases and yards used by the British navy in the eighteenth century, but 
Bombay also had other essential facilities. Figure 1h shows the 1750 Grose Plan of 
Bombay Dockyard in which the first dock was shown together with a hospital, 
storehouses, offices and accommodation for the yard’s officers. A later plan, figure 1j, 
shows the yard in 1803. From this the triple Bombay dock can be clearly seen together 
with the buildings shown in the 1750 plan. What is of note is the long ropewalk that has 
been shown. The walkway was 900 ft. long and had been roofed over in 1760 and 
provided a facility to produce cables and cordage for the Company. 
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The shipbuilding facilities at Bombay were considerable and as discussed above this 
had been recognised at an early date by the Company. As Hughes commented the 
artificers at Bombay were highly skilled. Amongst these were the Wadia family who 
had a distinguished record of providing shipbuilding expertise to the Company.
135
 The 
availability of these artificers and the managers of the dockyard removed the need for an 
Admiralty organisation being present, or for British artificers being sent from Britain. 
 
 




Figure 1j:  Bombay Dockyard in 1803 (Prior to building of the Duncan Dry Dock)
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The positioning of naval squadrons overseas resulted in the establishment of naval 
yards with careening facilities and store houses. From their formation the need for 
administration was recognised. The necessity to issue, maintain stock levels and 
securely house naval stores required accurate record keeping and timely re-ordering. 
Recording what refit work was performed, by whom, when and for how long, required 
a muster of the men and the hours they worked. This vital clerical function was 
invested in the naval storekeeper and muster master, also known as the naval officer. 
The Salary and Pension lists of the Admiralty first records the appointment of a naval 
storekeeper to Lisbon in 1703, Port Mahon in 1708 and Gibraltar in 1725. It was not 
until 1721 that the salary list records storekeepers being appointed to the West Indies, 
initially at Jamaica and with Antigua following in 1731.
138
  It was not until 1756 before 
a storekeeper was appointed to the North American station with the establishment of 
the naval yard at Halifax. From their first appointment the position of naval storekeeper 
was always filled at Port Mahon, Jamaica, Antigua and Halifax providing a constant 
management presence at the naval yards.  
 
The necessity for technical expertise and management in a naval yard was also 
recognised with the appointment of a master shipwright and master attendant. Although 
these officers were not always present in peacetime, they were usually employed in 
wartime. During peacetime fewer vessels were stationed overseas, resulting in the role 
of the master attendant being carried out by a master of the ships in the harbour. In the 
absence of a master shipwright being appointed by the Admiralty the commander-in-
chief would usually choose a carpenter from his squadron to act in that capacity, if 
considerable refit or establishment work was required. Alternatively the carpenter of 
each ship managed their own refits and liaised with the storekeeper for their needs.  
 
The master shipwright, master attendant and naval storekeeper were known as the 
principal yard officers, with the storekeeper being the senior post. The yard officers 
reported to the Navy Board and the naval commander-in-chief, who corresponded with 
the Admiralty and Navy Boards. Initially the need for a senior manager above the 
principal officers was not considered necessary, but in wartime the practice of 
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appointing a naval captain as a resident commissioner occasional occurred. It was not 
until the American War of Independence that the practice became systematic. Resident 
commissioners were appointed to Halifax in 1775, Antigua in 1779 and Jamaica in 
1782. However, it was only at Halifax a commissioner remained in peacetime. 
 
1.5.2 Manning the naval yards 
 
As the naval bases grew out of the need for a ship’s company to securely repair, re-
supply and refit their vessel, so did the issue of who was to perform the work. There 
were three choices with advantages and disadvantages in the method selected, using the 
squadron’s crews, using local contracted artificers and labours, or to recruit dedicated 
artificers to serve at the shore establishment. In reality by mixing these alternatives the 
disadvantages of the individual solutions was avoided and the advantages maximised. 
This was to be the case at all the overseas yards, but the West Indian yards also became 
involved in the best way to utilise the local slave labour force. 
 
The advantages of using the squadron’s crews were many. The required skill groups of 
artificers, labours and managers (the commissioned and warrant officers) were present 
and on the spot. As the workforce had already been paid for normal duties, a bonus 
system could be provided with the costs being to a large extent predictable. There were 
also many disadvantages in using a vessel’s crew, particularly in the tropics. Not only 
did the ships require refitting, but the crews required rest and recuperation. Similarly the 
effort required to un-load a ship, careen and clean the hull, and load a ship was 
considerable. At the West Indian yards the death of sailors may have been accelerated 
by too much refit work in addition to the hot climate and mosquito borne diseases. 
 
British naval administrators had used the practice of contracting for many services since 
the seventeenth century, ranging from provision of health services, victualling and naval 
stores manufacture and delivery, to building ships and supplying labour. The use of 
contract labour at the overseas yards had the advantage of removing or supplementing 
the need to use the ship’s crews. A further advantage to contract labour was it could be 
used to service the known and expected base load of refit activity with an option to be 
increased to meet peak loads. The main disadvantage of using contract labour was the 
potential high cost brought about by a high market rate caused by local demand 
outstripping supply. When this cost reached a level that was far in excess of using 
government employed artificers, than recruitment of a dedicated crown workforce was 
64 
the next logical step. The cost of labour in the West Indies was high due to the death 
rate of individuals who worked ashore. The hot climate, hard toil and yellow fever 
caused many deaths and hence the labour market was constantly dominated by the need 
for skilled and un-skilled labour. This problem had been solved since European 
occupation in the West Indies by the forced importation of Africans and their 
enslavement.  
 
It would appear the cost of locally contracted skilled labour became high as artificers 
were sent from Britain. This solved the skilled labour problem, but recruiting labours 
from Britain was illogical as there was an alternative to the hire of local slaves, they 
could instead be purchased. 
 
In February 1725 the Navy Board proposed to the Admiralty the additional pay rates to 
be paid to ship’s artificers. This was brought about as the Navy Board had noticed that 
very high sums had been paid to contractors that were far in excess of rates in Britain, 




Per Day Allowance 
(Shillings & pence) 
East Indies, 
Jamaica  & Virginia 
Barbados & 
Antigua 
All other foreign 
parts 
Master carpenter 2s 6d 2s 3d 2s 0d 
Carpenter’s mate 2s 0d 1s 9d 1s 6d 
Carpenter’s crew 1s 6d 1s 3d 1s 0d 
 
Table 1b: Proposed daily pay rates for warship artificers 
 
These proposed wage rates were insufficient, as although crews were satisfied with 
working on their own ship they were reluctant to work on other ships in a squadron. The 
Navy Board’s solution was to pay shipwrights and caulkers twice as much a day on 
other ships of the squadrons, for example one shillings per day on their ship and two 
shillings per day on another ship at Jamaica. This was a very economic approach as the 
price of a locally hired shipwright or caulker per day was ten shillings and five shillings 
per day for a slave. This not only encouraged crews to work on other vessels but 
indicates the market cost of skilled and unskilled labour at Jamaica.
140
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Creating a dedicated labour force was the logical approach for the Admiralty. Admiral 
Stewart, commander-in-chief Jamaica, wrote to the Navy Board in 1729 with a proposal 
for purchasing and training government owned slaves. In this letter he suggested a 
workforce of thirty, with the young being apprenticed to the master caulker, carpenter or 
builder and to be brought up in that trade;
141
 this idea was to reappear at Cape Town in 
1809.
142
 Examination of the paylists in the 1740s and the letters by Admiral Knowles, 
the Navy Board and the Admiralty in that period shows that slaves had been purchased 
and trained as King’s Negros at Jamaica.143  
 
Sending out artificers from Britain was also a tactic that the Navy Board used to staff 
the overseas yards, but such appointments were difficult to fill especially for the West 
Indies. Although the West Indies became known as the grave yard of the British Army 
during the campaigns of the 1790s, this was already known to potential dockyard 
recruits throughout the eighteenth century as a dangerous place to serve and work.
144
 
Therefore to get shipwrights and other artificers to come to the West Indies, an element 
of including ‘danger money’ appears to have entered the thinking of officials, as higher 
rates of pay, compared to a home dockyard, and other inducements were proposed.  
 
Persuading artificers in England to serve at an overseas yard was difficult but in the 
1740s the Navy Board introduced measures to recruit British specialists.
145
 In 1740 the 
terms offered to shipwrights were, a pay rate of 32 shillings per month, known as home 
pay, and a daily pay rate of 2s 6d paid at Gibraltar and Port Mahon and 3s 6d at 
Jamaica. The outward and homeward passage was provided with free victualling. The 
initial service term was for three years with on return employment at a home dockyard 
an entitlement to an apprentice. These latter conditions were subject to satisfactory 
service. However, additional temptation was required to staff the West Indian yards as 
there were no volunteers for Jamaica. The situation must have been critical as the pay 
rate for Jamaica was raised in 1741 to 36 shillings for monthly home pay and a day rate 
of 5 shillings. Other sweeteners were the offer of double pay for apprentices, compared 
to that at home, and access to the Chatham Chest and Greenwich Hospital services in 
the event of need if incapacitated by their service at Jamaica. These inducements were 
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successful and were extended to Antigua in 1743 to attract men to work in the English 
Harbour yard. 
 
The recruitment of British artificers to the overseas yards continued throughout the 
period with very similar conditions to those outlined above, for example, in 1808 the 
artificers sent to the Cape of Good Hope had the same employment conditions with the 
only difference being the daily pay rate. It was the creation of the Halifax naval yard 
that was to introduce another variation to the composition of the workforce, recruitment 
of residents of Nova Scotia. During the Seven Years War the artificers came from 
Britain returning at the end of the war, but by 1800 the labour force came 




1.5.3  Foreign yard structure, composition and squadron’s supported in 1792 
 
By 1792 the management and composition of the workforce at Britain’s overseas, or as 
referred to at the time, foreign, yards had formed a settled pattern. With the loss of 
Minorca Britain no longer had a naval base in the Mediterranean, with only Gibraltar 
able to provide local support. Table 1c below shows the posts occupied in 1788 and 
indicates Gibraltar was a very minor yard. Although table 1c shows the management 




Halifax was the only yard with a full technical and management structure. A master 
attendant is absent at all the other yards with presumably his duties being delegated by 
the commander-in-chief to a master of one of the ships of the squadron. The 
composition of the Gibraltar yard together with the absence of a master shipwright 
indicates its role was primarily for supply rather than one for refitting. However, the 
Gibraltar yard paylists indicate the master shipwright’s supervisory role was undertaken 
by the foreman of shipwrights. This yard classified its workforce as garrison employees 
with no shipwrights being present.  
 
Table 1d below shows the number of artificers and labourers in these yards in the last 
full year before the commencement of the Great Wars with France in 1793. The Jamaica 
yard paylists record those who received home pay and are thus the artificers, and their 
apprentices, who had come from Britain. The paylists recording the slaves that were 
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& two clerks 
No No No 
Naval Storekeeper Yes 
 two clerks 













Master Attendant Yes 
one clerk 
No No No 
   
Table 1c:  Management and clerical organisation – Foreign Yards 1788148 
 
employed are missing. However, the paylists for the Antigua yard do record the use of 
slaves, particularly as labourers. Given the size of the squadrons supported, and the 
additional numbers of European artificers employed at Jamaica, a slave workforce was 
probably present especially as paylists in 1809 confirm their presence.
149
 From table 1d 
the number of workers in the overseas yards in 1792 was 319 consisting of Gibraltar 
with 46, Antigua with 106, Halifax with 111 and Jamaica with 56. If an allowance is 
made for the presence of labourers and slave artificers at Jamaica another 50 to 70 could 
be added with the total overseas workforce approaching 400. 
 
The Antigua paylists revealed the existence of instructions for the government of 
Negroes as these documents recorded establishment Negroes being employed as 
watchmen, with a number being recorded as invalid caulkers and sawyers. The naval 
storekeeper headed these paylists thus, ‘agreeable to Warrant of Commissioner Moutray 
dated 10
th
 March 1785 and the 8
th
 Article of Printed Instructions respecting Government 
of Negroes’.150 
 
The management and workforce of the overseas yards were supporting the ships shown 
in table 1e and show the West Indian yards supported more ships than on the North 
American station. However, Halifax was the only yard with a resident commissioner 
while Jamaica and Antigua had a combined workforce that exceeded that at Nova 
Scotia, but they were without a commissioner. The Jamaican station was the largest 
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European      
Master sailmaker 1    
Foreman of 
Shipwrights  
1 1 1 1 
Foreman of Sailmakers 1    
Foreman of House 
Carpenters 
1 1   
Foreman of Smiths 1 1 1  
Foreman of Sawyers  1   




21    
Shipwrights 7 16 12  
House Carpenters 14 3 2  
Garrison Carpenter    19 
Sailmaker 3 1 1  
Blacksmiths 6 1 4  
Blockmaker 1 1 1  
Caulkers    22 
Sawyers 4   2 
Armourers    2 
Masons 9    
Other Yard (Watchmen 
etc) 
21 16 11  
Labourers 65    
Apprentices 16 14 9  
Total European 111 56 43 46 
Slaves     
Shipwrights  Unknown 1  
Caulkers  Unknown 6  
Masons  Unknown 4  
Sawyer  Unknown 1  
Labours  Unknown 51  
Total Slaves  Unknown 63  
 
Table 1d: Workforce at Foreign Yards – 1792 
 
overseas command in both number of vessels and men and together with the Leeward 
Islands station accounted for 40 percent of the manpower, and 41 percent of the ships 
allocated to foreign stations. This would therefore have generated a greater expenditure 
on refitting and naval stores than at the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland commands, as 
only 15 percent of manpower and 26 percent of ships were allocated. It was not, 
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therefore, the number of ships or men on the North American station, or the size of the 
naval yard establishment, that dictated the presence of a resident commissioner at 
Halifax and a full complement of principal officers. It would seem there were additional 
reasons for this allocation of a senior manager. A reason possibly lies in the contribution 
the resident commissioner made as a representative of the British government; serving 
as a magistrate was an additional duty performed by resident commissioners. 
 




























1.6 Victualling and care of sick and wounded 
 
The naval yard provided the facilities and personnel to refit and supply vessels with 
naval stores, but access to fuel, water and food together with the care of the sick and 
wounded of the vessels, turned these locations into naval bases. 
 
A ready source of clean, fresh water and fire-wood would seem to be relatively easily 
met, but supplying these basic requirements was particularly challenging for Gibraltar. 
Small tanks for collecting rain water near the new mole were the only local storage until 
1804 when the Rosia Tanks were available.
158
 Byng on returning to Gibraltar after his 
failed relief of Minorca in 1756 had to send half his fleet to Tetuan, North Africa for 
water, indicating this storage was inadequate or at least needed to be preserved.
159
 On 
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Minorca there were numerous springs for irrigation and hence a secure water supply 
was available.
160
 Timber for fuel was also available on the island, but the British 
occupation possibly caused deforestation.
161
 Such materials were non-existent on 
Gibraltar and hence when at war with Spain supplies came from North Africa, or from 
Britain as was the case during the siege of 1779-83.
162
 This illustrates the limited use of 
Gibraltar as a fleet operational base unless there was access to North Africa for fuel 
during a war with Spain. 
 
When ships were on overseas duty obtaining provisions was achieved in a number of 
ways.
163
 To supplement the salt beef and pork supplied by the Victualling Board, food 
could be purchased by a ship’s purser from local suppliers, or from an approved 
Victualling Board merchant, such as a console, but this method was for small scale 
requirements. Where squadrons congregated another method was used, that of a 
contractor delivering, at an agreed price, a full range of provisions at one or more ports. 
Examples of these methods appeared throughout the eighteenth century and were 
particularly suited to peace-time conditions, but in wartime the risk of a contractor being 
unable to remain solvent and to supply goods was recognised, resulting in the 
Victualling Board suspending contracts and providing its own local management. These 
managers were agent victuallers who either served afloat with a squadron or on shore at 
the main ports. 
 
Whatever method was used it was successful as provisions were available and seldom 
restricted operations, but the overseas victualling arrangements provided many 
opportunities for fraud by agent victuallers, consuls, ship’s captains and pursers. How to 
remove these abuses exercised the Commissioners on Fees and Naval Revision and are 
examined in chapter two. 
 
Enabling the officers and crews of an overseas squadron to recover from wounds or 
sickness resulted in the early establishment of naval hospitals at foreign locations. The 
advantages of removing the sick from operational warships were many, if only to lessen 
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the spread of infection, but it also benefitted the patients with an unquantifiable effect 
on moral. 
 
The first instance of an overseas hospital being formed was in 1701. Admiral Benbow, 
before departure to Jamaica, asked for a hospital ship for isolation of infectious cases, a 
house on shore to receive other patients, and a physician with medical supplies. What 
the Admiralty provided instead resulted in the formation of an overseas hospital with an 
organisational structure that was to be repeated throughout the century. This was for a 
dedicated building to serve as a hospital, an agent for administration, medical staff and 




The Jamaican hospital was quickly followed by the establishment of a similar institution 
at Lisbon in 1705 and at Minorca in 1709.
165
 The hospital at Minorca was initially 
housed in temporary premises when the newly arrived agent rented a part of the priory 
with this in use till 1712, when patients were moved into purpose built 
accommodation.
166
 Of these three hospitals only the establishment at Minorca was 
retained with the staff of the Sick and Wounded Board at Jamaica and Lisbon being 




The site chosen for the Minorca hospital was on an island in Port Mahon harbour and on 
completion had 16 wards with a capacity for at least 336 patients. This single story 
hospital continued in operation until the 1770s when it was re-built as a two story 
building providing 1200 beds in 40 wards. The care of the patients came under different 
arrangements in this century and was affected by the presence, or lack of presence, of 
the Sick and Wounded Board. This organisation was only in place during the eighteenth 
century in wartime, so the hospital was managed and care provided by a contractor. The 
arrangement did not deliver the standard of care expected by commanders-in-chief in 
wartime with the re-formulated Sick and Wounded Board resuming responsibility.
168
 
The crews of the Mediterranean squadron were also provided with shore health care at 
Gibraltar. Initially this was provided by contracting private homes to house the sick but 
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by the 1730s a purpose built hospital was being considered. This hospital was 




The Minorca and Gibraltar naval hospitals provided the Mediterranean squadron with 
considerable capacity, but the West Indies was a different story. Following the return of 
the Sick and Wounded staff from Jamaica hospital in 1712 the temporary wooden 
hospital disappeared. The navy resorted to use of hiring houses and contract care, but 
with war in 1739 and the stationing of a fleet in the West Indies, the building of a naval 
hospital at Jamaica was again considered. This resulted in a hospital being built, but it 
was not ready until 1745 unfortunately its location at New Greenwich proved 
unsatisfactory so that by 1749 it was concluded the hospital was “rather a hurt to the 
Service than a relief”.170 The need for health care in the West Indians was undoubtedly 




Although Halifax was equipped with a naval yard in the 1750s it was not until the 1780s 
that a satisfactory hospital was built at that base. Initially a small naval hospital was 
provided in 1750, but this was easily overwhelmed, and was not supplemented until 
1776 when a military barracks was temporarily converted into a hospital. This was 
superseded in 1779 by a storehouse conversion, but following a report by Commissioner 
Hamond in 1781 a purpose built hospital was constructed and ready to receive patients 
in 1783. The plans sent from England indicate this hospital had a capacity for up to 127 
men and 20 officers. This hospital was staffed by a surgeon, dispenser, a purveyor, a 
matron, hospital mates, nurses, a cook, a porter and labourers.
172
 Although this facility 
at Halifax did not have the capacity of Gibraltar’s hospital, or the recently lost Minorca 
hospital, all three hospitals demonstrate the developments in shore medical care at 




Britain’s overseas naval bases in 1792 are marked as 1, 3, 4 and 5 on figure 1k with 2 
showing Port Mahon, which was lost on the fall of Minorca during the America War of 
Independence. The British navy also had access to the East India Company port and 
facilities of Bombay in the Indian Ocean. Although these bases were on British 
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sovereign territory, by the use of diplomacy, access was gained to other ports. A notable 
example of this was Lisbon as it was frequently used as a repair and re-supply base 
throughout the eighteenth century. 
 
Figure 1k below and table 1a show Britain’s bases and ship deployment prior to 1792 
and illustrate the development of Britain’s strategy for the defence of its commercial 
and colonial assets. This defence consisted of stationing small overseas squadrons with 
local logistical support. In peacetime the squadrons carried out Navigation Act and 
customs compliance, fishery protection and diplomatic duties. On war being declared 
the squadrons provided instant defence and opportunities to close enemy maritime trade 
in their area. A further benefit was the ability to support larger squadrons by increasing 
the storage capacity and workforce. This was possible because the basic infrastructure 
required was already present. 
 
Common themes operated in the establishment of this network of overseas bases in 
terms of strategy, with those in the West Indies being essentially defensive. However, 
the establishment of naval bases at Louisbourg, and later at Halifax, was initially 
offensive so operations could be mounted to capture Canada. The role of Gibraltar and 
Port Mahon were also offensive in nature, but only if they could be defended and hence 
provide a home for an aggressive fleet. These forces could pin down enemy fleets and 
thus leave other areas free from their interference. The Company’s presidencies 
supplied the necessary ports for both a defensive and offensive policy, with Bombay’s 
facilities being particularly valuable. 
 
These naval bases required government funding and were capital intensive. If an ally’s 
port or British colonial commercial port’s facilities could be hired, and was also in a 
relevant operational location, then a cheaper option was available. This was the case in 
Britain’s initial operations in the late seventeenth century and was to continue 
throughout the period, but in the case of an ally’s port, it relied on diplomacy and hence 
was not politically reliable. The maturity of Britain’s colonial North American ports 
allowed the limited number of ships on that station to be supported, but with the area 
becoming a major theatre in the mid eighteenth century, a purpose built base was 




Figure 1k: British Overseas Bases prior to 1792 
 
Economic considerations were indicated in the approach taken in the operation and 
development of the Admiralty’s bases. A naval yard was established, followed by 
victualling arrangements and naval hospitals being considered. Naval yard development 
followed a similar path with, at first, provision of a careening wharf, hire of local 
storage space and the appointment of a storekeeper to administer the yard. This was 
followed by building and expanding government owned storage buildings, mast, smith 
and boat houses and additional careening capacity. The provision of a mast pond was 
frequently made and during wartime, a master attendant and master shipwright were 
appointed. The requirement for security from theft was accounted for by the building of 
walls around the developing yard. All these factors indicate that investment in facilities 
or management was only made when a benefit could be anticipated. 
 
The workforce used to refit and repair the navy’s ships also shows a consideration for 
cost and benefit. Initially the artificers and crew of a ship would only repair their own 
ship, but by financial inducements this was extended to other ships of a squadron. This 
was followed by hiring from local sources skills that the crews did not possess, or to 
supplement or increase the capacity of the yard. Using contract labour was a resource 
that was frequently used, but the day rate charges could become excessive, resulting in 
the recruitment of a dedicated civilian workforce. Frequently artificers from Britain 
were encouraged to serve at the overseas naval bases. An additional strategy used in the 






1. Gibraltar: 1704 
2            Port Mahon: 1708; 1755; 1782 
3            Port Royal: 1720s 
4            English Harbour: 1720s 
5. Halifax: 1757 
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contribution to a yard’s workforce. The mix of ship’s crews, hired artificers and 
employed civilians was a developing practice and when perfected provided a flexible, 
economic and effective way of refitting the overseas squadrons. 
 
Hiring labour was not the only use of local resources. The North American colonies 
were rich in agriculture produce, timber and the materials to manufacture naval stores, 
accompanied by a growing capacity for shipbuilding. An experiment was tried to 
explore this capacity, but the Admiralty halted further exploitation on the Navy Board’s 
advice. India also had a great resource of food, timber and skilled workmen at all of the 
Company’s presidencies, but a special mention must be made of Bombay. At this port 
the Bombay presidency was to build a yard, with all the facilities that could be found at 
a British royal dockyard including dry docks. 
 
The refitting and re-supply of naval stores was only one aspect of these naval bases as 
the two other civilian naval departments were also represented. Agent victuallers were 
appointed by the Victualling Board to arrange for local purchase of fresh and preserved 
food. Storehouses for the preserved food were also to be a feature of these bases. Caring 
for the sick and injured of the navy was also carried out at these locations, with the 
building of purpose-built hospitals becoming another feature at these overseas locations. 
 
At the end of the American War of Independence the surviving British naval yards, with 
attendant hospitals and victualling organisations, had reached maturity. The 
investigations of the Commission for Fees in the1780s recognised the benefits of these 
bases, but they made recommendations for improvements in both management and 
financial control. Chapter two examines their recommendations and the background to 




Chapter two: Proposals for reform in the management of overseas naval yards, 




The war with France, Spain, the Netherlands and the newly formed United States of 
America created significant political turmoil in Britain. The catastrophic loss of thirteen 
of Britain’s North American colonies, Florida, Minorca and some West Indian islands, 
created a crisis in national confidence and reforms in government and management of 
Britain’s affairs were brought forward. 
 
These reforms were precipitated by the appointment of commissioners to examine 
public accounts by Lord North in 1779.
173
 1782 was a watershed year with reform of the 
Treasury and the introduction of the Foreign and Home Departments from the existing 
secretaries of state for the Northern and Southern Departments. This was to be the case 
until 1794, when an additional secretary of state for War and Colonial affairs was 
created.
174
 This was followed in 1783 by the Public Offices Bill. In 1784 bills for the 
better regulation of the East India Company were enacted with 1785 bringing the Fees 
Commission Act. This chapter concentrates on the findings and recommendations of the 
Commission on Fees and the subsequent actions of the Select Committee on Finance, 
Commission of Naval Enquiry and Commission of Naval Revision. The reports of these 
commissions not only provide key sources into the contemporary management of 
Britain’s overseas naval bases, but also the cultural changes that were being proposed 
for administrating and manning her civil departments both at home and abroad. 
 
Charles Middleton’s, later Lord Barham, influence on Pitt and the findings and 
recommendations of the Fees Commissioners was considerable. As comptroller of the 
Navy Board from 1778-1790 Middleton provided input to the Commission on Fees that 
was to be of critical importance to the Fees reports on the navy. This can be particularly 
seen in the letters from Middleton to Pitt and Baring in 1785 and 1786. In ‘Mr. Pitt’s 
Queries’175 Middleton, provided answers to questions of naval administration and 
preparations required to maintain a suitable fleet at the start of a war and the subsequent 
enlargement of that fleet. However, it is in answer to the tenth question that he 
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suggested restructuring the Navy Board into committees with the comptroller at its 
head. This was to be a recommendation of the fifth report of the Fees Commissioners, 
but had to wait until 1796 before its introduction.  
 
The lobbying of Baring can be seen in the letters Middleton sent in which he provided a 
summary of the duties and workings of the Navy Board and Navy Office.
176
 In these 
letters can be seen the origins of the recommendations for a Transport Board, a Civil 
Engineer of dockyard facilities and the re-structuring of the Navy Board. In the absence 
of interviews with overseas yard officials the Fees Commissioners appear to have used 
the instructions provided for home and foreign dockyards. Middleton was collecting 
these instructions with a view to their rationalisation whilst comptroller.
177
 Middleton’s 
direct influence on naval reform will be seen again as chairman of the Commission of 
Naval Revision.  
 
Figure 2a provides a brief chronological record of the significant activities and events 
that affected the administrative departments of the navy, with particular relevance to the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on Fees. The period shown, 
1793 to 1817, contains considerable management reorganisation and underlying cultural 
change. Considering this period encompassed the great wars with France it could be 
considered remarkable that the underlying management structure and employment 
system was changed to such a degree. However, the pressure engendered by financial 
crises and for national survival probably had an influence on the scale and breath of 
change.  Amongst the initiatives for these changes were the various parliamentary 
committees and commissions with the thirty-first report of the Select Committee on 
Finance, the Commissions of Naval Enquiry and of Revision, being particularly 
important. The reports by the Commission of Naval Revision have the greatest 
relevance to the study of the overseas, or foreign, yards as this commission 
implemented many of the recommendations of the ninth report of the Commission on 
Fees.  
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Organisation 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817
Prime Minister
First Lord of Admiralty
Treasury agrees to Fees commissions 
recommendations
Treasury
Deputy Comptroller appointed Navy Board
Transport Board - Established (4th July 1794) Transport Board
Agreement to recommendations of 
Commission on Fees with exception of 
permanent Under Secretary (Feb). 
Secretaries of State
Hydrographic Office Admiralty
Inspector of Telegraphs appointed Admiralty
Civil Engineering Office
Admiralty / Navy 
Boards
Deliberation and action on Commission on 
Fees
Admiralty
Committee structure, removal of fees etc; 
enhanced salaries (May)
Navy Board









First Lord of Admiralty commissions Samuel 
Bentham to prepare plan on dockyard reform.
Dockyards
Admiralty and Victualling Departments. 





Implementation of Bentham's revision of 
Commission on Fees recommendations
Dockyards
Commission of Naval Enquiry Various
Commission of Naval Revision Various
Fifth Report of Naval Revision Foreign yards
Twelth Report of Naval Revision Victualling Abroard
Thirteenth Report of Naval Revision 
(Instructions for Agents, Surgeons etc Abroad)
Transport Board 
(Abroad)
1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817
Figure2a: Chart showing principal milestones and activities in the reform of civil naval departments, 1793-1817
Replaced by Hurd  
Centre of excellence for civil works 
Order in Council (Jun) 
Dalrymple appointed 
Provides an update on implementation of 
Commission on Fees 
Order in Council (Jan) 
Care and custody of prisoners of war transfer from Sick 
and Wounded Board 
Duties of Sick and Wounded Board 
moved to Transport Board 
Transport Board dissolved 
Post removed 
Order in Council (May) 
Fees removed, Chips replaced by allowance, Apprentice 
Appointment of Inspector General of Naval Works (Bentham). 
Centre of excellence for civil works and ‘in-house’  management 
consultant 
Move to Navy Board. 
Civil Architect and 
Engineer Department 
Post replaced by third 
surveyor 
Completed (Aug) Order in Council (Sep). 
Resident Commissioners appointed to 
Cape and East Indies 
Completed (Dec) 
Completed (Dec) 
Order in Council (Sep). 
Order in Council (Sep). 
Order in Council (Jun) 
School of Naval Architecture Started 
Apprentice indentures transferred to Head of 
Departments 
Apprentice indentures transferred to Resident Commissioner 
Subsistance pay to workforce (3/4 of weekly earnings) Weekly payment  to 
workforce in full 
Pitt 
Addington 





Chatham Spencer St. Vincent 
1st Melville Barham 
Grey 
T. Grenville 
Mulgrave Yorke 2nd Melville 
Sea Service funding raised to 
 £7 per person per lunar month 




Peace Peace Peace 
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Historians of the civil naval departments and particularly the royal dockyards have all 
used to considerable effect the reports of the Commissions on Fees and of Naval 
Revision.
1
 The reports on the Admiralty Board, Navy Board, Dockyards, Sick and Hurt 
Office and the Victualling Office have been their main sources, but the ninth report of 
the Commission on Fees, the fifth, twelfth and thirteenth reports of the Commission of 
Naval Revision have been generally ignored. 
 




In 1783 the Public Offices Bill was introduced and although not passed by parliament 
this formed the basis of the Commissioners’ Act into fees. Pitt introduced three 
significant changes to the Fees Bill. The new commission was set up independent of the 
existing Commissioners on Public Accounts; the Commission on Fees was composed of 
only three members, of whom two were already in government employment.
3
 The most 
significant change was that the Fees Commissioners would report directly to the Privy 
Council rather than to parliament. If the recommendations of the reports were to be 
carried out, then only an Order in Council would be needed.
4
 These three changes 
ensured the commission was low in cost and acted as a consultancy body for the 
executive. This allowed for reflection on its recommendations and hence was a subtle 
political tool rather than providing a stick for parliament to punish the executive. 
 
The Fees Commissioners were John Dick, William Molleson and Francis Baring. Dick 
and Molleson were comptrollers of army accounts with Molleson having been secretary 
to the Commission of Public Accounts; hence they both had knowledge of the reward 
systems of public employees with Molleson being familiar with commissions. Baring 
was a successful merchant and banker, who was to become an individual, on whom the 
government was to rely. Baring was employed as a government contractor and 
consultant in the early 1780s
 
. He became a director of the East India Company from 
1779 until his death in 1810, and was Pitts’s preferred candidate as chairman of the East 
India Company in the 1790s. Consequently he was influential in both governmental and 
quasi-governmental organisations.  
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lately in several Public Offices, (25 Geo III 19). 
3
 The Commission into Public Accounts consisted of eight members. 
4
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 Aug) Commission started Order in Council 
1786 (11
th
 Apr) First report complete Secretary of State Departments 
1786 (20
th
 Jun) Second report complete Treasury 
1787 Commission’s life extended 
by an additional two years 
Act of Parliament required 
1787 (27
th
 Dec) Third report complete Admiralty 
1788 (10
th
 Jan) Fourth report complete Treasurer of Navy 
1788 (14
th




 Mar) Sixth report complete Dockyards 
1788 (20
th
 Mar) Seventh report complete Sick and Hurt Office 
1788 (17
th
 Apr) Eighth report complete Victualling Office 
1788 (1
st
 May) Ninth report complete Naval and Victualling Departments 
at Foreign or distant ports 
1788 (30
th
 Jun) Tenth report complete Post Office 
1789 (14
th
 Oct) All reports submitted to the 
Privy Council 




 Jan) First meeting of special 
committee 
Reports referred to the departments 
for comment 
1792 – 1801 Meetings of a special Privy 
Council committee 
 
1793 Reports (ex. Appendices) 
published by the House of 
Commons  
The reports were again published 
together with the appendices in 1806 
 
Table 2a:  Commission on Fees - Table of events prior to start of Revolutionary War 
 
Landmarks in the work of the Commission on Fees are shown in table 2a. They indicate 
the areas investigated by the commission and show the delay in acting on their 
recommendations. Pitt waited over a year from the completion of the tenth report before 
presenting the reports to the Privy Council. It took a further two years for the Privy 
Council to refer them to the individual departments for comment.  Historians have 
suggested various reasons for the delay in presenting the reports to the Privy Council. 
The regency crisis in 1789 and the fear that public business would be disrupted by 
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implementing the Fees Commissioner’s recommendations being the chief reasons 
cited.
5
 These are likely reasons, but perhaps the state of foreign affairs was also a factor. 
Pitt was attempting his “Grand Design” for a balance of powers in Europe to preserve 
peace. However, Britain was to become distracted by her dispute with Spain over 
Nootka Sound in 1790. Russia was at war with Turkey and Sweden and Britain’s 
foreign policy was to fail over the Ochakov crisis regarding Russia. With France in a 
state of revolution, there appears to have been considerable uncertainty in foreign 
affairs.
6
 If remaining in power after the 1790 general election is included, it is not so 
surprising that the Privy Council delayed implementation of the commission’s 
recommendations. Maybe the prospect of civil departments being distracted with their 
own affairs, rather than providing a known level of service, caused Pitt to pause his 
reforms; this also seems to be confirmed by Pitt’s pragmatic character. Possibly this was 
a case of allowing the departments involved to be part of the implementation process, 
rather than just being imposed upon. 
 
The report that chiefly concerns the support of the British navy at overseas locations 
was the ninth report, but to fully appreciate the findings and recommendations in this 
report the sixth and eighth reports have to be considered. The ninth report examined the 
function of the civil naval departments at foreign ports and how they should be 
managed. As this replicated the function of the home dockyard and victualling 
organisations, the commissioners frequently referred to their sixth and eighth reports. 
 




The structure of the commission’s reports provides an understanding of the process used 
by the commissioners in their examination of the respective departments. Those familiar 
with modern management consultant’s reports on an organisation’s departments and 
structure will find themselves on recognizable ground.  
 
The first report on the Secretaries of State departments provided the legal justification 
for the commission’s duties and the objectives of the commission for all the areas 
investigated. The commission stated it was tasked to, “examine and report what Officers 
and Clerks were employed in the [departments studied]; what was the nature of their 
                                                 
5
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6
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7
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duty, services, and attendance; what were the Salaries, Fees, Gratuities, Perquisites and 
Emoluments, received by each of them, or their Substitutes; what they might and ought 
lawfully to have and receive; adding such observations, as might occur to us therein.”8 
 
The reports followed the same basic layout. The purpose of the department studied was 
detailed. The people in the department were examined with their evidence being 
presented in appendices. These appendices detailed their roles and duties with the 
payment they received being listed in separate categories. The individual’s examined 
received an annual income that consisted of a small basic salary, with additions that 
were identified as fees, gratuities, perquisites and emoluments. The commissioners 
evaluated the work performed, made recommendations for improvements in 
management, and proposed new salary levels without fees, gratuities, perquisites and 
emoluments. 
 
The key recommendation of the commissioners was the enhancement of salaries to a 
level approximately equal to that received by the combined salary and additional 
income streams. The need to provide pensions was also recognised. To ensure security 
in their old age individuals had either to work until they died, or to sell their posts to 
their juniors. By removing payment of premiums for posts, a mechanism to encourage 
retirement was essential. In essence, the measures proposed would promote a cultural 
change in the way business was conducted by promoting departmental, rather than 
individual priorities. Significantly, the commissioners were concerned on how these 
enhanced salaries were to be implemented. Hence, they provided suggestions on how 
they could be funded without increasing overall expenditure, or penalising any 
particular group or individuals. 
 
2.3 The Sixth (Home Dockyards)
9





For historians of the royal dockyards the sixth report of the Commission on Fees 
provides a key text on the organisation and management of these complex entities.
11
 In 
                                                 
8
 Reports of the commissioners appointed by act 25 Geo. III. cap. 19. to enquire into the fees, gratuities, 
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9
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15
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 Eighth report of Commission on Fees – Victualling Office, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 
Printed 15
th
 July 1806, 507-547. 
11
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terms of size and complexity they were unique industrial enterprises and presented 
management problems that deserve study by students of management theory. The report 
not only documented the duties, payment and department structures, but also provided 
the interactions in place between the departments and individuals. The importance of 
stores and contracting practice becomes quickly apparent from studying the report. 
 
The observations and recommendations of the sixth report reflected the general tenor of 
all the reports. Significantly this report suggests the spreading of existing good 
practices, strong local management and reforming the system of apprenticeship. All of 
these measures were reflected in the ninth report with particular relevance for strong 
local management.  
 
The abolition of fees, premiums, gratuities and emoluments, together with informal 
gifts, was the starting point for the commission’s recommendations. Their thoughts on 
spreading good practice can be seen in their recommendation to use the stores 
management system perfected at Portsmouth.
12
 Their recommendation for the 
centralisation of the tasks regarding transports and store ships, anticipated the setting up 
of a separate Transport Board. The London dockyards currently fulfilling this role, was 
to be allowed to concentrate on their core function.
13
 The recommendation to change the 
system of attaching apprentices from the yard officers to deserving artificers included a 
compensation system for the former to aid its introduction.
14
 The Fees Commissioners 
also had faith in the existing system of yard management, as their recommendations 
were a case of enforcement of existing instructions rather than radical change in process 
or instructions. The role of the dockyard resident commissioner was seen by the 
commissioners as economic and effective. 
 
Although the resident commissioner had been part of the dockyard organisation since 
1664,
15
 the Fees Commissioners’ observed that, ‘The Commissioners of the Dockyards 
have not any instructions for their government’.16 Hence they recommended that this be 
rectified by the issue of full and detailed instructions. They also indicated that the post 
was not to be one restricted to reporting and advising. The resident commissioner was to 
have full authority over everything and everyone in the dockyard. This was to include 
the power of suspension or dismissal of clerks on proof of their misconduct, a 
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significant increase in resident commissioners existing powers. All communication to 
and from the yard was to go via his office, so that he was responsible for all affairs 
under his superintendence in the management of the yard. The intention of the 
commissioners was to put the resident commissioner at the heart of affairs at the yard 
and to have them drawn from sea officers of great experience in both military and civil 
matters. What was also recognised was the need for resident commissioners to 
concentrate on the core dockyard activity. This was indicated by the recommendation of 
the removal, in war time, of the task of attending the payment of ships afloat at the 
naval yard by either the commissioner or master attendant. This task would instead be 




It was also proposed in the sixth report that civil engineering contracts for the design, 
maintenance and building of yard facilities were removed from the yard officers. 
Instead a new post was recommended, that of surveyor of civil architecture to the Navy 
Office.
18
 This was to ensure the expertise of the yard officers would be concentrated on 
their primary function, and that a specialist was responsible for yard facilities.  
 
Dockyard artificers also received additions to their wages. This supplement to their pay 
consisted of allowing artificers to remove off-cuts of wood, or chips, from the dockyard. 
The commissioners were concerned that abuses had arisen from this practice and, in 
common with the Navy Board and dockyard officers, recommended a pay rise of 5d per 
day for shipwrights and 2d per day for house carpenters in lieu of chips. The 
commissioners again showed a consistency of purpose regarding perquisites together 




The eighth report concerned the Victualling Office. It described the purpose, structure 
and management of the organisation that supplied the British navy with food and 
alcohol. Again the commissioners made observations on the department, with 
recommendations for improving performance and reported on the income, from all 
sources, of the individuals concerned with victualling. 
 
The report stated the business of the victualling organisation was to obtain provisions by 
contract, for finished articles or raw materials, manufacture and pack items at its 
victualling yards.  These provisions were then distributed to ports at home and abroad at 
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which HM Ships assembled. The commissioners highlighted the importance of ensuring 
the agents, storekeepers and ship’s pursers, who were issued with these items, recorded 





At the four overseas bases remaining after the American War of Independence the only 
location with a permanent victualling establishment was at Gibraltar. This victualling 
yard was not examined in the eighth report, but it stated that an agent victualler, a clerk 
and a store clerk were present with duties similar to those at Portsmouth and Plymouth. 
However, the other overseas stations were recorded as being managed by agent 
victuallers in the West Indies and America. Where agent victuallers, or British consuls, 





This was amplified by the Fees Commissioners who described the process that 
commanders of naval ships operated at a port without an agent victualler, or contractor. 
Commanders had delegated authority to purchase what was required and to ensure that 
their purser drew a bill against the Victualling Board. The process also required 
certificates to be signed by the captain, master and boatswain for the quantity and type 
of provisions received. Further checks confirmed that the market price was not 
exceeded, together with local exchange rates at the time of purchase, receipts from the 
suppliers and items supplied were of good quality. It was emphasized that this was not 
to be standard practice, as agents or consuls on the spot would be the normal avenue of 
supply. The appointment of an agent would be made by the Victualling Board, or the 





The observations of the Fees Commissioners are telling regarding the overall 
organisation of the Victualling Board. They considered the commissioners of that board 
lacked the skill and knowledge required to carry out duties, ‘which few, if any 
gentlemen in their habits of life can be expected to possess’.23 It was no better regarding 
the superintendence of the areas the commissioners had responsibility for, commenting 
‘[superintendence] is rather nominal than real’.  
                                                 
20
 Eighth report of Commission on Fees – Victualling Office, 554. 
21
 Eighth report of Commission on Fees – Victualling Office, 554. 
22
 Eighth report of Commission on Fees – Victualling Office, 565-566. 
23
 Eighth report of Commission on Fees – Victualling Office, 567. 
86 
The Fees Commissioners’ comments on supply from overseas ports are also instructive 
and indicate why the separate report for foreign and distant ports included victualling in 
its scope. The commissioners considered it was difficult to obtain value for money, even 
with the checks in place, because frequently an unavoidable reliance on one contractor 
provided opportunities for abuse.
24
 They considered the confidence commanding 
officers had in their pursers ensured a lack of adequate checking and, consequentially, 
the potential for considerable fraud existed at overseas locations. Their 
recommendations to increase effectiveness and counter fraud at these locations were 
included in the ninth report. 
 
As with the other reports, the removal of premiums, fees and emoluments were 
recommended with a corresponding increase in the basic salary, but a considerable 
number of organisational recommendations were also made. Other suggestions 
concerned the composition of the Victualling Board, operation by the use of committees 
and the location and frequency of meetings. The reform of the purser’s system of 
remuneration was also recommended. Essentially this was to increase the amount paid. 
The desire to remove opportunities for abuses at overseas stations, gave rise to the 
commissioners recommending an increased role and responsibility for the captain’s 
clerk in the purser system. They also suggested that before pursers were appointed they 
had to have at least three years experience as a captain’s or admiral’s clerk.25 
 
The Fees Commissioners’ reports on the dock and victualling yards provide a picture of 
their management in Britain up to 1792. By using the ninth report a view can be formed 
on the support given at overseas ports and how the commission thought that the service 
could be improved. 
 




In the preamble to the ninth report the commissioners gave their reasons for devoting a 
separate document on the support provided overseas. It was during their initial 
investigations into the naval and victualling departments, that it appeared to the 
commissioners that overseas provision was ‘replete with fraud and abuse, as to require 
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the adoption of the most decisive measures which may be suggested for their prevention 
in future.’27  
 
The Fees Commissioners’ examination of the departments in Britain was carried out by 
interviewing people employed in the departments. This, together with documentary 
evidence, enabled them to form a coherent view of the departments. However, a 
complete examination of all the overseas bases could not be done in that manner as they 
were only able to interview one individual who had recently worked at such a base.
28
 
Their method of assessment therefore followed a different path, which consisted of the 
examination of the Admiralty, Navy and Victualling Boards records. In spite of this 
limitation the commissioners provided a “snapshot” of the existing establishments. This 
included the current management of the overseas base, the duties performed, the 
underlying reasons why fraud had occurred, and recommendations for the better 
regulation of the civil departments. 
 
In common with the previous reports, the operation of the departments was obtained by 
reference to the duties of the employees. By researching the duties and roles of the 
commander-in-chief or resident commissioner, naval storekeeper and master attendant, 
the underlying operation of the overseas yard was revealed.
29
 From this examination, 
five interacting areas were identified between the commissioner and principal officers, 
consisting of the management of the yard, stores provision, management of the 




2.4.1 Management of the naval yard 
 
All activity in the yard required an element of management, ranging from, discussion 
with the commander-in-chief for refitting priorities within the capacity of the available 
workforce and stores availability, to commercial activities, such as contract 
management and financial control. Ensuring all control mechanisms were in place and 
all tasks were performed correctly was an essential activity to maintain a naval 
squadron. This management activity formed the major role of the resident commissioner 
and naval storekeeper at overseas yards. 
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2.4.2 Stores provision 
 
Providing a place where naval and victualling stores could be supplied to naval ships 
was a primary purpose of Britain’s overseas bases. The provision of secure 
accommodation and the maintenance of serviceable items were fundamental to 
providing this service. Maintaining accurate records of items issued to ships, disposed 
of and the quantity remaining in store, spawned the requirement to obtain replacement 
items. This was achieved by ordering stores from Britain or, if available and at an 
acceptable cost, by purchase from local suppliers. Therefore knowledge of the local 
economy, the changing size and composition of the attached squadron and the capacity 
of existing storehouses, all made considerable intellectual demands on the managers of 
the yard for the timely re-order of stores. 
 
2.4.3 Management of the workforce 
 
Other than the supply of stores the purpose of an overseas naval yard was to refit naval 
vessels. For this a skilled workforce was required together with specialist facilities and 
buildings that also required maintenance. Recording what work was done, the 
consequent payments, and maintaining the required number of artificers with the 
optimum mixture of skills, were all essential to providing a motivated and effective 
workforce. These activities generated the requirement for rules for the supply or 
recruitment of artificers and labourers. These individuals were obtained by local 
recruitment or by requesting the Navy Board for specialists from Britain. As the 
workforce also included clerks and the principal officers, rules were in place for 
temporary appointments until confirmed by the Navy Board or Admiralty. Significantly, 
the recommendation of the commander-in-chief was required for the posts of master 
shipwright and master attendant. 
 
Although recruitment was detailed in the ninth report the rules for dismissal or 
suspension of individuals were not included. Also missing were rules for the care, 
training and treatment of the black slave workforce at Jamaica and Antigua.
31
 These 
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2.4.4 Work done by the workforce 
 
The work performed by the master shipwright and master attendant, apart from 
supervision, was their specialist input in their respective areas. This ranged from 
surveys of ships and buildings to determining the work, stores and individuals required. 
When ships were absent and the yard workforce would be otherwise idle, they either 
maintained the establishment’s facilities or manufactured items such as masts, spars and 
cordage to re-stock the storehouses. A further activity by the master shipwright and 
master attendant was the advice given to the commander-in-chief on the suitability of 
purchasing vessels for the service. 
 




These reports not only provided an important tool for the resident commissioner and 
principal officers in their management of the naval yard, but also gave essential 
information to the Navy and Admiralty Boards for monitoring, controlling and planning 
purposes. 
 
The reports the resident commissioner and principal officers of the yard were required 
to send to the Navy Board are detailed in appendix 2b and show that monthly, quarterly 
and annual reports were requested. The monthly report recorded all the work that had 
been undertaken in the yard and what ships had called at that port in the past month. 
The latter aspect of this report contributed to a picture of actual deployments for the 
Admiralty. The muster lists provided an estimate of the number of people available in 
the yard and in the squadron. To ensure stores issued and purchases made could be 
continually audited the cash accounts and vouchers issued were reported. Providing a 
monthly list of what letters had not been answered, or warrants not executed, provided 
not only a check on the yard, but also indicated if a warrant or letter had not yet arrived 
or had been lost. The quarterly and annual reports provided information on personnel 
numbers, stores status and usage to assist the Navy Board in the following year’s 
estimates.  
 
2.4.6 Salaries and other payments at overseas bases 
 
In common with the previous Fees Commissioners’ reports the payment of fees, 
premiums and emoluments were investigated with the recommendation that they were 
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replaced by an increased basic salary and pension arrangements. Their greatest concern 
in this area was the payment of commission, known as poundage, to the naval 
storekeeper at these overseas bases. The naval storekeeper’s salary although small was 
enhanced by the payment of a percentage charge on every purchase made by that 
officer. The percentage rate allowed was 1
1
/4 percent, equating to 3d in every pound 
spent. In time of war the commission paid had amounted to very large sums. This was 
shown in appendix 3 of the ninth report where the sums granted to naval storekeepers 
since 1755 were listed.
33
 In the case of the naval storekeeper interviewed, Mr. Munton, 
this had totalled to over £4200 from 1779 to 1783. Munton’s annual salary was only 
£200. The commissioners concluded there was evidence that items had been purchased 
at inflated prices with the commission payment system acting as an incentive to this 
practice. 
 
The report listed many examples of suspect contracting practice in both the areas of 
victualling and naval stores. The commissioners considered the purser system had 
potential for fraud as the auditing and control systems in place could be easily 
circumvented. The Fees Commissioners’ disturbing conclusion was, ‘that abuses of the 
most alarming nature had prevailed at foreign stations during the last war; and [ …] that 
those abuses had arisen from the want of a general system’.34 This was amplified by 
stating that the effect of an increase in the number of checks in the system would be 
nugatory, so long as the individuals whose duty it was to detect fraud participated in 
them. The commissioners’ solution was to introduce a system that prevented, rather 
than detected, embezzlement.  
 
2.4.7 Recommended improvements, organisation and responsibilities of resident 
commissioner at overseas bases 
 
The key conclusion of the Fees Commissioners was that the overseas stations should be 
superintended by a person responsible for the whole business of shore support at these 
locations.
35
 Their recommendations were that resident commissioners should reside at 
one of the West Indian islands, Bombay, Halifax and during war at any port where a 
large fleet would rendezvous. Resident commissioners should be a sea officer, a post 
captain, and selected from those who had also been commissioners of the Navy or 
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Victualling Board. The resident commissioners were to be responsible for the conduct 
of every officer and person employed, and for every part of business in both the naval 
and victualling departments. The instructions for resident commissioners at home yards 
were to be complied with, plus the superintendence, control and execution of contracts 
by the Commissioners of Victualling. With these duties the resident commissioners 
were to be representatives of both the Victualling and Navy Boards. 
 
The Fees Commissioners also recommended improvements in obtaining, issuing, 
reporting and accounting for both naval and victualling stores. These ideas consisted of 
reporting what stores had been used and what remained for issue; estimates of items 
required, how many and when they would be needed; ensuring that contractors 
delivered, or kept in their stores, the quantities and type as detailed in the contract; and 
if valid accounts and bills had not been approved by the resident commissioner that 




The composition of the management required at an overseas establishment was also 
recommended by the Fees Commissioners. In the absence of a resident commissioner 
the naval storekeeper was to remain the senior yard officer, with a master shipwright to 
manage the skilled workforce. Where a resident commissioner was appointed, the Fees 
Commissioners considered a master shipwright, master attendant, and naval storekeeper 
were required. All these officers were to be supported by clerks. The Fees 
Commissioners’ recommendations also extended to the salary and accommodation to be 
provided. The resident commissioner was to receive £1200, the naval officer £400, 
master shipwright £350 and the master attendant £300, with all these individuals being 
provided with official accommodation. The salaries for the overseas clerks were also 
recommended and were to receive the same remuneration as those at Portsmouth. The 
commissioners also recognised the expense of living in India and that the above salaries 
were doubled for service at Bombay or Madras. Pensions were also recommended and 




Having proposed the salaries and accommodation to be provided, the Fees 
Commissioners turned their attention to the conditions the officers and clerks were to 
obey. These consisted of an oath of fidelity; providing a bond of  three times their 
annual salary; to not to receive any fee, gratuity, perquisite or emolument; and if found 
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guilty of fraud that the bond was confiscated, they were dismissed from their post and 




In the summing up of their suggestions the Fees Commissioners believed the nation had 
not received the full benefit of her overseas naval bases in the American War of 
Independence. In their opinion this occurred because the bases had either not been 
formed before the war began, or that the bases had been neglected. They stated: ‘The 
system which we have recommended is the best which hath suggested itself to our 
minds; and if the Commissioner who may be appointed to superintend the Foreign 
Establishments are properly selected and execute their trust with zeal and integrity we 
are satisfied that the Public will be most amply compensated for the additional expence 
[sic] which may be incurred during the continuance of peace.’39 The Fees 
Commissioners considered that the expenses they had recommended would bring about 
savings and enhance the service delivered. 
 
The instructions uncovered by the Fees Commissioners suggest a sound system of 
management was in place. It only required that individuals work to their directions, and 
for the checking systems to function correctly, for an effective and economic overseas 
base to be in place. Summarising their enquiry into naval establishments, the 
commissioners noted that most of the abuses of considerable magnitude originated at 
sea, or at a foreign port.
40
 This caused them to comment that the boards in London put 
too much reliance on vouchers, certificates and affidavits. Providing the paper work was 
satisfactory, fraud could not be detected even though collusion between the parties 
involved could easily occur.
41
 The measures they recommended indicated that they saw 
a need to change the culture of the individuals involved to one of public service. By 
placing the whole enterprise in the hands of a resident commissioner they indicated a 
move to an individual being given responsibility for delivering shore naval services.  
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The parliamentary Select Committee on Finance was appointed to examine and state the 
public debt as it stood on 5
th
 January 1797 and how it had changed since 5
th
 January 
1793. They were also tasked with ascertaining the total amount of expected public 




 Charles Abbot, the half brother of 
Jeremy and Samuel Bentham, chaired this committee which produced thirty-six reports 
of which the thirty-first report concerned the Admiralty, dockyards and transports. In 
this latter report, the committee detailed an interview with the comptroller of the Navy 
Board, Sir Andrew Snape Hamond, on the progress of implementing the 
recommendations of the Commission on Fees, for both home dockyards and foreign 
establishments. They also took evidence from Admiral Lord Keith, Vice-Admiral 
Pasley and Sir Samuel Bentham regarding their thoughts on the dockyards. 
 
The evidence examined for this thesis focused on the progress made concerning the 
recommendations of the ninth report of the Commission on Fees, and the opinion of the 
admirals on the post of resident commissioner. However, it is worth noting the progress 
that had been made on implementing the recommendations of the Commission on Fees 
in their sixth report on dockyards. What becomes evident was that the removal of fees 
and gratuities and their replacement by enhanced salaries had not yet occurred. Nor had 
the resident commissioners been issued with instructions, correspondence sent via their 
office, or been relieved from paying ships afloat. What had been introduced were the 
measures regarding principal officers being present to check the quality of stores 
delivered; the Portsmouth stores system had been adopted at all yards; and the 
establishment of the Transport Board had removed from the dockyard officers any tasks 
concerning the arrangement of transports.
44
 The subsequent work of the Transport 
Board was considered to have been so well administered that it was subsequently 
rewarded with additional management responsibility. Initially, this occurred in 1795 for 
the responsibility of prisoners of war. This was followed in 1806 by absorption of the 
Sick and Wounded Board into the Transport Board. 
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The replies by Hamond concerning the implementation of the recommendations of the 
Commission on Fees are revealing as they illustrate the power of the Navy Board. His 
answers indicate that only one of the recommendations had been introduced, but that the 
recommendations were sound, for example he commented, ‘very proper to be 
established’, ‘very proper’, ‘proper to be adopted’.45 However, he considered the Navy 
Board did not have the power or right to bring about the changes. 
 
The only recommendations that had been implemented concerned the removal of 
servants
46
 from yard officers at overseas yards, together with a compensation payment 
to these individuals. The servants themselves instead were allocated to ships on the 
overseas station; this looks to have been in the power of the Navy Board, as it related to 
payment of their staff. The other recommendations made by the Commission of Fees 
focused on the appointment of resident commissioners, with a complete allocation of 
principal officers. Hamond, by his comments, conveyed his view that this was a good 
idea, but that it was not in place. As a resident commissioner was an appointment of the 
Admiralty, it was their decision to decide where they would be placed, together with the 
size of management present at an overseas establishment. It would seem the comptroller 
considered the Navy Board’s role was to advise and the Admiralty’s role to decide and 
direct. 
 
The appointment and powers of resident commissioners had featured strongly in the 
recommendations of the Fees Commissioners, but the select committee discovered, 
from the evidence of Hamond, that the position had not changed. Instructions to resident 
commissioners had not been issued, or all communication routed via his office. 
Likewise, the selection of a resident commissioner was still that of a senior captain, but 
without previous experience as a commissioner at the Navy Board. The select 
committee also asked Admiral Lord Keith and Vice-Admiral Pasley their opinions 
regarding resident commissioners, with both replying that these officers should have 
complete authority over their dockyard.
47
 The findings of the select committee seem to 
indicate that very little had changed at the yards at home or overseas, but the setting up 
of the Transport Board in 1794 had been a major step forward.  
 
The select committee had been established in response to the financial crisis in 1797, 
arising from a crisis in liquidity and government credit. The government not only 
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needed more income from taxation, but realistic naval estimates. Pitt’s government 
increased taxation in a number of areas and eventually introduced income-tax for the 
first time in 1799. Prior to this crisis, the navy had been funded by navy estimates that 
consisted of three elements; the Ordinary, the Extra and the Sea Service. The Ordinary 
estimate contained the baseline costs of fixed infrastructure, civil boards, victualling, 
dockyards, ships in reserve, pensions and the salaries of half-pay officers. The Extra 
estimate consisted of the costs of exceptional and non-recurring items, for example, 
changes to fixed infrastructure, new ships and major refits. The Sea Service estimate 
was the expected cost of maintaining men and ships in service at a rate of £4 per sailor 
per lunar month. This was allocated at 30 shillings for wages, 27 shillings for wear and 
tear (maintenance of ship and equipment), 19 shillings for victualling and, finally, 4 
shillings going to the Ordnance Board. 
 
The estimate requiring a substantial increase was for the Sea Service, as it had remained 
at the same level since Cromwell’s time and had resulted in chronic underfunding 
causing a naval debt to be an everlasting feature of government finance in both peace 
and war. The Admiralty overcame this by resorting to innovative, but costly methods to 
obtain naval items and services from suppliers. Essentially, the navy purchased items 
and services on credit and delayed payment till additional funds were available. The 
suppliers would provide their goods and services and on presenting their bills would be 
provided with a promise that they would be paid in due course. These navy bills became 
a financial commodity, with those who needed their money selling their bills at 
considerable discounts. When one considers the navy’s creditors also included its 
dockyard personnel, who obtained loans on the strength of their expected pay, it can be 
of no surprise that it proved difficult to remove their rights to take home “waste” timber, 
known as chips, from the yards – a ready source of cash. 
 
Following the Great Mutinies at Spithead and the Nore in 1797, sailors’ pay was 
increased and influenced a rise in the Sea Service allowance to £7 per man per lunar 
month. This was allocated as follows: 37 shillings for wages, 60 shillings for wear and 
tear, 38 shillings for victualling and finally 5 shillings going to the Ordnance Board.
48
 
As the allocated split was heavily biased to the “wear and tear” and “victualling” 
categories it suggests the government used the financial crisis and naval mutinies to 
more accurately match expenditure to income. Binney comments, ‘Had the customary 
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procedures of the Admiralty Board been the same as that of the Secretary of War, there 
would have been virtually no Navy Debt, no heavy fundings of Navy Bills during or 
after war, little or no interest charge, and no enhancement of contract prices to cover 
discount in the market’.49 Binney further concluded, ‘The reform of the estimating in 
1797 included a reform in estimating for contingencies, and was so effective that 
thereafter in Course Bills were uniformly payable 90 days after date. The interest charge 
disappeared, and no material Navy Debt oppressed the market nor harassed the 
ministry.’50  
 
The recommendations of the Fees Commissioners for overseas yards had not been 
introduced by 1797 but fundamental reorganisation had occurred in the navy. The 
Transport Board had been established, the Navy Board had been re-organised, 
Dalrymple had been appointed as Hydrographer and Bentham was the Inspector 
General of Naval Works.  
 
The more realistic funding of the naval service, by an increase of 175 percent in the Sea 
Service estimate, created financial room for the creeping adoption into naval civil 
departments of higher salaries. This was with the corresponding removal of other 
methods of payment, thus shaping a new culture of service. This fundamental cultural 
change was therefore introduced first in the Navy Office, followed by the Victualling 
Board in 1800 and the home dockyards in 1801, but it was not until 1811 that this 




2.6 St. Vincent, Reform and the Commission of Naval Enquiry, (1802-1804) 
 
The background to the Commission of Naval Enquiry
52
 is implicitly tied to the 
administration of Earl St. Vincent as first lord of the Admiralty.
53
 Much has been 
written concerning his tenure in charge of the British navy, but maybe the best judge is 
the prime minister whose ministry had to deal with the consequences of St. Vincent’s 
actions. Pitt stated of St. Vincent, in March 1804, that his leadership as first lord 
consisted of, ‘That blind and false confidence which exposes the safety of our country’ 
and considered him ‘less brilliant and less able in a civil capacity than in that of a 
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warlike one.’54 This reflected what Middleton had predicted in 1801, ‘Sea officers 
[probably referring to St. Vincent] are very seldom judges of the civil branches of the 
navy […] They imbibe prejudices against the civil boards and overturn in ignorance 
what has cost ages and long experience to establish.’55  
 
For this thesis only the first report of the Commission of Naval Enquiry needs to be 
considered.
56
 This was the only report of that commission that investigated any aspect 
of an overseas naval yard’s operation. What it examined was the conduct of naval 
storekeepers at Jamaica. Considerable evidence of fraud by the storekeepers was 
detailed in this report, together with the opinion that the Navy Board had not acted on 
information to prevent this from occurring, or of obtaining reparation. The complete 
report consisted of 114 pages containing 55 appendices of supporting evidence. It was a 
very comprehensive report of the poor management and checking by the Navy Board on 
the fraud of the various storekeepers, but it was very insubstantial regarding 
recommendations for improvement. It was more about rebuking the Navy Board than 
about improving the performance of the yards. The recommendations emphasised the 
need to operate to the existing regulations, trust to oaths by the storekeeper and ensure 
the Navy Board promptly checked the returns of the overseas officers. Surprisingly, the 
commissioners did not recommend the solution that the Commission on Fees suggested, 
that of an empowered resident commissioner. However, there is evidence that resident 
commissioners had their authority strengthened by St. Vincent.
57
 This is evident in the 





These proposed instructions to Charles Stirling and Charles Lane, the recently 
appointed Jamaica and Antigua resident commissioners, contained detailed instructions 
from the Admiralty for the superintendence of naval business.
59
 These officers were the 
first resident commissioners to be appointed in these ports since the War of American 
Independence and show a close alignment with the recommendations of the Fees 
Commissioners. Prior to these appointments, resident commissioners had only been 
appointed to the overseas yards at Halifax, Gibraltar and Lisbon, in the Revolutionary 
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 The instructions totalled twenty-nine separate articles and collectively illustrate 
the responsibilities of an overseas resident commissioner considered necessary at that 
time. These instructions confirmed the role of the overseas yards, as described in 
chapter one and the duties of the civil officers found in the ninth report of the 
Commission on Fees. Significantly, these instructions only detailed the role and 
responsibilities for a manager of the naval repair and supply yard, as superintendence of 
the victualling or medical departments, as recommended by the Fees Commissioners, 
was missing. It was to be the Commission for Naval Revision that addressed changes in 
the management of these departments at overseas bases. This commission was also to 
provide a comprehensive reform, or change, programme for the civil departments of the 
British navy. 
 
2.7 Commission for Revising and Digesting the Civil Affairs of His Majesty’s Navy, 
(1805-1809) 
 
William Pitt returned as prime minister in 1804, with Henry Dundas, now Lord 
Melville, as the first lord of the Admiralty, and realised the Commission of Naval 
Enquiry had raised expectations in parliament for the reform of the dockyards. Pitt and 
Melville considered that a commission for revising the management of the civil naval 
departments was needed and approached Middleton for his views and to be chairman of 
the commission. Middleton now had the chance to complete the work that he initiated 
via the recommendations of the Commission on Fees, and agreed to be chairman of the 
new commission. The commission was established on 8
th
 January 1805 with Middleton 
as chairman and contained two admirals, Roger Curtis and William Domett, plus two 
administrators, John Fordyce and Ambrose Serle, with the latter being a member of the 
Transport Board.
61
 The brief of the commission was to revise the instructions for the 
civil naval departments, a rationalisation exercise, and produce a digest of instructions 
for each department.
62
 It was not to end there, as they were also to review the un-
adopted suggestions of the Commission on Fees, of Naval Enquiry and the 1797 Select 
Committee on Finance. If they found these suggestions practical they were to find ways 
of bringing them into being. This was to be a commission to execute change. 
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A table of reports produced by the commission are shown in appendix 2d and it can be 
seen that, while the majority concentrated on the home civil organisation, the fifth, 
twelfth and thirteenth reports concerned the organisation overseas. These are the 
documents that are examined below with the sixth report also providing a valuable 
insight into the operation of supply bases. The sixth report concerned the operation of 
the British naval out-ports of Deal, Harwich, Leith, Falmouth and Kinsale which were 
essentially supply bases for naval stores with a very minor refitting capability. The only 
post expected to be filled was that of the naval storekeeper whose duties were detailed 
in the report. Their role was similar to the British overseas yards and has echoes of the 
bases described in chapter one. 
 




This report consisted of an introductory section, dated and signed by the commissioners, 
followed by the instructions for the resident commissioner, general instructions for all 
officers and finally individual directions for the principal officers. The report was 





In the introductory section the commission reviewed the existing digest book of 
instructions for foreign yards that had been revised in January 1800. They found defects 
in the layout of the instructions and felt that would prevent them being clearly 
understood. They also noted there was a lack of understanding concerning which 
records to keep and send to the Navy Board, leading to a lack of uniformity in returns 
between the yards. The opportunity was also taken to redraft and issue instructions to 
improve the checking systems and reduce expenditure in obtaining stores. The 
commissioners also undertook to ensure that the instructions which had been issued to 
the officers of the home yards were reflected in those for overseas yards. 
 
The influence of the ninth report of the Commission on Fees was shown in the 
agreement for the need for resident commissioners at overseas yards to have 
responsibility for other civil naval departments. This they expanded beyond the 
responsibility for the victualling department to include that of overseas naval hospitals. 
It was also recommended that commanders-in-chief on foreign stations were to be 
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provided with the instructions of the officers of the Navy, Victualling and Transport 
Boards. This was an extension of the recommendation of the Commissioners of Naval 
Enquiry that the instructions of Navy Board officers were sent to the commander-in-
chief.  
 
The commissioners then turned their attention to the locations at which resident 
commissioners should be located. They noted that these officers had now been posted to 
Jamaica, Antigua and Malta, in addition to Halifax and Gibraltar, and proposed that an 
additional two commissioners were appointed to the East Indies. This was a reiteration 
of the recommendations of the Commission on Fees in 1788, with the addition of an 
extra commissioner in the East Indies. This suggestion was urged as a result of the 
financial expenditure in the east and after consultation with Admiral Rainier, the 
recently returned commander-in-chief. This additional commissioner was to be 
stationed at Madras, but also to have responsibility for the yard at Penang and facilities 
at Calcutta. If the squadron was to re-locate to Trincomalee then the commissioner was 
also to assume responsibility for that location. The commissioners also proposed that a 
resident commissioner was appointed to the Cape of Good Hope. With the complement 
of senior managers having been advocated, the report went on to set out the number of 
officers to be appointed at each establishment with their current and recommended 




A number of interesting features are evident in the structure and salaries proposed. The 
salaries were dependant on location, with an equalising of salary of the master attendant 
and master shipwright posts. The resident commissioner was provided with a number of 
staff to assist him. By reference to the Salary and Pension lists of the Navy and 
Admiralty
66
 it will be seen these salaries were broadly introduced, but some took time to 
be fully instituted. These documents also provide an indication of the career progression 
of individuals at the Navy Board and overseas yards.
67
 Career progression was 
recommended in the Commission of Naval Revision with the overseas yard postings for 
resident commissioners, principal officers and clerks as a training ground for posts in 
Britain. The only officer excluded from this proposal was the master shipwright due to 
the following reason: ‘[these] officers are usually selected from among the Carpenters 
of Ships, to appoint them to any of the situations, in their line, in the Dock Yards at 
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home, would interfere with the Regulations contained in our Third Report;
68
 by which it 
is prescribed that those Officers should be filled by persons educated as apprentices of 
the superior class, in the manner we have proposed.’69 
 
Chapters three, four, five, six and seven examine the resident commissioner post at the 
overseas yards, where the instructions they were given, will be assessed.  
 
Description Number of instructions or articles 
Resident commissioner 19 
General Instructions 162 
Naval storekeeper 40 
Master attendant 19 
Master shipwright 18 
 
Table 2b:  Number of instructions detailed in fifth report of Commission of Naval 
Revision 
 
Table 2b provides an indication of the intricacy of the management and tasks of the 
commissioner and his principal officers by the number of separate articles. Briefly the 
instructions to the principal officers adhere to the following layout. They were 
answerable for the conduct of their staff and that those they recruited had the skills and 
experience to perform their duties. Specialism specific instructions concerning their role 
were provided together with details on the interaction expected between the storekeeper, 
master shipwright and master attendant. 
 
An example of the interacting instructions between the master attendant and master 
shipwright can be seen in directions for careening ships. The eleventh article of the 
master attendant’s instructions and the tenth article of the master shipwright’s 
instructions both relate to careening vessels. They stated these officers should render 
assistance to each other, attend the ship during heaving down and ensure the careening 




The Commission of Naval Revision incorporated the regulations introduced for 
dockyards by the Order in Council in May 1801 into their instructions for the overseas 
naval yards. Included in these regulations were the terms of employment and conditions 
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of service for yard personnel. Those familiar with employment in the public service will 
find it comforting to see cardinal principles in place. Employees were to work for the 
public with no private employment. This included not working in any private capacity 
for dockyard officers, or in the case of the clerks as agents for other government 
employees. The taking of fees, premiums, emoluments, gratuities or presents of any 
kind was banned, with suspension and eventual dismissal if proved. To reinforce these 
instructions, clerks and officers swore written oaths not to receive any unauthorised 
rewards and to provide a bond of three times their salaries. The principle of 
confidentiality was also detailed stating information was not to be divulged to those not 
entitled to receive the information. 
 
Injured or sick officers, clerks and established workmen were to receive free treatment 
from the surgeon of the hospital, with hired workmen to be treated if they received 
injury while in the execution of their duty. Compensation was in place if a workman 
was injured performing his work. Superannuation terms were in place for officers and 
clerks, but workmen were dependant on the resident commissioner’s recommendation 
for such treatment. Care of establishment employees’ families who became sick was 
subsequently introduced. 
 
Outlined in the general instructions were the duties of the porter who was responsible 
for all aspects of security and fire prevention in the yard. He supervised the wardens and 
watchmen who acted as the police and fire prevention staff in the dockyard. Their 
collective jobs were to maintain a secure boundary and only allow entrance and exit to 
the yard by authorised personnel. They were the precursors of the modern Ministry of 
Defence police and guard service. 
 
Holidays, leave and working hours were also detailed in the instructions, with salaries 
and wages being paid monthly to all employees at the local yard. The only exceptions to 
this local payment practice were the resident commissioner and naval storekeeper who 
were paid in London. 
 
The terms and conditions of employment detailed in the instructions have many of the 
features of modern employment practice with regular pay, sick leave, welfare, pensions, 
holidays and leave. The yard employee was to only work for the public, not to receive 
bribes, in the case of officers and clerks to swear oaths concerning their accounts and 
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actions and not to divulge information to unauthorised people. The latter point provides 
similarity to modern public servants signing the Official Secret Act.  
 





In the introduction to their twelfth report, the Commissioners of Naval Revision 
recorded that the existing instructions for agent victuallers abroad had been in existence 
for over 100 years and were ill-suited for current requirements. They redrafted the 
instructions to conform as much as possible to those for the home victualling 
organisation. A system of accounts and vouchers was also instituted to prevent a 
reoccurrence of the abuses recorded in the Commission on Fees report. The 
Commissioners of Naval Revision pointed out the main difference between the role of 
the agent victualler at home and abroad being the checks that naturally occurred in 
Britain. The commissioners considered that the appointment of a resident commissioner 
with a superintending role over the victualling department would provide the checks 
required. In framing the instructions for the agent victualler abroad, the commissioners 
provided details on how the resident commissioner and agent victualler were to interact 
together with their respective duties. 
 
The instructions for the agent victualler amounted to 100 in number, with the resident 
commissioner having direct interaction with nineteen of these instructions. In the 
second instruction, the overall responsibility of the victualling establishment was vested 
with the commander-in-chief, who had full authority over every person in the 
establishment. The agent’s role was very similar to that of the naval storekeeper, as his 
duties consisted of, stores management and security; financial and contract 
management; supervision of the victualling staff consisting of clerks, artificers 
(coopers), labours, and wardens; and reporting to the London board on current status 
and future requirements. 
 
What to pay the staff overseas and future employment was also considered in the report. 
Appendix 2e shows the recommendation the commissioners made in reply to the 
request by the Victualling Board to increase the salaries of its overseas staff at Gibraltar, 
Malta and the Cape. Only increases for Malta staff were agreed and then to a lower 
level to that proposed. As with the naval yard officers a career path for the overseas 
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victualling agents was proposed, with appointment to a home department on satisfactory 
completion of five years service abroad. 
 
The overseas resident commissioner’s primary function concerning the victualling 
establishment was one of financial and contract management, with the addition as an 
auditor together with a reporting line to the Victualling Board. 
 





The thirteenth report referenced the ninth and seventh reports of the Commissioners of 
Naval Revision, that of the transport organisation and hospitals in Britain. The report 
contained instructions for the officers of the three sections of the transport organisation 
abroad: the agents of transports; the officers of the hospital; and the agent for prisoners 
of war abroad. Particular effort was made to make the instructions for the overseas 
locations as similar as possible to those in Britain, and was particularly evident in the 
instructions given to the officers of the overseas hospitals. Although the hospital staff 
were superintended by the commander-in-chief, superintendence of financial and 
contract management was to be carried out by the resident commissioner. 
 
The instructions, which provided for a surgeon, an agent of the hospital and the 
dispenser at each of the overseas hospitals, were comprehensive and provide an 
illuminating insight into these institutions. The surgeon was the first officer of the 
hospital who was to obey the instructions of the commander-in-chief unless it 
contradicted his medical opinion. With the agent of the hospital being the financial, 
contract and storekeeping officer and the dispenser acting as the keeper and supplier of 
medical stores, the management of the hospital was complete. A matron, nurses, 
dispenser’s assistant, hospital mates (also known as servants), and labourers completed 
the staffing of the hospital. Rules for running the hospital and caring for the patients 
covered the following procedures: admission; cleanliness and sterilisation; infectious 
disease precautions; treatment procedures including individual patient record in hospital 
care book; diet control of patients; vaccination programme for smallpox; discharge 
procedure to return to work or sending patient home to Britain; and finally reporting to 
the Transport Board (Sick and Hurt). 
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As described above the agent of the hospital worked in partnership with the surgeon to 
provide the logistical support required. He found himself in a confused situation 
regarding his management as, while the commander-in-chief had full power over him, 
the new instructions gave the resident commissioner control over the financial and 
contract aspects of his role.  
 
In common with the other civil naval posts the surgeon, agent and dispenser were 
banned from receiving fees, premiums and emoluments. They all had to provide oaths 
and bonds equal to three times their salaries, but in the case of the agent he also had to 
provide two additional sureties of £1000. Additional restrictions were set on the surgeon 
consisting of having no interest in firms providing medicines, or having a private 
practice. 
 
The instructions of the Commissioners of Naval Revision were comprehensive and 
provided a sound set of instructions, which if complied with would produce an 
economical and effective logistics organisation. How the fifth, twelfth and thirteenth 
reports worked in practice will be examined in chapters third, four, five, six, and seven 
to determine if they were effective and whether problems arose. The key difference 
before and after the implementation of the Commission of Naval Revision was the 
introduction of a resident commissioner with his superintending role extended to 
include the victualling and hospital departments. The relationship he was to have with 
the commander-in-chief and the agents of the victualling and hospital overseas 
departments was to be the crucial factor in delivering financial savings and 
improvements in service. 
 
2.7.4 Fourteenth and fifteenth reports of the Commission of Naval Revision 
 
These reports were not published and remained with the Admiralty and Navy Boards as 
their content was considered secret. The fourteenth report considered in detail the 
subject of supply and use of the most vital strategic material required by the navy, that 
of timber. The fifteenth report was more diverse as it not only covered supply and use of 
other strategic naval materials, but also major improvement projects. Amongst these 
projects was the building of Northfleet dockyard, improving access for vessels to 
Woolwich and Deptford and the proposed building of the massive breakwater in 
Plymouth Sound. It is not difficult therefore to understand the reasons for declaring the 
content of the reports as secret. 
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The relevance of these reports to this thesis lies in the overseas areas that were 
considered as sources of strategic materials. In the introduction of the timber report it 
stated its purpose was to consider future supplies and usage with an update of the report 
of 1792 on timber resources on crown lands.
73
 Although the fourteenth report 
considered all potential timber resources in Britain, it also looked overseas to its 
colonial lands, European sources and to the potential of other areas. Parts one and two 
of the report evaluated British’s timber resource, with part three reporting on foreign 
sources. The supply of timber was not the only concern of the document, as methods of 
reducing consumption by eliminating waste, or substitution of other materials, were 
covered in part four. 
 
Part three of the timber report was itself divided into four geographical sections, North 
America, East Indies, Trinidad and near coasts of Central America, and finally other 
potential sources.
74
 This final section included such diverse geographical locations as 
the shores of the Mediterranean, New South Wales, New Zealand, Cape of Good Hope, 
the Brazils and the west coast of South America. The investigation and exploitation of 
the East Indies is examined in chapter seven.  
 
Another strategic naval material, hemp, was of considerable importance to Britain and 
the fifteenth report illustrates this with a number of appendices being devoted to the 
subject. Obtaining hemp from North America was considered, as was encouragement 
for growing hemp in Ireland with an Act of Parliament for the cultivation of that plant 
being considered. However, appendix 147 of the report shows the quantities of hemp 
imported into Britain in the year from 1797 to 1806. This illustrated the overwhelming 




This dependence on Russia can be seen in figure 2b with an average of 95 per cent of 
the total quantity imported to Britain coming from that country. Only during the year of 
peace, following the Treaty of Amiens did this percentage fall below 90 per cent. What 
could be considered of greatest concern for Britain was the limited amount of hemp 
being provided from British controlled territory, or Asian areas. 
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The necessity for a secure source of hemp for the manufacture of cordage was essential 
to Britain to ensure its merchant and naval fleets could continue sailing. This is shown 
in the fifteenth report of the Commission of Naval Revision by the methods that were 
proposed to mitigate the dependence on Russia. With the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 and 
Russia being at war with Britain, obtaining this strategic material was at grave risk. 
Stockpiling, alternative sources, re-use, new methods of cordage manufacture and 
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2.8  Summary 
 
The decade prior to the start of the wars with France in 1793 was one when a 
remarkable interest in the civil departments of the British navy was shown by her 
parliament and government. A climate of reform was engendered as a result of the 
disastrous American war. This reform initially consisted of the government proposing 
methods for more economic and effective management of the country’s affairs. 
Parliamentary commissions were raised and bills produced that resulted not only in 
changes in financial governance but also in how the East India Company was to be 
regulated.
77
 What was to become significant was how government employees should be 
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financially rewarded. The new climate of reform and regulation challenged the culture 
that had been in place since the restoration of Charles II. 
 
The investigations of the Commission to enquire into the Fees, Gratuities, Perquisites, 
and Emoluments in the naval departments of the British navy provided many insights 
into contemporary management and prevailing attitudes. The view of the financial 
rewards of employees is instructive. Officers and clerks considered their posts as 
personal property which particularly affected their recruitment, promotion and 
retirement. The system of fees can be thought of as an incentive system, directly related 
to work done, yet it encouraged the clerks to make the priorities. It also caused 
individuals to hold on to high fee-paying posts which caused stagnation in promotions. 
The Fees Commissioners recommended an increase in basic salaries to a level 
approximately equal to the total earnings being legally made and suggested methods of 
ensuring it was cost neutral to the State. 
 
Although the Fees Commissioners’ reports concerning the home dockyards, victualling 
and foreign yard organisations collected and recommended changes in the payment of 
individuals, its observations and recommendations also provide insights into 
contemporary methods of management. Strong and meaningful local managers in the 
person of resident commissioners, experienced in both sea-going and civil naval 
organisation, was a key recommendation. They also believed the systems of checks on 
fraud were insufficient and that existing documentation reflected more on the people 
operating the procedures, than the existence of embezzlement. They believed that 
increasing the basic salaries, removing other payment methods and stifling fraud at its 
birth by better management, abuses would be greatly reduced if not eliminated. 
 
Following the reports of the Commission on Fees being considered by the Privy 
Council, with their subsequent decision to pass them to the relevant departments for 
comment, it was not until 1793 before any of the Fee Commissioner’s recommendations 
were introduced. Figure 2a provides a diagram of the changes that were made to the 
civil departments of the navy showing the implementation of the Commission on Fees 
recommendations and those of the subsequent Commissions of Naval Enquiry and 
Revision.  
 
The Select Committee on Finance in 1797 discovered that the Fees Commissioners’ 
recommendations for resident commissioners had not been introduced and that these 
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officers had not been appointed to the East and West Indies bases. Subsequently, it was 
not until the start of the Napoleonic War that resident commissioners were appointed to 
Jamaica and Antigua. Although these officers were provided with comprehensive 
written instructions, they only concerned the naval yard aspects of refit and supply of 
naval ships, with no responsibility for the victualling and transport departments.  
 
It was to be the Commission of Naval Revision that introduced resident commissioners 
into the East Indies and the Cape of Good Hope. This commission also recommended 
that resident commissioners were given full authority over naval yard functions, and 
superintendence of financial and commercial affairs of the victualling department, 
together with the naval hospital at overseas locations. Career paths were envisioned for 
overseas commissioners, principal officers and clerks in home naval departments. The 
Commission of Naval Revision also rationalised the instructions for officers and clerks, 
provided common forms to be used throughout the overseas bases and hence promoted 
standardisation. 
 
The Commission of Naval Revision not only recommended and introduced rationalised 
processes and reward systems at both home and abroad by 1809, but also improvements 
in infrastructure and production techniques. This is most easily seen in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth reports of the commission and although these reports were never published 
their contents is instructive. Obtaining and use of strategic materials occupied 
considerable thought, with timber and hemp being most noticeable. The overseas bases 
were to become a focus from which timber and hemp investigations could be made.  
 
Thirteen years elapsed from the completion of the Commission on Fees reports on the 
Navy Office, dockyards and overseas naval yards in 1788, to the introduction of the 
commissioners’ recommendations into the dockyards in 1801. Organisational 
restructuring was completed relatively quickly but changing the reward system required 
cultural transformation. The removal of fees, changes in apprentice allocation and 
substitution of an allowance for chips to artificers by 1801 could be considered an 
impressive timescale. 
 
Alternatively it could be considered that the Commission on Fees was irrelevant as its 
recommendations took 23 years before they were introduced at Madras.
78
 However, 
historians have examined other British governmental organisational changes and have 
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discovered delivering such modifications require considerable time. Harold Laski in his 
study of British parliamentary government found that an average of 19 years elapsed for 
the recommendations of a unanimous Royal Commission to come into effect, and 30 
years if the Commission was divided.
79
 Peter Hennessy in his examination of the post 
war government of Britain from 1945 to 1951 found himself in agreement with Laski on 




In the light of Laski’s and Hennessy’s findings the time required to reorganise the civil 
naval departments was normal rather than unusual. Considering the cultural change 
required and the nation being at war for almost the entire period, the reorganisation was 
achieved in a creditable timescale. 
 
This chapter has provided the background to the reform of Britain’s civil naval 
departments with particular relevance to overseas naval bases. With the appointment of 
resident commissioners to the East Indies and the Cape of Good Hope in 1808/9, a 
prime recommendation of the Commission on Fees had been adopted. How this worked 
in practice, how the problems encountered were overcome, and how the building of new 
facilities and exploitation of resources was achieved is explored in the remainder of this 
thesis.  
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Chapter three     The management of British overseas bases in the Revolutionary 




This chapter surveys the location of the various naval and forward replenishment bases 
that were established, however temporarily, in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 
The size and composition of the squadrons deployed at overseas commands is reviewed. 
This shows the British navy reached its peak numbers in 1809 when Britain’s overseas 
commands also attained their maximum numbers. 
 
Chapters one and two have shown the overseas naval yards were primarily for the re-
supply of ships with naval stores, but with the capability to perform limited refits. As 
the number of vessels deployed by the Admiralty reached its maximum in 1809, the 
principal overseas bases have been examined for that year to determine if ship repairs 
were still of a limited nature at the naval yards. To reveal the core establishment of 
management and support personnel, artificers and labourers involved in refit work the 
organisation of the naval yards and the composition of the workforce is studied.   
 
The rationale for the range and quantity of naval stores to be placed at overseas yards is 
examined, together with a discussion on the limitations different policies on stores 
would make on the type of refits that could be performed at these yards. 
 
The Commissions on Fees and Naval Revision placed considerable faith in the civil 
departments of Britain’s overseas naval bases being superintended by resident 
commissioners. This chapter examines the history and developing role of this post and 
the introduction of extended powers to resident commissioners when serving overseas. 
 
3.1 Survey and location of Britain’s naval refitting and supply bases 
 
At the commencement of the Revolutionary War with France in 1793, Britain had four 
overseas naval yards at Halifax, Jamaica, Antigua and Gibraltar, with only Halifax 
having a commissioner in residence. By the close of the Napoleonic War in 1815 the 






Figure 3a: Location of Britain’s overseas naval bases in 1814 
 
KEY Source
Home Dockyard with Resident Commissioner ADM 106 Home and Foreign Dockyard records, TNA
Foreign naval yard with Resident Commissioner ADM 7-823, Salary and Pensions  attached to Navy Board, TNA
Superintendent of Building Marshall, J., Royal Navy Biography, London, 1827
Base under occupation with Naval Storekeeper as senior Navy Board officer. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
Base under control of Harbour Master Canadian Dictionary of National Biography
Australian Dictionary of National Biography



























Calcutta EIC port with private dry docks and home of Bengal Marine. Naval Agent present but docks and use of facilities not recommended or approved by Navy Board
Bombay
Madras EIC port. Open road stead. Naval hospital
Penang EIC Port. From 1805 contract to build a frigate for British navy.
Trincomalee
Cape of Good Hope
Port Louis (Mauritius)
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Figure 3a shows the location of Britain’s overseas naval bases when Napoleon 
abdicated in 1814. Numbers 1 to 14 were official bases, with letters a to e indicating the 
locations where ports had recently made a contribution to supporting the navy. 
Heligoland, number 15, only had a harbour master after capture in 1807 and was used to 
circumvent Napoleon’s Continental blockade and as a centre for espionage and 
smuggling.
1
 The building of the naval yard at Trincomalee was underway, with the 
naval shore services slowly re-locating from Madras. Port Jackson, while of very little 
value as a repair base, is included to show the support network that had been built. 
Figure 3b complements figure 3a as it provides a chart of the naval yards, including the 
home dockyards, which operated in these wars. The timescale used for this chart was 
extended to 1832 to follow the careers of resident commissioners.  
 
Many of the naval bases were of a temporary nature, usually a result of a transitory 
operational need, being returned to the sovereign power or simply abandoned because 
they could not be defended. Amongst such bases were Toulon in 1793, Ajaccio on 
Corsica (1794-1796),
2
 Cape Nicola on Saint Domingue in 1798 and Monte Video 
(Montevideo) in 1807. Although these locations were untenable, the operational need 
for bases in these areas was still required. Cape Nicola was only briefly occupied and, 
with Jamaica close by, its abandonment was not logistically important. The River Plate 
operation in 1807 resulted in the need for a local base to support the invading squadron, 
with Monte Video being chosen, but was soon evacuated after the defeat of the British 
army. However, in 1808 following the evacuation of the Portuguese Royal Family to 
Brazil, South America became a separate naval command. The British naval squadron 
attached to this station was subsequently supported by a formal Navy Board base at Rio 




Chapter one demonstrated the search for a base in the western Mediterranean which 
resulted in Gibraltar and Minorca being secured, one as a sentry box and the other as a 
fleet base to cover Toulon. At the start of the Revolutionary War the scene was very 
promising with Royalists in Toulon and access available to Minorca, Genoa and 
Leghorn for Lord Hood’s fleet. Very quickly, however all were lost, with Britain 
attempting to remain in the Toulon area by using Leghorn, and the placing of a naval 
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base at Ajaccio following the British occupation of Corsica. The subsequent entry of 
Spain into the war as an ally of France and the loss of access to north Italian ports in 
1796, led to the abandonment of Corsica and withdrawal of the British fleet from the 
Mediterranean. This left Gibraltar as being the only base available to the British in the 
Mediterranean, with her fleet being stationed at Lisbon.  On Britain’s return to the 
Mediterranean, bases were again required, resulting in the capture of Minorca in 1798. 
The acquisition of Malta in 1800 provided a secure location to station ships in the 
central Mediterranean, with Alexandria providing a base in the east, following the 
French surrender of that port in September 1801. The British soon departed from 
Alexandria in March 1803, possibly in compliance with the Eleventh Article of the 
Treaty of Amiens.
4
 The Tenth Article of that Treaty concerned Malta, with Britain 
agreeing to return the island to the Knights of St. John, with Malta’s independence 
being guaranteed by the European powers. The refusal of the British to leave Malta, and 
the general distrust of the French by the British leadership, resulted in the 
recommencement of hostilities in 1803 with the Mediterranean a critical theatre. 
 
Gibraltar and Malta were once again essential bases, with the latter being able to 
provide considerable capacity to service the fleet, but an additional supply base and 
anchorage for the squadron blockading Toulon was required. Nelson had considered 
such a base in March 1796 by suggesting that a bay on Sardinia be examined.
5
 
However, it was only the result of his flagship being dismasted in May 1798 that 
provided an opportunity to gauge local acceptance of using Sardinia’s bays. Not only 
did the Vanguard use the San Pietro anchorage, but Nelson and Saumarez charmed the 
local commandant into providing food.
6
 Although the potential of these anchorages had 
been recognised it was not until late 1803 that these Sardinian bays were used more 




An informal refuge, or forward support base, was important in Britain’s logistics 
network as it supplemented the naval bases and allied ports. Figure 1a in chapter one 
provided a map of the Mediterranean showing the principal ports and the proximity of 
Sardinia to Toulon, hence its value to Nelson in the absence of access to Minorca. Also 
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to be seen was how the British countered a French threat to the eastern Mediterranean. 
The British feared Napoleon would launch another adventure to Egypt with a possible 
onward thrust to India. This offensive would have been launched via the Adriatic, so a 
British squadron was placed at the Strait of Otranto to block the French. Britain resorted 
to the occupation of the Ionian Islands
8
 to provide a forward replenishment base to 
supplement Malta.
9
 As with ships going to Sardinia there was no need for vessels to 
return to Malta for anything other than repair, thus maximising a ship’s time on station.   
 
These Mediterranean replenishment bases were reflected in other seas. For example, 
Britain’s Baltic fleet obtained support from Swedish ports, even when at war with that 
country.
10
 The vessels using the trading routes in the Atlantic called at Madeira, Cape 
Verde Islands and St. Helena, with Madeira becoming a particular favourite calling 
place for British ships. A consequence of France threatening Portugal in 1807 caused 
Britain to occupy and garrison the island to ensure its availability. The invasion of the 
Iberian Peninsular, together with the uprising of the Spanish, gave the opportunity for 
Britain to intervene with an army into the Peninsular. To support the defence of 
Portugal and the British army, the creation of a separate naval command, Coast of 
Portugal, came into existence with, Lisbon again becoming a naval base. The defence of 
home waters, holding a ring around Europe and maintaining access to naval supplies 
from the Baltic region, was to be the primary role of the navy. However, defence of 
Britain’s colonies and her seaborne trade was the main purpose of her naval squadrons 
on non-European stations, with Britain’s back door being her Caribbean and North 
American colonies. The maintenance of the security of these North Atlantic areas was to 




 was a major theatre in the Revolutionary War and spawned a number 
of temporary naval bases for the British alongside the existing bases at Jamaica and 
Antigua. With the occupation of Martinique in 1794, the British established a naval base 
on the island to support operations in the Leeward and Windward Islands. At the end of 
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that war Martinique was returned to France and was not re-captured in the Napoleonic 
War until 1809. A base in the region was established at Barbados in 1806 with a naval 
storekeeper and master shipwright. The establishment was placed under the supervision 
of the resident commissioner at Antigua. The mopping up of the French colonies in the 
West Indies in early 1810 would seem to have removed any threat from the Caribbean 
and western Atlantic, but this had been after considerable attention in this theatre.  
Although the region appeared to be entering a period of inactivity Britain was 
investigating the upgrade of its facilities at Bermuda and building a new naval base. A 
map of the western North Atlantic, figure 3c, provides a reason for this development.  
 
 
Figure 3c: Western North Atlantic in 1810 
 
Bermuda was a seemingly insignificant island perched over 600 miles from the coast of 
the United States, surrounded by a treacherous coral reef that made it a difficult 
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destination to approach, or use as shelter. With the loss of her American colonies the 
possession of Bermuda became important. Britain was left with North American bases, 
but these were at Halifax and St. Johns, Newfoundland in the north east. Both these 
ports were almost unusable due to sea ice in the winter months, limiting refitting 
opportunities and leaving them in an inconvenient position to support squadrons called 
upon to blockade the United States coast. Bermuda was ideally situated for an enemy to 
interdict British trade with the West Indies, so garrisoning Bermuda could be considered 
a defensive measure, but it was turned into a base for offensive operations. This naval 
headquarters, together with a strong squadron, was to be a key tool in Britain’s plans for 




The template for this strategy resulted from the United States declaration of war on 
Britain in June 1812. Britain’s war aims turned on the question of how to make the 
Americans sue for peace while retaining Canada. Blockading ports, raiding the coast 
and terminating the seaborne trade of the United States were the offensive measures that 
Britain took, whilst continuing defensive measures required for trade protection.
13
 
Defending Canada from invasion was to turn on the command of the Great Lakes and 
the choke points between them. Both the offensive and defensive measures resided on 
naval command and the naval bases that supported them, Halifax, Bermuda and 
Kingston on Lake Ontario 
 
The work of turning Bermuda into a naval anchorage, with the building of the naval 
dockyard has been extensively covered elsewhere and will not be detailed in this 
thesis.
14
 A naval surveyor’s work, Thomas Hurd, a future hydrographer to the 
Admiralty Board, was to be the key that unlocked Bermuda as Britain’s Gibraltar of the 
West.
15
 However, its pre-naval base capacity to support naval operations should not be 
underestimated. 
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Similarly, many Canadian historians have written about the Great Lakes campaign, the 
role and development of Kingston dockyard and the ship building contest that took 
place.
16
 Prior to naval command coming under Admiralty control, the British facilities 
and ships were a colonial force, the Provincial Marine, and came under the command of 
the British Army at Quebec. James Yeo was appointed commodore and commander-in-
chief for the Great Lakes in March 1813, arriving in May, with full Admiralty control 




Figure 3d provides a map of the military and naval establishments on the lakes. 
Although the lakes are connected by water they had to be treated as separate entities as 
navigation between them was almost impossible. Lake Ontario could be negotiated 
seventy miles down the St. Lawrence until rapids blocked navigation, while Niagara 
Falls separated Lake Erie from Lake Ontario. Materials could be transported over the 
rapids on the St. Lawrence via bateaux,
18
 thus the Navy Board could transport goods 
from England to Kingston dockyard that were difficult to obtain in Canada, such as 




The impossibility of moving vessels from the ocean to the Great Lakes made Kingston a 
unique Navy Board overseas yard in being the only one that built major warships. 
Halifax built two small ships, a sloop and a gun brig, and small gun boats for a Leeward 
Island’s operation, but this was the limit of overseas Navy Board yards’ shipbuilding.20 
Vessels for the Royal Navy were built overseas, with Bermuda providing 41 minor 
vessels in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, but these were commercial 
contracted vessels, as were the Bombay dockyard built warships, the Penang built 
frigate and the later Calcutta built 74 gun ship.
21
 Kingston’s time in the sun as a 
shipbuilding centre and naval yard was short lived with the War of 1812 ending in 
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 The shipbuilding already in place was suspended and was followed by 
the Rush-Bagot agreement in 1817 to demilitarise the Great Lakes, by reducing the 
number of warships on the lakes. 
 
 
Figure 3d: Military and Naval Establishment on the Great Lakes System 1812 
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 Appendix 3a contains illustrations of Kingston dockyard including a plan from the UK Hydrographic 
Office. 
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Although Kingston was a building, refitting and supply yard, the other overseas yards 
were only for repairs and re-supply of the squadrons in their area. This made them 
logistics centres that were dovetailed into the major home dockyard and victualling 
organisations, connected by the vessels of the Transport Board. 
 
3.2 The extent of the refit work at overseas yards: the size and composition of the 
squadrons and the naval yard workforce 
 
 Number of Ships Deployed 
Station Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
East Indies 31 36 32 29 
Cape of Good Hope 12 13 15 15 
South America 14 16 13 11 
Jamaica 40 38 39 32 
Leeward Is 64 71 73 65 
North America 33 31 35 35 
Newfoundland 5 10 12 11 
Mediterranean 72 80 78 77 
Coast of Portugal 9 11 21 16 
Channel Fleet 68 65 30 34 
The Downs 32 29 28 27 
Off Texel and 
Scheldt 35 34 32 80 
Baltic 31 52 62 55 
Home Ports 87 77 75 70 
Convoys and 
Cruisers 21 30 34 23 
Unassigned 122 103 142 152 
Totals 676 696 721 732 
 




Figure 3b and the foregoing discussion have provided a survey of the established naval 
yards, during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The discussion has excluded 
those yards and bases in the East Indies and Cape of Good Hope which form the subject 
of chapters four, five, six and seven. The great naval battles of these wars ended with 
Trafalgar in 1805 and although this gave naval supremacy to the British, to maintain 
that status required the navy and its logistics to be further enlarged in scale.  The peak in 
the number of ships and men employed by the British occurred in 1809, with 732 ships 
and over 146000 men being shown in the Admiralty’s ship deployment lists.24 Table 3a 
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shows where the ships were deployed during this peak year and indicates that the West 
Indies and North America were the major overseas stations outside of Europe. 
 
Table 3a only shows the total number of ships on each station and does not truly convey 
the relative strengths of these squadrons. Those in Home Waters, the Baltic and the 
Mediterranean contained the vast majority of the battleships. Appendix 3b provides a 
graphical representation of the station deployments, by vessel classification for January 
and June 1809 and January 1810. What all three graphs show is that the non-European 
overseas squadrons were based on frigates, sloops and gun brigs, which emphasize their 
role as one of trade protection. The Home and Baltic based squadrons had close access 
to the highly capable royal dockyards, while those in all the other theatres, apart from 
the East Indies, only had access to naval yards with limited refitting capability. 
 
The major overseas squadrons in 1809 were based in the Mediterranean, West Indies 
and North America supported by their local naval yards at Malta, Jamaica, Antigua and 
Halifax. These yards had a considerable workforce for undertaking repairs, with the 
minor yard at Gibraltar also providing limited refit facilities. The type of work carried 
out at these locations was detailed in the reports the resident commissioners sent to the 
Admiralty. These dispatches notified when ships arrived, left their port and itemised the 
work that was performed.
25
 Examples of these reports for Malta, Halifax and Jamaica 
have survived from mid 1809 and when compared with the establishment paylists, not 
only specify the type of work performed, but also indicate the capabilities of the 
respective yards. Table 3b shows the workforce at these key yards together with the 
yard at Antigua. 
 
A mere glance at the table below confirms the workforce was divided into two types, 
permanent (established) and temporarily hired (extra) personnel. This continued earlier 
practice and ensured that when demand decreased, the extra men could be the first to be 
dismissed. The labour force can also be considered in two further categories, firstly, 
management with support staff and secondly, artificers with supporting labourers.  
 
The management and support staff at all four yards had the same structure, consisting of 
a resident commissioner, three principal yard officers, clerks, plus security of the yard 
and stores being maintained by the gate and store porters together with watchmen. 
Included in the management and support structure were foremen of the key trades and 
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Jamaica Antigua Halifax Malta 
Estab. Extra Estab. Extra Estab. Extra Estab. Extra 
Commissioner 1  1  1  1  
Naval Storekeeper 1  1  1  1  
Master Shipwright 1  1  1  1  
Master Attendant 1  1  1  1  
Boatswain 1  1  1    
Clerks 5 4 6 2 8 5 6 4 
Commissioner's 
coxswain   1  1  1  
Gate porter 1  1  1  1  
Watchman 15  7 1 15  7  
Store porter 1  2 1 1    
Cabin keeper     1  1  
Boatmen 19    10  3 9 
Foreman of 
Shipwrights 1  1  1  1  
Foreman of 
Sailmakers 1  1  1  1  
Foreman of House 
carpenters 1  1  1  1  
Foreman of 
Smiths 1  1  1  1  
Foreman of 
Labourers 1  1  1  1  
Foreman of 
Caulkers  1     1  
Foreman of 
Ropemakers       1  
Foreman of 
Masons        1 
Quarterman  2       
Building Assistant  1       
Masters of 
watering 
schooners  3       
Managers & 
support staff 
(Total) 51 11 27 4 47 5 30 14 
 
Table 3b: Establishment of major overseas naval yards in 1809
26
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Jamaica Antigua Halifax Malta 
Estab. Extra Estab. Extra Estab. Extra Estab. Extra 
Shipwright 24 8 16 78   29 43 
Shipwright / 
Caulkers     26 31   
House carpenter 4 3 1 32 4 20 3  
Blockmaker 1  1  1  1  
Smiths 3 3 4 10 4 3 5 4 
Sawyer 1 8  3 2 4 3 1 
Sailmaker  16  17  13  19 
Caulkers 11 41 6 25   7 16 
Masons  3 1 32 1 1  29 
Pavior  1       
Ropemaker  1 1  1  37 45 
Hemp preparer       7  
Painter       2  
Cooper 1        
Servants to 
Artificers 
(apprentices) 5 4 9 3 16    
Labourer 29 101 40 108 30 1 34 13 
Ropemaker 
Labourer        30 
Pitch heater  2       
Artificers and 
labourers (Total) 79 191 79 308 85 73 128 200 
Total  130 202 106 312 132 78 158 214 
Grand Total 332 418 210 372 
 
Table 3b: Establishment of major overseas naval yards in 1809 (continued) 
 
The skilled workforce, although small compared to a home dockyard, had 
representatives of all the main trades including at each yard a single blockmaker. 
Presumably even in the time of the mass production of blocks, recently introduced at 
Portsmouth, the necessity for the repair or manufacture of blocks was essential. The 
capacity for building repairs can also be seen at all the yards via the employment of 
house carpenters and masons, with Antigua and Malta having particularly large 
numbers of masons. 
 
What is not separately identified in table 3b is the black workforce, both slaves and 
freemen, at Jamaica and Antigua. They constituted over two thirds of the labour force 
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and 100 percent of the labourers. The skills represented in the workforce in 1809 were 




Malta was unique amongst these yards in having a significant number of rope-making 
personnel and a legacy facility for making cordage created by the Knights of St. John. 
The Maltese State’s naval yard at Valetta had been equipped with all the facilities 
required to build, refit and supply its vessels.
28
 Apart from the absence of a dry dock, 
Britain found on capturing the island in 1800, a naval yard that had been built and 
recently supported two 64 gun ships, two frigates and four galleys for the Knights of St. 
John.
29
 The local workforce who had serviced this force is evident in the 1809 paylists 
for all the trades. Considerable investment was also made in a ropeyard, with 
completion in April 1808 following considerable lobbying from the resident 
commissioner and master shipwright.
30
 It was unfortunate that the ropery was destroyed 
by fire in July 1809,
31














Type of work 
Jamaica 19 0 13 Upper works repair; spars 
made; decks and weather 
works caulked; sails 
repaired; careened ship. 
Halifax  29 0 25 Caulking upper decks; 
masts, spars and yards 
made; repair of cabins and 
timber shot away; pump 
made and other iron work; 
repair to copper sheathing; 
sails repaired and 
manufactured. 
Gibraltar 32 17 5 Caulking; spars and masts 
made. 
Malta  29 8 4 Caulking; spars and masts 
made; sails repaired. 
Antigua N/A N/A N/A No reports found 
 
Table 3c: Refit work of selected naval yards in July 1809
32
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The refit work performed by the labour force at Jamaica, Halifax and Malta in 1809 is 
detailed in the commissioner’s reports to the Admiralty. These reports, represented in 
table 3c above, show particular dependence on shipwrights, caulkers, sailmakers and to 
a lesser extent smiths. Although only providing a snap-shot of activity in July 1809, the 
figures in table 3c appears representative, as they are confirmed in similar reports for 
the Jamaica yard from July to October 1813.
33
  The reports for the Cape of Good Hope 
and the correspondence of the commissioners, commanders-in-chief and the Admiralty, 
Navy, Transport and Victualling Boards in chapters four, five and six over a six year 
period reinforce this view.  
 
3.3 Refit and stores policy for overseas yards 
 
From the reports on the refits performed, it would appear the overseas yards were 
equipped and manned to carry out minor repairs and maintenance tasks on naval 
vessels.  This was the main refitting role of the overseas yards, but what was the policy 
regarding the fitting out of captured prizes and vessels requiring major repairs? 
Undoubtedly, the skills required existed in the workforce, so the critical factor would 
have been in the availability and use of suitable stores, without unduly affecting the 
existing squadron.  
 
The answer to this question can be considered theoretically and examined by what 
occurred. To answer in the abstract some assumptions have to be stated. A primary 
consideration would be Cicero’s dictum on war ‘Nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam’ (The 
sinews of war, unlimited money), remembering that money is never unlimited and that 
spending effectively is probably a more accurate dictum. Unfortunately judging what 
constitutes effective spending is subjective and open to many interpretations. 
 
Maintaining a squadron on an overseas station reduces transit times to a theatre of 
operations and hence maximises a ship’s time in the operational area. Consumable 
stores such as victualling items would be placed in local storehouses and supplemented 
by regional contracts for fresh supplies. Conceptually, this was simple if the number of 
people to be fed, the ration to be allocated and what the local area can provide was 
known. Recent scholarship has provided an excellent examination of the victualling 
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These studies show there were many variables involved in obtaining and processing the 
victualling items, but the total amount needed, where to send the supplies and when the 
items would be required could be predicted with some confidence. The victualling 
organisation had many foreseeable problems such as, shipping losses, or the processed 
food being found inedible on opening. This latter problem was mitigated by strict 
quality and control standards being operated, with the loss of ships being merely an 
inconvenience, as local stockpiling and emergency purchase usually prevented 
temporary shortages. The answer to supplying victualling stores to world-wide 
squadrons could therefore be determined by simple arithmetic, in modern terminology a 
deterministic model.
35
 Supplying the optimum naval stores required to an overseas 
squadron presents a slightly more difficult calculation, when there was no uniformity of 
design even among ships of the same rate, and especially if unexpected vessels were to 
be locally commissioned, or major refits were to be undertaken. 
 
Although the overseas yards can be considered as one group, for stores supply from 
England, the East Indies yards must be considered a special case for ship refit and repair 
as they had access to East India Company resources and the highly developed economy 
of India. Consequently this will be considered separately in chapter seven. 
 
The items required to enable a warship of the sailing age to function were many and 
varied, ranging from anchors to nails, bolts of canvas to masts and shipwright tools to 
barrels of turpentine. To provide the scale of different stores required, to ensure a 
squadron remained operational, reference can be made to the stores shipping form used 
by the Navy Board.
 36
 Examples of this form can be found in the National Maritime 
Museum for items being shipped from Woolwich to Madras in 1812. The descriptions 
of the stores being sent on the form were listed alphabetically, with units of measure 
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and amount issued, and consisted of 17 pages of pre-defined items. This list by item 
description, indicates a standardisation process had been established, complementing 
the vessel classification in the British navy. At the highest level within this system was 
the rate or unrated vessel identification, with this being further sub-divided into classes. 
Each vessel class now had a list of items that applied to that type of ship. It would seem 
attempts were made to maximise the use of common items between vessels, but made 




The above has, to some extent, defined the question of what store items were required to 
support a ship. However, it does not explain what had been carried on board ship as 
ready stores, or what quantities had to be allocated to overseas yards. The Navy Board 
laid down guidance for what ships should carry as spares, together with the tonnage to 
be allocated for stowage.
38
 For equipping ships with stores the Navy Board divided 
vessels into two categories. Ships were either equipped for foreign or home service, 
with an allocation of stores for a set number of months, for example, four or eight 
months. This indicates that knowledge had been accumulated on the expected turnover 
of broken, lost or simply unserviceable anchors, spars, masts, sails and cordage. What 
could not be anticipated, with any certainty, would be when battle or storm damage 
would take place, what stores would be required or in what quantity. This would be 
exacerbated if captured ships also received naval stores.  
 
Once the ships had arrived on their foreign station the question of re-supply of naval 
stores and repair was the responsibility of the local naval yard, which helps to answer 
the question of what items would be needed at the overseas yard. The minimum 
holdings would be items that supported all the ships allocated to its area, with the 
quantity required at least equal to the expected operational turnover. This could prove to 
be a serious under-estimate of the amount required, as the ships were expected to be in 
action and some items had a limited shelf life. The expected loss due to this is by its 
very nature, unpredictable, but reasonable allowance could be made. What could not be 
anticipated, would be the stores required for captured vessels. The stores requirements 
for refitting and commissioning prizes and those required for major refits at overseas 
bases, fall into the same category, that of being unpredictable.  If stores were 
excessively issued for commissioning prizes, and major refits on ships of the squadron, 
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then the expensive stores shipped out from Britain would be unavailable for their prime 
purpose, the maintenance of the local squadron. 
 
Many enemy vessels were captured by the British in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars, particularly in the earlier conflict, making a considerable contribution to the 
strength of the fleet.
39
 Considerable numbers of these prizes were captured on overseas 
stations, with a high percentage being commissioned at local ports, which suggests a 
refit and stores issue policy at odds with the previous discussion. More work is required 
in this area to determine if refitting and supplying these prizes with naval stores unduly 
affected the existing squadron. It is unlikely that a definitive answer can be found as too 
many variables have to be determined, for example, what was the condition of the 
captured vessel and what stores were required?  However, what has survived is evidence 
of an Admiralty policy to not commission and refit prizes at foreign stations, confirming 
the view that the main purpose of overseas yards was for maintenance of vessels.
40
 This 
provides an indication of the range and quantity of naval stores required, which allowed 
the number of storehouses and their capacity to be calculated to accommodate a 
squadron’s requirements.41 
 
The stores process fell broadly into two main groups. Firstly, issuing items to refit, or 
for later use by ships at sea and secondly, ensuring a relevant ready stock of serviceable 
items was always available. This ready stock was to be obtained from the most 
economic source either from Britain, or from local resources. The ability to locally 
obtain naval stores provided considerable flexibility for naval yard operations. 
 
Accurate record keeping was fundamental to operating this process, together with 
regular communication to the Navy Board on current holdings and future needs. The 
reports on store holdings, requests for new items and what stores were issued were sent 
monthly, quarterly and annually, together with the purchase vouchers for locally 
obtained items. 
 
The above has provided in general terms the role, location and range of activities of the 
overseas naval bases, but has not evaluated their in-depth activities, or how they were 
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managed. Chapters four, five, six and seven provide an answer to how the naval bases at 
the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies were rationalized, operated and managed. 
Particular attention has been given to the change in their management introduced by an 
Order-in-Council in September 1808. This adopted the recommendations of the 
Commission of Naval Revision’s fifth, twelfth and thirteenth reports and the 
appointment of resident commissioners to the Cape, Bombay and Madras. 
 
3.4 Resident commissioner – history and developing role 
 
The evaluation of the role and activities of the resident commissioners of Britain’s 
dockyards by historians has produced mixed reviews, but one is left with the overall 
impression they were considered ineffective. As their appointment to overseas bases, 
and increase in their responsibilities, was a key recommendation of the Commissions on 
Fees and Naval Revision, a review of the office of resident commissioner provides a 
clearer understanding of their role and how it developed. 
 
On the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, James, Duke of York, resumed the 
position of Lord High Admiral and reconstituted the Navy Board in a new format. This 
consisted of the appointment of three extra sea-officer commissioners to sit with the 
existing four principal officers. In 1662 James followed this up by providing detailed 
instructions to the principal officers of their duties, with the subsequent issue of 
instructions to the principal dockyard officers.
42
 It soon became obvious that the control 
of the out-ports, Portsmouth and Harwich, would be enhanced if a Navy Board 
commissioner was resident at these locations, resulting in 1664 with resident 
commissioners being appointed, shortly followed by a third at Chatham. At the end of 
the Second Dutch War, the commissioner at Harwich was removed leaving two 
permanent officers at Portsmouth and Chatham.
43
 Significantly, these out-port 
commissioners were not issued with instructions, subsequently resulting in the role 
being one dependent on the individual appointed.  
 
The framing of the Duke of York’s instructions to the principal officers of the Navy 
Board and dockyards promoted collective responsibility by demanding their agreement 
and countersigning of orders. This resulted in the Portsmouth commissioner requesting 
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clarification in the event of an urgent decision being required. James replied in a letter 
empowering the out-port commissioners to act with as much power as the whole Navy 
Board: ‘Power to do whatsoever might or ought to have been done by the whole 
Board’.44 In principal this provided the detached commissioner with more individual 
power than any other Navy Board official.  
 
John Ehrman in his study of William III’s navy, states that naval commissioners were at 
Portsmouth, Chatham and Plymouth, but suggests they either submitted to demands 
from sea-officers for their ships, or quarrelled with them until they left harbour.
45
 Daniel 
Baugh noted the attendance of commissioners at the dockyards and the informal 
position they held relative to the Navy Board. Baugh also records the 1749 Admiralty 
inspection of Plymouth dockyard with the recommendation that the Navy Board draw 
up explicit instructions for dockyard commissioners.
46
 This was not done, nor was it, 
until the first decade of the nineteenth century, and then it was not drafted or issued by 
the Navy Board. Baugh records a remark by Commissioner Hughes in 1747. Hughes 
stated, ‘for every ship that goes out of harbour, I think, two others come in’.47 This 
indicates that the task of arranging the repair and supply of these vessels with their 
commanders, the port admiral and the officers of the yard, was one of considerable 
importance and delicacy, not one where credit for good negotiating would necessarily 
be recorded. 
 
The most comprehensive studies of Britain’s dockyards in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries are those by Knight and Morriss.
48
 Both historians outline the 
duties of the dockyard commissioners for whom the priority and scheduling of refits 
was only one of many tasks. Resident commissioners were meant to be the eyes and 
voice of the Navy Board; ensure rules and warrants were followed; report on operations, 
potential and actual problems, presumably with recommendations for their solution; and 
to make local contractual arrangements. They also acted for the local civil authorities as 
magistrates and were involved in the payment of men on vessels in harbour. 
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Historians have focused on the lack of hiring and firing powers of the resident 
commissioners, tending to consider this central to their perceived ineffectiveness. 
Knight, in his examination of the dockyards in the American War of Independence 
provides an in-depth survey of the actions of resident commissioners. He confirms that 
the effectiveness of the post was dependant on the personality and determination of the 
commissioner, not specifically their ability to hire and fire.  
 
Even with the limitations outlined above, Knight considered the navy was served well 
by its out-port commissioners, with the exception of James Gambier at Portsmouth. 
Gambier, Samuel Hood and Henry Martin were studied, with Hood replacing Gambier 
in 1778, Martin following Hood in 1781 with the latter’s return to the fleet. Gambier 
had distaste for his non-combatant role, but does not seem to have been a success as a 
commissioner or senior naval officer.
49
 Hood had already been at Halifax as 
commodore in the late 1760s during major renovations of that naval yard, making 
recommendations for improvements, hence becoming familiar with such facilities.
50
 
Knight remarks that Hood took the Portsmouth post, as he saw it as a step to promotion 
and was a success in the role. Hood gained the respect of the yard officers, the Navy 
Board and of the port admiral. Knight summed up Hood’s contribution thus – ‘[he] 
made [the role of commissioner] into an effective post. A forceful personality and 
intelligence capable of adapting to a situation very unlike that of a quarterdeck could 
make his period in office an exceptional one of great value for the navy’.51 
 
Henry Martin continued where Hood left off and remained as commissioner at 
Portsmouth until 1790 when he replaced Middleton as comptroller at the Navy Board; 
this example of experience and expertise being retained in civil naval administration 
was to become the norm in the next thirty years.
52
 Martin’s successor, on his death in 
1794, was Hamond, a previous commissioner at Halifax, later to be followed by 
Martin’s son, Thomas Byam Martin, as comptroller from 1816 to 1832. Maybe, 
Thomas’s familiarity and understanding of civil administration, dates from time spent in 




                                                 
49
 Knight, R., James Gambier, ODNB, accessed 7
th
 November 2010 
50
 Gwyn, J., Ashore and Afloat, 13-16 
51
 Knight, R., Portsmouth Dockyard Papers 1774-1783, xxvi 
52
 See figure 3e for a list of resident commissioners from 1792 to 1832 showing their employment from 
their first appointment. 
53
 Laughton, J., and revision by Lambert, A., Thomas Byam Martin, ODNB, accessed 7
th
 November 2010. 
Thomas was born in 1773 and was entered into the Royal Naval Academy at Portsmouth, of which his 
father was governor, in August 1785. 
Key: Sources
Home Dockyard ADM 7-823, Salary and Pensions of Civil Officers, TNA
Foreign naval yard Marshall, J., Royal Navy Biography, London, 1827
London Board (Navy, Victualling or Transport) Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
Other civil / administrative posts. Canadian Dictionary of National Biography
Australian Dictionary of National Biography
Name Lt Captain 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832
John Ayscough 1793 1806
Robert Barrie 1795 1802
Alexander Ball 1778 1783
Robert Barlow 1778 1793
Courtenay Boyle 1790 1797
Jaheel Brenton 1790 1800
Thomas Briggs 1797 1801
William Brown 1788 1793
Isaac Coffin 1776 1782
Charles Cunningham 1782 1793
John Dilkes 1762 1790
Henry Duncan 1759 1776
George Dundas 1779 1795
Andrew F. Evans 1787 1798
Robert Fanshawe 1759 1768
Percy Fraser 1789 1795
George Grey 1781 1793
Robert Hall 1800 1811
Harry Harmood 1759 1778
Francis Hartwell 1775 1779
Charles Hope 1767 1777
John Inglefield 1768 1780
Charles Inglis 1794 1802
Henry Inman 1780 1793
James Johnstone 1793 1806
Charles Lane 1777 1790
Joseph Larcom 1782 1795
John Mason Lewis 1790 1801
William Lobb 1777 1795
Robert Middleton 1793 1794
William A. Otway 1773 1781
Charles Proby 1746
Peter Puget 1790 1797
Charles Ross 1796 1802
Charles Saxton 1757 1762
Michael Seymour 1790 1795
William Shield 1779 1794
Thomas Shortland 1790 1802
Charles Stirling 1778 1783
Andrew Sutherland 1770 1780
Clotworthy Upton 1795 1802
Thomas Ussher 1797 1807
Charles White 1782 1795
Philip Wodehouse 1794 1796
Isaac Wolley 1793 1797
Daniel Woodriff 1783 1802
Name Lt Captain 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832
Figure 3e:  Resident Commissioners of the British Navy, 1792 - 1832
Cape of Good Hope Plymouth Navy  Board 
Gibraltar Navy Board (includes short time at Sheerness) Awarded pension 
Gib Died 




Sheerness Port Admiral (Portm) No longer employed 
No longer employed 
Halifax S H Navy Board (Dept Comptroller) No longer employed. Superannuated Captain 1811 
Halifax 
Jamaica Promoted to Flag rank and commander-in-chief posts Court Martial. Found guilty and 
no longer employed 
Jamaica Promoted to flag rank and no longer employed 
Jamaica Gibraltar Malta Deputy controller Victualling Board Deputy Controller Victualling Board 
Promoted to flag  rank 
Jamaica 
At Port Jackson 
Austrilia 
Posts as Resident Agent of Transports and 
Superintendant of POWs 
Resigned 
Plymouth Jamaica Malta 
Bermuda 
Gib / Malta Promoted to Flag rank Oct. 1807 and died July 1815 
Gibraltar Navy  Board 
Transport  Board 
Gib / Malta 
Minister-plenipotentiary and commissioner to 
Malta till death in October 1809 
Gibraltar Malta Sheerness Died July 1814 
Sheerness Promoted to flag rank Malta 
Navy  Board Malta Gib Awarded pension 
Malta Died Feb 1818 aged 54 
Navy  Board Sheerness Malta Bermuda Antigua & Barbados 
Superintendant of building works. Assistant to Hurd during Hydrographic survey of Bermuda 
Antigua & Barbados Died Nov 1807 
Antigua Died Apr 1810 
Died Aug 1814 Cape Bombay 
Madras Died Jul 1809 
Bombay On Vancouver's vovage Poor health and returned home 
On Vancouver's vovage Madras, Penang & Trincomalee Return to England - died 1822 Flushing 
Cape of Good Hope Mahon 
Quebec / Kingston Died Feb 1818 
On Vancouver's vovage Quebec / Kingston 
Bermuda Malta 
Portsmouth Retired 1806, pension & died Nov 1808 aged 75 
Portsmouth Died Oct 1828 Sheerness 
Appointments on Royal yacht Portsmouth 
Flag Captain of St. Vincent, Adjuntant-
General to Fleet and Royal Yacht 
appointments 
Vict. Board Appointed by St. Vincent Deptford and Woolwich Chatham 
Chatham Died Mar 1799 
Victualling Board Sheerness Chat Navy  Board Navy Board (Dept Comptroller) Retired Aug 1814 
Navy Board (Dept Comptroller) NB Chatham Died Sep 1808 
Navy Board  
(Dept Comptroller) 
Chatham Retired Jan 1823 
Transport Board Sheerness Navy  Board 
Superintendent of 
Transports 
Plymouth Awarded pension 
On 1788 vovage to New South Wales Agent POW - Dartmoor 







Died Aug 1822 
Jamaica 
Bermuda 
Sup. Of Ordinary -Plymouth Jamaica 
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The formation and retention of a professional class of sea-officer naval administrators 
was coming into existence and possibly can be traced to Charles Middleton. Middleton 
had suggested in 1784, that resident commissioners should serve for one year on the 
Navy Board before taking up their posts at a dockyard,
1
 so they could be properly 
trained and made ready to co-operate with their partners in London.
2
 Although this did 
not become immediate practice, his idea was adopted by the Commissions on Fees and 
Naval Revision who recommended that commissioners at overseas yards subsequently 
serve on the Navy Board, or at a home dockyard. 
 
Figure 3e provides a list of the resident commissioners who served at overseas and 
home dockyards from 1792 to 1832, on the abolition of the Navy Board. What becomes 
apparent is all the commissioners were senior captains with at least ten years in that 
rank, the only exception being Robert Hall at Kingston. Also evident is the developing 
nature of the subsequent careers of commissioners who first held a post at an overseas 
yard. Provided these commissioners did not die whilst serving overseas, or retire 
because of ill health, they were either appointed to flag rank, served on the Navy Board, 
appointed to a major home yard, or were moved to another overseas yard. This clearly 
demonstrates a continuity of appointment, re-use of skills obtained and implementation 
of the recommendations of the Commissions on Fees and Naval Revision. The 
Admiralty had created a group of professional managers for its large industrial concerns 
and its governing sub-boards.  
 
From 1664 to 1832 resident commissioners were permanent fixtures of naval 
administration with the role evolving into captain / admiral superintendant of a 
dockyard, a post that was retained into the 1960s. The Admiralty placed considerable 
faith in the post. The Admiralty visitations of the dockyards, the Commissions on Fees, 
Naval Enquiry and Naval Revision together with the Select Committees on Finance in 
1797/8, all approved of the role of resident commissioner, requiring the post to be at the 
centre of dockyard activities. Maybe their understanding and expectation of resident 
commissioners were more realistic than those expected of some historians. This 
compares favourably with Roger Knight’s observation on resident commissioners, 
‘overworked, usually unappreciated by their brother sea officers and the Board in 
                                                 
1
 James Gambier had been a Navy Board commissioner prior to his appointment at Portsmouth hence 
showing a precedent.  
2
 Knight, R., ‘The Royal Dockyard in the American War of Independence’, 56. 
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London, he set the tone of his yard; the out-port commissioner was the key position in 
the administration of the dockyard’.3 
 
Appendix 3c contains the full set of instructions for overseas commissioners, which 
indicate they had considerable autonomy compared to their equivalents in Britain. They 
had hire and dismissal powers of artificers and other workmen; and could suspend 
principal officers, clerks and foremen pending an enquiry by the Navy Board. Resident 
commissioners also had authority to hire clerical officers and, with the commander-in-
chief’s agreement, to appoint technical officers such as master shipwright, master 
attendant and foremen. The partnership with the commander-in-chief was recognised as 
the key relationship in the instructions and this is examined in the next four chapters. 
 
In the instructions, issued to the overseas commissioners in the fifth report, was a most 
significant addition to a commissioner’s duties. This was the nineteenth article and from 
its length and sweeping scope indicated an element of the experimental. The nineteenth 
article gave the overseas commissioners superintendence of the victualling department 
and parts of the transport department, particularly the naval hospital. What 
superintendence was to mean in practice was to cause considerable dispute between the 
commissioner, commander-in-chief, agent of victualling and the staff of the hospital. 
Chapters four to seven have concentrated on the period following the appointment of 
resident commissioners armed with these new powers. 
 
The Revolutionary War period made necessary new bases, such as Malta, Trincomalee, 
the Cape of Good Hope and the development of Bermuda into a secure anchorage. In 
terms of management, this period repeated the practice of previous wars, with additional 
resident commissioners only being appointed to the yards supporting the main overseas 
fleets, in this war, the Mediterranean. In all the other yards the senior yard officer was 
the storekeeper, with the commander-in-chief providing direction. With the re-opening 
of hostilities with France in 1803, there was a considerable expansion in the number of 
British naval bases to support its far flung squadrons, including those on the Great 
Lakes of America. The Admiralty appointed resident commissioners to the West Indian 
yards in 1803, but this was only with responsibility for the naval yard; this is illustrated 
in appendix 2c. With Commissioner Otway’s appointment to Malta in 1804, all major 
yards in Europe and the New World had a senior officer. The naval bases at Bombay, 
Madras and the Cape of Good Hope by mid 1809 also had a resident commissioner. The 
                                                 
3
 Knight, R., Portsmouth Dockyard Papers 1774-1782, xxvii. 
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management of Britain’s overseas bases was from 1809 to experience a significant 




By the end of the Napoleonic War Britain had fourteen naval yards and the base at 
Heligoland supporting her overseas squadrons, with a naval storekeeper at each and ten 
resident commissioners at the major bases. The navy now possessed a comprehensive 
network of naval bases, a network that with a few additions was to serve Britain into the 
twentieth century.  
 
The acquisition of bases mirrored Britain’s strategic needs, but had not been without 
reverses such as, Cape Nicola, Corsica, Alexandria, and Monte Video. This confirmed 
that while these bases were close to the area of operations, they were not politically or 
militarily secure. Significantly, replacement bases, with the exception of Alexandria, 
were obtained in the operational area by a combination of using existing bases, capture 
of new locations, or diplomacy to ensure political and military security. 
 
Possibly the most obscure base possessed by Britain was that of Heligoland being 
captured from the Danes in 1807. This location was used as an instrument to circumvent 
Napoleon’s Continental blockade and as a centre for espionage. Assisting the small 
ships involved in this activity was a harbour master stationed there by the Admiralty. 
 
It was not only the salt-water seas the British navy sailed as the Great Lakes of North 
America were patrolled. The naval yard supporting the largest British squadron on the 
lakes of Canada was at Kingston, Ontario. This yard was unique amongst Britain’s 
overseas naval bases as major warships were built, including a first rate ship. The 
defence of Canada depended on command of Lake Ontario with Kingston yard 
remaining an important tool in the defence of British North America until the 1830s. 
The Bermuda naval base was another of these tools used to ensure any war with the 
United States could have been pursued with the hope of a successful peace treaty. 
 
The primary duty of Britain’s naval squadrons stationed at non-European commands 
was one of trade protection. The make-up of the commands, with frigates, sloops and 
gun-brigs forming the majority of the squadron reflect this role. To some extent this also 
dictated the role of the naval yard and the type of repair work to be carried out, that of 
maintenance activities. 
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From their earliest times the overseas bases were established as supply centres for naval 
and victualling stores, with an ability to perform limited refits at secure anchorages. At 
the beginning of these wars in 1793, the naval yards had reached maturity, with the 
composition of the workforce consisting of management and clerical staff, plus 
representatives of all the trades required to refit ships. The chief change that occurred 
during these wars, to the labour force, was one of an increase in numbers of artificers 
and labourers by the employment of temporary workers. This provided additional 
capacity to perform refits on the enlarged wartime squadrons.  
 
It was the management of the overseas bases which experienced the most change in this 
period. Initially, this was only in the increase in numbers of resident commissioners 
being appointed to the Mediterranean yards, in addition to the permanent fixture at 
Halifax, followed by appointments to Jamaica and Antigua at the start of the 
Napoleonic War. However, it was with the introduction of the recommendations of the 
Commission of Naval Revision, in 1808, that significant change occurred. Resident 
commissioners were appointed to the Cape of Good Hope, Madras and Bombay, with 
an extension of their powers at all overseas bases to superintend the victualling and 
medical parts of the transport departments. The effect of this change is examined in 














This chapter examines Britain’s reasons for involvement at the Cape of Good Hope and 
the organisation of the civil departments during the Cape’s first and second occupations. 
By investigating this overseas command, an understanding of the strategic importance 
of the region is obtained, with examination of this isolated naval outpost revealing the 
logistics required to maintain the squadron based at the Cape. 
 
The Cape of Good Hope was remote in distance and time from Britain. The voyage 
from Portsmouth to Cape Town was over 8400 miles
4
 and the fastest transit time was at 
least two months. A response to an urgent request for information, advice or orders 
could not therefore be expected for at least four months, with five to six months being a 
more realistic time span. Therefore, requests for stores, ships and personnel could take 
as much as a year to arrive. This remoteness gave the local officers considerable 
autonomy, but they were required to work to a predictable system. 
 
Chapters two and three have shown that such a system had been created for overseas 
bases and comprised a fixed series of regulations, regular feedback of work done, stores 
used, remaining, and unserviceable together with those demanded. This gave the 
Admiralty and its sub-boards a picture of what was needed to support the planned 
squadrons.  
 
Competent clerical officers were needed merely to record this detail and expenditure, 
with technical officers available to ensure that work was planned, surveyed and 
executed correctly. The Cape was the base furthest from a dry dock with the nearest 
such facility being at Bombay, but this was earmarked for the East Indies squadron, 
with ships stationed at the Cape directed to return to Britain.
5
 This factor made this the 
most remotely supported squadron in the service.  
 
A further feature required to support the Cape squadron was the necessity to have two 
naval refitting locations at the Cape of Good Hope, figure 4a illustrates the reason. 
These locations were at Cape Town and Simon’s Town. The main facilities were at 
                                                 
4
 Volvo Ocean Race 2001-2002, www.nationalgeographic.com/volvooceanrace/background.html , 
accessed 24
th
 May 2009. 
5
 Appendix 7b details the dry docks that were available in the Indian Ocean during the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. 
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Cape Town, but during the winter months, ships in Table Bay were on a lee shore and 
were moved to Simon’s Bay. The latter was partially sheltered, even during the summer 
when False Bay was subjected to the prevailing south-easterly winds.
6
 The map also 
shows the potential of Saldanha Bay, which was used during the first occupation for 
refitting and prompted the Navy Board, in 1808, to direct the newly appointed resident 








Studying the methods and organisation of the shore naval services during the first and 
second occupations reveals a change in Admiralty policy to one of increased central 
control. The most significant of these changes was the implementation of the 
Commission of Naval Revision reports on foreign yards, and the appointment of 
William Shield as resident commissioner to the Cape in late 1808.  
 
Prior to the introduction of the Commission of Naval Revision’s recommendations, the 
Admiralty had already altered its stance concerning the appointment of individuals to 
the civil naval departments’ posts at the Cape. This development can be seen in figure 
4b. This shows the holders of the senior positions at the naval yard and victualling 
organisation during the first occupation; they had been selected and appointed by the  
                                                 
6
 See chapter six for the rationalisation of these two establishments. 
7
 Brock, B.B. & Brock, B.G, (eds), Historical Simon’s Town Book, (Cape Town, 1977), 3. 
1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815
Commander-in-Chief
1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815
Legend:
Appointment by Admiralty with time in post at Cape of Good Hope
Appointment by commander-in-chief with time in post at Cape of Good Hope
Unknown appointment or time in post
Appointment by Admiralty with uncertain end of time in post at Cape of Good Hope
Appointment by Admiralty of Troubridge as commander-in-Cape of Good Hope but never arrived as he and his flagship missing on passage frpm Madras.
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Sick and Hurt Provision 
Surgeon of Hospital 
Agent of Hospital 
Key Events Capture of Cape of Good Hope Evacuation 
Curtis 
Pringle 
Christian (died in post) 
Douglas Post not approved by 
Admiralty 
Hood 
Locker Hall Arbuthnot Taylor Holman S. 
Jamsetjee Bomarjie Wadia 
Wellington Pitt Ropemakers sent out Flint Dunda Seward Alexander Pitt Pitt Mr. J. Browne Holman H. Taylor Holman H. Wellington Puget Inman ug t P get Puget 
Naval Hospital 
C osure Hay s 
Home Popham Stirling 
Rowley 
Bertie Stopford Tyler 
Shield Dundas (died in post) Brenton 
Re-capture of Cape 
of Good Hope 
Capture of Mauritius 
Naval Yard 
Hopley Howitson (returned home) 
Balston 




Trail (returned home) Payne Goodridge 




Jackson Farquhar (died in post) Maude (remained at Cape) 
Losack 
Troubridge 
Hospitals at both Cape Town and Simon's Town. The large hospital at 
Simon's Town was occupied by British army as barracks in 1796. House 











) Dr. Pattison 
) Held both posts 
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Artificers were not sent to the Cape during the first occupation 
Foreman of Shipwrights 
Shipwrights from Britain first arrived in August 1808. They were 
followed by smiths, ropemakers and a sailmaker.  
Robinson 
Pallister (replaced) Johnson 




commander-in-chief. The only exception to this was the replacement of the naval 
commander’s selection for naval storekeeper by an officer appointed by the Admiralty. 
 
On re-capturing the Cape in 1806 the commander-in-chief again appointed the principal 
officers of the naval yard and victualling organisation.  Whereas previously, the 
Admiralty only replaced the naval storekeeper, they now not only replaced that 
individual but also appointed a master shipwright, master attendant, agent victualler and 
an agent for the hospital. This policy was eventually extended to the appointment of a 
surgeon to the hospital. The Admiralty’s shift to appointing the senior officers of the 
civil naval departments rather than, relying on chance and the selections of the 
commander-in-chief, shows an acceptance of central responsibility and faith that the 
correct individual would make a difference in service. 
 
It was not only in the appointment of these senior civil naval posts, that a different 
approach was taken by the Admiralty, as dependence on squadron and local artificers 
was reduced, by the recruitment and sending of artificers from the home dockyards to 
the Cape. 
 
4.1 The first occupation: 1795-1803 
 
4.1.1 Strategic position 
 
Britain’s involvement with the Cape of Good Hope arose as a result of the English East 
India Company and its trade with India and the east. Although the Portuguese and 
Dutch were early pioneers in the east and southern Africa, the English also had an early 
knowledge of the Cape area.  This included an unsuccessful early settlement in 1615 by 
English convicts. However, it was not until 1652 that a permanent colony by the Dutch 




The necessity for replenishment on the outward and homeward voyage to India 
provided only four potential places, St. Helena, Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Cape of 
Good Hope. By the late eighteenth century the British had relied on St. Helena, in the 
South Atlantic, and in peace or war, when allied or neutral, the Dutch settlement of 
Cape Town for this service. The French occupied Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, with 
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 Keay, J., The Honourable Company, A History of the English East India Company, (London, 1991), 90-
93. 
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Madagascar remaining unused as its climate was considered unhealthy for Europeans.
2
 
This arrangement served Britain well in the eighteenth century until the War of 
American Independence, when her enemies included the Dutch. Without access to the 
Cape, the journey to and from India was not greatly impeded if access to St. Helena was 
maintained, but if held by an enemy the trip could be made untenable. As St. Helena 
could be threatened by the power holding the Cape, the key to Britain’s access to the 




On declaring war on the Dutch in December 1780, Britain took immediate steps to 
capture the Cape. This expedition was prepared and left England in March 1781, but 
knowledge of its mission leaked to the Dutch and French. In response, the French also 
prepared an expedition in that month to strengthen the Dutch at the Cape. The French 
and British forces met at the Cape Verde Islands in mid April, but following an 
inconclusive action the French force reached the Cape of Good Hope first, resulting in 
the British abandoning attempts to land. The position of St. Helena was also under 
threat, as not only did it rely on food supplies from the Cape, but an attack could have 
been mounted from the Dutch colony.
4
 In October 1781 the Directors of the East India 
Company pressed for another expedition to occupy the Cape.
5
 However, this was not 
mounted, leaving the Dutch in possession at the end of the American War of 
Independence in 1783. 
 
With the opening of the Revolutionary War in 1793, the security of Britain’s 
communications with India again became of concern. While the Dutch remained an ally 
then the situation was acceptable, but when Britain became concerned that the French 
would obtain the Cape a more active policy was undertaken. In the winter of 1794/5 
Holland was successfully invaded by France. This caused Sir Francis Baring, the 
chairman of the East India Company, to write to Dundas, secretary of state for war, on 
the 4
th
 January. In his letter he called for the occupation of the Cape for the strategic 
reasons discussed above, but also expressed the contemporary value of that area to 
Britain. Baring observed that occupation would not provide any commercial gain to 
Britain but would protect her interests which would be harmed if the Cape was in the 
                                                 
2
 Richmond, H., The Navy in India, 1793-1783, Appendix VI, 416. 
3
 Richmond, H., The Navy in India, 1793-1783, Appendix VI, 415. 
4
 Richmond, H., The Navy in India, 1793-1783, 117-153. 
5
 Richmond, H., The Navy in India, 1793-1783, Appendix VI, 414-419. 
144 
hands of the French. He advised Dundas that the colony was governed very lightly 




Britain now prepared an expedition to take and hold the Cape of Good Hope having also 
obtained the exiled Stadtholder’s7 approval for occupation. This approval was based on 
a promise by Britain to return the Cape to Dutch control at a future date. The Stadholder 
provided letters to the Cape colony’s Dutch governor requesting his cooperation with 
the British commanders.
8
 The British, again worried that the French would get there 
first, rushed an invasion force to the Cape under the command of George Elphinstone, 
later Lord Keith. It arrived in June 1795 and protracted negotiations resulted in British 
forces landing to bolster the defences. However, with the arrival of a Dutch newspaper 
absolving the Cape governor from all allegiance to the Stadtholder, a military solution 
was inevitable. These operations resulted in the capitulation of the Dutch at the Cape on 
16
th
 September. Yet this was not to be the end of the operation for the Dutch sent a force 
to expel the British, resulting in the surrender of a Dutch squadron to Elphinstone in 




This occupation ended in 1803 with the return of the colony to the Batavian Republic as 
part of the terms of the Treaty of Amiens. It is worth noting the reasons given for 
abandoning this colony, while retaining Ceylon, also captured from the Dutch in 1795. 
Lord Macartney whilst governor of the Cape, 1797-1798, claimed that possession by a 
powerful enemy would threaten Britain’s position in India.10 Even so, he saw little 
chance of the colony ever becoming a profitable base for the economic exploitation of 
the interior, or a market for British goods. Macartney also considered that possession 
would always be at a great cost to the Exchequer,
 11
 predicting that having to choose 





During the first occupation the British established shore naval services at Cape Town 
and Simon’s Town, with naval storage facilities and hospitals being provided at both 
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locations. Figure 4c shows the organisation set-up by Admiral Elphinstone in 1795, 
which with the exception of the agent for transports and prisoners of war was to remain 
in place until the British withdrew in 1803. This arrangement of the shore support 
followed the practice developed over the last century and was the usual organisation 
under the control of the commander-in-chief. Elphinstone also saw a role for a senior 
captain to assist him in managing the shore departments and appointed Captain Billy 
Douglas in August 1796 as resident commissioner.
13
 The Admiralty did not agree, and 
immediately on receipt of the admiral’s letter, informed Douglas that the appointment 





Figure 4c:   Relationships, accountability and organisation of civil naval 
departments at Cape during the first occupation 
 
The Cape of Good Hope squadron was not separately identified from the East Indies 
command until late in 1797 and was never planned to exceed 18 vessels during the first 
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 In reality, the planned figure was rarely met, but a letter from the Pownoll, 
the naval storekeeper gives a picture of the stores supply problem. He reported that the 
storehouses and holdings were adequate for two third rates, three fifth rates plus a sloop, 
making a total of 6 ships, but 14 ships were in the squadron.
16
 The composition of the 
naval force during the first occupation was based around 64 and 50 gun ships, with a 
few sloops and brigs as support vessels, indicating it was a local defence force rather 
than one of trade protection. 
 
The necessity for victualling and medical shore support was particularly important to 
the commander-in-chief in maintaining the effectiveness of his ships’ crews, but the 
requirement to re-supply with naval stores and to repair vessels also required facilities 
and management. 
 
4.1.2 The naval yard 
 
Amongst the first actions of Admiral Elphinstone on capturing the Cape was to report to 
the Admiralty the urgent need for naval stores of all types to be sent out to form a depot. 
Such stores could be locally obtained, but were limited in quantity and at a very high 
price with gold or silver the only currency accepted. This latter factor caused the 
admiral to state the sending out of silver dollars was absolutely necessary. The need to 
transport stores and people between the two anchorages in Table and Simon’s Bays 
highlighted Elphinstone’s logistical problems, as he requested that two small transport 




Having reasoned that a naval depot was required the commander-in-chief had already 
assigned Alexander Farquhar as naval storekeeper at Simon’s Town in July 1795.18 The 
admiral informed the Admiralty in October he had formed a stores depot and had 
appointed Farquhar as naval storekeeper with Donald Trail, the master of Monarch, as 
master attendant.
19
 These two officers formed the management of the naval stores depot 
with the composition of the workforce revealing the commander-in-chief’s intentions 
for the naval yard’s role. 
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 Figure 7c in chapter seven shows the combined planned deployment in the East Indies and Cape of 
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Table 4a shows the composition of the naval yard during the first occupation. This 
indicates that Elphinstone intended the organisation to manage, house, issue and deliver 
naval stores. It can be seen in the establishment’s paylist that Elphinstone’s successors 
as commander-in-chief agreed this role for the naval yard. The delivery of stores to 
ships, and between the arsenals at Cape Town and Simon’s Town, is most clearly seen 
in the number of sailors on the establishment’s paylists. The most notable difference in 
the composition of the Cape’s naval yard compared to those at other overseas yards, 
described in table 1d, was the lack of artificers such as, shipwrights, caulkers, smiths, 
sailmakers and sawyers. The only craftsmen on the yard’s books were carpenters who 













Commissioner 0 1 0  0 
Naval Storekeeper  1 1 1 1 1 
Master Attendant 1 1 1 1 1 
Master Shipwright 0 1 1 1 1 
Clerks 2 6 7 7 7 
Boatswain 1 1 1 1 1 
Boatswain's Mate 1 1 1 1 1 
Foreman of Shipwrights 0  1 1 1 
Quartermasters 7 7 7 7 7 
Warehouse men 2 5 5 4 5 
Storehouse men 4 3 0  0 
Gatekeeper 0 0 2 2 2 
Office men 0 2 3 2 3 
Boat Crew 10 0 0  0 
Seamen 25 50 20 22 20 
Carpenters 4 4 5 4 5 
Sailmakers 2 0 0  0 
Signalmen 4 0 0  0 
Total 64 83 55 54 55 
 




Although the core naval yard establishment did not contain ship repair artificers, the 
need for a master shipwright was recognised in mid 1796 with the appointment of 
Monarch’s carpenter, John Narrocote, to that post. The management of the naval yard 
was now complete with the master shipwright and master attendant carrying out their 
normal duties which included, ship surveys and supervision of hired artificers and those 
of the Cape squadron’s ships engaged in vessel repairs. These officers were assisted by 
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a boatswain and later by a foreman of shipwrights, with the latter being an inhabitant of 
the Cape colony.  
 
The refit work undertaken consisted of the manufacture of yards, spars and sails, repair 
of hull damage and the ever present caulking activity. Significantly, the necessity to 
careen vessels to effect underwater repairs during the first occupation was rare, as this 
operation was only mentioned twice in naval yard and Navy Board correspondence. 
Rattlesnake, a sloop, was hauled down in Saldanha Bay with the assistance of a 
squadron brig in early 1800 to effect repairs.
21
 The larger 50 gun Jupiter was also 
hauled down later in that year in Simon’s Bay, but the hire of a sizeable vessel was 
required to assist in the operation and to provide accommodation for the fourth rate’s 
crew.
22
 The repairs undertaken by the naval yard and the two careening operations 
performed, illustrate the limited nature of the Cape’s facilities but also that Saldanha 
Bay was thought of as an alternative refit location. However, the composition of the 
workforce also indicates limitations were imposed on refits by reliance on artificers 
from the squadron. 
 
The October 1795 yard paylists show that initially local Dutch artificers, two sailmakers 
and ten carpenters, were hired as the ship refitting workforce, but by late in the 
following year the squadron was supplying a considerable workforce. The October to 
December 1796 quarter shows the hired element was large, with 46 carpenters and 31 
labourers, but the squadron was now supplying 22 carpenters, ten caulkers, two sawyers 
and nine smiths.
23
 Large elements of the hired workforce were slaves and the naval 
storekeeper suggested purchasing slaves to reduce costs and provide a core yard 
workforce, but the Navy Board rejected this idea.
24
 The year 1796 seems to be when the 
peak in hired artificer employment occurred, as the paylists for the last quarter of 1799 





This shift from hired personnel to squadron artificers may have been driven by the low 
wages offered and the lack of hard currency. Trail, the master attendant, reported in 
December 1795 that Dutch workers were leaving the yard as their pay rate was too 
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 The cost of living at the Cape was very high and it was requested that cash was 
sent from Britain to lower local interest rates.
27
 The ability of the local workforce to 
move to the highest payer suggests the labour market was volatile in availability and 
cost. 
 
It was not only labour that was in short supply, as buildings of all types were limited in 
number, with those available required by a number of competing agencies. The navy 
required accommodation for the commander-in-chief, the principal officers of the naval 
yard, victualling and hospital departments, but housing was also needed for officials of 
the colonial government, together with officers and men of the British army. As 
storehouses for naval and victualling items were also required together with hospitals at 
both Cape Town and Simon’s Town, the number of buildings needed was considerable. 
The classic supply and demand equation merely resulted in high rents being charged by 
the local inhabitants. 
 
Shortly after the capture of the colony, Elphinstone provided the Admiralty with a 
description of the buildings available for the shore naval purposes at both Simon’s 
Town and Cape Town.
28
 The dwelling houses were soon lost as accommodation for the 
yard officers, leading to the naval storekeeper and master attendant requesting and 
obtaining a rent allowance in lieu of official accommodation. The obvious answer to 
this problem was the construction of additional buildings, but materials and labour were 
expensive and as the colony was likely to be abandoned at the subsequent peace treaty, 
the expenditure was considered wasteful and not approved. Obtaining approval to 





This situation became even more critical in November 1798 when a fire occurred at 
Cape Town causing many buildings to be destroyed. The stores within the naval 
warehouses were saved by moving them to the safety of the beach, but the stores 
records were lost and items were stolen. The theft of these items explains why the 
practice of building a wall to isolate a naval yard was now employed at the Cape. The 
need for a night shift of watchmen as security guards with a supervisor had already been 
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authorised by Admiral Christian shortly before the fire,
30
 but it was Admiral Curtis who 
ordered the building of a wooden palisade along the beach to secure the naval yard.
31
 
Curtis also overcame potential storage problems at Simon’s Town by beaching the 
condemned brig, Hope, and using her as a combined store and accommodation ship. 
 
The hand to mouth existence concerning accommodation and storage space extended to 
the quantity and type of naval items available with numerous requests for goods of 
many kinds, with reports notifying the dispatch of them by the Navy Board. Admiral 
Pringle was driven by necessity to take items from storeship Chichester to maintain his 
squadron, even though these stores were not destined for his command.
32
 Naval stores 
were available at the Cape, although they were expensive, and it was recognised at an 
early date that Plettenberg forest offered considerable potential for ship building and 
repair timber.
33
 Admiral Christian dispatched a sloop to Plettenberg Bay with the master 
shipwright and 18 shipwrights to obtain timber and examine the nature of the wood.
34
 
This resulted in a report from John Narracott, the master shipwright, on the timber 
available, that was to be re-examined by the Navy Board following the Cape’s re-
capture in 1806.
35
 However, the lack of naval stores did not impede naval operations to 
the extent that food shortages were to cause concern to the naval commanders-in-chief. 
 
4.1.3 Victualling and naval hospital 
 
Seven days after the capture of the Cape of Good Hope, Elphinstone was able to 
determine the immediate capacity of the local economy to supply food. He requested 
that considerable quantities of salt provisions, butter and pease were sent without 
delay.
36
 The Victualling Board continued to send quantities of salted beef and pork plus 
dried provisions such as biscuit, but alcohol together with fresh and preserved food 
could be obtained from Cape suppliers. However, a local failure in the wheat harvest, 
reported by Major General Craig in February 1797, was to have profound 
consequences. 
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Admiral Pringle informed the Admiralty of the likely scarcity of flour and biscuit for his 
squadron and requested a supply of these articles from Britain.
37
 Four months later in 
August, Pringle reported the situation was now critical as bread, flour and biscuit were 
unattainable at the Cape and the squadron only had enough biscuit for one month. 
Pringle concluded if biscuit sufficient for four months was not received he would not be 






 October 1797 a general mutiny broke out onboard all the ships anchored in 
Table and Simon’s Bays. This occurred about a month after news of the mutinies at 
Spithead and The Nore had arrived at the Cape. Although the demands of the ships’ 
crews included the removal of some commissioned and warrant officers, the poor 
quality of the provisions, especially of bread and biscuit, provided a common grievance. 
The mutiny was undoubtedly sparked by the news from Britain, but the failure of the 
Cape wheat harvest in 1797 and the lack of requested supplies from the Victualling 
Board, gave a focus for dissatisfaction. Significantly, the mutiny was ended by the 
commander-in-chief’s dialogue on the reasons for poor quality of provisions and the 
measures he was taking to improve matters, together with an agreement to examine all 
cases concerning alleged abuses by commissioned and warrant officers.  Pringle issued 
a general pardon on the 12
th




The impact of the failure of the Cape wheat harvest and the inability of the Victualling 
Board to respond with timely supplies had a severe effect on deploying the squadron in 
1797, but the local economy, plus supplies from India and Britain, had removed this 
problem within months. Successive commanders-in-chief no longer reported 
provisioning as an impediment to operations, but advised on improvements required to 
enhance performance and reduce costs. 
  
An example of the improvement made in the robustness of victualling for the Cape 
squadron occurred in November 1798. On the evening of the 22
nd
 November a 
catastrophic fire in Cape Town destroyed a number of buildings that contained 
victualling stores. The quantity and description of the losses was reported by the agent 
victualler and is shown in table 4b. The report indicates the loss was considerable and 
was across a complete range of stores. Possibly the most interesting aspect of this report 
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was the presence of local supplies of preserved meat and large quantities of wine. 
Although this was a drastic loss, the amount saved from the fire, together with the 
provisions at the Simon’s Town warehouse and local production, ensured the squadron 
was not inconvenienced. 
 
Description Unit of Measure Amount Notes 
English Beef (Salted) Hoghead 165 
Each hoghead contains 66 
in number 8 lbs pieces 
English Beef (Salted) Hoghead 8.5 
Each hoghead contains 84 
in number 4 lbs pieces 
Cape Bacon Hoghead 12   
Cape Bacon Leaguer (half) 14   
Cape Meat (Salted) Leaguer (half) 65   
Biscuit Pounds (lb) 57512   
Flour Pounds (lb) 10767   
Raisins Pounds (lb) 6300   
Rice Pounds (lb) 65663   
Sugar Pounds (lb) 17896   
Wheat Bushel 59 Approximately 3304 lbs 
Peas Bushel 270 Approximately 15120 lbs 
Wine Gallons 19266   
Brandy Gallons 1140   
Vinegar Gallons 589   
Lemon Juice Leaguer 2 Local Dutch unit of capacity 
Oil Pots 14   
Lemon Juice Chest 16  Empty Bottles 
Wood fuel Ton 21   
Storage       
Cask Number 31  Leaguer (3.5) 
Cask  Number 66  Leaguer (1) 
Cask Number 18  Butt 
Cask  Number 154  Puncheon 
Cask   Number 73  Hoghead 
Cask   Number 66  Hoghead (half) 
Bread Bags Number 2963   
 
Table 4b: Losses of victualling stores from Cape Town fire of November 1798
40
 
Shortly after the arrival of the new commander-in-chief, Roger Curtis, in December 
1799, he provided a status report on provisioning the squadron to the Victualling Board. 
Curtis informed the board his squadron only numbered 3500 out of an establishment 
                                                 
40
 Locack to Admiralty, TNA, ADM 1/56, 30
th
 November 1798. 
153 
size of 4000. The admiral’s observations on what to send from Britain give an insight 
into victualling and local conditions at an overseas base. Curtis stated raisins could not 
be locally obtained, as Cape residents turned all their grapes into wine and it was 
impossible to obtain bags to pack bread at the colony. It was however the lack of 
warehouses owned by the Victualling Board that gave him his greatest concern as this 





Obtaining secure warehouse space was but one task of the agent victualler.  Figure 4d 
has been derived from the examination of Alexander Farquhar’s accounts as agent 
victualler from September 1795 to September 1800. The tasks revealed in these 
accounts fell into four main categories, obtaining the provisions from Britain or by local 
contracts (Provisions); hiring mechanisms to hold and move provisions from store to 
ships plus artificers to supplement the departmental workforce (Rent, hire and material 
costs); managing financial affairs to fund contracts and workforce (Financial); finally 
managing and paying the department workforce (Salary costs). The number of rented 
buildings occupied by the department in January 1800 was 15 at Cape Town and one at 
Simon’s Town. 
 
The workforce of the victualling department consisted of two parts, administrative and 
cask maintenance and manufacture. Table 4c illustrates the change in composition of 
the department from Farquhar’s appointment as sole agent victualler in 1796 to his 
death in September 1800. The department size in January 1800 corresponds with the 
victualling report requested by Admiral Curtis on his arrival. Throughout the period, the 
department had a number of sailors employed to supplement the squadron and locally 
hired boat crews, but the greatest change was the increase in administrative workload 
and hiring of clerks. The number of coopers employed fluctuated during the first 
occupation and, as with the clerks, were normally obtained from the local population. 
However, unlike the naval yard, Farquhar requested three coopers from the Victualling 
Board who were sent out to the Cape.
42
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  Sep 1796 Jan 1800 Oct 1800 
Agent Victualler 1 1 1 
Clerks 3 6 5 
Superintendent of 
Coopers 1 1 1 
Master Cooper  1 1 
Coopers 5 10 4 
Boat crew / sailors 7 2 2 
Extra coopers (slaves) 0 7 0 
Total 17 28 14 
 
Table 4c: Victualling department at the Cape of Good Hope under Farquhar’s 
management 
 
Following Farquhar’s death the commander-in-chief appointed William Maude, the 
purser of Tremendous, as agent victualler. Curtis states he had known Maude for 20 
years and vouched for his suitability in that post. Maude continued in post after the first 
occupation ended in February 1803, at the request of Curtis, with 1500 casks of salted 
provisions under his care.
44
 His accounts for this period were not to be examined and 
countersigned until 1810 following the arrival of a resident commissioner at the Cape. 
 
The victualling organisation had struggled to supply the Cape squadron, but with the 
exception of 1797, this had not restrained naval operations. By May 1802 Curtis was 
able to report he had a minimum of over two years supply of all preserved provisions 
for 2000 men and that he was sending beef to New South Wales as he had heard that the 




From Elphinstone’s arrival at the Cape of Good Hope in June 1795, to Britain’s 
evacuation in 1803, the sailors and marines of the naval squadron made use of shore 
hospitals at Cape Town and Simon’s Town. Before diplomacy failed and military 
operations took place in September 1795, the large Dutch naval hospital at Simon’s 
Town was used by Elphinstone to enable the sick of his crews to recover. This care was 
provided by contract, at 6 shillings per man per day, for which accommodation and 
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With the capture of the Cape, the navy initially took possession of the hospital at 
Simon’s Town, but in May 1796 Commodore Blankett, senior naval officer in 
Elphinstone’s absence, agreed to temporarily give up the building to the army to serve 
as a barracks. Elphinstone had arranged for contracted care of the sick at Cape Town 
and Simon’s Town, at 33 Stivers per man per day, for quarters and all requirements. 
This situation appears to have continued until the arrival of Lord Macartney, colonial 
governor, in May 1797, when Dr. Pattison also landed and became both surgeon and 
agent of the naval hospitals. The navy was not able to recover the large hospital at 
Simon’s Town causing Dr. Pattison in February 1798 to report on the alarming 
conditions the seamen suffered in hospital. The surgeon reported the men would be 
better off on board ship, as isolation in the existing building was not possible.
47
 Pattison 
continued to lobby for another building before the squadron arrived back at the Cape 
and achieved success, being instructed to purchase a house at Simon’s Town for 65000 
Guilders. Pattison remained in post until February 1803, then on the orders of Sick and 
Wounded Board of September 1802, sold the building housing the naval hospital at 
Simon’s Town.48 Unfortunately obtaining any of the agreed purchase price of 40000 
Guilders from the buyer became mired in legal argument. 
 
4.2 Strategic position following the Battle of Trafalgar and re-capture of the Cape 
in 1806 
 
The remainder of this chapter and chapters five and six of this thesis examine the naval 
base at the Cape of Good Hope and the support given to the ships and men making up 
the attached squadron. To ensure the actions of the Admiralty, the respective naval 
commanders-in-chief and resident commissioners are viewed within the overall 
strategic context of the Napoleonic War, a brief examination of the calls on naval 
resources is required. 
 
Napoleon saw Britain as his chief obstacle to domination of Europe and subsequent 
success in the east. His initial plan was to gain temporary control of the English 
Channel to enable his army to invade Britain. This plan failed before Nelson’s victory at 
the Battle of Trafalgar in October 1805 and with it any real threat of invasion. However, 
this is not the picture provided by the War Office and Admiralty deployment figures in 
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this period, or in a number of studies covering the post-Trafalgar period.
49
 Napoleon’s 
strategy now turned on the isolation of Europe from Britain and the creation of a large 
fleet to challenge British seapower and threaten invasion from the Low Countries. 
 
Following the signing by France, Russia and Prussia of the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807, 
Britain no longer had a significant ally in Europe. Britain held Sicily for the Kingdom 
of Naples but was in a state of isolation, concerned about maintaining its naval 
dominance in numbers and about access to vital naval stores in the Baltic region. The 
pre-emptive attack on Copenhagen from August to September 1807, to neutralise the 
Danish fleet and prevent it joining the French, was a prime example of concern for the 
maintenance of naval dominance. Therefore from 1808 a strong Baltic command was 
created, together with the operation of diplomacy and trading links, to ensure naval 
supplies were maintained.  
 
Figure 4e shows the deployment of the British Army in the post-Trafalgar period and 
indicates that until mid 1809 over fifty percent of the army’s strength was stationed in 
the British Isles. It was not until mid 1810 that the home percentage fell below forty 
percent and even at the beginning of 1814 was as much as twenty-four percent. When 
the militia is also taken into account, Britain had the majority of its land forces engaged 
in home defence throughout the period, or paused for intervention in the Low Countries. 
To garrison Britain’s overseas possessions, shown as Other on diagram, and provide a 
striking force outside of Europe, the secretary of state for war deployed at least a third 
of the army for this purpose.  
 
Figure 4e also shows the opportunity that arrived in 1808 for a military return to Europe 
via the Spanish revolt and protection of the Portuguese Crown. These events provided 
the means of effective military intervention on the continent, where sea power could 
provide meaningful support.
50
 In 1809 the largest sea-borne force assembled by Britain 
in these wars, 40000 men, was launched against the Low Countries to support Britain’s 
Austrian allies and destroy enemy dockyards and ships.
51
 The Walcheren expedition 
was a disaster, but it illustrates the British concerns about a growing French fleet in a 
critical region.  
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Figure 4e:  British Army Deployments 1806-1814
52
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Figure 4f: The British Navy – planned deployment of ships in the Napoleonic Wars53 
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Figure 4g: The British Navy – Planned deployment of men in the Napoleonic Wars54 
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To complete the picture of the relative campaign priorities, figures 4f and 4g show the 
planned deployments of the British fleet in the Napoleonic War. Some naval stations 
have been combined to simplify the picture. The West Indies section contains Jamaica 
and the Leeward Islands stations whilst the North American section includes 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and North America. These graphs show the peak number 
of ships and men appeared in 1809-10 and that the Cape of Good Hope and East Indies 
stations were very small in these years. These two stations combined only once reached 
seven percent of the total in deployed ships with the Cape naval base supporting only 
two percent of the navy’s vessels. 
 
The size of the squadrons deployed at the Cape and East Indies were small, as the 
French naval forces were contained in Europe, with only the occasional force evading 
the British blockade. This allowed all the overseas naval squadrons to be kept to a 
minimum. Yet the presence of the distant British squadrons had to be a factor in French 
strategy when defending their interests in the Indian Ocean. To be of any use, the 
French detachments had to be of sufficient strength to allow a measure of parity in 
engagements. Once the Admiralty obtained intelligence of these detachments it was 
only a matter of time before re-enforcements, if required, were sent resulting in the 
French being overwhelmed. The British therefore only needed to expend resources on 
these distant stations when absolutely necessary and hence obtained maximum 
effectiveness at the minimum cost. 
 
To maximise the number of ships available and the time the squadron could remain at 
sea was the role of the civil naval departments at the overseas bases. In the jargon of 
modern warfare, they were “force multipliers”. They worked within parameters set by 
the Board of Admiralty in terms of the number of ships released for duty overseas. The 
collective views, orders and actions of the civil naval departments were not always 
agreed by the commanders-in-chief on the foreign stations and sometimes caused 
considerable friction. 
 
The re-opening of hostilities with Napoleon in May 1803 occurred just three months 
after the return of the Cape to the Dutch. The re-capture of the Cape was expected by 
both the Dutch and the British, although it was not until June 1805 that plans were 
enacted to send an expedition.
55
 The naval force was under Commodore Home Popham 
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with the troops commanded by Lieutenant-General Baird. The invasion fleet arrived in 
early January and, following the Battle of Blauberg on the 8
th
 January 1806, the Dutch 
capitulated.  
 
Following the capture of the Cape of Good Hope, Home Popham and Baird turned their 
attention westward across the Atlantic Ocean to operations in the River Plate region.
 56
 
The South American adventure not only occupied the Cape squadron from March 1806 
to January 1808 it left the civil naval departments at the Cape with little direction from a 
commander-in-chief. 
 
4.2.1 The civil departments of the navy at the Cape of Good Hope following re-
capture 
 
Until April 1809 and the arrival of William Shield as resident commissioner to 
superintend the civil naval departments, the commander-in-chief was the directing 
manager as had been the case during the first occupation. Within a week of the Dutch 
surrendering, Home Popham reported the situation at the Cape, requesting storeships 
were sent with naval stores, biscuit and other provisions.
57
 Home Popham now 
appointed a naval storekeeper,
58
 an agent victualler,
59





 a boatswain of the naval yard
62
 and a surgeon of the naval hospital.
63
 All 
these appointments were from ships of his squadron so that on his departure to South 
America he left behind at the Cape a re-established shore organisation. 
 
However, unlike under the previous occupation, the Admiralty took control of all 
appointments to the naval yard. In April the temporary naval storekeeper, Hopley, and 
master attendant, Brown, were told by the Admiralty that they were replacing them with 
John Howitson and John Goodridge.
64
 The master shipwright selected by the Admiralty 
was John Clark, with the Navy Board informing Clark that passage for himself and his 
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family had passage on a storeship for the Cape.
65
 In 1806 the Admiralty also replaced 
Home Popham’s appointment of William Robinson as agent victualler with Henry 
Pallister.  
 
The Admiralty appointed Troubridge as commander-in-chief of the Cape station and as 
in the past expected him to be their key advisor and manager of the civil departments. 
This expectation was shown in Admiralty’s letters to Troubridge and the Navy Board’s 
letters to the yard officers in August 1806.
66
 Although the Admiralty had decided on the 
number of clerks for the naval yard, together with the appointment of a boatswain and a 
foreman of shipwrights, the necessity, type and number of artificers was to await the 
advice of Troubridge. 
 
Unfortunately Troubridge was never to arrive. This left decisions on the repairs needed 
to establishment buildings, the composition and number of artificers required, the pay 
rates of hired employees and accommodation arrangements in abeyance. Admiral 
Murray, bound for the River Plate, informed the Admiralty on his arrival at the Cape in 
March 1807, that Troubridge was probably dead.
67
 Nevertheless the Admiralty were 
still addressing letters to Troubridge on command allocation in June 1807.
68
 The lack of 
a commander-in-chief had frozen decisions and investigations on the shore 
establishments and into the accounts of Maude, Hopley and Robinson.
69
 This was only 
temporarily improved when Admiral Stirling arrived from the River Plate operation in 
September 1807. He left in January 1808 on health grounds but he did provide guidance 
to officers of the naval yard. The admiral handed over to Captain Rowley who remained 
in command until Admiral Bertie arrived as commander-in-chief in August 1808.  
 
The shore naval departments that had been re-established in 1806 were fundamentally 
the same as in the first occupation. The only difference was that the naval hospital and 
its staff were now part of the Transport Board. Figure 4h shows the organisation of 
these departments following the implementation of the Commission of Naval 
Revision’s fifth, twelve, and thirteenth reports. Privy Council approval for 
implementation occurred on the 14
th
 September 1808, with William Shield being 
subsequently appointed as resident commissioner to the Cape of Good Hope.   
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Figure 4h:   Relationships, accountability and organisation of civil naval departments 
at Cape from April 1809 (dotted lines only show influence) 
 
Figure 4h shows the resident commissioner had full management control over the Navy 
Board department, as he was a member of that board, and a superintending role of the 
Victualling and Transport Board departments. As discussed in chapter three, his 
instructions from the Admiralty consisted of nineteen articles with eighteen referring to 
his management of the naval yards, with the last article detailing the superintendence of 
victualling and transport departments. How the nineteenth instruction was to operate in 
practice was to become the subject of considerable dispute between the commissioner, 
commander-in-chief and agents of the victualling and transport departments. This, on 
reflection, was not surprising as the introduction of any new system, particularly one 
where an organisational change was brought about, depended on the personality of the 
key players. If the instructions were unclear or open to interpretation, then a mechanism 
was needed to evolve, change and clarify them. Disputes and points of clarification 
were referred back to Britain and this gradually removed the main points of contention. 
However delays in this process of clarification ensured that disputes could become very 
heated. How this process worked is examined in chapters five, six and seven. 
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The key relationship to enable the overseas bases to work well was that between the 
resident commissioner and the commander-in-chief. In particular this would require a 
commander-in-chief to be content to give up the power he had exercised to further the 
squadron’s objectives and hence his reputation. In modern terminology, the 
commander-in-chief was the customer, with the resident commissioner and agents of 
the victualling and transport departments the suppliers. However, in this case, the 
commander-in-chief retained a management role over the suppliers as he had power of 
appointment over the agents of the transport and victualling departments and the 
technical officers
70
 of the naval yard. This created a potential conflict of interest. The 
resident commissioner was independently appointed and had instructions to operate the 
overseas departments economically and efficiently, hence would tend to think globally 
as well as locally. The commander-in-chief had operational objectives and could argue 
that he needed more resources and local cooperation, especially as the boards in London 
did not understand the local circumstances. The agents were in a classic middle 
management dilemma, one of trying to satisfy the customer whilst under pressure to 
operate effectively and economically by the resident commissioner. As the commander-
in-chief had power of appointment and influence in promotions, his opinion was of 
great value and the satisfaction of his desires was important to these middle managers. 
 
4.2.2 Resident commissioner and commander-in-chief interaction: a statistical view 
 
A key source for chapters four, five, six has been the correspondence between William 
Shield and the commanders-in-chief while he was resident commissioner. These letters 
uncovered the affairs of all the civil departments at the Cape, with the correspondence 
providing considerable insight into the routine affairs of the naval, victualling and 
hospital departments.  
 
Figure 4j shows the cumulative total of letters between the resident commissioner and 
commander-in-chief from the arrival of Commissioner Shield in April 1809 until his 
departure in May 1813. Of the 1258 letters in this period over 50 percent of these were 
exchanged in the first year. This was a result of the presence of the commander-in-chief 
at the Cape throughout this period and the conflict that resulted between Admiral Bertie 
and Commissioner Shield. Much of this conflict centred on their respective 
interpretations of article nineteen of the commissioner’s instructions, the 
superintendence of victualling and hospital activities, and the refitting role of the naval 
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yard. An advantage of this conflict is that it reveals the ship deployment strategy and 
policies of the Admiralty which is studied in chapter five. 
 

















































































The number of letters exchanged between the commissioner and commander-in-chief 
reduced when the latter was at sea. This occurred when Admiral Bertie sailed to join the 
squadron in preparation for the invasion of Mauritius and when his replacement, 
Admiral Stopford, departed for Java. The capture of the French and Dutch bases in the 
Indian Ocean greatly reduced the threat from these powers in that ocean, resulting in the 
Cape station being almost on a peacetime basis. With the return of Stopford from Java, 
an increase in consultation resulted between the admiral and the commissioner. This 
discussion consisted of the role of Mauritius as a naval base, the consolidation of naval 
facilities at Simon’s Town, provision of accommodation for the commander-in-chief 
and the smooth provision of service. This period is examined in chapter six. 
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Table 4d: Letters by primary and secondary category – Apr 1809 to May 1813 
 
The volume of letters between Commission Shield and the respective commanders-in-
chief, over the four year period of the commissioner’s appointment, provided an 
168 
opportunity to examine the relationship between the individuals, and the routine 
operations of a naval base. An added advantage being these routine operations were in 
support of the squadron engaged in the blockading and subsequent capture of the islands 
of Bourbon and Mauritius. By examining the concerns of the commissioner and 
commander-in-chief, a picture emerges of the role of the Cape of Good Hope overseas 
naval headquarters and to such bases in general.  
 
To obtain this picture table 4d
72
 was constructed by classifying the letters into distinct 
categories.
73
 Almost a third of the correspondence concerned ship refitting. This 
indicates the importance of this activity with providing naval stores also emerging from 
this classification system. Victualling and hospital activities were also prominent but 
other areas appear that were not so obvious. These included the use of slaves, transports 
and boats, hydrographic activities, contracts, timber acquisition and the considerable 
management of the officers, clerks, artificers and labourers in the various departments. 
 
4.3 The naval yard following the re-capture of the Cape 
 
During the first occupation, the naval yard had no capacity from within its own labour 
resources to carry out refit work. The yard was organised to support artificers and crews 
with the occasional use of hired personnel. The master shipwright and master attendant 
provided technical knowledge and supervision, with the naval storekeeper and clerks 
ensuring stores were available for issue with all records maintained. Following the 
second occupation, the Admiralty appointed the yard’s principal officers and sent 
artificers from Britain. The yard officers appointed by the Admiralty had all arrived by 
early 1807, but the yard officers had no idea of the vessels that were to be supported. 
This lack of information was to restrict what naval stores to order, or any ability to 




On Stirling’s arrival, in September 1807, the yard officers at last had a commander-in-
chief to discuss the needs of an attached squadron. This enabled a list of the most 
wanted stores to be compiled and a request that six shipwrights who could also caulk, 
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were sent. The reason for the yard officers’ latter request was the difficulty of recruiting 




The Admiralty agreed to this request, with the six artificers arriving with Admiral Bertie 
in August 1808. This was the first intake of home dockyard artificers arriving at the 
Cape. With their arrival the Admiralty indicated the vessels of the squadron would be 
maintained by naval yard staff. However, it was with the arrival of the resident 
commissioner in April 1809 that the naval yard was organised in the method the 
Admiralty desired. 
 



















Figure 4k: Naval Yard Organisation – February 181076 
 
Figure 4k shows the organisation following Commissioner Shield’s rationalisation of 
artificer provision from February 1810. The paylists for this period and letters from 
Shield, Bertie and officials at the Admiralty and Navy Board, provide great insight into 
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the thinking of the individuals with regard to a refitting policy for British overseas 
yards. 
 
The paylists record who was employed at the Cape of Good Hope naval yards, 
providing the name, role and payment details for the entire establishment and hired 
employees. From this can be determined the salary structure and pay rates for different 
types of artificer and employees. 
 
The salary and allowances of the officers and clerks at the Cape are presented in 
appendix 4b, with the artificers and workmen of the naval and victualling departments 
shown in appendix 4c. They have been presented in the form of tables, to allow for ease 
of comparisons between the various types of officer, clerk and artificer. What became 
evident on compiling the tables was the composition of whose salary and pay was 
calculated using sterling whilst others were calculated in currency. It was noticeable that 
salaried employees had their pay rate expressed as sterling, as were artificers who had 
been sent out from England. This appears to have been to their advantage as their 
monthly pay was expressed in sterling and then in currency after an agreed exchange 
rate uplift. Other employees, one can assume locally recruited, had their day rate 
expressed in currency. Another feature of this was that the artificers were paid different 
amounts according to their trade. The pay rates of hired artificers can be seen to be 
considerably in excess to the equivalent permanent staff. 
 
Following the implementation of the Commission of Naval Revision with the 
appointment of a resident commissioner to the Cape, the naval yard paylists changed in 
format.
77
 This consisted of separate paylists for establishment employees, hired 
employees, H.M. ship’s artificers and working parties, and slave employees.78  
 
The request for support from the squadron to assist in refit and supply of vessels was 
frequently in the correspondence between the commissioner and the commander-in-
chief. Although paylists for ships’ crews have yet to be found, the eighteenth General 
Instruction for Regulation of Foreign Yards states the payment terms and form to be 
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used to record their work.
79
 The size of the skilled workforce on board HM Ships was 




It is unlikely that all the individuals shown in table 4e were present, although logical to 
expect a reasonable number made a significant contribution to refitting the squadron. 
The pay rates of these individuals and supervised working parties from the ships were 
laid down in the fifth report of Commission of Naval Revision. However, this was 
evidently not entirely comprehensive as the Navy Board issued an update in March 
1813. This included the terms for warrant officers, artificer types, marines and others 
missing from the report.  The pay rates can be seen in appendix 4d, together with the 
source for the payment rate and general instructions. The principle of differentiating 
between performing work on his own, or another ship, was continued with clarification 
on what constituted extra payment for an artificer on his own ship. 
 
Description 
Type of Ship 
74 64 50 38 36 32 28 24 20 Sloops Gun 
Brigs 
Carpenter 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Armourer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Carpenter’s 
Mate 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Caulker 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Caulker’s 
Mate 
1 1 1         
Ropemaker 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sailmaker 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Armourer’s 
Mate 
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Sailmaker’s 
Mate 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Carpenter’s 
Crew 
8 8 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 2  
Sailmaker’s 
Crew 
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
 
Table 4e: Planned artificer complements of HM Ships 
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Figure 4l: Cape of Good Hope Naval Yard employees – 1809-181181 
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Figure 4m: Hired and establishment Artificers employed at Cape of Good Hope  
 
174 
Figures 4l and 4m have been constructed from the naval yard paylists covering the 
period when Mauritius and Bourbon were under blockade, followed by a year of relative 
peace to reflect a maximum and baseline workload. What was also provided by this 
period, was the change-over from commander-in-chief management to the 
implementation of the Commission of Naval Revision instructions, via the resident 
commissioner. Figure 4l provides the total number of employees at the naval yard and 
does not make any distinction between establishment and hired individuals. To enable 
this distinction to be made figure 4m shows the relative numbers of temporary and 
establishment artificers, as this was the only area where men were hired. These graphs 
show the impact in May 1809 of the arrival of the resident commissioner, and that hired 
men had been eliminated from the workforce a year later. As this refers to the 
management changes introduced by the resident commissioner, the reasons and impact 
are examined in chapter five. 
 
4.3.2 The work of the naval yard 
 
Table 4d confirmed the main purposes of the naval yard were two fold, the supply of 
naval stores and the refit and repair of HM ships. This latter activity at the Cape was, 
apart from the magnitude and scale of the work performed, similar to that at Britain’s 
home dockyards with the major restriction being the lack of a dry dock. As at other 
overseas yards, repairs to the underwater parts of ships’ hulls could only be achieved by 
careening. In the absence of a careening wharf, as was present at the major overseas 
yards, the only method available at the Cape was to use another vessel to haul down the 
ship requiring refit. 
 
Figure 4n shows the Doris being put in a ‘hauled down’ state for survey at Valparaiso in 
1828. Although this was for a survey it does show the principle of how underwater hull 
work was undertaken, with the bonus of the significance of boats in refit work. The 
preliminary work required was considerable, as a loaded ship would put additional 
stress on the structure of the vessel, and preventing access to the internal hull. The 
lowering down of the ship on to one side and the hauling back up, also required 
considerable control of the forces applied. A structurally suspect ship may not be 
sufficiently strong to be capable of being careened and a dry dock would be essential.  
 
Careening was a most demanding operation, but was not always needed. Before any refit 
work was undertaken a survey of the ship was made by the master shipwright to 
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determine what needed to be done, together with a recommendation on the refit required. 
Many letters requested and discussed these surveys. An example of such a survey can be 
found in appendix 4f.
 82
 This survey was for the Boadicea following her service at the 
blockade and capture of Mauritius. The text of this survey not only confirms the type of 
work detailed in table 3c, shown in chapter three, but also included a recommendation to 
return her home for a full refit. The need to send ships to a home yard for repair was 
frequently a subject of dispute between Shield and Bertie and is returned to in chapter 
five. 
 




A report from Commissioner Shield, in answer to the criticism of the yard by Admiral 
Bertie, provides considerable detail on the type and extent of the refit work performed.
84
 
The type of work included caulking of hulls, topside decks and waterways, manufacture 
of masts and spars, repairing copper that had worn off, making sails, repairing pumps and 
various metal and timber work. Shield’s comprehensive report not only contained the 
work done on the ships, but also their refit start and completion date, thus providing a 
comprehensive picture of activity. The period covered in this report, from June 1809 to 
April 1810, included work on the blockading squadron prior to the operations leading to 
the capture of Bourbon and Mauritius in July and December 1810.  
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The labour force necessary at the naval yard was not restricted to those skilled in 
shipbuilding or ship repair, as erecting new and converting existing buildings, together 
with maintenance of existing facilities of the shore naval departments, required masons 
and carpenters on the yard pay role. Chapter six examines the plans of the Admiralty and 
the actions at the Cape to maintain and improve the shore facilities.  
 
The primary role of the naval yard was supplying naval stores. The naval storekeeper’s 
instructions concerning care of storehouses and stores, together with rules for procuring 
items overseas, were considerable.
85
 The stores status and re-ordering process was well 
established and allowed a picture to be regularly obtained, both locally and in London. 
In the hands of competent and knowledgeable individuals at the Cape and the Navy 
Board, it would have been possible to provide an effective and efficient logistics 
organisation, in spite of the delays in communication and transport. 
 
The final link in the logistics chain, from naval and victualling storehouses, to the 
squadron’s vessels can be easily overlooked, that of the role and use of boats. The naval 
yard’s organisation during the first occupation had a number of sailors and yard boats 
on the establishment. Following the re-capture in 1806 at least six boatmen were 
recorded on the yard paylists until May 1810. The letters between the resident 
commissioner and the commanders-in-chief highlight the importance and use of the 
yard and the ship’s boats in transporting stores and refitting the squadron. The ships 
were usually moored in Table or Simon’s Bays and hence needed boats to transfer all 
items from the shore to the ship. 
 
The request for yard boats to assist in supplying stores to the squadron was frequently 
made, but in 1809 and 1810 there seemed to have been an insufficient number of 
serviceable boats. To overcome this problem the commissioner and the commander-in-
chief reached a pragmatic solution. This was to retain some of the ship’s boats at the 
Cape from vessels returning to Britain. Shield also comments in his early reports to the 
Navy Board on providing a covered area to repair and build boats.
86
 In an early letter to 
the Navy Board, Shield requested that a vessel was sent out to enable the yard officers 
and artificers to be transported between Cape Town and Simon’s Town. He stated that it 
would be quicker and cost less than the current arrangement of hiring wagons.
87
 This in 
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principle was agreed by the Admiralty, although instead of sending out a boat they gave 
permission to purchase a local craft, stating it should be manned by the yard.
88
 The Navy 
Board’s policy on yard boats for overseas yards also provides an insight into their 
thinking. The principal officers of the yard had asked for cutters to be sent out, but in a 
letter of August 1809 the Navy Board stated that no cutters, except jolly boats, were to be 
sent to Foreign Stations. Instead of cutters they said that, on demand, materials would be 




Building boats at the Cape was undertaken in the naval yard and seems to have been very 
successful, as Shield informed the Navy Board that he had heard that the East Indies 
station was short of boats and had sent them two yawls.
90
 The yard officers were still 
demanding 25 foot cutters in 1813, but the Navy Board held to their policy of only 





Boats were of great importance to the squadron in the support of operations, loading and 
unloading stores, and in general transport duties. By retaining returning ship’s boats, 
together with building and repairing boats, Commissioner Shield found an economic 
method in meeting this vital need. 
 
4.4 The victualling department following the re-capture of the Cape 
 
Home Popham immediately on re-taking the Cape accessed the stocks of available 
provisions. He reported he had sent a ship to Rio de Janeiro for rice. That there was only 
a little flour at the colony so he had written to the governor of St. Helena to send any 
that could be spared. Home Popham suggested that storeships were sent with biscuit and 





The commodore re-established a victualling department by appointing his secretary 
William Robinson as agent victualler and also consulted Mr. Maude, the late agent 
victualler left behind by Curtis in 1803, on local provisioning.
93
 Home Popham’s 
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actions were quickly followed up by the Admiralty and Victualling Boards, as they 
decided to send out individuals to form the nucleus of a victualling organisation. An 
agent victualler and an experienced clerk, together with a foreman of coopers and three 
coopers were placed on the Cape establishment. This shows the Admiralty took control 
of victualling in a way quite unlike the first occupation. Henry Pallister, the agent 
victualler and his staff appear to have arrived in September 1806 as Pallister’s accounts 






Unlike the naval yard officers, Pallister was given guidance from naval officers on 
victualling before Stirling arrived in September 1807. Captain Stopford directed that 
provisions sufficient for 5000 men to last six months were always ready in store.
95
 
Admiral Stirling before he left the Cape, briefed Captain Rowley on the victualling 
department. Stirling stated that cooperages were set-up at Cape Town and Simon’s 
Town with contracts in place for wine, fresh meat and vegetables. Although there was 
only a limited supply of biscuit in store the admiral suggested, as plenty of flour was 
available that biscuit was baked. The admiral also informed Rowley that he was 
awaiting the Victualling Board’s opinion as he thought there were too many clerks on 
the establishment.
96
 Figure 4q indicates Stirling was worried that the number of clerks 
would reach the level set earlier in that year. 
 
4.4.1 Organisation and work of victualling department 
 
Figure 4p shows the organisation of the victualling department established following 
Pallister’s arrival in 1806. The agent victualler reported to the Victualling Board and 
was under the direction of the commander-in-chief until the arrival of William Shield as 
resident commissioner, when local management became more complicated.  
 
Following Privy Council approval of the fifth and twelfth Reports of the Commission of 
Naval Revision, the management of overseas victualling changed. The resident 
commissioner was to superintending, the overseas victualling department with the role 
being that of a financial director and auditor. The resident commissioner had four main 
tasks: to examine the agent’s accounts and regularly authorise them with his signature; 
to examine contracts and inspect contractors; to ensure good value for contracts was 
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obtained, and to exercise control over the performance of all contracts; and ensure the 
agents made timely demands for goods. However, there were three other statements in 
the resident commissioner’s instructions that were more akin to direct management, as 
he was to see that business had been properly and economically conducted; provide 
copies of all the instructions given by Victualling Board to their officers; and to 
correspond with the Victualling Board, suggesting improvements for conducting 
business. 
 
How the interaction between the resident commissioner, the commander-in-chief and 




Figure 4p: Victualling organisation at Cape of Good Hope – March 181097 
 
Figures 4p and 4q has been derived from the accounts of the agent victualler from his 
arrival at the Cape in 1806 and the paylists of the victualling department at the Cape. 
The work of the department indicated in figures 4p and 4q can be seen to consist of 
three parts; the administration of stores, placing and control of contracts and recording 
of work done; the manufacture and repair of casks to receive the contracted food stuffs; 
and, finally, the occasional requirement for labourers. Figure 4q shows the number of 
clerks and coopers varied considerably throughout the period, indicating a seasonal 
cyclic nature in temporary employment, with a peak occurring in March 1810. This 
peak coincided with the effort required to provision the squadron about to return on 
blockade of Mauritius for the final time.                                                           .  
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Figure 4q: Victualling department – Cape of Good Hope (1806-1811) 
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A marked reduction in establishment number can be seen from August 1810 when a 
new agent victualler and chief clerk were in post. Prior to this, Commissioner Shield 
was endeavouring to improve the performance of this department and was meeting 
considerable opposition from the agent victualler, victualling chief clerk and the 
commander-in-chief.  
 
In the letters between the resident commissioner and the commanders-in-chief, the 
victualling department was represented with 138 letters. These letters were further 
categorised and represent the concerns of Shield in attempting to superintend the 
organisation. He became alarmed with the financial operation and performance of the 
department, the existing victualling contract and the re-negotiation of a replacement. 
Whether this was either fraud or incompetence was open to question, but the actions of 
the commander-in-chief appear odd and are examined in chapter five. 
 
4.7 The naval hospital at the Cape of Good Hope 
 
In common with the naval yard and victualling department, Home Popham re-
established a naval hospital at the Cape with the appointment of Carver Vickery as 
hospital surgeon. The Admiral and Transport Board accepted this post, but sent an agent 
from Britain to manage the financial and contracting affairs of the hospital. This was a 
departure from the first occupation when the surgeon also performed the agent’s 
function. 
 
The management of the hospital appears suspect, as Stirling reported to the Admiralty 
in December 1807, that the surgeon stated that the clerks had been deceiving him 
regarding the accounts and that Willett, the agent, had little idea of what had been 
happening prior to his arrival.
98
 In Stirling’s briefing report to Rowley as acting 
commander-in-chief he considered the animosity between the agent and the surgeon 
prevented the talents of both from being useful to the public. 
 
The Admiralty and Transport Board acted on Stirling’s letters and informed Admiral 
Bertie, on his recent appointment as commander-in-chief, that the surgeon and agent of 
the hospital were being replaced. On arrival in August 1808 Bertie found that although 
Vickery had been sent home suffering from mental exhaustion, Willett, the agent, was 
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 The admiral immediately dismissed Willet and appointed Richard 




The financial and contracting affairs of the naval hospital department appeared fraught 
with difficulties. With the appointment of a new agent, surgeon and the introduction of 
the superintendence by a resident commissioner it would seem this had been addressed, 
but chapter five indicates otherwise. 
 
4.7.1 Organisation and work 
 
Following the absorption of the Sick and Hurt Board into the Transport Board in 1806 
the naval hospital and its staff now reported to that board and the commander-in-chief 
until the arrival of the William Shield in April 1809. Similarly, to the victualling 
department, the hospitals at overseas stations were to be superintended by the resident 
commissioner. This management function consisted of the financial and contracting 
activities of the agent of the hospital. 
 
Figure 4r provides the organisational structure of the hospital with the agent performing 
the administration required and the surgeon being responsible for the medical function. 
 
The records at the National Archive concerning the hospital do not reveal a paylist, 
although some documents hint at the people involved in providing care to the 
patients.
101
 These documents consist of the certificates, which were signed jointly by the 
agent and surgeon of the hospital, on the men who had been in the hospital. These 
accompanied the Quarter Books that summarised the number of men treated in the last 
three months, those discharged, those who had died and the number still in the hospital. 
It also detailed the daily victualling of all patients on full, half or low diet, together with 
the servants who received victuals.  
 
Table 4f is an example from the first quarter of 1810, of the returns for the hospital 
which coincides with the return of the squadron from blockade. Details of the rations 
issued, which also included the victualling of the servants, can be seen in a breakdown 
of the first quarter of 1810 in table 4g. 
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Figure 4r: Implicit Naval Hospital Organisation at the Cape of Good Hope 
 
No. in hospital at 
beginning of quarter 
37 
230 
No. received into hospital 
in quarter 
193 
No. discharged in quarter 179 
195 No. dead in quarter 15 
No. run in quarter 1 
No. remaining in hospital 
at quarter’s end 
35 35 
 
Table 4f: Hospital return for 1
st
 quarter of 1810 
 
The tables indicate the hospital was for rest and recuperation as much as for medical 
care, returning 179 men to duty, but the squadron was depleted by the loss of 16 men. A 
feature of the times was the use of slaves as the servants in the hospital and this is 
possibly why their victualling is included in the totals.  
 
How the medical care at the Cape compared with other overseas bases has not been 
investigated in this thesis, but chapter seven examines the supply of medical services to 
the East Indies squadron. At a comparable date, April 1810, at Bombay, Commissioner 
Dundas records that of 607 patients admitted in the last 12 months only two had died.
102
 
From this data it suggests the hospitals were effective in returning sailors to their ships. 
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 Full Diet Half Diet Low Diet Servants 
January 626 497  248 
February 1134 593 22 224 
March 875 1280  227 
Totals 2635 2370 22 699 
 
Table 4g: Hospital rations issued for 1
st
 Quarter of 1810 
 
As with the victualling department the correspondence with the commander-in-chief on 
the hospital was considerable. The problems that Shield unearthed concerning the agent 
of the hospital caused him not only to involve the commander-in-chief, but also the 
Admiralty. As the management of the hospital related so much to Shield’s relationship 





This chapter has outlined why the Cape of Good Hope was of strategic importance to 
Britain in maintaining its trading links with the east. The Cape was perceived not so 
much as an asset, but its potential as a threat in the possession of an enemy. Until 1780 
the Dutch, who had occupied the Cape since the 1650s, had been neutral or allied 
whenever Britain was at war with the Bourbon powers. This changed during the War of 
American Independence when the Dutch became an opponent. Unsuccessful attempts 
by Britain were made to capture the Cape during that war to eliminate the threat to East 
Indies trade. In the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch colony was again 
perceived as a threat. This danger was successfully neutralised by British occupation 
in1795 and again in 1806. 
 
The naval squadron stationed at the Cape during the first and second occupations reflect 
different strategy positions. During the period 1795 to 1803, the squadron was 
constructed to resist an attack from an enemy invasion force, but this was not the case in 
the second occupation. Following the re-capture in 1806 the squadron re-deployed to 
the River Plate although with the failure of that campaign by 1808 the squadron was 
reduced in size reflecting the campaign priorities of the Admiralty. That year the naval 
squadron was given an additional mission to defending the Cape, that of the blockade of 
Mauritius and Bourbon. However, at no time were more than two percent of Britain’s 
naval ships allocated by the Admiralty to these tasks.  
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The civil departments of the British navy were all represented at the Cape during both 
occupations. As Table Bay was unsafe during the winter months the navy’s vessels 
anchored in Simon’s Bay, this resulted in a duplication of facilities to service the 
squadron. Cape Town was the main centre of activity, but Simon’s Town also had a 
naval yard, victualling establishment and a naval hospital.  
 
The most significant difference between the first and second occupations was the 
management of the civil naval departments. During the first occupation the Admiralty 
rested all control of the shore departments in the hands the commander-in-chief. After 
the re-capture in 1806, this attitude had changed. Following Home Popham’s re-
establishment of the shore naval departments and officers to man the significant posts, 
the Admiralty immediately responded with specialists of their own. The Admiralty’s 
actions took time to implement, but they had now taken direct ownership of the civil 
naval departments. This ownership was enhanced following Privy Council approval in 
September 1808, of the Commission of Naval Revision reports, concerning the overseas 
civil departments of the navy and the appointment of resident commissioners to 
superintend these organisations. 
 
This chapter has detailed the organisation, composition of the work force available and 
the work performed. The Cape squadron was the most distant from Britain’s logistic 
support centre, as squadron’s based in the East Indies had mature facilities and 
resources available from the East India Company. How this isolated logistic 
organisation was managed by the resident commissioner, armed with the new 
nineteenth article to superintend the victualling and hospital department, is examined in 
chapters five and six. The greatest problem he had to address was the difference in 
opinion between himself and the commander-in-chief on how the squadron should be 
supported. This was exacerbated by instructions he had received from the Admiralty to 
reduce expenditure, and the complications always encountered introducing a new 
method of management. 
186 
Chapter Five The part played by the shore facilities at the Cape of Good Hope 




The story of the blockade and capture of Mauritius and Bourbon has been told in many 
published sources, from James in the 1830s, to Taylor in 2007.
103
 All these sources have 
a common theme, that of operational histories. James and Clowes concentrated solely 
on operational matters, with no campaign focus and hence tended to jump from one 
action to another. Parkinson and Taylor provided an excellent campaign analysis, 
although there was understandably little regard to demands of theatres outside of the 
Indian Ocean. What was also common in these histories was that the support 
departments are either largely ignored, or criticised without an examination of 
underlying factors. This chapter seeks to examine this naval campaign from a different 
view point. 
 
By investigating the timing, type and number of vessels deployed by the Admiralty, 
together with their directions on the older ships already at the Cape, a view can be 
formed on the strategic thoughts of their lordships regarding this campaign. The Cape of 
Good Hope station was isolated from other commands with only ships bound to, or 
from the East Indies, offering any opportunities for assistance. This makes a study of 
the contribution of the shore facilities at the Cape particularly useful, as it was the only 
agent that could influence the number of vessels that were available for blockade duty. 
The object of the naval yard, victualling organisation and hospital was to maximise the 
number of ‘vessel days’104 available, for a commander-in-chief’s direction. 
 
With the focus on these shore organisations over a two year period of intense effort, the 
operation and management of these departments is highlighted, particularly, the refitting 
policy of the Admiralty and the use of local contractors for victualling and naval stores. 
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Central to Admiralty policy, implied in the fifth, twelfth and thirteenth reports
105
 of the 
Commission of Naval Revision, was effective and efficient spending, with explicit 
expectation of honesty and checks to ensure compliance. 
 
The 24 months from January 1809 to December 1810 presented two approaches of 
supporting the blockading squadron, a traditional one of complete attention to the naval 
operation without regard to expenditure, and another where central direction and 
economy were paramount. Following the arrival of a resident commissioner who was 
instructed to introduce the recommendations of the Commission of Naval Revision, a 
view into the management of the victualling and hospital departments is obtained. An 
unexpected benefit of this examination gives insight into how a resident commissioner 
handled a situation where the commander-in-chief appeared to support individuals and 
contractors engaged in fraud. 
 
5.1 The campaign to blockade and capture Mauritius and Bourbon 
 
In April 1808 the Admiralty appointed Albemarle Bertie as commander-in-chief, Cape 
of Good Hope. Significantly Bertie was not directed to undertake operations against the 
French islands and instead had been given instructions to report on refit and storage 
facilities at the Cape. 
 
Commodore Rowley reported to the Admiralty that he had deployed some of the 
squadron to Madagascar and the French Islands, to obtain intelligence.
106
 It was 
however, the arrival of the new commander-in-chief in August 1808, which changed the 
focus of the squadron. This thesis does not examine the operational aspects of the 
campaign, but a timeline of the main events and activities is necessary to provide a 
context for the actions of Bertie, Shield and the Admiralty. Hence, figure 5a presents a 
timeline of the key events with figure 7a, in chapter seven, supplying a map of the 
Indian Ocean. 
 
The desirability of neutralising the French base at Mauritius had long been in the 
thoughts of the British authorities in London and India, with plans made to seize the 
French Indian Ocean islands long before their eventual capture in 1810. At the 
beginning of the Revolutionary War in 1793, Gardner, the recently appointed 
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Figure 5a:  Time line showing blockade and capture of Mauritius and Bourbon 
 
commander-in-chief for the East Indies, was directed to capture Mauritius before 
arriving in India.  His appointment and mission were subsequently abandoned, in favour 
189 
of operations in Europe and the West Indies.
107
 Elphinstone, as commander-in-chief of 
the Cape and the East Indies stations, considered an operation against Mauritius, but this 
was also cancelled. Wellesley, governor-general of India, also planned to use elements 
of the Indian army to invade Mauritius in 1800. He needed support from the naval 
squadron, but Admiral Rainier refused this assistance as he considered the plan 
impractical, given his existing commitments and available resources.
108
 However, the 
French increased their commercial warfare on Britain’s trade in the Indian Ocean in 
1808, so that the removal of this threat became of greater importance than had hereto 
been warranted. 
 
On arrival at the Cape, Bertie discovered an opportunity to discomfort the French on 
Mauritius and Bourbon leading to their surrender. He learnt from several sources, 
including the recently captured paymaster general of the French Islands, that they could 
be made to surrender by starvation. Bertie discovered food was imported to these 
islands for 60000 people throughout the year. This was confirmed by observing that in 
1805 the Americans had a contract for supplying the French with provisions. With the 
American government introducing their 1807 Embargo Act
109
 to stop all trade between 
themselves and the French and British, Bertie observed; ‘The American embargo 
having operated to distress it [French islands] so far, points out to us the means by 
which this spot of annoyance to our Indian commerce is to be subjected or kept at 
check’.110 Bertie continues in the same letter to the Admiralty that his squadron was 
being deployed to blockade the islands and requested ships suitable for the operation. In 
1808 the Cape squadron was a mixed bag of vessels consisting of elderly third and 
fourth rates, supported by small frigates and sloops.
111
 Bertie also pointed out an 
additional problem of applying the blockade was that the squadron would have to quit 
the operational area from January to March, due to the hurricane season. 
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The Admiralty’s response to Bertie’s communication was sent on the 30th December 
informing him they were sending four frigates as reinforcements.
112
 Deploying these 
ships may also have been triggered by intelligence that the French had dispatched four 
frigates to their islands in late 1808. Bertie acknowledged the Admiralty’s letter 
strengthening his squadron, and ‘directing me in the meantime to keep up as strict a 
blockade of those islands as the force under my command will allow’.113 It is in the next 
part of Bertie’s reply to the Admiralty that shows that the use of Indian military 
resources was central to Britain’s plans concerning the French Islands. For Bertie was to 
provide the Bombay Council with intelligence of the forces occupying Rodriguez to 




The Indian army from Bombay occupied Rodriguez in 1809, with elements of that force 
being involved in the raid on Bourbon in September 1809. The French and British each 
dispatched another frigate, but it was not until after the 1810 hurricane season that the 
final push on the French islands was mounted. Lord Minto, governor general in India, 
informed Bertie of his plan to first capture Bourbon and later, Mauritius. This letter, 
dated 26
th
 April, requested support from Bertie’s squadron for both invasions and for 
troops from the Cape, for the capture of Mauritius. Bertie forwarded Minto’s letters to 
the Admiralty, informing their lordships that he was leaving the Cape to join his 
squadron to support the army from India.
115
 Bourbon was subsequently captured and 
garrisoned from early July with the Cape squadron returning to the blockade of 
Mauritius.  
 
As Minto was closing in for the kill, the Admiralty despatched four further frigates 
timed to arrive in early September. This would have provided an overwhelming 
superiority in frigates, but the British lost four of the Cape squadron at the Battle of 
Grand Port, before the reinforcements arrived. This battle was the greatest defeat 
inflicted on the British Navy in the Napoleonic War, but it was strategically 
unimportant. With the further dispatch of Minto’s military force from India, the troops 
and escorting warships met at Rodriguez, resulting in the subsequent surrender of 
Mauritius on 3
rd
 December 1810. 
 
                                                 
112
 The Admiralty letter to Admiral Bertie has yet to be found, so date written is unknown. The Admiralty 
letter is quoted in Bertie’s reply of 13th April 1809 in which he states Cornelia had arrived in late March. 
ADM 8/98 States the Cornelia sailed for India on 30
th
 December 1808. 
113
 Bertie to Admiralty, TNA, ADM 1/61, 13
th
 April 1809. 
114
 Bertie to Admiralty, TNA, ADM 1/61, 13
th
 April 1809. 
115
 Bertie to Admiralty, TNA, ADM 1/63, 12
th
 July 1810. 
191 
This brief review of the campaign shows the interaction between the Cape squadron and 
British forces in India. Without military occupation by elements of the Indian army the 
naval campaign might have continued indefinitely.  
 
5.2 Admiralty planning (deployment strategy and refit policy) 
 
The Admiralty ship lists books 
116
 contain the planned deployment figures for all ships 
in the navy and show the competing theatres and the resources the Admiralty considered 
appropriate. These figures were from time of ship allocation to a ship’s return from 
theatre, or notification of loss, hence the figures were not the same as being on station 
and available for operations. Using these allocation figures, the Navy, Victualling and 
Transport Boards, had guidance for determining and solving logistical requirements. 
This included the victualling and naval stores required, together with the manning needs 
of the hospital, naval and victualling yards. The facilities of the operating bases could 
also be considered and measures planned for improvements or additions, or even 
closure, if a station was no longer needed. With the local naval storekeeper and agents 
providing regular returns of naval, victualling and medical stores usage and future 
requirements, the home organisations could anticipate what and when to send out 
supplies.  
 
The Cape squadron never exceeded two percent of the navy’s strength.117 This only tells 
one side of the story as it does not consider the type or relative strength of ship. The 
most powerful and up to date ships tended to be placed in the critical theatres, leaving 
old and less formidable ships to other areas. Figures 5b and 5c illustrate this as they 
contrast the planned, with the on station deployments. The Admiralty changed the 
composition of the squadron from a mixed force of elderly, third and fourth rates 
supported by small frigates and sloops, to that based of modern fifth rates. These 
changes both matched the deployments of the French and fashioned a squadron better 
able to maintain a blockade. This was most noticeable in the deployment of fifth rate 
frigates. 
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Figure 5b: Planned deployment at Cape of Good Hope (Jan. 1808 to Feb. 1811)
118
 
                                                 
118
 Admiralty Ship Lists, TNA, ADM 8/95-99, 1808-1811. 
193 
 




                                                 
119
 These monthly figures have been obtained by referring to commander-in-chief, resident commissioner 
letters and journals for times of arrival at and departure from station. Note: One sloop, Caledon, was 









J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F
Fifth Rate (Planned) Fith Rate (on station)
1808 1809 1810
 
Figure 5d: Comparison of Admiralty deployed frigates and those on station 
 
The following observations can be made by comparing the planned and on-station 
records. It took, on average, two to three months for ships sailing from England to 
arrive on station. Locally commissioned vessels, losses and ships returning to Britain 
were not reflected in the Admiralty’s ship lists until the Admiralty were notified. For 
example, the sloop Caledon did not appear on the Admiralty’s deployment records until 
five months after she was brought into service and only remained at the Cape for 15 
months.
120
 The elderly, third and fourth rate ships remained on station even when their 
unsuitability for blockade duty had been recognised. Raisonable and Leopard were 
recalled by the Admiralty, but they were retained by the commander-in-chief. However, 
usually ships were returned to England when they had been away for a considerable 
time, indicating a refitting policy. What is evident is that the Admiralty planned to 
change the complexion of the squadron to one more suited to a blockading role, 
consequently building up its strength in time for the invasion of Mauritius.   
 
The ship lists present a view into Admiralty thinking, showing how the composition of 
the squadron was changed, as well as its delay in reacting to losses. If the contribution 
of the shore establishment, in supporting the Cape squadron, is examined more aspects 
of the Admiralty’s logistical thinking is forthcoming. With the appointment of a resident 
commissioner to the Cape, the Admiralty had a man on the spot to implement their 
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policies. The evolving role of the commissioner and problems encountered in executing 
policy constitutes the core of this chapter.  
 
What becomes apparent from the letters of the Admiralty was their refitting policy and 
the role of the naval yard. The Admiralty’s refitting strategy was based on economic 
considerations as ships were only to receive minimal refits. The effect of this reduced 
the number of artificers required in the naval yard, limited the usage of naval stores and 
hence also reduced the area required for storage space, accommodation costs and 
facilities needed. If a ship needed considerable work, the vessel was to receive sufficient 
repairs to enable her to sail to Britain for a full refit. A vessel that required dry dock was 
also to be sent to Britain.  
 
The Admiralty and Navy Board ordered this for financial as well as operational reasons. 
The dry docks at Bombay were a commercial concern and charged for usage. If only 
vessels in the East Indies squadron used the facilities, costs could be predicted and kept 
to a minimum. However, if the Cape squadron also used the docks, it would disrupt the 
building, refit and repair programme of the East Indies squadron. Another policy, 
implied in the limited refit directive of the Admiralty, was that prize ships were to be 
patched up and sent to Britain. Examples of all of these instructions in action can be 
found during the blockade and capture, of Bourbon and Mauritius. 
 
Exploiting local materials was a standing instruction at the overseas yards. This was to 
reduce the necessity of sending naval stores to an overseas yard. In the case of the Cape 
of Good Hope, not only were local forests at Plettenberg Bay used to reduce 
dependency on Britain, but investigations into the forests’ potential for exporting ship 
building timber, spars and masts to Britain were commissioned. It was not just for naval 
stores that the importance of local contracts was recognised. To victual the ships with 
fresh provisions local purchase was inevitable, but if other items could be economically 
obtained, this would reduce the requirement for victualling stores being sent from 
Britain. 
 
Keeping expenditure to a minimum always concerned the Admiralty. By controlling 
resources through set Admiralty policies, the most strategically important areas would 
receive the lion’s share. These policies required strong local representation of the 
Admiralty, or the local commander-in-chief could demand and obtain resources he 
considered necessary. A phrase frequently used by the Admiralty and Navy Boards 
196 
when giving directions in their letters to the commander-in-chief and resident 
commissioner illustrate their concern for expenditure: ‘only that absolutely necessary’. 
 
By following the actions and dispute between Vice-Admiral Bertie and Commissioner 
Shield, from their respective appointments, the reason for Bertie’s replacement as 
commander-in-chief becomes understandable. If Bertie’s actions on arrival and the 
briefing Shield was given before departure are examined, the scene is set for the violent 
arguments that were to take place. 
 
5.3 Albemarle Bertie takes command 
 
On appointment to the command of the Cape of Good Hope squadron in April 1808 
Bertie was provided with a briefing paper from the Navy Board on the facilities at the 
Cape. In this letter the Navy Board provided information from Admiral Stirling on the 
work that he had done to secure the stores from damage or theft. Information on the 
timber at Plettenberg Forest from a 1798 report, was also provided with a request for 
further investigation on what could be obtained. A third point in the letter was the 
sending of six shipwrights with Bertie for the naval yard to supplement the artificers of 




Bertie on arrival answered the Navy Board’s questions on timber and facilities.  
Regarding timber, he reported that substitutes for hull parts could be obtained in any 
quantity, but timber for masts and yards was more doubtful, as the pine substitute 
appeared to be too brittle and heavy. Whether the timber could be economically 
obtained was uncertain. As for naval yard requirements, Bertie forwarded letters from 
the yard officers on the need for blacksmiths, storage and refit facilities. These letters 
called for a very large increase in the number of shipwrights required and the provision 
of a sheer hulk. The question of accommodation for the artificers and their families, 
who had come out with him, continued to illustrate the high living expenses at the Cape, 
reported during the first occupation. This problem caused the admiral to recommend an 




Investigation into the recommendations for a sheer hulk and other improvements in 
naval yard facilities, including an increase in shipwright numbers, were passed by the 
Navy Board to the Admiralty’s newly appointed resident commissioner, William 
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Shield. Bertie was informed of this appointment together with an order to give up the 
official house at Cape Town upon his arrival. In addition Shield would now be 




Until the arrival of Commissioner Shield in April 1809 the shore establishments 
continued to be under the direction of Bertie. Bertie had decided to devote the squadron 
to the blockade of the French islands but, as discussed above, the ships were not suitable 
for the operation and inadequate in number. This was exacerbated by the loss of the 
sixth rate frigate Laurel to the French in September 1808. To maximise the operational 
capability of the squadron, Bertie resorted to increasing the number of artificers in the 
naval yard, commissioned a prize as the sloop Caledon and refitted his only third rate 
ship.
124
 Commissioning the sloop provided him with a replacement for Laurel, with the 
retention of Raisonable maintaining the appearance of strength at the Cape.  
 
The increase in yard artificers was achieved by using prisoners of war, drafting artificers 
from ships calling at the Cape before the ships’ return to Britain and the hiring of local 
contract labour.
125
 Bertie’s reasoning for increasing the numbers of artificers, was to 
reduce the turn round times of ships returning from blockade and to carry out major 
refits.
 126
 These measures would boost the number of ships, by removing the need to 
send them home and increasing the time available for operations. 
 
The effect of these measures can be seen in the resources used to commission Caledon, 
repair Nereide following hurricane damage in March 1809, and refitting Raisonable. 
This latter refit enabled the Raisonable to be useful to Bertie, although the Admiralty 
had requested, prior to this refit, she was returned to Britain.  Bertie noted this request in 
a letter to the Admiralty in January but his case for retaining her was rejected. This can 
be seen in a note, dated 29
th
 March 1809 by the Admiralty, on Bertie’s letter, reiterating 
their instruction that Raisonable was sent home.
127
 Bertie ignored these orders, with 
Raisonable not leaving the Cape until mid 1810. The commissioning of Caledon, was 
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also to become a subject of enquiry by the Admiralty due to the costs incurred. It was 
not only the manpower costs of the repairs to Caledon, Raisonable and Nereide that was 
of concern, as the refits used considerable stores. Bertie had taken some measures in 
order to rectify his depletion of timber caused by these refits, by contracting local Boers 
to supply timber from Plettenberg Forest. To assist and oversee the contract, Bertie sent 
a foreman and two shipwrights. However, this did not solve the alarming naval stores 
situation that Commissioner Shield found on arrival.  
 
Increasing the complement of the naval yard was not the only area in which Bertie 
involved himself concerning the shore establishments. He obtained slaves from captured 
prizes, employed them as labourers in the naval and victualling yards and requested 
permission to train some as artificers. Bertie was informed by Lord Caledon that an 
Order in Council had given directions on the use of captured slaves and the admiral 
considered this as authority for entering 72 men and eleven boys onto the 
establishment.
128
 A further measure involved entering into a victualling contract with 
Maude and Robinson and the commissioning of building work for his own 
accommodation. Both these latter measures were to become a subject of much dispute 
with the incoming commissioner during his drive for economy. 
 




 was appointed by the Admiralty as resident commissioner to the Cape 
of Good Hope in late 1808. The Admiralty, Victualling and Navy Boards all sent Shield 
letters briefing him of their concerns including papers and reports by the Admiralty 
solicitor concerning Maude and Robinson. The instructions to Shield from the 
Admiralty and the Navy Board were particularly instructive as they illustrated their 
concerns.  
 
The Admiralty were uneasy about the actions of the agents of the victualling and 
hospital departments and the transactions of the victualling contractors, Maude and 
Robinson. Shield was to investigate the management activities of every agent victualler, 
since the second occupation.
130
 The Navy Board in their briefing was focused on 
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economy, with repairs to establishment facilities to be done only if absolutely necessary 
stressing expenditure was only to save money, indicating any investment should have 
immediate benefit, as the Cape might again be returned to the Dutch.  
 
Both the Admiralty and Navy Boards’ letters indicate that prior to departure Shield was 
in London, where verbal directions and discussion of the written correspondence 
probably took place. Shield also appears to have collected and had bound, a copy of the 





In their letters, the Navy Board initially tasked Shield with advising, when he arrived, 
on the composition and numbers of artificers required at the naval yard, particularly the 
number of masons and smiths needed. In addition, he was to advise on the employment 
balance of hired and established artificers and labourers. He was also directed to keep 
the number of clerks on the establishment to a minimum.
 132
 All these instructions were 
given in late December, but it was the Navy Board’s letter of 7th January 1809 that was 
Shield’s key briefing document.133 
 
Bertie’s 30th September 1808 letter to the Admiralty concerning Plettenberg timber, 
naval yard facilities and artificers, promoted the following directives from the Navy 
Board to Shield. Regarding local timber, Shield was to obtain all necessary information 
to determine quantities, costs and potential for local use and export to Britain. The store 
buildings at both Cape Town and Simon’s Town were only to receive repairs that were 
absolutely necessary. Concerning the other building projects being promoted by the 
admiral, the Admiralty directed that no expenditure should take place without their 
direct approval. What was requested was that Shield provided estimates for these 
projects and give advice on their practicality. The improvements to facilities together 
with the consolidation of them to Simon’s Town are detailed in chapter six of this 
thesis. 
 
It was the Navy Board’s directives to keep costs under strict control and to recommend 
on the make up and numbers of artificers for the naval yard, which was to be 
particularly relevant, as it was to govern Shield’s actions on his arrival. Regarding 
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Bertie’s request for an increase in shipwright numbers, the Navy Board delayed action 
until Shield gave his opinion. The request for a sailmaker and smiths was agreed with 
the latter sailing with Shield for the Cape. Concerning the welfare of the shipwrights 
and their families, who arrived with Bertie, Shield was directed to ascertain the 




A major recommendation in Bertie’s letter was the provision of a sheer hulk for hauling 
down ships and providing accommodation. The Admiralty and Navy Board rejected this 
as an option, as they considered the vessel would be in danger of being wrecked. Instead 
they suggested that ships requiring careening proceed to Saldanha Bay with a vessel 
being hired for that purpose. Shield was to inspect this option and report his findings on 
arrival. During the first occupation Saldanha Bay had been used as a refitting location 




The instructions contained within briefing letters from the Admiralty, Victualling and 
Navy Boards, provided the basis for what was to be Shield’s subsequent actions. What 
was revealing was that the Admiralty, with Navy Board guidance, had calculated the 
number of artificers necessary to support the squadron at the Cape. This decision had 
been made with full knowledge of the reinforcements being sent for the operation 
against the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon. 
 
5.5 Shield’s first months at the naval yard: A new broom 
 
Commissioner Shield in his first two months at the Cape was to make an immediate 
difference as to how the naval yard was to function. He made this his priority, before 
investigations into the supply of timber from Plettenberg Bay. However, he also found 
time to examine the work and management of the hospital and victualling departments, 
with this being discussed later in this chapter. 
 
On arrival at the Cape, Shield immediately contacted Admiral Bertie. Their relationship 
got off to a poor start, as the admiral would not give up the commissioner’s official 
house and continued to issue orders directly to the yard officers. The admiral’s and 
commissioner’s views on how many people should be employed in the yard and the 
latter’s economising was to be at the root of their subsequent disputes. For example, 
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Shield’s refusal to spend any more money on the stable, the admiral had directed be 
converted from a store building, was not to the admiral’s liking.  
By the end of his first week at the Cape, Shield wrote to the Navy Board answering 
many of the questions set out in their letter of 7
th
 January 1809. After consultation with 
his principal officers, Bertie and Captain Rowley, Shield rejected Saldanha Bay as a 
refitting location on grounds of time and cost. Simon’s Bay was perfectly safe and very 
suitable; it was much easier and cheaper to hire a hulk for heaving down in that bay, 
whereas it would take weeks to move a hulk, artificers and stores to Saldanha to little 
advantage. Having confirmed the need for a Simon’s Town establishment, Shield 
verified the necessity of paying travel costs for yard officers working at Simon’s Town. 
Shield suggested that a more cost effective measure than paying travelling allowance 
was to obtain a vessel of approximately 60 to 70 tons to transport people and materials. 
Shield also commented on the usefulness of a ropemaker being added to the 




Shield examined the stores inventory and found them at a very low level. There was an 
urgent need for naval stores to replace those consumed on Nereide repair, due to her 
damage from a hurricane, as her main and mizzen masts had been lost with all attached 
items. Stores required included blocks of all sizes, canvas, lower masts for frigates 
because none were in store, copper sheathing, nails and bolts, rough spars from 6 to 18 
inches (noting Plettenberg contract spars might not be suitable), pitch, tar, sails, cutters, 
large cordage, and warm clothing. He also noted that a fire-engine was required in the 
yard to protect the storehouses.
137
 Shield’s concern regarding stores was again raised in 
early May in connection with hauling down Raisonable and ‘the wretched little 
Caledon’. The increase in frigates on station was also noted by the commissioner, with 
him pointing out that lower masts were needed. Although some of these materials were 
available locally and had been purchased, they were extremely expensive consequently 




Regarding the instruction to report and make recommendations on the yard workforce, 
Shield found a much larger establishment of personnel employed than he had been 
given as guidance by the Navy Board. He therefore returned artificers from the yard, to 
the squadron and reduced the number of hired employees. On the question of the 
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number of smiths and masons required, he suggested that a total of four smiths, one of 
which was to be a foreman, should be sent together with three or four masons. 
The question of the balance of using hired, or establishment artificers, was addressed in 
favour of bringing labour from Britain. Shield’s comments on the local labour force are 
damming as he states they were slow, expensive at ten shillings a day and difficult to 
hire on the spur of the moment.
139
 This payment was approximately two to three times 
more than establishment employees received. Shield only used contractors as a last 
resort and this is reflected in the paylists, as contract labour was greatly reduced in May 
1809. The commissioner re-introduced contractors to assist in refitting Bourbonaise in 
November 1809 and continued their use when the squadron returned from blockade for 
refit. The use of contract labour was however, completely eliminated by April 1810. 
 
Pay and conditions was another task which required investigation by Shield. The 
existing ship carpenter artificers stated their pay was inadequate for subsistence and had 
requested their release back into a ship of war. Shield had the power to raise wages and 
increased the pay rate of carpenters from six to seven shillings a day. He also raised the 
pay rate for sailors from three to four shillings per day, as he commented it was 
impossible to hire the most ineffective slave labourer for that amount.
140
 Shield also 
reported that the standard of lodgings at Simon’s Town was not only miserable, but 
extremely expensive. He negotiated a reduction in the rent and even provided a diagram 





Before his first month was out, Shield had formed a view on the facilities, location, 
stores situation, careening areas and transport required. He had determined the labour 
needs, balance of yard and contract artificers and addressed the payment and allowances 
required to retain his workforce. This was an impressive start, but until he obtained 
support and approval for his actions from the Admiralty, he was being attacked by 
Bertie for the reduction in the workforce. The admiral was reluctant to give up control 
of the naval yard, the commissioner’s house, or agree to halt the building works he had 
commissioned.
142
  However, Shield managed to gain access to his house, control of the 
yard and because he was holding the purse strings, all spending. All this was achieved 
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before the Admiralty had ordered Bertie to relinquish the house and shown their 
disapproval regarding the conversion of a storehouse into a stable.
143
 
The Navy Board approved of Shield’s actions regarding the navy yard informing him in 
August that the Admiralty would be informing Bertie of their support for the 
commissioner’s actions.144 The stores situation was quickly addressed by the Navy 
Board, by the dispatch of storeships both directly and via ships first bound for Rio. They 
also approved the recommendations of Shield for shipwrights, ropemakers, masons and 
smiths. 
 
5.6 The naval yard – support and refit of blockading squadron 
 
Chapters three and four detailed the type of refit work performed on ships at overseas 
stations with appendix 4e showing the work performed by the naval yard at the Cape 
during a critical period.
145
 By studying the paylists of the shipwrights and caulkers of 
the naval yard during the transition year of management control, 1809, it becomes 
apparent why the Admiralty and Navy Board approved of Shield’s actions.  
 
The establishment figures shown in chapter four were derived from the paylists, but 
more information can be gained by recording where the workforce was engaged. 
Figures 5e, f and g show the relative effort of the shipwrights
146
 on various tasks in 
1809 and show three categories of work. Firstly, yard and Plettenberg Bay related 
activities, secondly, major refits such as Raisonable and finally minor refits.  
 
The paylists were designed to record where work took place. If workmen were 
employed outside of the naval yard perimeter, certificates were provided by a ship’s 
officer of the number, type and time spent by the artificers on board ship. This method 
suited the control mechanisms required at the time, but does not definitively state the 
effort required to refit the ships. It does however provide a sound method of comparing 
relative effort. The yard category, while not allocated to a ship, was either preparing 
items for ships or maintaining yard facilities. The shipwrights at Plettenberg Bay were 
obtaining timber for the naval yard and so were also indirectly working on the ships of 
the squadron.  
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Figure 5f: Shipwrights and caulkers – Employment on ships (Dec. 1808 – Dec. 1809) 
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Figure 5g provides a view of the relative percentages of the shipwrights and caulkers 
activity on ships and on shore in 1809. To understand when this activity occurred, 
figure 5e gives the month and amount of artificer’s effort, including work within the 
yard, or at Plettenberg Bay, whilst figure 5f only shows the activity on board ship. The 
first third of 1809, during the period of direct management by Admiral Bertie, the 
artificers were involved in considerable ship refitting activity.  Following Commissioner 
Shield’s arrival the reduction in demand can be seen. This is more evident in figure 5f 
where the yard and Plettenberg activities have been removed. Once the ships returned 
on blockade there was only a very limited amount of ship borne work required. To have 
a large permanent artificer establishment would be costly and leave them very little to 
do for nine months of the year. Figures 5e, 5f and 5g also show that if high maintenance 
ships were removed from the squadron, and replaced by recently refitted ships from 




Figure 5g: Shipwright and caulkers: Allocation by percentage in 1809 
 
Admiralty policy was to use its overseas yards for maintenance activities and hence 
only to resource these yards for that role. This is what Commissioner Shield had done, 
but in introducing this reduction in capability, a violent disagreement resulted between 
the commissioner and Bertie. However, if Bertie’s recruits had been retained what were 
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they to do? There were insufficient ships for them to refit and unnecessary expenditure 
would have occurred employing them. 
 
Bertie had a very different view on the role of the naval yard to that of Commissioner 
Shield and that of the Admiralty and the Navy Board. Bertie’s squadron was unsuitable 
for the role he had undertaken; instead of merely defence of the Cape, it also included 
blockade of the French Islands. The composition of the squadron was not only 
inadequate for these tasks, but also of the wrong mix. By increasing his support 
capacity, commissioning a prize and retaining Raisonable, Bertie considered he was 
maximising the ability of his squadron to carry out their mission. With intelligence that 
four large French frigates were joining those already at the Mauritius, his view would 
appear to have made very sound operational sense. 
 
This was the strong case that Bertie made to Shield in a series of letters between them in 
April and May 1809. Shield starts this strand of letters on 29
th
 April, five days after 
informing Bertie he had arrived and taking charge of the naval yard.
147
 Shield states he 
was reducing the enormous costs of running the yard at Simon’s Town and asked Bertie 
who he would like returned to his ships. Bertie took offence at the implied criticism and 
stated the squadron’s mission dictated a large establishment, especially with the 
expected French reinforcements.
148
 Bertie took Shield even more into his confidence by 
sharing intelligence of the newly arriving French frigates. He acknowledged Shield’s 
zeal, capabilities and power and that retrenchment was required, but objected to a 
reduction in the numbers of artificers.
149
 Shield’s reply was that the Admiralty were 
aware of his mission, and had laid down the establishment size to which he had to 
conform. He did try to mitigate this by saying he would continually review yard 
strength and increase support if he considered it necessary.
150
 By the 17
th
 May an 
impasse had been reached. Shield believed in his actions and that the Admiralty had 
correctly scaled the risk of French reinforcements with their own, while Bertie believed 




Bertie wrote to the Admiralty on 22
nd
 May stating his strong objections to Shield’s 
policy of reducing the manpower of the naval establishment. He provided copies of all 
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the letters that had passed between them and wanted the policy reversed.
152
 The 
Admiralty replied on the 12
th
 September defining the role of overseas naval yards. They 
stated in this letter ‘that they can not but approve’ of the actions of Commissioner 
Shield, particularly the reduction in the size of the establishment workforce. They 
further outlined their policy directing the admiral that no large repairs were to be 
undertaken, as the cost of materials and labour was too high; that vessels requiring such 
refits were only to be repaired to make them safe for a return to England; and that 
vessels returning to the Cape were only to receive small or temporary repairs. The 
Admiralty’s letter contained a sting in the tail; ‘their Lordships trust that you have paid 
too much attention to the expenditure of the public money to have allowed any 
considerable expense to be already incurred on any of the old or unsound ships under 
your command’.153 Bertie did not acknowledge receipt of this letter until 9th January 
1810, by which time his relationship with Shield had gone from mutual dislike to open 
warfare. 
 
Admiral Bertie pleaded for a reversal of the Admiralty’s refit policy and wanted to 
know how he was to blockade the French Islands with the resources he had available, 
without resorting to the methods he had employed.
154
 Given a campaign focus this was 
an attitude easy to understand. However, Bertie does not seem to have realised that his 
squadron was involved in a holding operation until the Indian army was available and 
reinforcements arrived from Britain. 
 
The Admiralty continued to rebuke Bertie for deviating from his orders and instructed 
him to not interfere with vessels bound or returning to the East Indies, nor to remove 
sailors from those ships.
155
 It was not only for this interference with the East Indies 
squadron that the Admiralty was later to scold the commander-in-chief. To circumvent 
his problems with refitting at the Cape, the admiral sent the Leopard and Iphigenia to 
Bombay for docking and repair. Commissioner Dundas at that dockyard accommodated 
these repairs, but reported that if the Cape squadron were to use his yard on a regular 
basis it would be a ruinous plan.
156
 The Navy Board asked the Admiralty if it was their 
intention to direct Cape ships to Bombay for refit.
157
 This caused the Admiralty to 
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reinforce their directive to Bertie of 12
th
 September for ships not to be sent to Bombay 




This clearly answered the question of the role of the naval yard at the Cape: it was for 
the maintenance and minimal refitting of ships. The Admiralty knew of the operations 
which the Cape of Good Hope squadron was engaged in and had reacted to Bertie’s 
request for reinforcements and to intelligence of the French sending frigates. What the 
Admiralty required was for expenditure to be effective and not spent on vessels that 
would consume valuable stores and expensive labour.  
 
The Admiralty may have clearly stated their directions regarding the purpose of the 
naval yard in August and September 1809 to Bertie, but he was not to receive these 
letters until January 1810. It therefore left the resident commissioner as the only brake 
on the admiral’s intentions to refit his squadron without thought of the cost. The 
resulting dispute is best examined through three case studies. These studies are firstly 
the commissioning of Caledon and refit of Raisonable, the second being the 
commissioning and refit of La Bourbonaise and the third the refit of Inconstant. 
Appendix 5a contains a detailed report on the refit of Inconstant and the commissioning 
of Caledon and La Bourbonaise, but the essential points are summarised below. 
 
Figures 5e, 5f and 5g showed that prior to Shield’s arrival, considerable work had been 
performed on the Caledon and Raisonable. This caused the Navy Board to request 
reasons for Caledon’s acceptance into service159 and for the Admiralty to admonish 




An examination of the paylists explains why the Navy Board instigated an enquiry into 
the purchase of Caledon. From her commissioning, to her departure from the Cape in 
March 1810, she received more expenditure in shipwright labour than any other vessel 
in the squadron with the exception of Raisonable.
161
 Bertie reported in April 1809 that 
the Caledon had three years of service in her, but she had already returned from sea in 
March with serious leaks. On beaching her it was found she had rotten wood and 
corroded nuts, bolts and other iron work. Bertie ordered her repair and re-coppering 
with completion in April 1809. This was not to be the end of surveys into making the 
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sloop a safe vessel, as Bertie sent her to Bombay for docking and repair. On survey, 
Commissioner Dundas and the master builder refused, stating she was not worthy of 
repair and sent her back to the Cape. Caledon was eventually sent by the commander-
in-chief to Britain in March 1810, where on arrival she was examined and subsequently 
broken up. 
 
The consequent enquiry by Shield found the yard officers, on surveying the sloop had 
recommended to Bertie that she was not purchased for the service. Their 
recommendation had been based on the cost of repair compared to the cost of the vessel. 
The yard officers were over-ruled by Bertie and ordered to repair her for HM service. 
 
More refit work was performed on Raisonable than any other vessel of the squadron. 
She had not received a full refit for many years and this had been recognised by the 
Admiralty as they ordered her return.
162
 If she had been sent home when requested, 
stores would have been preserved and spending greatly reduced.  
 
The successful raid on Bourbon in September 1809 captured a number of ships with the 
French frigate Caroline being amongst them. This captured ship was brought into Table 
Bay in October 1809 causing the admiral to commissioner her as La Bourbonaise. The 
type of refit she was to receive became the subject of much debate between the admiral, 
commissioner and yard staff, eventually resulting in her being repaired sufficiently for 
her return to England.  
 
On arrival she was examined at Plymouth, paid off and never brought into service. The 
Admiralty and Navy Board supported Commissioner Shield on his stance regarding the 
type of refit she was to receive. The Navy Board informed the Admiralty, ‘if the 
commander in chief upon foreign stations do order ships taken from the enemy to be 
fitted out and equipped from the arsenals abroad those magazines must inevitably be 
distressed for the stores which have been provided for the ships of the squadron 
stationed there’.163 The Admiralty subsequently informed Bertie that they disapproved 
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The Admiralty sent the 36 gun frigate Inconstant to reinforce the Cape squadron in late 
December 1809, matching intelligence that another frigate had been sent by the French.  
Inconstant arrived in March, but had run aground shortly before arriving at the Cape 
and reached Table Bay in a state just short of sinking. 
 
Shield concentrated all the yard’s efforts onto the ship, but requested urgent support 
from the commander-in-chief in saving Inconstant. The master shipwright had 
determined she needed immediate careening, necessitating a rapid unloading and 
temporary repairs being carried out. In addition to the naval yard and local hired 
contractors, the squadron’s boats, artificers and seamen were requested to assist in 
repairing the Inconstant.  
 
Bertie, instead of providing prompt support, held two courts-martial on the ship, 
diverted the squadron’s boats to unload prize ships and stated the squadron had more 
important operational tasks to perform. Shield applied considerable pressure on the 
admiral and eventually obtained the support needed, but Bertie initiated an inquiry by 
three of the squadron’s captains on the performance of the naval yard and its officers. 
 
Both Shield and Bertie wrote to the Admiralty and Navy Board concerning the 
Inconstant and the dispute that had resulted between them. As before, the Admiralty and 
Navy Board approved of Shield’s actions, with the Admiralty informing Bertie that they 
considered he had impeded the refit by holding the courts-martial on the ship. The 
Admiralty’s letter was dated 15th August 1810 and may be significant, as another letter 
from Bertie was received on that day at the Admiralty. Bertie’s letter complained that he 
had not been supported regarding his disputes with Shield and requested his withdrawal 
if the commissioner was not removed. An Admiralty official merely ticked this 




The subsequent career of Inconstant shows the repairs at the Cape allowing her to return 
to Britain were worthwhile. She was subsequently refitted at Portsmouth and re-
commissioned in October 1810 to remain in service until 1817 when she was broken up. 
The comparison with the fate of La Bourbonaise, that of paying off and subsequent 
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scrapping, suggests that the actions of Shield and his yard officers were completely 
vindicated.  
 
For a final review of the management of the naval yard up to the surrender of the 
Mauritius in December 1810, figures 5h and 5j provide a rational for the Admiralty’s 
refit policy. Figure 5h follows the same principles as figure 5f as only shipwright and 
caulker activity on board ships have been evaluated. The spread of activity is presented 
over 24 months and shows an absence of refit work on ships occurring from April to 
December 1810, apart from repairs to allow Leopard to return home.  
 
Shield looked for work for the shipwrights during this period and kept them occupied 
by training them in mast making and infrastructure work at the hospital and victualling 
yard. Employment on maintenance of Cape Town wharf was also a sound use of yard 
labour. If Bertie’s policy of a larger workforce had been employed, it is difficult to 
know what value they could have been. 
 
Figure 5j more clearly shows the purpose of the naval yard, that of small refits. Of the 
27 vessels and three special shore duties on which work occurred between January 1809 
and December 1810, three vessels dominated the refit activity. These were Raisonable 
(23 percent), Caledon (13 percent) and Nereide (11 percent), a worn out ship, a prize 
that should have not been brought into service, and a vessel that had survived a 
hurricane. If Shield had been in post with the Admiralty refit policy for foreign yards in 
place, this would have ensured that Raisonable was sent home and Caledon not brought 
into service. Money would have been saved without unduly weakening the squadron.  
 
It has been argued that Shield refused to refit Bourbonaise and withheld stores for that 
purpose.
166
 The paylists, represented in figures 5h and 5j, indicate a different story as 
Bourbonaise received more days of artificer effort than any other ship, with the 
exception of Inconstant, under Commissioner Shield’s management of the naval yard. 
Bourbonaise dominated activity in November and December 1809 and this was only to 
put her in a condition to safely send her to England and disposal. A closer examination 
suggests she was not the valuable ship that an operational historian considered her to be, 
or that stores had been refused by Commissioner Shield.
167
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Figure 5h: Shipwright and caulkers – Employment on ships only (1809-1810) 
 
A similar view can be formed of Inconstant, as she dominated activity in March 1810 to 
save her for future service. To make the overseas refit policy work in the most efficient 
manner, soundly built and recently refitted ships were required. This is what the 
Admiralty ship lists demonstrate, with the deployment of such ships from January 1809, 
but only taking effect from the beginning of 1810 when worn out ships were sent home. 
 
The refits of Caledon and Bourbonaise provide a partial answer to the question of 
commissioning prizes overseas. These ships were locally commissioned and in both 
214 
cases used considerable manpower resources. However, it was probably the use of naval 
stores on Caledon which illustrates the wisdom of not commissioning prizes overseas, 
and instead to send them to Britain. 
 
 
Figure 5j: Shipwrights and caulkers activity (on ships only) Jan 1809 – Dec 1810 
 
5.7 The victualling department and naval hospital 
 
The naval hospital at the Cape was part of the Transport Board as shown in figure 4h in 
chapter four. This chart also shows the superintending responsibility entrusted to the 
resident commissioner. Figure 4p provided a chart of the hospital organisation, with 
chapter two providing a description of the various activities of a naval hospital. When 
the squadron returned from blockade in December 1809, the sick were sent to the 
hospital to recover; tables 4f and 4g provided the hospital returns for the following 
quarter. The provision of a suitable diet appears to have been crucial to the recovery of 
the sailors, indicating the hospital victualling contract was as important as medical care. 
 
Victualling the squadron was a vital service performed by the base at the Cape and as 
table 4d in chapter four demonstrated, a considerable number of letters between the 
resident commissioner and commander-in-chief were exchanged on this subject. Prior to 
Commissioner Shield’s arrival at the Cape, the victualling organisation was completely 
in the hands of the local agent victualler, in support of the commander-in-chief, to 
whom he reported. Chapter two described what the Commissions on Fees and Naval 
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Revision sought to introduce, to improve the management of victualling overseas. They 
recommended an additional role for the resident commissioner, that of superintendence 
of victualling, but as described in chapter two there was much room for interpretation. 
 
Shield was directed to investigate and report on the dealings of the previous agent 
victuallers; the Admiralty were suspicious and wanted an improved control system in 
place. William Maude had been that officer from 1800 to 1803, with William Robinson 
being the agent victualler in 1806 until Henry Pallister arrived. Maude and Robinson set 
up a company that was subsequently to become important to the navy as, not only were 
they prize agents, but also the main victualling suppliers. In addition, their role as 
victualling contractors became the cause of a considerable argument between Bertie and 
Shield, when they were supplying wine and goods to the blockading squadron. 
 
The disagreement between the commissioner and the command-in-chief were not just 
confined to the naval yard possibly adding further evidence as to why Admiral Bertie’s 
resignation was so eagerly received by the Admiralty. By examining the actions of 
Bertie and Shield regarding the victualling department and the hospital, not only does 
this provide evidence of the problems created by the framing of the nineteenth article of 
the commissioner’s instructions, but also the improvements forced on these 
departments. These changes were introduced in the teeth of opposition from the admiral 
and the respective agents. It would seem significant that both of the agents were 
replaced followed by the admiral’s departure, all of whom were never again employed 
in public service. 
 
On arrival in April 1809, Shield had concentrated on the naval yard to dramatically 
reduce costs and improve the naval stores situation, but he quickly turned his attention 
to the victualling department and hospital. Within a fortnight of his arrival Shield had 
reported to Bertie that the Transport and Victualling Boards had not sent out the new 
instructions, or briefed their local officers on the resident commissioner assuming 
superintendence of their departments.
168
 Bertie was supportive and stated that Shield 
should take responsibility until clear instructions were sent from England, but this 
support ends with the statement, ‘subject to my [Bertie’s] immediate control and 
direction’.169 This still left the commander-in-chief as the controlling power for the 
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victualling and transport agencies and hence, would only work if the commissioner and 
commander-in-chief could agree on areas of responsibility. 
 
Shield was considered by the Victualling Board as their local representative, as they 
wrote directly to him regarding victualling affairs, for example, in June 1809 when 
Shield informed Bertie that provisions from Britain would be delayed. The next part of 
this letter provides a view of the depth of involvement Shield was already taking in 
victualling affairs. He observed that, as the stock of ‘beef and pork are getting low I 
think it would be advisable to increase it whenever fair opportunity offer’170 and that a 
tender for a large quantity of salted beef and pork at a very advantageous price had been 
handed in. He commented that he had inspected some of the casks and found the 
contents in excellent condition and hence requested the admiral to order the agent to 
purchase the items. 
 
Five points become apparent from this letter; firstly, Shield had detailed knowledge of 
the items in store; secondly, he could calculate likely consumption, compare against 
items available and hence determine the short fall; thirdly, he had a clear understanding 
of local market conditions to ascertain an advantageous price; fourthly, the importance 
of a random inspection of the goods being tendered; and finally, only the commander-
in-chief could direct the agent. The first point is particularly critical and rests on 
accurate record keeping and audit. To confirm these holdings, Shield obtained an 
inspection of the victualling stores in mid June 1809. This he stated was necessary, as 
the agent victualler needed a survey carried out to comply with Victualling Board 
regulations, subsequently requesting three officers from the squadron to carry out the 
inspection.
171
 The commissioner may not have had direct control over the staff, but he 
was using his financial and audit powers to effect the actions he considered necessary. 
 
Early indications were that Bertie considered Shield was in charge of the victualling 
department. This is shown in his use of Shield to solve a problem of the inadequate 
amount of wine in store, observing it would soon be exhausted and requiring 
requisition, a simple management function that could have been sent directly to the 
agent victualler.
172
 By involving Shield in an activity, that was not one of merely 
financial control, it may have seemed to the commissioner that he had management 
authority in that department.  
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Shield was to assume this authority and quickly became unpopular with the agent 
victualler and his office clerks. In attempting to implement his interpretation of his 
instructions, Shield found much wanting in the management and work performed in the 
victualling department. The deficiencies he uncovered in the victualling yard and office 
were many. These consisted of poor time-keeping and attendance at the victualling yard 
and office, with consequent over manning, inadequate financial and contract 
management, poor record keeping, defective procedures in the acceptance of items 
delivered and finally insufficient supervision of the workforce. Appendix 5b contains 
details of the problems Shield encountered in the victualling department.  
 
The local victualling contract and money management was to prove the means that 
Shield was to use to operate his authority and in doing so, effected a replacement of the 
agent and his first clerk. A further result of Shield’s management demonstrated the very 
strange behaviour of the admiral in defending and continuing the existing victualling 
contract, which the commissioner and the Admiralty found perplexing. They wondered 
whether Bertie was party to fraud, an accusation that was never made, but was hinted at 
many times. 
 
Admiral Bertie wrote to the Admiralty on 1
st
 September 1809 with a copy of the letter 
he had sent to the Victualling Board. This outlined the victualling contract that he and 
the agent victualler had entered into with Maude and Robinson in November 1808.
173
 
He pointed out that only two tenders were received, but that he felt a good contract had 
been obtained with a solvent and respectable firm. This showed an understanding of 
vender assessment, as there was no point having a contract with an organisation that 
could not be trusted, or would become bankrupt during the contract period. What 
concerned Bertie was that the renewal date was in October and he wanted to extend the 
contract term. Shield’s examination of the victualling department and the problems that 
were occurring with supplying the squadron caused him to question the suppliers, which 
seems to have prompted Bertie’s letter to the Admiralty. 
 
In order to examine the victualling contract with Maude and Robinson, Shield requested 
from the admiral, copies of the tenders that had been submitted. On receipt Shield 
recorded that he had received copies of four tenders when the admiral had earlier 
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reported to the Victualling and Admiralty Boards that there were only two.
174
 Shield 
now proposed, as the Maude and Robinson contract was coming up for renewal, 
effective from 1
st
 November, that the existing contract only be extended for six months, 
when a re-tendering exercise take place and more advantageous terms obtained.
175
 
Bertie replied he had anticipated this, had written to the Admiralty on 1
st
 September and 




Shield appears to have informed the Victualling Board of his suggestion, as the 
Admiralty directed Bertie to terminate the Maude and Robinson contract and act on 
Shield’s proposal. The Admiralty’s letter revealed their surprise: ‘their lordships 
astonishment at your having shown any opposition to the commissioner’s proposal so 
obviously for the advantage of the public service and that they are further of opinion 
that any loss the Country shall sustain in consequence of such opposition should be 
charged as an impress against you’.177 This Admiralty letter was in advance of their 
reply to Bertie’s of 1st September, as their reply to that is dated 14th February 1810 in 
which they referred him to their earlier letter. 
 
This was not the end of the matter as the Admiralty’s letter took a few months to arrive 
and the admiral continued to resist the termination of Maude and Robinson’s contract. 
As part of this campaign Bertie sent a series of letters to the Admiralty. He had 
requested from his squadron commanders details of the quality of the provisions that 
had been provided under the victualling contract. This action was prompted because 
Shield initiated an enquiry into the quality of some wine delivered to the squadron’s 
ships. All of the reports from the squadron stated the provisions and wine had been of a 
good quality during the last twelve months.
178
 However, Shield’s concern had not been 
about quality, but of cost, as acceptable quality of items supplied was a contractual 
obligation. Nevertheless a revealing argument over quality occurred regarding the wine. 
 
Commissioner Shield in early November 1809 carried out an inspection of the wine 
supplied to two ships of the squadron and found it was inferior to the test sample of the 
nine month warranty wine. He asked his yard officers to give their opinions on the wine 
supplied to the ships, and they concurred that the contractor had supplied inferior 
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 Howell, acting agent victualler, was requested by Shield to inform the 
commander-in-chief of the situation and the contractor of their non-compliance with the 
contract. The contract stated, ‘that the whole of the wine delivered under the contract 
shall be at least one year old, and warranted to keep six or nine months, as may be 
required’. Howell considered the victualling department was not to blame for the quality 
of the wine, but noted this had never happened before and that the contract had always 




Maude and Robinson provided a lengthy defence against the complaints of Howell, 
Shield and the yard officers refusing to take any responsibility for the wine’s condition. 
Their view was that the wine was acceptable when it left them. They provided an 
affidavit from their storekeeper to that effect, adding that the varying climatic 
conditions from one year to another provided differences in taste. They further 
commented that the yard officers were not skilled in assessing wine quality. The 
contractor’s bottom line was that they took no responsibility for the wine supplied.181  
 
This view was endorsed by Bertie who appears to have used this case as an example of 
Shield’s interference with the smooth running of the victualling contract. He considered 
the oaths of the contractor’s men on the quality of their products to be of greater 
standing than the evidence of the yard officers on two samples of wine.
182
 In this letter 
Bertie also stated he was obtaining information from the squadron of the quality of all 
provisions supplied, together with the comparison between Maude and Robinson’s 
contract and Mr. Bird’s183 tender, which represented a saving of £4386 currency over 
the past 12 months.
184
 Was the defence of the contractors out a sense of fairness, or did 
Bertie have another reason? What was strange was there was no evidence of the admiral 
demanding an improved acceptance process in the victualling department.  
 
A strange postscript to the wine element of the contract was to occur in December 1809. 
Shield demanded to know of Bertie why he had ordered more wine against the contract 
than could be used by the ships of the squadron, plus if it was not for the ships, what 
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was the wine for? He also complained that he only found out about this order by 
accident and that, as he had superintendence of the department he wanted an 
explanation. Shield did not stop there, as he continued to point out the disadvantageous 
terms of the contract and the admiral’s refusal to even issue a termination notice.185 
Bertie refused to be drawn into an argument. He merely stated that store wines were 
being shipped into La Bourbonaise for transport to England and that he would not 
discuss the matter further. However, he was reporting the obstacles Shield was putting 
in his way, to the Admiralty, Victualling and Navy Boards.
186
 This did not deter Shield, 
as he pointed out that Bertie was sending home wine to England on a contract that was 
six pounds per ton more expensive than could be obtained in the colony. It was also in 
this letter that he pointed out that, unlike Bertie, he had no connection with the 
contractor, as Maude and Robinson were Bertie’s prize agents and he had only the 
public’s interest in mind.187  
 
Bertie never replied to Shield’s letter, so we do not know if he was promoting colonial 
products at the suggestion of local government, or for his own interest, or that of the 
contractors. All of this discussion occurred during the aftermath of the La Bourbonaise 
affair and the clash between Captain Corbet and Shield when the relationship between 
the commander-in-chief and the commissioner was at a very low point. 
 
The victualling contract remained with Maude and Robinson until the January letter 
from the Admiralty arrived in June, but Shield was still determined to extract value 
from the contractors. The new agent victualler, Alfred Johnson, arrived from England 
on the 23
rd
 May 1810 and dined with Shield the following day, presumably briefing the 
commissioner on the thoughts of the Victualling Board.
188
 Shield had recently found the 
contractors had substituted calavance for pease and he wanted to make it a contract 
termination issue. He informed the admiral of what had happened and that the 
Victualling Board had disapproved of this practice.
189
 However, Bertie merely stated in 
his reply that he had approved this substitution, as it had been in the original tender and 
was unaware of the Victualling Board’s ruling.190 Shield stated he was in charge of 
paying for goods on contract and that as it was not in compliance with the contract, he 
was not paying for the goods. The commissioner had found pease in the colony at a 
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competitive price and could not account for the victualling department asking for the 
substitution.
191
 Unfortunately for Bertie the new agent victualler had similar views to 
Shield, but Bertie did not give up his contract without a fight. 
 
Bertie informed Shield that his delay in replying to the letter of 11
th
 June, was due to the 
fact that he had resorted to the law officials at the colony to rule on the terms of the 
contract and the legality of the substitution of alternative items. He ended by directing 
Shield to pay for the calavance.
192
 Shield’s reply is one of amazement, ‘most sincerely 
lamenting that you have sought legal opinions to thwart me in my duty and operating 
essentially against the interest of the public really sir you could not have advocated the 
cause of the contractor more strenuously had you belonged to the firm and a partaker of 
the profits.’ He further stated that the contract was no longer binding on the crown and 
that calavance would not be paid for.
193
 Bertie’s letter of 30th June to the Admiralty’s 
letter acknowledged that the Maude and Robinson contract was to be terminated, but 
even at this late hour he still championed the contract and his actions. 
  
With the new agent in place, tenders for a replacement victualling contract were 
advertised. Shield wrote to the admiral that a new contract had been entered into and 
that a saving of over £5000 would result, with a further £2360 saved if put into effect 
immediately. He added he had consulted the King’s Procter who had stated that Maude 
and Robinson had been in breach of their contract and hence it could be terminated.
194
 
Bertie again jumped to the defence of the contract, by obtaining the procter's opinion 
and presented this, together with supporting information to the King’s advocate, the 
highest legal opinion at the colony, and stated the advocate’s opinion was at variance to 
Shield’s and the procter.195 This appears to have been a delaying tactic, as the admiral 
used the time taken to fill the storeship Ranger with stores from the old arrangement, 
before the new contract could be put in place.
196
 Shield’s comments to Bertie were 
scathing, regarding the ‘retention of your darling contract the dissolution of which has 
been extorted from you by my endeavours [….] to promote the real interests of the 
public’.197 
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Bertie’s options to retain the contract, or extend it for any length of time, had now run 
out. The Admiralty and Victualling Board wanted a more cost effective contract with 
Shield and the new agent letting nothing obstruct this aim. Victualling was not to 
become an issue of controversy again.  
 
Bertie’s behaviour at best looked intractable and incompetent providing another reason 
for his removal as commander-in-chief. The case, while not strong enough for a 
prosecution for fraud, was suspicious enough to put a black mark against his name and 
prevent his employment again in a position in which he had access to government 
contracts. Hence, although it may have been the refitting policy that he had objected to, 
which caused him to be withdrawn; his actions concerning the victualling contract may 
have been the reason why his request for an enquiry into his removal was not granted.  
 
The fate of Pallister and Howell is also instructive. They were not investigated but were 
never to work in public service again. Pallister had been involved with the British 
victualling organisation for over twenty years. In his last month as agent victualler he 
called on Bertie’s support as Shield was questioning him regarding fraudulent 
practices.
198
 This investigation appears to have ceased with Johnson’s arrival causing 
Pallister’s replacement, shortly followed with Howell leaving the following month. 
Pallister remained in the colony until 1812, when he is recorded as leaving on storeship 
Dolphin, on which he died at sea in September 1812.
199
 Howell remained at the Cape in 
various enterprises and found himself bankrupted within two years.
200
 Alfred Johnson, 
however, remained as the agent victualler at the Cape until 1820 shortly before the 




Following Admiral Bertie’s examination of the medical department and appointment of 
senior staff on his arrival at the Cape, the Admiralty informed the commander-in-chief 
that a new surgeon and agent to the hospital were being sent.
202
 These individuals, 
James Cairns (surgeon) and Andrew Millar (agent), arrived at the Cape on 13
th
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Within days of his arrival at the Cape, as resident commissioner, Shield made enquiries 
of the surgeon regarding the naval hospital.
204
 Shield’s questions prompted a series of 
letters from Cairns that not only provided information on the running of the hospital, but 
also the control the commissioner wished to exercise. Shield in his letter, asked for 
information on who worked in the hospital, their role, how much they were paid and 
who had appointed them. He also requested copies of the survey reports carried out by 
Captains Rowley and Johnson on the hospital together with an account of the hospital 
stores. By obtaining this information Shield was obtaining a picture of the current 
hospital organisation, enabling him to compare this with the Commission of Naval 




The reply Shield received, contained worrying information from the surgeon. Cairnes 
stated he was concerned over the victualling contract for the hospital on which he and 
the agent disagreed. The latter, Millar, had stated he was retaining the existing 
arrangement, set up by his predecessor, unless directed otherwise by the commander-in-
chief.
206
 Cairnes reported the quality of the goods was poor and that Millar had received 
a considerable sum from the previous agent. What Cairnes also brought to light was that 
he was never consulted on purchases, but was asked to approve accounts the correctness 
of which he had no means of ascertaining.
207
 Shield quickly dealt with the contracting 
arrangements. He obtained agreement from Bertie that he take the hospital contract and 




Suspicion of Millar’s honesty was again put into question by Cairnes, who on 
investigating a complaint from his patients, found their rations were being reduced 
without reason or the surgeon’s agreement. Cairnes commented, ‘highly improper it 
appears to me that the agent or any other person connected with the department should 
act in the capacity of contractor’209suggesting the agent was involved in fraud.210  
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Shield acted on this information by removing victualling from Millar’s influence, and 
requesting Cairnes draw up detailed instructions to record and audit the food and 
medicines given to the patients.
211
 Millar was to account for every item provided to a 
patient, recording whether on half or full rations, so that Millar only received payment 
from the commissioner for these items. To obtain the status of the stores at the hospital, 
Shield obtained a survey. This was requested of the admiral who sent officers from the 
Boadicea with them carrying out the audit in mid June 1809. These officers 
subsequently complained to the admiral that the allowances awarded them were 
insufficient. Bertie used this complaint in his quarrel with Shield, by forwarding the 
letter to the Admiralty. Shield merely records in his journal, ‘believe they were drunk 
most of the time’212 and to the admiral, replied that he had paid the officers subsistence 
and travel costs at naval yard rates.
213
 It is difficult to know what other amount he 
should or could have paid. 
 
In attempting to manage the hospital Shield had encountered similar problems to those 
he had with the victualling department. Shield attempted to exercise his superintending 
powers over the hospital and, as seen, started by obtaining information from the 
hospital’s functional head. The commissioner focused on the performance of the agent 
and his reports caused the Admiralty to replace Millar.
214
 The new agent of the hospital 
was to remain in post until 1822 when the naval base was run down to care and 
maintenance status. 
 
5.8 The relationship of Admiral Bertie and Commissioner Shield 
 
Shield’s arguments concerning the hospital and victualling departments continued with 
Bertie until the respective agents were replaced. Once the new individuals were in post, 
the commissioner’s and agents’ positive relationship removed Bertie’s close 
involvement in hospital or victualling affairs. It seems the commissioner and the agents 
worked as a team, with the commander-in-chief rarely becoming involved in the general 
running of the civil naval departments. Article nineteen of the commissioner’s 
instructions had caused considerable problems, but by placing an individual to act as an 
auditor and financial controller, it created more effective departments for the delivery of 
public service. 
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The continuing disagreements on policy and violent arguments between Admiral Bertie 
and Commissioner Shield have been thoroughly examined concerning the naval, 
victualling and hospital departments. Both Bertie and Shield found the situation 
intolerable, but the commander-in-chief took action to have Shield removed. He did this 
in a series of letters to the Admiralty and his letter of 24
th
 May 1810 resulted in the 
resolution of this dispute. In this letter he referred to his earlier dispatch of 10
th
 
December 1809 to which he expressed his dissatisfaction with the Admiralty’s 
response. 
 
Bertie’s letter of 10th December 1809215 to the Admiralty contained a record of many of 
the disagreements the admiral, his officers and the agents of the hospital and victualling, 
had had with Shield. Bertie provided a catalogue of this correspondence ranging from 
complaints on inadequate allowances, when officers undertook a hospital survey, not 
assisting with boats in loading vessels, not providing stores authorised by the admiral, 
and Shield seeing fraud everywhere, including not giving freedom to agents to draw 
money. Bertie thought he was showing Shield’s general interference in his management 
of the civil departments.  
 
The admiral considered the drive for economy was ill thought out, interfered with 
operations and slowed action by endless discussion. Bertie considered the 
commissioner’s nineteenth article undermined the authority of commanders-in-chief; 
that it gave the commissioner too much independence; that orders given by Bertie 
concerning the civil departments were subject to Shield’s agreement. The admiral 
considered the commissioner was only the representative of boards subordinate to the 




Bertie sent more letters showing he wanted Shield removed, but it was by his letter of 
24
th
 May that Bertie asked ‘that their lordships will be pleased to recall me from my 
command’. This appeal was annotated on the letter by the Admiralty with, ‘acqt. 
[acquaint] him that his request will be complied with’.217  
 
The admiral appears to have been compelled to this action because the Admiralty never 
supported him in his complaints against Shield. In fact the reverse was the case. The 
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Admiralty had disapproved of his refit policy, locally commissioning ships, his control 
of costs, ignoring directions to return ships and not to remove men from homeward 
bound vessels. The swansong of Bertie’s campaign obsession was the order he sent to 
St. Helena calling for ships there to join him at the Cape. The Admiralty not only 






This chapter has examined and reviewed the part played by the civil departments of the 
navy at the Cape of Good Hope in the capture of Mauritius and Bourbon. It has shown 
that the Admiralty changed the complexion of the squadron to one of recently refitted 
heavy frigates more suited to the operation, and timed an overwhelming force to be in 
place to support the invasion of Mauritius.  
 
It illustrated that a mere reading, or studying, of operational histories and naval 
commanders’ reports provides only one side of a campaign and ignores logistics and 
central planning. By examining the Admiralty, Navy Board and resident 
commissioner’s actions and thoughts, a more complete understanding is obtained. 
 
Bertie as commander-in-chief had become completely campaign orientated and did not 
obey the orders of the Admiralty, who had a clearer view of Britain’s priorities. 
Capturing or neutralising the French Indian Ocean Islands was not one that could be 
accomplished by naval action alone, regardless of the resources applied, but one where 
an army was required. Until this could be arranged, the squadron from the Cape could 
obtain intelligence, apply pressure on French commanders by disrupting food imports 
and to their ships, but not invade Mauritius. 
 
The appointment of Commissioner Shield by the Admiralty placed an individual to 
ensure the shore naval departments worked effectively and economically. This took 
longer than it should as the commander-in-chief protested the implementation of the 
Admiralty’s policy for overseas bases which was one of maintenance of vessels and 
supply of stores to ships. An overseas naval yard was not for major repairs or 
commissioning vessels. 
 
A close examination of Bertie’s observations on Shield’s behaviour as resident 
commissioner indicates the commissioner was carrying out the tasks the Admiralty 
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required. The Admiralty wanted central control over expenditure and behaviour in all 
the support areas, which was achieved. By pressurising the agents slack and possibly 
corrupt practices were removed with improvements made in the deliver of victualling 
and medical services. Article nineteen of the resident commissioner’s instructions can 
be seen to have been successfully implemented, even in the face of the commander-in-
chief’s obstruction. 
 
The reason for the Admiralty’s acceptance of Albemarle Bertie’s resignation, and its 
refusal to sanction an enquiry would seem to lie in the admiral’s independent behaviour. 
This ranged from interference with Admiralty dispositions and refit policies, to odd 
contracting practices. However, the era when such behaviour could be tolerated had 
passed, Bertie was never employed again. 
228 




This chapter examines the shore naval facilities at the Cape of Good Hope following the 
capture of Mauritius and Bourbon. The utility of these islands was examined by the 
British, as anchorages and potential naval bases and provides evidence for the retention 
of Mauritius together with the return of Bourbon to the French. With the capture of Java 
in 1811, French and Dutch bases were eliminated in the East Indies, resulting in the East 
Indies and Cape of Good Hope squadrons being reduced in size and power. With the 
reduction in ships the resident commissioner now had to either find alternative work to 
occupy the labour force, or decrease their number. 
  
The Cape of Good Hood squadron had an anchorage during the summer at Table Bay 
moving in the winter to Simon’s Bay. This resulted in two naval arsenals and refit 
locations being provided at Cape Town and Simon’s Town an inefficient and costly 
arrangement, but consolidating to one location would require investment. Before this 
investment could be made the fate of the Cape required resolution. If the Cape was 
again to be returned to the Dutch then the venture was unnecessary. The re-organisation 
of the naval shore establishments are investigated in parallel with this political decision. 
 
6.1 Operational context 
  
Following the capture and occupation of Mauritius and Bourbon, the activity of the 
Cape of Good Hope squadron and its support services, became one that almost 
descended into peace-time conditions, until the outbreak of war with the United States 
in 1812.  On discovering that Drury, the commander-in-chief in the East Indies, had 
died, Admiral Stopford left his command at the Cape, to assist in the elimination of 
French and Dutch power in Java. Stopford returned to his squadron after the capture of 
Java, arriving at Mauritius on 20
th
 October 1811. In his absence Stopford had left 
behind the majority of his squadron with a strong force concentrated at Mauritius. 
Unaware that Mauritius had been captured the French sent three frigates to reinforce 
their position at that island. This resulted in an encounter with British warships in May 
1811. Two of these frigates were captured in late May off Tamatava, Madagascar, with 
only the La Clorinde escaping back to France.
219
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With the occupation of Tamatava and the Seychelles in 1811, the Admiralty responded 
to this removal of French power in the Indian Ocean, by reducing the number of ships in 
the Cape squadron. By July 1812 the squadron consisted of the Lion (64) as flagship 
and a force of only four frigates and three sloops. The squadron was further reduced in 




An indication of the central control exercised by the Admiralty, plus the trust in their 
abilities was shown in Stopford’s reply to a briefing report from Britain. Responding to 
Admiralty intelligence that two French line of battleships with supporting frigates were 
bound for Mauritius in early 1812, Stopford replied he was concentrating his weaker 
force at Simon’s Bay, awaiting re-enforcements and only engaging if opportunity 
dictated.
221
 This threat never materialised but the response made sound strategic and 
tactical sense. The only other operational threat Stopford and his successor Tyler had to 
counter in this period resulted in war being declared by the United States in 1812 
necessitating the need to provide escort vessels.  
 
6.2 The potential of Mauritius and Bourbon as naval bases 
 
With the capture of Mauritius and Bourbon, the British had not only removed the threat 
of the French, but also acquired another port for its own navy. The advantageous 
position of these islands for supporting operations in the western and southern Indian 
Ocean can be seen in chapter seven, figure 7a. Since the French stationed large frigates 
at Port Louis, Mauritius, this implied that such vessels could be accommodated. The 
number and type of vessels to be stationed at that port, together with the scale of local 
shore support to be provided, exercised the minds of Admiral Stopford and 
Commissioner Shield over the next eighteen months.  
 
Initially Stopford stationed frigates at Port Louis, as can be seen in the engagements that 
took place in May 1811, calling on Shield at the beginning of March 1811 to discuss the 
arrangements that should be made to support these ships.
222
 However, with the 
departure of Stopford to support the invasion of Java, decisions on the shape and role of 
the base were delayed until his return in October. In the interim Stopford delegated 
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authority of the civil naval departments to Commissioner Shield, together with 
instructions to open all dispatches addressed to the commander-in-chief. During this 
period Shield operated a stores policy of equipping ships bound for Port Louis with 
naval stores for four or eight months, with regular forwarding of items on request. The 
commissioner’s approach was detailed in a letter to Captain Butterfield, commander of 




On Stopford’s arrival at Mauritius in October he found a letter from the Admiralty 
requesting a report on the suitability of Mauritius and Bourbon as naval bases.
224
 
Stopford provided a long report
225
 not only on these islands, but also information on the 
Seychelles from a dispatch he had received from Captain Beaver.
226
 In Stopford’s reply 
to the Admiralty’s request he immediately disposed of Bourbon’s potential use by 
stating the island had no harbour.
227
 His observations on Mauritius were extremely 
detailed and commented on the harbour at Port Louis, the depth of which had been 
surveyed in 1810.
228
 The admiral reported the depth of water was low but the harbour 
could be dredged if a vessel was provided for that purpose. However, he observed that 
the Admiralty had already directed that the harbour was not to be deepened, indicating 
the retention of Mauritius at a future peace conference was not yet certain. Therefore he 
suggested the improvement of the harbour was foolish until its fate was known. 
  
Nevertheless, the harbour depth was sufficient for frigates, though not a safe anchorage 
in the months of January, February and March. Stopford confirmed this by stating three 
ships
229
 had broken three of their eight cables during gales from the west, observing that 
if the wind had blown directly into the harbour that anchors could not have prevented 
the ships going on shore. To alleviate this problem the commander-in-chief planned to 
dispatch a frigate and sloop to the Seychelles in these months, leaving two frigates at 
Port Louis with them being secured in Trou Farfayon,
230
 the inner and most protected 
part of the harbour. 
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Figure 6a: The harbour of Port Louis indicting soundings in 1810 and 1817
231
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Figure 6b: Detail of harbour of Port Louis indicating soundings in 1810 and 1817 
 
Stopford had thus reported the shelter and capacity elements of Port Louis as a naval 
anchorage, but he also outlined other aspects of Mauritius contributing to its suitability 
as a naval base. He noticed that fresh water was abundant and excellent in quality, but 
233 
all other items were scanty and extravagantly high in price. To obtain fresh meat for the 
naval squadron and the military garrison, transports were being sent to Madagascar to 
obtain cattle, but there was a shortage of transport ships. All other naval and victualling 
stores had to be obtained from the Cape of Good Hope for which he recommended 
dedicated transports were attached to the squadron. This caused Stopford to conclude, ‘I 
can not consider Port Louis in the respects of supplies as by any means a desirable 
Naval Port excepting for a very small force’.232 
 
The admiral also recommended the kind of repair and storage facilities that were 
required at Port Louis, together with observations on the management and workforce 
required. He thought repairs to the ships might be done using the carpenter crews of the 
squadron, supported by contracted artificers and that this would be cheaper than 
maintaining a large establishment. In the absence of a dedicated artificer workforce 
Stopford considered the shore establishment need only consist of secure buildings for 
victualling and naval stores. To manage this establishment he considered an officer, 
who combined the role of storekeeper and agent victualler with two clerks would be 
sufficient. This officer was to be in constant correspondence with, and submit his 
accounts to, the resident commissioner at the Cape. 
 
In the following month the admiral provided an update to his October letter observing, 
‘[the] insecurity of the harbour for many months of the year and the difficulties of 
procuring refreshments at all times, prevent the port from ever becoming of 
consequence to the British, though its situation rendered it particularly favourable to the 
French’.233 In this Stopford summed up the reason for retaining Mauritius at the 
subsequent peace treaty, even though it was of limited use to Britain.  
 
In spite of the disadvantages, the commander-in-chief continued his plan to establish a 
temporary base by appointing Thomas King
234
 as acting naval storekeeper and agent 
victualler at Port Louis with two clerks. The establishment was to be considered an 
appendage to the Cape of Good Hope under the direction of Commissioner Shield. 
Regarding the availability of contractors at Port Louis to assist in ship repairs, Stopford 
found Rondean and Piston, who had previously supplied the French with materials and 
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 This confirmed his contention that maintaining a permanent establishment 
was not required. 
 
Medical services were also available to the squadron at Mauritius as a hospital was 
available, being attended by both the army and naval surgeons. Stopford commented 
this arrangement was at risk, as the general hospital was about to be abolished removing 
the support of the army’s staff. This would leave naval patients without a medical 
person when ships were absent from port, causing Stopford to recommend the 
appointment of a surgeon, with medical supplies being sent from the Cape. 
 
A more considered recommendation was also made in the admiral’s November letter 
concerning the vessels he had found at Port Louis on his arrival. Nereide he thought was 
of little use to the service and recommended she was broken up.
236
 The Staunch was in a 
poor shape and not worth refitting and he put her up for sale.
237
 The admiral sent the 
two frigates captured off Madagascar in May to the Cape where the prizes were 
surveyed for acceptance into service and repaired for the voyage to Britain. Stopford’s 
actions were approved and confirmed that the refitting and prize policy of the Admiralty 
for overseas stations, that Admiral Bertie had disputed, was being observed. 
 
The commander-in-chief had decided the forward positioning of part of his Cape 
squadron for nine months of the year, was worth the investment in civilian staff and hire 
of storage space at Port Louis. Commissioner Shield came to a different conclusion, that 
this ship detachment could be supported without the need for a shore establishment. 
This difference of opinion was to become the subject of debate between Shield and 
Stopford on the latter’s return to Table Bay in mid December 1811. 
 
On being told by the admiral that King had been appointed as acting storekeeper and 
agent victualler at Port Louis, Mauritius, Shield provided Stopford with evidence of 
King’s unsuitability for the post. Stopford stated it was a case of necessity, rather than 
choice, as a storekeeper was needed to oversee the stores at Mauritius. Shield 
questioned the need for such quantities of stores being lodged at Port Louis to 
necessitate a storekeeper. The commissioner suggested that as the ships could not 
operate in the surrounding seas for at least three months of the year, it would be more 
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economic to have them return to the Cape for refit at that time. When necessary they 
could be re-supplied for eight to twelve months by means of a transport supplying 
Mauritius with minimal stores. Shield went on to worry that having an establishment at 
Mauritius would result in wastage and increased expenditure, especially as the captains 
would have full control over the stores.
238
 This had been the policy that Shield had 
operated during the commander-in-chief’s absence.239 Shield briefed the Navy Board on 
the conflicting views of himself and the commander-in-chief with that board forwarding 
the letter to the Admiralty. The Admiralty had not previously formed a view, but instead 
had directed the commissioner and commander-in-chief should consult each other and 
reach an agreement on supplying ships at Mauritius.
240
 On the subject of Thomas King, 
the Admiralty backed Shield and directed that King was removed from his post and the 
stores put in charge of another person.
241
 Shield’s stores and refitting policy was 
adopted, but achieved at some cost to his relationship with Stopford. 
 
6.3 The work of the naval yard 
 
The influence of the capture of the French Islands on the naval yard at the Cape was 
evident in an examination of the Cape of Good Hope naval yard paylists. These confirm 
that the refitting policy of the Admiralty was firmly in place. Figure 4l in chapter 4 
showed that the permanent workforce at the naval yard had been stabilised in 1810, 
containing a complete range of skilled artificers with recourse to contract labour being 
no longer required. 
  
The trend of continued involvement in colonial activities plus enhancements to shore 
facilities, started in the second half of 1810, is evident in figures 6c and 6d. Shield’s 
workforce continued to work on the naval hospital, the victualling yard and Cape 
Town’s wharf, but it was in the support of the colonial schooner Isabella that 
considerable labour was provided. The colonial governor had requested Commissioner 
Shield’s assistance as the materials required to refit the schooner could not be obtained. 
Shield informed the Navy Board he had not only released naval stores but, as there were 
no naval ships to refit, he had also agreed to supply yard labour.
242
 Not surprisingly, the 
Navy Board confirmed their approval of his actions.  This indicated that flexibility was 
                                                 
238
 Shield to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 106/2004, 20
th
 December 1811. Note: Admiral Drury made a 
similar point regarding refits at Calcutta.  
239
 Admiralty to Shield, TNA, ADM 2/938, 18
th
 December 1811. 
240
 Admiralty to Stopford, TNA, ADM 2/938, 28
th
 March 1812 . 
241
 Navy Board to Shield, TNA, ADM 106/2483, 13
th
 March 1812. 
242
 Shield to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 106/2004, 18
th
 May 1811. 
236 
expected of resident commissioners. As the work carried out on the Isabella was an 
inter-government department activity, the naval storekeeper provided a detailed 
financial bill so the colonial department was correctly charged.
243
 His report detailed all 






Figure 6c: Shipwrights and caulkers – 1811 
 
Figures 6c shows that the policy of limited refitting work was in place on naval ships in 
1811. The most significant refits performed were on Boadicea, Scipion, Portsea, Java 
and Madagascar. The Boadicea, a veteran of the blockade campaign, received a refit to 
enable her to return to Britain, Scipion was fitted for Java whilst Portsea was used to 
carry French prisoners to Britain. The significance of Java and Madagascar refits lays 
in them being prizes, they were only sufficiently repaired to enable them to sail to 
Britain. A comparison of their cost with that of La Bourbonnais in late 1809, adds 
further weight to the Admiralty’s policy not to carry out major refits at overseas yards. 
La Bourbonnaise did not serve in the British navy, but Java and Madagascar were both 
subsequently refitted at Portsmouth and re-commissioned.                            .
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Figure 6d:   Shipwright and caulkers (on board ship) in 1811 
 
238 
The composition of the naval yard workforce during the blockade and capture of 
Mauritius was shown in figures 4l and 4m, but with the elimination of French bases in 
the Indian Ocean, the Cape squadron was reduced in numbers. As work on ships 
declined so the need for a reduction in numbers of artificers was needed. Figure 6e 
provides a view of the naval yard workforce, from 1809 to 1815, hence including the 
entire period from resident commissioners being appointed, until the end of the French 
and American Wars. Artificers from Britain were usually contracted for three years 
service overseas resulting in individuals, who had served their time, either choosing to 
return home, remaining in post, or leaving the yard to settle in the colony. As artificers 
left the yard from 1811, they were not always replaced, as can be seen in the years from 
late 1811 to mid 1813.  
 
With the reduction in establishment artificers until the decision to build at Simon’s Town 
in late 1812, interaction with the private ship-repair business of John Osmond at Simon’s 
Town was considerable. Osmond had supplied contract labour to the naval yard from 
1808 to 1810, but the relationship changed over the next three years to a more 
sophisticated arrangement. It was not merely supplying labour when required; Osmond 
was given a complete task with a contract to report on the condition of yard launches 
including the materials and time required for repair.
245
 The arrangement was not one 
sided, as Osmond hired naval yard equipment by obtaining the loan of scaffolding.
246
 
Osmond also provided stores support as Shield asked if he could supply a large spar for a 
colonial schooner, Egmount, as none were available in the naval arsenals.
247
 The picture 
this draws was one of a flexible approach to the employment of contractors and the 
support of government departments. 
 
William Shield left the Cape of Good Hope in May 1813 and was replaced by George 
Dundas, who arrived in July 1813. The main task of Dundas was to transfer the naval 
establishments at Cape Town to Simon’s Town which is examined later in this chapter. 
However, it was not only the resident commissioner who was changed in 1813, as 
Stopford was replaced by Rear-Admiral Charles Tyler as commander-in-chief. Tyler 
arrived in February and continued in command until the peace agreement with the United 
States of America was ratified by the American Congress. 
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Figure 6e: Cape of Good Hope – Naval Yard Establishment, 1809-1815248 
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Commissioner Dundas died in August 1814, resulting in the commander-in-chief taking 
full control of the shore naval departments. An unexpected benefit for the historian is that 
the monthly reports of ships arriving, departing and repair work performed at the naval 
yard, from April 1814 to February 1815, survived in Tyler’s dispatches to the 
Admiralty.
249
 Compiling these reports and sending them to the Admiralty was a duty of 
all overseas resident commissioners, but only a small number have survived. Tyler’s 
reports confirmed the limited nature of the refits recorded in chapters three and four, with 
caulking and minor repairs again dominating activity. Major refits were avoided with 
such vessels being either fitted for return to England, or locally condemned, confirming 
the actions of Commissioner Shield during the Mauritius campaign. Jahleel Brenton was 
appointed resident commissioner as a result of the death of Dundas, arriving at the Cape 
in March 1815. 
 
6.4 Rationalisation and improvement of shore facilities: The move to Simon’s Town 
(1809-1815) 
 
The naval squadron based at the Cape of Good Hope from its first occupation in 1795 
and again, following its recapture in 1806, had been supported by two naval yards and 
supply arsenals at Cape Town and Simon’s Town. The reason for this seemly 
unnecessary duplication was the prevailing wind direction in Table Bay during the 
months of April to September. This meant ships had to be stationed in Simon’s Bay to 
avoid being driven onto the shore during these winter months.
250
 Simon’s Bay is located 
within False Bay, which is subjected to prevailing winds from the south east, but 
Simon’s Bay is sheltered. Simon’s Town and its bay are sheltered from both prevailing 
winds and hence had the potential to be the single location for the naval squadron and 
the required shore facilities. The location was suitable, but Simon’s Town was a small 
settlement without the facilities of Cape Town and to build a suitable navy base would 
require investment. The Admiralty had to decide if the investment was worthwhile, 
especially as the fate of the territory was uncertain. 
 
The road between Cape Town and Simon’s Town covered a distance of over 20 miles 
and was of very poor quality. Stores were moved by sea whenever a vessel was 
available, leaving the road for transport of people by wagon or horse. A map illustrating 
the distance between Cape Town and Simon’s Town together with the route by the road 
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can be seen in figure 6f. As most suppliers to the naval base resided at Cape Town the 
importance and condition of this road was still being felt after the relocation.  
 
The improvement of this road was the responsibility of the colonial government, 
causing Lord Somerset
251
 to write to Lt. Col. Torrens on his objection to the withdrawal 
of troops from the Cape, as he needed them to complete work on improving the Cape 
Town to Simon’s Town road. Somerset observed that it was, ‘not only for the utmost 
importance of this colony but of necessity to the naval establishment lately formed at 
Simon’s Bay, viz making a road to Simon’s Town, the excessive badness of which had 
already raised the naval contracts to an enormous height’. He went on to say that in a 
short time the road would become impassable and that he doubted contractors would be 
willing to supply the naval departments on any terms.
252
 The isolated position of 
Simon’s Town had been recognised by Commissioner Shield, even when proposing the 
centralisation of all naval facilities in 1810, but he lobbied for a yard there whilst at the 
Cape and when on the Navy Board. 
 
At a local managerial level the advantages of one base was considerable. By reducing 
duplication of offices, accommodation, storage and specialised facilities, together with 
the removal of unnecessary transportation of stores and personnel, a more efficient 
operation would result. However, other factors had to be considered. Would investment 
be recovered before the war ended? If not, would the Cape of Good Hope colony be 
returned to the Dutch at the end of the war as it was in 1803? Would a mobile facility, a 
sheer hulk, provide a better solution to that obtained from buildings? The answers made 
to these questions provide insight into the thinking of the British authorities in 1810 to 
1813.  
 
The belief that Britain would retain the colony was a major factor in the decision to 
rationalise the naval facilities at the Cape. Until the colony’s future was decided the 
Admiralty only allowed planning options to be prepared. It was in December 1812 they 
decided to proceed with Commissioner Shield’s plan. This suggests that the Liverpool 
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ministry had determined to retain the Cape, a year before Clancarty
253
 wrote to 





Figure 6f: Cape of Good Hope – Route from Cape Town to Simon’s Town (1822)255 
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To keep or not to keep the Cape had been a Foreign Office question since its first 
occupation. It was considered that the Cape, in the hands of an enemy, was a dagger to 
the throat of British trade with the East Indies. However, possession of the colony was 
not considered an imperial jewel, being more likely to be a drain on Britain’s exchequer. 
At the Treaty of Amiens in 1802 Britain retained Ceylon, captured from the Dutch in 
1795, but returned the Cape to the Dutch. The first occupation by the British provided 
benefits useful at the subsequent re-capture. These included experience of the colony 
and British individuals, who remained to assist in the government of the colony on its 
second occupation. However, the previous withdrawal also made colonial business 
difficult to conduct. Previous arrangements made during the first occupation by the 
British colonial government were not honoured by the Dutch in 1803. Hence, raising 
funds by selling government property, or securing loans as collateral, for launching a 
colonial paper currency was compromised by uncertainty.
256
   
 
Whether the Cape was to be retained not only caused considerable difficulties to the 
colonial authorities in governing the territory, but also made it difficult for the 
Admiralty to decide if any investment should be made. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 
1814 settled the fate of the Cape colony, together with the Dutch South American 
colonies of Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice, but this was not concluded until mid 
1814 by which time the naval establishment was being built at Simon’s Town. 
 
Improving conditions for the workforce was one of Commissioner Shield’s first 
objectives on viewing the ‘miserable and expensive lodgings’ he found at the Simon’s 
Town settlement in 1809. Shield suggested the purchase of a house at £6000 to provide 
accommodation for 25 artificers, or the use of a prize ship as an accommodation ship.
257
    
 
The commissioner again raised the subject of improving Simon’s Town ability to 
support refits in early February 1810 with the impending transfer of the squadron to 
Simon’s Bay. As Simon’s Bay was a safe anchorage all year, Shield proposed that all 
naval establishments were moved to Simon’s Town.258  
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On receipt, the Navy Board sent Shield’s proposal to Admiral Curtis,259 for his opinion 
as he had been the last commander-in-chief at the Cape during the first occupation. 
Curtis considered Shield’s proposals were sound, but would cost a considerable sum. 
His experience indicated operating two establishments was not overly expensive, but his 
main argument for not backing Shield’s plan was the uncertainty regarding the future of 
the Cape. The admiral thought spending money on a station that might be returned to 




The Navy Board sent Curtis’s opinion of Shield’s proposal to the Admiralty in June 
1810, but it would seem that another letter from Shield moved the commissioner’s plan 
to a more advanced state. Shield’s June 1810 letter informed the Navy Board he was 
still of the opinion that two establishments were wasteful and that a saving of several 
thousand pounds a year would be made after the removal of the initial expenditure.
261
 
The Admiralty took notice of Shield’s plea by instructing him to prepare a plan for 
approval and requesting Rear-Admiral Stopford to investigate Shields’ proposals on his 




Stopford’s report to the Admiralty, on 1st March 1811, supplied considerable detail on 
conditions at the Cape, the cost of Shield’s plan and the capacity of the anchorage. He 
confirmed that Simon’s Bay was a secure harbour and capable of accommodating up to 
six sail of the line and a similar number of frigates. The only measure required was the 
marking of Whittle Rock in False Bay to ensure safe access to the anchorage.
263
 The 
admiral estimated that the cost of moving the whole establishment to Simon’s Town 
was approximately £50000. Shield thought that money could be found by selling the 
existing naval buildings at Cape Town, but found the governor had considered these 
buildings to be colonial property and had already mortgaged them as security for the 
paper currency in circulation. Nevertheless Shield indicated to Stopford that 
independent of raising the funds, the savings accrued in consequence of having one 
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Stopford followed up his earlier letter with another that month, having obtained an 
additional estimate of the costs for the store-houses and lodgings required to be erected 
at Simon’s Town.265 The admiral observed that the cost of materials and labour at the 
Cape made it cheaper, wherever possible, to purchase existing buildings and modify 
them, than to purpose build. Amongst the buildings to be converted was 
accommodation for the commissioner, the yard officers, the agent victualler and their 
clerks. A building to serve as a hospital for 100 men also needed to be converted, but 
this would also provide lodgings for the dispenser and steward. However, a separate 
building for the surgeon and agent of the hospital would be required.  
 
This was the limit to converting existing buildings as there were none suitable to serve 
as store-houses, specialised facilities, or for accommodation of artificers. A plan to meet 
these requirements was submitted by Shield for the erection of a mast house, a boat 
house with a sail loft above, three double store-houses, accommodation for 12 artificers 
and an extension to the existing wall to enclose the new yard. The total costs of erecting 
new, purchasing and modifying existing buildings was estimated at £56666.  
 
The effort and money required, caused the commander-in-chief to again return to a 
solution proposed by Bertie and the yard officers in 1808, then again by Shield in 1810, 
that of a sheer hulk instead of dedicated fixed facilities. Stopford asked Shield for his 
opinion and a plan for stationing a 50 gun ship, armed and rated as a sloop of war, at 
Simon’s Town to act as a store-ship, with accommodation for artificers.266 Armed with 
this plan, in a letter of 31
st
 March, Stopford proposed to the Admiralty in view of the 
uncertainty of retaining the Cape at the end of the war, that a floating support vessel was 
the most suitable and economical way forward. Yet again the Admiralty rejected this 
suggestion.  
 
It is interesting to ponder the reasons for the Admiralty’s elimination of the use of 
support vessels. Initially this was one of concern that the vessel would be driven on 
shore, but maybe their rejection was due to the likelihood of the Cape being retained at 
a future peace conference. With this in mind, fixed facilities at this strategic location 
would have had many attractions to the Admiralty. It was during this period the 
Admiralty were developing fixed facilities at existing overseas bases and initiating new 
bases at Bermuda and Trincomalee. 
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Armed with plans and costs for consolidating the naval establishments at Simon’s 
Town, the Admiralty informed Stopford that they were considering his reports, but that 
no expenditure was to take place until they had made a decision. Only in December 
1812, did the Admiralty inform Rear-Admiral Tyler that they had directed the Navy 
Board to move to Simon’s Town.  
 
With the decision made by the Admiralty in December 1812, the final phase to close the 
Cape Town facilities and re-locate to Simon’s Town was commenced. The Admiralty’s 
intentions were communicated to the secretary of state for the colonies, who wrote to 
the Cape of Good Hope governor to, ‘afford every assistance in your power to this 
measure, which with regard to general convenience and economy is equally to be 
desired’.267 However, a rider to this was to cause problems for Commissioner Dundas in 
his negotiations with the governor. Difficulties arose when Dundas wanted to occupy 
existing colonial buildings, by offering to build replacements, but found little agreement 
to his proposals. 
 
The timing of the Admiralty’s decision was unfortunate, as they also decided to change 
both the commander-in-chief and resident commissioner. Rear-Admiral Tyler arrived to 
take command on 7
th
 February 1813 and whilst this was in the normal course of events 
for commanders-in-chief, withdrawing Commissioner Shield was regrettable. Shield 
was ordered to London on the next homeward bound ship to take up an appointment at 
the Navy Board.
268
 Shield did not leave the Cape until early May and hence started 
putting his plans into action with particular attention to funding the move. Tyler 
appreciated the work that Shield had done and told the first lord of the Admiralty, ‘I am 
sorry to find Commissioner Shield is ordered home to a seat at the Navy Board. His 
services at removing the Naval Establishment to Simon’s Town will be much wanted 
and severely felt by me.’269 
 
Shield was replaced by George Dundas, an experienced resident commissioner who had 
previously acted in that post at Bombay.
270
 Dundas arrived on 25
th
 July 1813 and 
proceeded to re-open the question of moving with a very negative report.
271
 Among his 
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concerns, were not being able to find Shield’s plans, the lack of fresh water at Simon’s 
Town and the problem of financing the project. Dundas subsequently came into 
possession of Shield’s plans, but found support for local finance unforthcoming from 
the colonial government and Lombard Bank.  
 
The Admiralty’s reaction to the commissioner’s letter was one of disbelief, replying 
they had not ordered the move without considerable thought and the guidance of men, 
who had great experience of the two establishments. They further quoted a passage from 
a letter by Commissioner Shield, now at the Navy Board, who stated, ‘he had not the 
least doubt, had it been their lordships pleasure to have continued him at the Cape, 
every creature belonging to the Naval Establishment would have been quietly settled by 
this time’.272  
 
The problem of funding by Lombard Bank, detailed in a letter to the Admiralty of 4
th
 
September, was answered by the Admiralty in their 29
th
 October letter and re-iterated 
again in December. In both letters they told Dundas to obtain money at the market rate 
and hasten progress. The problem in local funding did not surprise the Admiralty, 
presumably from a briefing by Shield that the opportunity of a Lombard Bank loan had 




In spite of his concerns, Dundas continued in preparing for the move to Simon’s Town 
and reported to the Navy Board his purchase of buildings to serve the victualling 
department, the naval hospital and a smith’s shop. Work was also being done to create 
slave quarters.
274
 His problems with the colonial authorities were raised again by him as 
the cost of purchasing buildings and land was being increased by a four percent 




Although continued progress was made, Dundas re-opened the problem of the cost of 
living at Simon’s Town, with his expectation that clerks, artificers and other members 
of the workforce would leave. He maintained that the isolated nature of Simon’s Town 
would increase costs by up to 25 percent and that an allowance would be necessary.
276
 
The Navy Board agreed with the commissioner’s assessment, particularly as 
Commissioner Shield now sat on that board and had personal experience of the local 
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cost of living and the difficulty of retaining staff. The Navy Board recommended to the 
Admiralty that a ‘Simon’s Town allowance’ was instituted.277 
 
To progress construction and alterations to buildings Dundas obtained local contract 
labour, but his reports on the subject of their high cost resulted in the Navy Board 
deciding to send a construction team. At Commissioner Shield’s suggestion, twelve 
masons and six house carpenters with a foreman as a supervisor, was sent out to replace 
the contractors.
278
 Figure 6e show these actions, with 47 contractors and a foreman 
being recruited by Dundas, before being replaced by Shield’s recruits.  
 
Dundas was encouraged by the Navy Board to hasten re-location in March 1814,
279
 but 
he was never able to resolve his problems before his death in August 1814. The 
Admiralty do not seem to have been pleased with Dundas’s performance as they 





Brenton did not arrive at the Cape until 12
th
 March 1815, but he was able to report 
considerable progress. The mast and boat houses were nearing completion and the naval 
hospital was almost finished. However, he did report problems concerning the 
substitution of new buildings for the army mess and officer accommodation and the re-
location of the Custom’s House.281 Brenton overcame the problems with the colonial 
authorities, but this was only achieved by paying and building what was asked for by 
the colonial government.  As a result Brenton was able to advise the Navy Board by 
May 1815, that the naval buildings at Cape Town could be returned to the colonial 
government and the admiral’s residence, Mount Nelson, could be sold.282 In a note on 
this dispatch Commissioner Shield recommended to the Admiralty the abandonment of 




The elimination of French and Dutch power in the Indian Ocean was achieved by the 
British in 1811. Following the capture of Mauritius in December 1810, the Seychelles 
were taken. Java, the seat of Dutch power in the East Indies, was occupied in September 
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1811. Without an anchorage or a place to receive support, French raiders could no 
longer operate effectively in the Indian Ocean. The need for a large squadron at the 
Cape was now removed, enabling the Admiralty to redeploy ships from the Indian 
Ocean to other areas. 
 
Commissioner Shield had scaled down the workforce in 1809, to that laid down by the 
Admiralty for the blockading squadron and found tasks for them during the long 
absences of the squadron in 1810. The need to occupy the artificers during these 
absences continued in 1811, with the commissioner finding work in the naval hospital, 
victualling yard and as before, on colonial activities. Finding work for the naval yard 
workforce that was not related to refitting the squadron, confirmed the findings 
documented in chapter five. Refitting the squadron was a periodic activity and would 
have been unnecessarily expensive if the workforce could not be employed when the 
ships were at sea. With the reduction in ships stationed at the Cape from late 1811, the 
commissioner had few options to cope with the decrease in demand for refit work. He 
could either find more colonial or shore establishment work, or reduce the number of 
artificers. The paylists show the latter option was selected. 
 
Following the capture of Mauritius and Bourbon, the Admiralty requested the 
commander-in-chief evaluate their potential as anchorages and naval bases. Stopford 
dismissed Bourbon’s usefulness, stating the island was without a harbour, but for 
Mauritius he gave a much more detailed report. He stated Port Louis harbour had 
sufficient depth for large frigates and could accommodate a small number even though 
the anchorage was not safe during the months of January, February or March. Another 
drawback was the inability to provide provisions, as he had to import fresh food from 
Madagascar and victualling stores from the Cape. The admiral’s view was that 
Mauritius was more useful to the French than the British, but in French hands it had 
been a troublesome base. These assessments were reflected in Britain retaining 
Mauritius but returning Bourbon to the French. 
 
Stopford turned Port Louis, Mauritius, into a naval base in 1811, appointed an 
individual to hold the posts of naval storekeeper and agent victualler plus obtaining 
warehouses to receive stores. He did not intend the port to be a refitting establishment 
but noted that contractors could, if necessary, be hired to support the artificers of a 
vessel. Commissioner Shield disagreed with the commander-in-chief decision as he 
reasoned ships had to leave Mauritius in December and could only operate in the area 
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for nine months. The base only had a very short life as the Admiralty approved the 
commissioner’s reasoning and ordered the dismissal of the Port Louis storekeeper. 
 
The political future of Mauritius and Bourbon was minor compared to that of the Cape 
of Good Hope. Until the fate of this colony was determined, the decision on whether to 
commit funds to rationalise the shore naval facilities could not be made. Logic dictated 
that Simon’s Bay was made the permanent anchorage, with the repair and support 
services being stationed at Simon’s Town. Commissioner Shield lobbied for this move 
in 1810 and was instructed to prepare plans for evaluation by Admiral Stopford in early 
1811.  
 
The Admiralty informed Stopford and Shield to move the shore facilities to Simon’s 
Town in December 1812, although the Cape of Good Hope was not ceded to Britain 
until the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814. This indicates Britain had decided to retain the 
Cape in late 1812. Both Shield and Stopford were recalled to Britain in early 1813 
leaving Admiral Tyler and Commissioner Dundas to complete Shield’s plan. Dundas 
questioned the project but the Admiralty, with advice from Shield, now at the Navy 
Board, over-ruled his objections. The complexion of the establishment workforce 
changed in mid 1813, with the addition of masons and carpenters to build the new 
establishment. In 1815 the newly arrived Commissioner Brenton was able to report that 
the establishment at Cape Town could be closed. 
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Chapter one provided a survey of British naval bases prior to the start of the 
Revolutionary War in 1793. It showed the squadron on the East Indies station was 
supported in a different manner from the other overseas commands. The West Indian, 
North American and Mediterranean naval squadrons were each supported via a yard, 
under the management of a resident commissioner or naval storekeeper; a victualling 
organisation, under an agent victualler; and occasionally a naval hospital with staff to 
aid the recovery of the officers and men of the ships. Table 3b, in chapter three, 
confirmed that the non East Indian naval yards were still managed in an identical 
manner, and chapters four and five showed the Cape of Good Hope squadron also used 
this shore support structure. However, the East Indies command was reliant on the East 
India Company for refitting bases, plus an administrative, technical and manual 
workforce. This chapter examines why the East Indies station was supported in a 
different way, who supplied this support, what this support was, and how a system 
became more akin to the other overseas commands was implemented. 
 
Pragmatism was the reason why the shore support services were initially so heavily 
dependent on the Company which had the required infrastructure and unique knowledge 
of the area. To create an independent support system, or at least one where the naval 
officials could intelligently question the suppliers, would take time, considerable 
investment in facilities and management expertise. As the British government had 
latterly obtained some control over the Company, it would seem foolish to create an 
independent support system.   
 
Prior to 1765, when the East India Company obtained control of the Indian province of 
Bengal, it was a mercantile organisation.
283
 The Company had been established to trade 
with the east. This was a capital intensive venture, with large sums risked on long return 
voyages to India, China and Bencoolen in Sumatra. The investors would have their 
money tied up in vessels for well over a year, with a return dependent on secure ports 
and skilled crews. To compensate for the financial risks taken by investors, the British 
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Government gave a monopoly to the Company on all imports of Asian products until 
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 Initially the Company established factories at the ports of Canton, Bencoolen,  
Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. The necessity to make the sub-continent ports secure 
against European and Indian enemies resulted in the establishment of fortifications and 
a Company army.  Following the Seven Years War the areas under British control 
increased, with the Company changing its role, together with its relationship with India 
and the British state. The size of the land revenues, the involvement of Britain’s 
moneyed classes and the wealth from the east, now made the Company too important to 
fail. The price the Company paid for its monopoly was to be no longer an independent 




7.1 Operational context 
 
The East Indies station was far removed, in time and distance from Britain. By sea it 
took a minimum of four months for a letter to reach India, but more normally six 
months for a despatch to reach Madras, Bombay or Calcutta. A faster method of 
communication was available via the overland route; letters could arrive in India within 
three months.
287
 The supply of stores, replacement ships, officers and men always took 
the sea route and frequently only sailed with the outward bound convoys, which were 
delayed, until they could be timed to catch the south west monsoon in the Indian Ocean. 
Hence, the overall time delay between sending a letter and receiving a reply could be as 





Figure 7a presents a map of the East Indies station. At its greatest extent the command 
was bounded in the north by the Indian sub-continent, in the west by the east coast of 
Africa, to the north west the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to the south east Australia and 
New Zealand, and to the north east by the seas around China, Japan and the Philippines. 
Within this area of over 30 million square miles,
289
 the commander-in-chief was 
responsible for providing trade protection, support to offensive operations and defence 
against military incursions into Britain’s Indian Empire. However, the crucial sea area 
where protection was necessary was simplified to the Bay of Bengal, the coasts of 
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Malabar and Coromandel, Ceylon, the Rea Sea, Persian Gulf, South China Sea and the 
straits through the Indonesian barrier. These latter straits, particularly the Straits of 
Malacca, were used for the vessels trading with China in which the Country trade
290
 and 
Company ships were engaged 
 
To protect the primary wealth generating area of India, the Bengal Presidency, 
command of the Bay of Bengal was essential. Prior to the capture of Trincomalee in 
1795 and its development as a naval base from 1810, another base was required on the 
Coromandel Coast to achieve this aim. There was no natural port on that coast, so the 
Company’s settlement at Madras was used throughout the period as the principal naval 
base. During the north east monsoon, Madras was a dangerous anchorage; fortunately 
the harbour at Bombay, on the west coast, was protected during these months, and as 
detailed in chapter one, was equipped with dry docks capable of accommodating a 74 
gun ship; hence it was the principal refitting location for the British navy.  
 



























































































































































































Throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars the squadron changed in the type 
of ships and numbers deployed. Chapters three and four have provided charts of the 
planned deployment of British ships during the Napoleonic War, showing the East 
Indies squadron was approximately five percent of the total strength of the navy. Figure 
7b presents the Admiralty’s planned ship deployment on the East India station from 
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1792 until mid 1813. This shows the peak number of ships deployed occurred in the 
post Trafalgar period, and that it was not significantly reduced until the French Indian 
Ocean islands and Java were captured in 1810 and 1811. The reduction in deployed 
ships to Britain’s most distant commands was even more marked in the Indian Ocean 




















































































































































































East Indies Cape of Good Hope
 





Figure 7d concentrates on the change in the number of third rate ships deployed in the 
East Indies, as these ships made the heaviest demands on Bombay’s dry dock. These 
ships were either 64 gun or standard sized 74 gun vessels and hence could be 




The third rates could be considered the most difficult vessels to maintain in the East 
Indies, as the limited docking capacity, the numbers of ships and their extensive duties 
restricted refit opportunities. This is borne out by the fate of two third rates which never 
returned to Britain, Arrogant and Russell. Both were worn out. However, another 14 
third rates sent from Britain all returned, indicating the success of the Admiralty’s 
refitting policy and use of Bombay dock.
294
 These vessels, although difficult to refit, 
were ideal as counters to enemy battleships, command ships for operations or escorts 
for important convoys to and from China. Yet, they were not the best ships to combat 
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fast privateers or commercial raiders. Frigates, especially powerful fifth rates of 36 to 
44 guns, were the true providers of trade protection with sloops and cutters performing 
scouting and communication duties. Appendix 3b shows this balance of ship types for 





































































































Figure 7d: Number of third rate ships in East Indies Squadron 
 
7.3 Administration of the naval shore facilities 
 
The development in how the British navy was managed on the East Indies station is 
most clearly shown in the change from complete reliance on the Company, to one of 
Admiralty control. Figure 7e provides a timeline during the 1793 to 1815 period 
detailing the individuals and organisations involved, but it does not provide the whole 
picture as it only highlights the posts in the East Indies. The British government’s 
control of the Company also provides a context into which the British navy was to 
operate, and how it was to change.  
 
Until the 1770s the East Indian Company was solely controlled by the Company’s Court 
of Directors, but following the dramatic collapse of the Company’s finances in 1772, 
the British Government became increasingly involved in Company administration and 
finance.
295
 Initially the 1773 Act merely provided a loan and placed the Company under 
the sovereignty of parliament, but eventually it led to Pitt’s India Act in 1784. There 
was a great reluctance to take responsibility for direct administration in India. Instead 
state control over the policy, strategy and management of the Company, was to be 
exercised by a Board of Control, consisting of six commissioners, with the board  
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Figure 7e: The Civil Naval Department Organisation and Post Holders on the East Indies Station, 1793 - 1815
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chairman being a significant ministerial appointment. The appointment as a governor of 
a Presidency came under state patronage with the governor-general at Calcutta 
subsequently having his powers over the other Presidencies increased. A further change 
was the reduction in the power of the Company’s shareholders to influence decision 
making. All this resulted in the Company managing itself at the lowest levels and 
operating to commercial principles, but with its senior managers being state appointees 
and its policies being influenced by the Board of Control. 
 
Before the implementation of the fifth report of the Commission of Naval Revision in 
1809, the day to day administration was in the hands of the naval storekeeper. The 
timeline provided in figure 7e, illustrates the development in the role and the number of 
people involved in providing support to Britain’s navy on the East Indies station. 
 
This pictorial approach more easily illustrates the interaction between individuals and 
actions they implemented, for example the re-negotiated Balfour and Baker victualling 
contract in 1811/12. Previously Samuel Hood has been credited for the savings, but as 
can be seen, this was achieved by the resident commissioner before Hood arrived as 
commander-in-chief in April 1812.
1
 The most notable change is the move from 
dependence on Company officials to Navy Board officers, following the appointment of 







Before the arrival of the resident commissioners, the commander-in-chief was the only 
senior naval officer directing the shore support services. Figure 7e shows Peter Rainier 
was the longest servicing commander-in-chief on the East Indies station, but the 
diagram also shows he was not always the senior commanding officer through his term. 
Elphinstone had command of the joint Cape and East Indies stations from May 1795 
until October 1796. His influence on civil administration is evident, as he appointed 
naval storekeepers at both Bombay and Madras, the chief supply and refitting bases. He 
also appears to have started the actions that resulted in Madras being provided with a 
naval hospital.
3
 Rainier’s long term ended in 1805 and he was initially succeeded by 
Pellew. The command was briefly split between Pellew and Troubridge until the latter 
was appointed to the Cape in 1806. The division of the command is evaluated later in 
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the chapter as this decision influenced the planned naval establishment at Penang. 
Broughton became temporary commander-in-chief on the death of Vice-Admiral Drury 
in March 1811. He continued the arrangements that Drury had initiated with the newly 
arrived Madras resident commissioner, Peter Puget. Sir Samuel Hood arrived the 
following year but died in December 1814. 
 
Figure 7e has concentrated on the locations where support services were delivered and 
on the individuals who occupied the naval stores and refit posts. The victualling 
function was delivered by contract with the agent victualler post nominally held by the 
commander-in-chief. This latter arrangement occurred in August 1795 following 
Rainier’s dismissal of Charles Arnott for corrupt dealings with Cochrane, the victualling 
contractor. Arnott, had previously been Rainier’s purser on Suffolk before his 
appointment as both naval storekeeper and agent victualler at Madras.
4
  The chart shows 
the victualling contractors together with the approximate dates of the re-tendering and 
renegotiation of prices. The provision of health care also showed considerable 
dependence on contract delivery by Company employees, particularly at the Bombay 
and Bengal Presidencies. Madras was the only location where a naval hospital was 
established and provided with administrative and medical staff. This hospital was re-
built and expanded following storm damage in December 1807. Pellew also created a 
naval hospital at Prince of Wales Island by moving the de-commissioned frigate 
Wilhemina to Penang as a hospital ship. 
 
What became evident in assembling the information in figure 7e, especially before the 
resident commissioners arrived in 1809 and 1811, was the dependence on officers of the 
East India Company providing administrative support. Examples of this being Philip 
Dundas and William Taylor Money, who were both the naval storekeeper at Bombay 
while also being the Company’s marine superintendent.5 These gentlemen continued to 
receive their Company’s remuneration whilst in receipt of a Navy Board salary and 
percentage fee on expenditure. Money’s replacement as storekeeper at Bombay was 
Hamilton who was also a Company employee, having been a captain in the Bombay 
Marine, as well as previously being Money’s first clerk in the naval office.6 It was not 
just Bombay where this dependence occurred, as the naval storekeeper post at Madras 
was also frequently held by a Company employee. Both Henry Sewell, who held the 
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post from August 1796 until his death in 1800, and Henry Hall who was employed, 
from late 1806 till early 1811, were Company men. Hall had been in the Madras Master 
Attendant’s office from the early 1790s and held the post of deputy master attendant on 
his appointment by Pellew. He retained this position in the Company through-out his 
term as naval storekeeper. It was not only Company employees who found employment 
in naval administration, as merchants were also employed. Matthew Louis, a local 
merchant, was employed at Calcutta by Rainier in 1800, as deputy naval storekeeper 
until the appointment was annulled by the Admiralty the following year.  
 
It was not merely in the administration area that Company employees supported the 
British navy. The Bombay and Madras Presidencies both provided artificers and 
labourers for the repair of the squadron’s ships. This provided technical expertise and 
management of the local workforce, and removed the necessity of appointing British 
artificers and technical officers until 1810, when men skilled in rope making were sent 
to India. This deployment occurred to reduce, or even eliminate, the necessity of 
sending cordage from Britain by using Indian hemp to produce rope and cables. 
 
The naval administration at Bombay was blessed with more advantages than the other 
ports that were used. This was not solely due to the dry docks at that port, or the skilled 
Parsi shipwrights, but reflected the quality and experience of the officers of the Bombay 
Marine. As mentioned above Philip Dundas and William Taylor Money occupied both 
the post of superintendent of the Bombay Marine and that of naval storekeeper at 
Bombay. They were both experienced sea officers having commanded ships before 
becoming superintendent. The family influence of Henry Dundas, President of Board of 
Control 1793 to 1801, was almost certainly important in placing his nephew in the 
superintendent post, but he was well qualified.  The system of ‘interest’, the supporting 
of careers of relations or favourites, was the norm in this time, being the only logical 
system that could be used to advance able men. Money also had a powerful champion in 
Frances Baring, who lobbied St. Vincent, when first lord of the Admiralty, for the post 
of master attendant at Bombay. St. Vincent was not able to help, as he stated no such 
post existed and the naval storekeeper in post, Mr. Halliday, had the favour of the 
Prince of Wales.
7
 As Money was shortly to become the superintendent of the Bombay 
Marine, it would appear Baring’s interest in him was effective. With these individuals 
having experience as captains of Company ships they were hence akin to resident 
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commissioners of Navy Board dockyards. They were both later to make a contribution 
in the East Indies, to provide ships for the navy and had an understanding of what 
resources could be exploited. 
 
Simon Halliday, who replaced Philip Dundas in 1801, resigned in March 1807,
8
 
handing over to Sir Migual de Souza,
9
 who served until he died in October 1808 when 
Money stepped into the breach. It was not until Charles Northcote arrived to serve as 
naval storekeeper in August 1812 that a Navy Board official took up a Bombay post. 
Northcote was followed in the next 18 months by a master attendant and master 
shipwright, thus ending the reliance on Bombay Marine officers. 
 
The expertise and assistance of Company officers was also to be found at Madras, the 
navy’s principal operating base. Company ports frequently had a master attendant in 
place, with duties depending on the importance of that location. At Calcutta, the master 
attendant’s office was part of the Company’s Bengal Marine10 which operated the pilot 
service on the Hooghly. At Madras, a master attendant office was available for port 
duties and able to supply manpower to naval ships to carry out refits.
11
  Minor Company 
ports also had master attendants, but these only covered harbour master and customs 
duties.
12
 It was not just Company ports that appointed master attendants, as Ceylon, a 
crown colony from 1802, also had colonial officials appointed as master attendants at 




Figure 7e shows the base at Madras had a number of naval storekeepers with two 
Company officials, Sewell and Hall, providing over eight years service. Henry Sewell 
was appointed in early 1796, with his office consisting of a further nine clerks and four 
labourers, all supplied by the Company.
14
 On Sewell’s death in 1800 Rainier appointed 
John Chinnery as deputy naval storekeeper, but soon appointed John Brouncher as the 
naval storekeeper with his resignation the following year.
15
 Rainier’s next appointment 
as naval storekeeper, Thomas Hoseason, the ex purser of Suffolk, was to cause 
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considerable dispute and litigation.
16
 The Navy Board appointed Chinnery as their 
official naval officer at Madras, but Rainier objected when Chinnery produced his 
warrant and he refused to remove Hoseason. Chinnery understandably complained and 
lobbied the Admiralty using his brother in London to further his case. Rainier produced 
documentation to show that Chinnery was unacceptable, but was told by the Admiralty 
that as commander-in-chief he could not make civil appointments.
17
 Although having 
thus been ‘ticked-off’, Rainier still retained Hoseason in post, which appears to have 
resulted in both Chinnery and Hoseason being paid as the naval storekeeper.
18
 This 
continued until Pellew suspended Chinnery’s warrant, due to the latter’s pecuniary 
embarrassment.
19
 A naval storekeeper had to provide financial securities to hold such a 
post and Chinnery no longer had the means to satisfy this criteria.  
 
In 1804 Rainier extended Hoseason’s duties to include those as his secretary with an 
additional salary, but payment of this was refused by the Admiralty, eventually resulting 
in Hoseason’s resignation. Pellew appointed his secretary, Edward Hawke Locker, in 
Hoseason’s place but he resigned after holding the post for only six months. Pellew then 
resorted to a pragmatic solution by requesting of the Madras governor that the 
Company’s deputy master attendant, Henry Hall, take the post of acting naval 
storekeeper in addition to his current duties.
20
 Hall held both these posts from 1806 until 
Commissioner Puget replaced him as naval storekeeper in early 1811. With Puget’s 
arrival, the management, personnel used and auditing function of the civil naval 
departments were to change dramatically.  
 
Parkinson states, ‘At the period when [Pellew] left India the East Indies station was 
organised on a pattern which survived for the rest of the war’.21 In this he was incorrect. 
Pellew left before the arrival of newly appointed resident commissioners and the 
implementation of the fifth report of the Commission of Naval Revision. This 
fundamentally changed the relationship between the Company and the British navy. 
Following an Order in Council in September 1808, authorising the adoption of the 
recommendations of the fifth report, George Dundas
22
 and Henry Inman were appointed 
to be commissioners at Bombay and Madras. Inman arrived on 4
th
 July 1809 but died on 
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 resulting in a long delay before the Madras base was brought under the 
new procedures. 
 
George Dundas arrived at Bombay shortly before the 6
th
 June 1809, when he reported 
that Mr. Money was acting naval storekeeper following the death of de Souza. Dundas 
reported to the Navy Board that he thought, ‘the service may receive much benefit from 
his [Money’s] local knowledge, he being I apprehend a man of strict honor (sic)’.24 
Until ill health forced Dundas to return home in January 1812 his tenure at Bombay was 
reliant on Company staff to assist him. His principal officers were Money and Hamilton 
as naval storekeepers, with the Parsi master builder being also paid as the master 
shipwright. Money asked to be released in August 1810 resulting in a fellow captain of 
the Bombay Marine taking his post.
25
 Hamilton remained as storekeeper until August 




Dundas had been tasked by the Navy Board to report if British artificers were needed at 
Bombay.
27
 On arrival he found that Pellew had already appointed a master smith for 
whom Dundas reported, a workshop was necessary. The requirement for masons, as 
suggested by the Navy Board, was considered unnecessary by Dundas, but he suggested 
a master sailmaker was sent out.
28
 The individual sent was an existing foreman of 
sailmakers, with the Navy Board stating the pay rate, allowances and working hours.
29
 
Rope making artificers were also sent, to assist in the manufacture of cordage from local 
hemp. This was the entire British dockyard personnel sent to Bombay until 1813, when 




During his thirty months at Bombay, Dundas first concentrated on rectifying the 
defective state of the naval storehouses and the depleted store holdings. This he did by 
building a new warehouse, vacating expensive hired property, entering into local 
contracts to obtain masts and spars, and requesting items from Britain not obtainable in 
India. Being the Bombay naval commissioner, Dundas also had an additional duty, that 
of supervising and reporting on the construction of the warships being built at Bombay. 
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Apart from the activities required to supply and refit the squadron, Dundas also became 
involved with the victualling and medical services, confirming his new duties in these 
areas. Unfortunately, the naval commander-in-chief at this time, Drury, thought Dundas 
an obstructive assistant. The basis of their disagreement was the standard of 
workmanship at the dockyard, together with confusion over victualling contract 
arrangements that both attempted to negotiate. The most furious disputes arose 
however, over the role of the receiving ship and the provision of medical care at 
Bombay. 
 
Seventeen months elapsed between the Admiralty hearing of Commissioner Inman’s 
death and the arrival of a replacement commissioner at Madras. The Admiralty was 
fortunate, as an experienced candidate was available, Peter Puget, who had just returned 
as resident commissioner at the temporary yard at Flushing. He arrived at Madras in 
January 1811 and brought with him two clerks, William Taylor and Samuel Jones. 
 
Puget’s arrival at Madras at last achieved an aim of the ninth report of the Commission 
on Fees, the provision of a resident commissioner where a fleet in the East Indies was 
based. Puget commented on his arrival that 75 percent of the squadron called at Madras 
for refit and supply.
31
 In Puget, Admiral Drury found a very willing ally in his efforts to 
improve the support services and praised his capabilities and ideas.
32
 The short time 
they were together set in train cooperation that Drury’s successors continued. Drury 
delegated financial control to Puget and supported his investigations into the accounts 
of Hall and Arbuthnot as naval storekeepers. Taylor was swiftly to replace Hall as 
storekeeper when Hall refused to swear an affidavit that his financial accounts were a 
true record.
33
 This had been a requirement of Hall’s instructions since his appointment. 
Hall’s behaviour was not unique, as Arbuthnot also refused to swear and sign an 
affidavit. The Navy Board had suspected collusion between these two in their financial 
accounts and directed Puget to suspend Hall.
34
 Another factor in Hall’s resignation was 
the change in reward for the naval officer brought in by the new regulations. Prior to 
Puget’s arrival, Hall received a £200 salary and 1.5 percent fee on all expenditure. The 
commissioner calculated that Hall had received in fees approximately £6250 a year.
35
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Before he left England Puget suggested he be given authority as resident commissioner 
over affairs at Calcutta, Penang and Ceylon.
 36
 It was not until he arrived in India that he 
obtained this authority. Admiral Drury entrusted all civil affairs on the eastern side of 
India, including those with the Company for ordnance supplies, to Puget, placing 
considerable faith in the newly arrived commissioner. Puget found on examining the 
administration provision at Calcutta and Penang that agents were employed.  John 
Alexander at Calcutta and Captain Flint at Penang both received a fee of five percent on 
expenditure incurred supporting ships using their ports. Both Alexander and Flint were 
required to swear affidavits regarding their accounts and accept a reduction in their fee. 
Alexander decided he no longer wished to act as an agent
37
 and Flint requested he was 
replaced. This led to the stationing of a salaried storekeeper, John Seward, at Penang.
38
 
At Calcutta, Puget obviated the need for an agent by entering into direct arrangements 
with the Bengal Marine and private contractors, thus automatically reducing costs by 
five percent. The civil naval departments on the east coast of India were now under one 
guiding hand. 
 
Before Drury’s death in early March 1811, he agreed that Puget end the reliance on 
Company employees in managerial and technical posts. Drury had previously raised the 
question of a shipwright being appointed to supervise refits in the East Indies, but the 
Navy Board had refused and directed he discuss the matter with Commissioner Inman 
on his arrival. However, with Inman’s death, this matter was not resolved until Puget 
arrived.
39
 Puget’s request to Drury was for a master attendant. He recommended 
William Pitt, ex. master of Nereid, as he knew him to be an individual of ability, zeal 
and fidelity. This is not so surprising when one considers that Puget and Pitt had both 
travelled together to India on the Barbados. Requesting the services of Pitt appears to be 
one of the commissioner’s first actions on arrival, as Puget’s letter is dated the same day 
he reported his arrival at Madras.
40
 Subsequently the commissioner informed the Navy 
Board of this appointment and outlined his reasons, chief of which was the lack of 
surveys on ships, inspections of stores purchased and unloaded, and the need to 
supervise the rope walk.
41
 Puget pursued this logic and next provided a case to the Navy 
Board for a master shipwright to be sent from Britain. In this letter the commissioner 
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stated that there had never been a system to exercise any control over the Company 
workforce, as it was left to the carpenter of any ship being repaired to provide 
supervision. This resulted in inconsistent practices and little or no means for the 
storekeeper to question the vouchers supplied by the workforce and also resulted in the 
wastage of materials.
42
 Puget returned to the necessity for a master shipwright in July 
1811. As the hired native artificers were completely under the Company’s master 
attendant Puget considered that this arrangement had encouraged inefficiencies. Without 
an alternative the Company could do as they wished. Having demonstrated the 
advantage of a master shipwright being on the establishment, Puget commenced an 
experiment to break the Company monopoly by directly hiring a native foreman, 15 
carpenters and four sawyers to form a naval yard workforce directly under the 
commissioner’s control.43  
 
The Navy Board had agreed to Puget’s earlier request for a master shipwright and 
obtained Admiralty approval to appoint Matthew Wellington.
44
 This appointment 
reunited Puget and Wellington, as both had been at the Flushing yard.
45
 Regarding the 
master attendant post, the Admiralty were not initially convinced that it was 
necessary.
46
 However, Commodore Broughton, temporarily commander-in-chief on 
Drury’s death, concurred with Puget’s view that a master attendant was needed, 
especially in the light of the additional responsibilities placed on Puget since his arrival. 
Broughton also stated the lack of a master attendant was sorely felt at Bombay.
47
 It may 
have been this letter that convinced the Admiralty that the Bombay post was required. 
The Navy Board informed Puget in September 1811, that the Admiralty had approved 
his proposals for the establishment required at Madras together with the appointment of 
Wellington.
 48
  This now gave Puget the organisation he had suggested, providing him 





Puget’s re-organisation was not restricted to ship refitting, as he also initiated savings at 
the Madras hospital and entered into re-negotiating the victualling contract. He also 
managed to find time to visit Trincomalee, resulting in recommendations for its 
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suitability as a refitting yard. Amongst the initial measures taken at Trincomalee, was to 
station Blanche there as a storeship and sheer hulk to create an embryonic naval yard, 




Figure 7f: Puget’s suggested Madras naval yard organisation 
 
On Hood’s arrival as commander-in-chief in April 1812, he found Puget had recently 
completed the re-negotiation of the victualling contract and had a firm grasp on civil 
naval concerns.
50
 On learning that Commissioner Dundas had left Bombay, Hood 
appointed Puget to act as resident commissioner at that port, in addition to his existing 
duties at Madras. This commander-in-chief also found that he had a complete naval yard 
organisation at Madras. Hood was to make full use of these individuals, using them as 
independent experts on the potential exploitation of the resources of India, to advise on 
building standards at Bombay and to manage the establishment of a naval yard at 
Trincomalee. Puget found himself in sole charge of all civil naval affairs until 
Commissioner James Johnston arrived at Bombay in March 1813. 
 
As at Bombay, the transfer of British dockyard artificers to Madras also occurred with 
cordage specialists being the first sent.
51
 These individuals, at both locations, were sent 
not only to manufacture ropes and cables, but to instruct the local workforce in 
European methods. This principle was developed, on the advice of Wellington, by Puget 
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when he suggested that other specialists be sent out to instruct local boys.
52
 The Navy 
Board agreed and stated they would dispatch a foreman of shipwrights, two boat 
builders, two mast makers and two smiths from Plymouth dockyard, where Wellington 
had recently been an assistant to the master shipwright. However, economy was still in 
the minds of the Navy Board as they did not agree to formal apprenticeship bonds for 
the boys. Instead, they instructed that the recruits received an annual pay increase as 
their skills developed.
53
 This measure was probably to prevent a legal entanglement in 
the event of peace which would result in the trainee boys being dismissed. The training 
of an indigenous establishment workforce appears to have been initiated by Puget as he 
anticipated a problem in providing a skilled labour force at Trincomalee.    
 
The administrative reorganisation of the civil naval departments was now complete so 
that on Admiral Hood’s arrival in India the shore support of his naval squadron had 
moved from one of dependence on Company employees to one of crown independence. 
By the employment of an Indian workforce and the training of its own artificers the 
Admiralty now had control of a naval refitting organisation in India.  
 
7.4 The naval refitting and re-supply bases 
 
The naval defence of India and British trade in the east rested on the East Indies 
squadron and the bases from which its ships could operate. The following presents a 
review of the principal bases, Bombay and Madras, and the other ports that were 
considered to provide refitting, re-supply and hospital capability. These other ports were 
Calcutta with it dry docks and commercial shipbuilding resources, Trincomalee, and 
Prince of Wales Island, Penang. Negapatam was also considered by Drury a more 
suitable refitting location than Madras.  
 
The evolution, adoption and use of ports fall into three periods. From 1793 to 1805 
Bombay, Madras and Calcutta were the main ports used, while Trincomalee, Penang 
and some other minor havens were rendezvous and refreshment locations. The second 
period, 1805 to 1813, still involved Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, but also included 
Penang, a product of Lord Melville’s initiative to build an eastern base. The third 
period, 1810 to 1815, overlaps the second and centres on Drury’s plan and Hood’s 
actions, to build an establishment at Trincomalee. The reasons for their use, 
abandonment and eventual consolidation at Bombay and Trincomalee, are examined 
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below. A strategic outlier of the British in this period was the colony of New South 
Wales with Port Jackson being its principal port. This location is examined to ascertain 
if this distant port was capable of supporting naval refits after over twenty years of 
settlement. 
 
Bombay provided the primary refitting location for vessels in the East Indies squadron, 
but its location was too far from the ships stationed to protect the Bay of Bengal and the 
eastern side of the Indian peninsular. How to support the squadron on that side of India 
was a problem that exercised the minds of the British throughout the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. It was the attempt to solve this problem that gave impetus to the 
evolution of Admiralty autonomy from the East India Company. 
 
The founding of an East India Company settlement on Penang in 1786 was obtained 
partly as a potential base for ships, but this was not the limit to the Company’s ideas for 
such a base before 1793. In 1789 the Andaman Islands were claimed by the governor 
general, with plans for establishing a naval base on Great Andaman Island, initially at 
Port Blair and later at Port Cornwallis, both being subsequently abandoned following 




It was not only the Company that looked for anchorages or replenishment bases before 
the Revolutionary War. Commodore Cornwallis’s squadron surveyed potential sites. 
Amongst these were all the bays of the Andamans, Nicobars, Diego Garcia, the north-
west side of Sumatra and many other locations.
55
 The Company and the British navy 
therefore had already determined there was a need for a naval base on the eastern side of 
India, but it was not until late in the Napoleonic War before Trincomalee was adopted 
as the solution. 
 
It was not only the refitting capability that made a naval base, as logistic supply of 
ordnance stores, victualling items and health care provided in hospitals were also vital 
elements of such a facility. Once a naval ship arrived in the East Indies, ordnance stores 
were provided by the East India Company and not the Ordnance Board. This is not 
covered in any detail in this thesis. Similarly the victualling system used in the East 
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Indies is not covered in this thesis as recent scholarship has already reported on this 
area.
56









Earlier in this chapter and in chapter one, it was noted that Bombay was the best 
equipped port in the East Indies, with its dry dock, access to a skilled workforce and the 
timber of the Malabar forests. However, it was not only these facilities that made 
Bombay valuable. This port was also ideally situated to serve vessels defending the 
western regions of India from any threat coming from the Red Sea or Persian Gulf plus 
protecting British trade between India and the Arab world. The British were frequently 
concerned in this period that the French could threaten India from these areas via an 
attack staged from Egypt.  
 
Figure 7h indicates the location of Bombay dockyard and the position of the islands that 
were considered as sites for hospitals or naval accommodation. This map together with 
figure 1j in chapter one and figure 7j show the location and development of the 
dockyard in this period. 
                                             
Figure 1j in chapter one provides a plan of the Company yard at Bombay in 1803 prior 
to the building of Duncan dock. St. Vincent’s decision to order the construction of a 74 
gun ship at Bombay resulted in the construction of a double dock. The inner dock was 
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Figure 7j shows the position of these new docks together with the location of the 
principal buildings in the dockyard and to whom they belonged. The draughtsman 
colour coded and annotated the plan, with ownership and building description. The 
Company buildings and facilities were shown in pink with those of the Crown shown in 
blue. 
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Number Description
1 Mrs Nisbitt’s building (Private ownership)
2 Marine Storekeeper’s rooms (Company)
3 Tar House (Company)
4 Cook House belonging to building No. 5 (Company)
5 Building occupied by the lascars in the Attendant’s office 
(Company)
6 Naval Storehouse (Crown)
7 Naval Storekeeper’s office and dwelling house (Crown)
8 Commissioner’s office, Sail Loft and Mast House (Crown)
9 Mast House and Storerooms (Company)
10 Mast House and Storerooms (Company)
11 Joiners and Blacksmiths shop (Company)
12 Sentry Boxes (not labelled)
13 Slips for building timber and launching boats (Company)
14 Slips for building frigates and merchantmen (Company)
15 Saw pit and boat house (Company)
16 Piece of ground lately taken from the sea to increase the size of 
17 & 18 Unused
19 Casements appropriated for reception of steam engine 
20 Casements made use of by cooks of the ships undergoing 
repair, no fires permitted within the docks (Company)
21 Old mast house (Company)
22 Lodgings for the crews attached to the builder (Company)
23 Master Attendant’s office (Company)
24 Sail Loft and Mould Loft (Company)
25 Superintendent of Marine office (Company)
26 Blacksmith’s forge (Company)
27 Guard Room (Company)
28 Gate Guardroom (Company)
29 Blacksmith’s forge (Crown)
30 Casements made use of by the painters (Company)
31 Wet Ditch
Figure 7j: Plan of Bombay Dockyard in 1816 575
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The King’s yard occupied only a small part of the dockyard, but had the offices, 
storehouses, mast house and sail loft that formed the essential elements of an overseas 
establishment. The Company dockyard also had these essential offices and buildings, 
plus the ownership of the old, Bombay dock and the new, Duncan dock. This 
duplication of buildings, for example storehouses, sail loft and mast house may seem an 
unnecessary expense, but can be easily explained. 
 
The Company dockyard was a commercial concern involved in merchant shipbuilding 
and repair, Bombay Marine related activities plus work for the British navy, all of 
which required separate accounting. The King’s yard existed only to support the supply 
of stores and repair of naval vessels. The physical division of Company and British 
naval supply organisations was a simple fraud prevention measure to ensure 
government stores were only used on naval ships. Other measures existed, including the 
identification of government items with the King’s anchor, or by coloured threads in 
cordage. Instructions were also issued that all such items were not to be sold or 
otherwise disposed of at overseas locations, but always returned to Britain.
1
 By these 
measures, any such item found in non-naval vessels indicted theft and hence provided a 
deterrent against embezzlement. 
 
The King’s yard at Bombay was a lodger in the Company’s dockyard and paid rent for 
the land occupied by the temporary buildings erected by the navy. When these buildings 
were found to be decaying in 1808, the cost of repair or re-building fell on the crown 
rather than the Company. Commissioner Dundas addressed this problem immediately 
on his arrival and discovered that Admiral Drury intended to build new storehouses at 
Bombay.
2
 Dundas instead, negotiated with the Bombay government for replacement 
buildings within the dockyard, whilst giving up the land currently occupied. This 
agreement provided a new range of buildings with access to the sea front for £5000, as 
opposed to the estimated cost of £20000 for a re-built facility.
3
 Dundas and Drury 
disagreed, with the admiral wanting the re-built facility, but the Admiralty sided with 
the commissioner. 
 
This was but one of a number of disputes between the commander-in-chief and the 
commissioner, as they also disagreed over the provision of hospital care and 
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accommodation of naval crews, when ships were being refitted.
4
 Drury considered the 
existing arrangements for the care of the sick and wounded were inadequate, and 
ordered the conversion of the recently purchased Ardasier to a hospital ship, rather than 
to a receiving ship, as originally intended. Arrogant, the existing receiving ship, had 
been recently condemned, and a home for crews when ships were in dock was needed. 
The admiral’s solution was instead to build accommodation on Butcher’s Island and to 
turn the rented shore hospital into a storehouse.
5
 Drury reported that Dundas was 
obstructive to his orders and he attempted to use this case to have the commissioner 
removed, or placed directly under his command. 
 
What Dundas presented to Drury and the Navy Board concerning the admiral’s 
intentions, illuminate their respective concerns, one for economy, the other for 
operational efficiency. The necessity to erect accommodation on Butcher’s Island to 
receive crews was only required in Drury’s plan, because the ship purchased to replace 
the condemned receiving ship was to be a hospital. By pointing out the unsuitability of 
the Ardasier for such a service, because the lower ports were too low in the water to be 
opened, Dundas crucially undermined Drury’s plan. Dundas also pointed out that the 
conversion of the existing hospital building to a storehouse was unnecessary, as the 
existing arrangements were more economic.
6
 Drury was unable to change the 
commissioner’s mind especially as Dundas had already fitted the Ardasier as a 
receiving ship. The Admiralty backed the commissioner’s actions and merely directed 




This was not to end the Dundas and Drury disagreements, as the admiral enlisted the 
squadron’s captains in an attack on the commissioner concerning the quality of the refits 
performed at Bombay.
8
 However, again the Admiralty supported the commissioner who 
was operating to his instructions.
9
 The later reports from Admiral Hood on the condition 
of ships sent to the East Indies provided a more considered reason for the refitting 
problems that Drury encountered. Drury’s complaints centred on the need for frequent 
docking to replace copper, or repair other underwater defects, suggesting a poor 
standard of refitting, but Hood instead pointed out that more care was required in the 
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selection of ships for the squadron.
10
 Hood reported that ships which had been in eastern 
waters for as little as a year, needed underwater repairs and copper replaced. By 
ensuring the ships were sound before departure for the east, the need for docking and 
refits would be considerably reduced. In contrast to Drury, Hood reported refits and 











The selection of Madras as the location to station the East Indies squadron and 
consequent establishment of a naval base was one of necessity rather than design. As a 
location Madras passed the essential criteria for such a base, being close to an area of 
operations, able to provide access to water, wood and food, plus being both politically 
and militarily secure.
12
 Unfortunately it was not a safe anchorage and although naval 
stores, victualling and health care were available, the open roadstead two miles off 
shore, ensured that only limited refit work could be undertaken, with careening being 
particularly unwise. This latter technique was ruled out in a letter from master 
shipwright Matthew Wellington to Puget concerning the refit of HMS Cornelia in 1812. 
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Wellington reported the sloop required docking or being hauled down to rectify her 




The risk of stationing the squadron at this open anchorage was well known to the navy, 
especially during the northeast monsoon period when ships usually retreated to 
Bombay, or to Trincomalee. However, Madras Roads was not always safe for ships at 
other times of the year and so it proved in May 1811. It was on the 5
th
 May that Puget 
reported to the Admiralty the results of a severe east-southeast storm that struck 
Madras. Not only had the storeship Chichester and frigate Dover been lost, but a further 
40 to 50 merchant ships had also foundered. Large trees had been blown down and 
houses had lost their roofs, but as Puget observed, it was fortunate the squadron had 




Trusting to luck is never a secure strategy, especially as a single storm had the power to 
decimate a naval capability. Madras was not abandoned until 1817, but three potential 




Calcutta was at the heart of British power in the east making the port politically and 
militarily secure. The resources of Bengal were available for water, food, fuel, health 
care and ordnance, with appendices 7b and 7c showing that the shipbuilding and repair 
infrastructure was in place to support naval ships, but there were also disadvantages in 
using Calcutta. A glance at figure 7a indicates that the chief obstacle was its 
geographical position, a combination of Calcutta’s distance from the most suitable area 
of operations in the Bay of Bengal and the inevitable delay, during the southwest 
monsoon when ships would be beating against the prevailing wind. A further 
complication is not evident from figure 7a, that of the distance from the mouth of the 
Hooghly River to Calcutta. This was compounded by the difficulty in navigating the 
river, necessitating a pilot of the Bengal Marine to be available. In short, Calcutta was 
unsuitable for the establishment of an overseas base, but it was used and resulted in a 
system of agents, or temporary appointments being used to support captains who took 
their ships to Calcutta for refit. 
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The refitting potential of Calcutta was not ignored by the British navy, as a number of 
ships were repaired at Calcutta, which included use of the dry docks that had recently 
been built on the Hooghly. However, Calcutta was never to become a primary refitting 
location, as it was found to be an expensive option. 
 
Investigations into the cost of refitting at Calcutta resulted in parliament examining the 
actions of Commodore Home Popham who refitted his squadron there in 1801.
15
 Home 
Popham had been put in command of a squadron to operate in the Red Sea, but sent his 
squadron to distant Calcutta to refit instead of to Bombay. When the Admiralty 
discovered Home Popham’s actions, plus the excessive costs of the refits at Calcutta, a 
witch hunt occurred, with accusations and counter accusations flying between them. If 
the political and the vindicating aspects of this dispute are ignored, a useful picture is 
obtained of the suitability of Calcutta as a naval repair location. The ships Home 
Popham sent were Romney, a fourth rate, and La Sensible, a troop transport that the 
commodore had converted to a 32 gun ship, both of which were repaired. La Sensible 
was placed in dry dock, indicating Calcutta could dock escort vessels. It also had 
commercial repair yards, a labour force and master builders, but the costs of repair had 
amounted to over a quarter of a million pounds,
16
 approximately the cost of building ten 
fifth rate frigates.
17
 What became evident was the lack of a naval storekeeper or agent at 
Calcutta to assist naval commanders until Rainier appointed Matthew Louis as deputy 
naval storekeeper in May 1801. The total expenditure at Calcutta for Home Popham’s 
command exceeded £600000 of which Louis was entitled to a five percent fee. The 
appointment of Louis was not approved by the Admiralty and Rainier was ordered to 
terminate the post. The parliamentary select committee concluded in their reports that 
Home Popham, or his commanding officers, had not been involved in any fraud, but 
that the costs incurred were excessive. 
 
Apart from the high costs at Calcutta, the Admiralty considered that the location was 
unhealthy for ships’ crews and requested that naval ships only visit the port if absolutely 
necessary. This ruled out Calcutta as a naval base and refitting location, but ships based 
at Madras still occasionally used the docking facilities at Calcutta. Amongst the vessels 
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dry docked at Calcutta were the fifth rates Phaeton, Dover, Modeste and the Samarang 
sloop. Details of these refits together with the costs incurred were the subject of 
dispatches from Drury and Puget, from 1809 to 1811 and underlined their concerns 
regarding Calcutta. 
 
Although Calcutta’s docking facilities had been used, on obtaining command of the East 
Indies squadron in February 1809, Drury commented on the absence of a second naval 
port in India with dry docks.
18
 It was in May of that year that the admiral pronounced 
his strategy for refitting in the East Indies to reduce, ‘[the] enormous expense attending 
the squadron’.19 His plan rested on reducing the necessity of using Bombay, but 
particularly Calcutta where, he considered, the health of seamen suffered considerably. 
However, his comment on refitting costs at Calcutta was particularly illuminating. 
Drury considered the contractors were running rings around the young commanders 
who were having their ships refitted at that port. Drury considered the lack of a 
shipwright officer at Calcutta who could check the contracts, ship surveys and the 
quality of work done, had resulted in an increase in costs. Drury’s solution was to warn 
his captains that investigations would be made on refits at Calcutta and to gave orders to 
shun that port unless unavoidable. The admiral’s short term refitting plan centred on 
using Negapatam instead of Calcutta or Madras for refits, as he calculated the costs 
would be one tenth of those at Calcutta and a quarter those at Madras.
20
 Drury’s long 
term plan was to establish a refitting port at Trincomalee. 
 
The Admiralty agreed with Drury’s comments regarding refits at Calcutta and issued 
instructions to avoid using that port in October 1809,
21
 but they disagreed on the use of 
Negapatam, as the benefits over Madras were marginal. Regarding Trincomalee, the 
Admiralty fully supported Drury’s proposals.  
 
Calcutta continued to be used by the navy for refits and replenishment when 
unavoidable, but the reports to the Navy Board and Admiralty continued to detail the 
considerable expense involved. The removal of the naval agent and his five percent fee 
on all expenditure, reduced costs and the suspicion that the agent encouraged spending 
at Calcutta. Puget’s actions as naval commissioner reduced the cost of using Calcutta, 
                                                 
18
 Drury to Admiralty, TNA, ADM 1/181, 26
th
 February 1809. 
19
 Drury to Admiralty, TNA, ADM 1/181, 10
th
 May 1809. 
20
 Drury to Admiralty, TNA, ADM 1/181, 10
th
 May 1809, 15
th
 July 1809, 17
th
 February 1810. 
21
 Admiralty to Drury, 27
th





especially by his direct arrangements with government officials, but the use of this port 
was negligible by late 1812. 
 
Calcutta had the potential to become the second refitting port of the East Indies 
squadron. It had the infrastructure, investment and access to materials and labour, but 
the navy avoided using the port primarily on cost grounds. It seems that the private 
shipbuilders, dry dock owners and naval stores providers realised they were in a 
position to charge whatever the ships’ captains would tolerate as there was no 
alternative. Possibly a cartel was in place, but as naval work was not essential to the 
private shipbuilders, they considered it an opportunity to charge premium rates. A naval 
dockyard could have been established at Calcutta, but it could not have functioned 
effectively as a naval base. This meant Madras, or another east coast location, was 
necessary. This appears to have been the reasoning of Lord Melville, Henry Dundas, 
first lord of the Admiralty who investigated and commissioned a naval base at Prince of 
Wales Island, Penang. 
 
7.4.4 Prince of Wales Island, Penang 
 
The first Lord Melville, on becoming first lord of the Admiralty in 1804, did not 
immediately look to create a new naval base, but had previously consulted his nephew 
on East Indian resources and shipbuilding locations in the east.
22
 The results of his 
discussions with Philip Dundas and Paul Tate, who had been recommended by Philip, 
provided Melville with first hand information.
23
 These gentlemen and Hamond, the 
comptroller of the navy, met and helped to form Melville’s plans.24 The first lord was 
turning his thoughts from merely shipbuilding in the east to strategic considerations. In 
August 1804, Melville wrote to Wellesley on the advantages to be obtained by turning 
the settlement recently established on Penang, into a naval base and shipbuilding 
location. Francis Light had landed at Penang in 1786, establishing East India Company 
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Melville’s plan was to split the East Indies station into two commands saying; ‘I have 
long thought that there was a defect in the distribution of our naval forces in India, and 
that the fleets should be so divided, under separate commands, as to afford constant 
protection to both coasts of the peninsular’. Melville logically followed this up with; ‘If 
I am right in this position it is obvious that a naval station for the building and repairing 
vessels of every description, on both sides on India, would be a great accommodation to 
our naval interests in the Indian Ocean. A new naval establishment therefore at Prince 
of Wales Island affords no argument for undervaluing and neglecting the establishment 
now existing at Bombay.’26 The first lord now proceeded on two fronts, firstly to split 
the East Indies command and secondly to encourage the East India Company to 
establish a dockyard at Penang, with a shipbuilding and dry dock capability. 
 
Pellew, already appointed to command the existing East Indies squadron, was re-
appointed to the westward station, using Bombay as his main base with its dry docks 
and yard. The eastward command was placed under Troubridge, who would defend the 
Bay of Bengal and trade with China. The dividing line between these commands was a 
line north/south and east/west drawn from Point de Galle. Pellew did not play to the 
intentions of this plan and shifted the line north and to the east of Galle to leave 
Trincomalee and Madras in his command, stating that during the south west monsoon 
Bombay was untenable.
27
 This split in command was short lived, as Pellew refused to 
recognise the intended split, played for time and awaited unambiguous directions. With 
Melville’s departure as first lord and the change in administration following Pitt’s death, 
Pellew got his wish as the whole of the East Indies command was placed under his 
orders. Troubridge was appointed to the Cape of Good Hope command and sailed from 




Melville’s initiative was one dependent on the Company funding and building the 
Penang yard. As this project was to meet strategic aims, Melville showed considerable 
faith in the Company to delivery his plan. Unlike at Bermuda and Simon’s Town, where 
the Admiralty merely commissioned and built establishments to meet strategic aims, 
Melville must have considered the orders for naval ships from Penang were incentive 
enough for the Company to build the yard. The Navy Board provided plans suited for 
this overseas naval yard. The Penang establishment was to be managed by the 
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Company, with the yard superintendent also acting as a naval storekeeper. This 
arrangement was identical to that at Bombay when Philip Dundas had been marine 
superintendent and naval storekeeper between 1796 and 1801. Hamond confirmed this 
arrangement in a letter to the chairman of the Court of Directors at the end of October 
1804, offering the Company assistance in building the naval base.
29
 The Board of 
Control and Court of Directors now discussed how to administer and bring this project 
into fruition. This resulted in Penang being given Presidency status, with Philip Dundas 
appointed its governor
30




The combined nature of building this repair and building dockyard becomes evident in 
the support provided by the Navy Board. Following a meeting with the Company in 
December 1804, the Navy Board provided designs and estimates of the costs of building 
a naval yard with store houses, building slips and a dry dock capable of accommodating 
a 74 gun ship.
32
 It was recognised at an early stage that a steam engine would be 
required to pump out the proposed dock, resulting in the Navy Board entering into 
discussions with Boulton and Watt for the design and build of suitable engines.
33
 Paul 





The question of financing the construction of the establishment, the warships built and 
the naval stores provided was to be one of the reasons why the project ended in failure. 
Hamond records the rules that had been agreed between Melville, himself and the 
Company. One third of the cost of the construction of docks, wharves and buildings 
would be paid by the British government, with the Company providing the remainder.
35
 
The construction of warships was to be a commercial venture with the Company paying 
for materials and labour, with the Admiralty agreeing to purchase the vessels if found 
                                                 
29
 Hamond to Elphinstone, 30
th
 October 1804, enclosure 16, Papers presented to the House of Commons 
respecting Prince of Wales Island in the East Indies, 25
th
 February 1805,  19-20. 
30
 Philip Dundas appointed Governor of Prince of Wales Island, 5
th
 December 1804, Papers presented to 
the House of Commons respecting Prince of Wales Island in the East Indies, 25
th
 February 1805, 33. 
31
 Memorandums concerning governor and staff for Prince of Wales Presidency, House of Commons 
Papers, Enclosures 17, 18 & 19, Papers presented to the House of Commons respecting Prince of Wales 
Island in the East Indies, 25
th
 February 1805, 20-33. 
32
 East India House to Hamond, TNA, ADM 42/89, 13
th
 April 1805; Deptford yard officers to Navy 




 April 1805. 
33
 Boulton and Watt to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 42/89, 8
th
 May 1805, 24
th
 June 1805; Barrallier 
(Assistant Surveyor) to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 42/89, 13
th
 May 1805, 29
th
 June 1805.  
34
 Ramsey to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 49/89, 4
th
 July 1805. 
35
 Elphinstone to Hamond, TNA, ADM 49/89, 29
th
 March 1805; Hamond to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 
42/89, 14
th




 For the provision of naval stores to HM ships, the Company 
would purchase items from the Navy Board in Britain, transport to Penang and charge a 
30 percent fee on all stores issued.
37
 The Navy Board considered this arrangement was 
to the public’s advantage, as a naval storekeeper would not be needed at Penang.38 
These arrangements placed all the financial risks with the East India Company, but left 
the strategic risks of a dry dock and base not being provided with the Admiralty. 
 
The building of a naval establishment and dry dock at Penang was not completed, with 
a number of factors contributing to its failure. The death of Governor Dundas in April 
1807 could be considered a crucial blow, especially as his uncle, the prime instigator of 
the idea, was in disgrace. Without these men the drive for the success of the project was 
lost. The financial condition of the Company, particularly in India, was starving the 
project of money, as the supreme government would not release any funds. Acquiring a 
skilled workforce was proving difficult to obtain, resulting in delays and the work being 
done of poor quality. The frigate being built, Malacca, was proving very expensive to 
construct as its teak was more costly than originally estimated. Drury reported in 
August 1809, ‘I have explained to that Board [Navy], the wasteful and ridiculous idea 
of ever building Men of War at this island where neither timber or workmen can be 
procured without immense expense.’39 The Ordnance and Navy Boards were still 
sending stores for ships that it was thought Penang would build, but as Drury stated, the 




The parliamentary papers and Admiralty records strongly indicate that the Penang naval 
establishment was the idea of Melville in the summer of 1804, but Anthony Webster 
credits Robert Farquhar, lieutenant-governor of Penang, raising a similar proposal with 
Wellesley in April 1804.
41
 As the source cited is an article published in 1851 it casts 
doubt on the year quoted.
42
 However, if the date of Farquhar’s proposal was April 1805, 
it would be consistent with Wellesley requesting information on receiving Melville’s 
July and late August letters of 1804, via the land route. It would seem unlikely that 
Farquhar would submit an opinion on building a naval base without encouragement. 
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The embryonic naval base at Penang continued to limp along with naval ships calling 
for refreshment, access to naval stores and use of the hospital ship, Wilhelmina, but 
Puget, the Navy Board and the Admiralty had all concluded the base was now 
unnecessary.
43
 Puget, in his briefing letters to the Navy Board on arrival in January 
1811, considered Penang expensive beyond calculation, and that there were insufficient 
checks on supplies demanded, or any regard to economy. The commissioner stated that, 
although he had insufficient knowledge on the political necessity for retaining a naval 
base at Penang, he stated a naval storekeeper would be needed if the base was not 
closed.
44
 The Navy Board replied in August that the Admiralty had issued instructions 
to Drury to break-up the Penang establishment and move the hospital ship to Bombay.
45
 
Commodore Broughton replied to the Admiralty in October that no advantage could be 
gained in moving Wilhelmina to Bombay, his opinion being that Penang was at a trade 
intersection with China, was a healthy place to recover, and the hospital ship would 
require a considerable refit to enable her to sail.
46
 In July 1812 the Navy Board re-
iterated the Admiralty’s order to close the Penang establishment.47 Hood, as 
commander-in-chief, had been briefed by the Admiralty on their decision to close 
Penang, but he first ascertained the situation before both he and Puget closed the 
establishment. 
 
The final acts involved in closing the establishment were issued by Hood in late August 
1812, with directions to Puget to instruct the naval storekeeper to load serviceable stores 
on to a ship being sent.
48
 It was left to the naval storekeeper to dispose of the hospital 
ship and all other unserviceable items. The establishment was finally closed in late 
December 1812, with the dispatch of naval stores and invalids to Madras. A poignant 
reminder of the project to build a dry dock and naval base at Penang remained, as Puget 
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The faith in the principle of using the East India Company to support the aspirations of 
British strategists in providing naval support, without significant British government 
financial support, was tested to destruction with the Penang initiative. Melville’s plan to 
provide an effective naval base, in addition to the one at Bombay was sound, but using 
the Company principally to fund the venture was optimistic. The attention now turned 




The British East Indies squadron and its relationship with Trincomalee can be 
considered, from the mid eighteenth century, to consist of three distinct periods, 1746 to 
1795, 1795 to 1810 and 1810 to 1822. The first period concerns the use of the port 
during its Dutch occupation, the second from Trincomalee’s capture to Drury’s plan to 
establish a naval yard and finally, the subsequent activities that occurred to build the 
naval yard, until Britain’s financial position caused building to halt. 
 
Chapter one provided a brief outline of British use of Trincomalee when occupied by 
the Dutch. The importance of Trincomalee as a naval anchorage and refreshment 
location became apparent on the Dutch being drawn into the American War of 
Independence in 1780. Initially the harbour was captured by the British, but they were 
expelled by the French who were subsequently able to retain their use of the port for 
operations against the British in Indian waters. The lesson learned was that it was not so 
much access to Trincomalee that was vital to the British fleet, but the denial of access to 
it for an enemy fleet. Only occupation, or in the possession of a neutral able to defend 
the harbour against Britain’s enemies, was sufficient insurance against the events of 
1782-83 being repeated. 
 
With war against Revolutionary France commencing in 1793 and the uncertainty of the 
political stance of the Dutch, the British decided to occupy Trincomalee in 1795. The 
military defences of the port were weak, consisting of two forts, Fort Frederick and Fort 
Ostenberg, and even with an adequate garrison these in themselves were insufficient to 
ensure retention. The weakness of these fixed defences ensured the Eastern squadron 
would have to remain in close proximity to Trincomalee if a large French fleet was sent 
into these waters, or the French would repeat their success of 1782. The military 
security of Trincomalee was not improved to a significant degree during these wars, 
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until it was decided to build a naval yard. However, political security was assured when 
Ceylon was ceded to Britain in 1802.  
 
 
Figure 7m: Location of contending naval bases at entrance to Bay of Bengal 
 
In terms of the necessary criteria for a naval base, Trincomalee was the reverse of 
Madras as its prime advantage was its superb anchorage, but it lacked almost all the 
other factors required, apart from proximity to the area of operations and access to wood 
and water. Trincomalee was a small settlement with limited indigenous capability to 
supply food or a labour force. Contemporary sketches and watercolours indicate the 
extent of the jungle surrounding Trincomalee and the considerable labour that would be 
required if a naval yard was to be built.
50
 As with Penang, a large investment would be 
required to turn Trincomalee from a wilderness, into a thriving naval base, therefore it is 
not surprising that this did not occur until the last years of the French wars. 
 
Until 1809 when Admiral Drury stated his plans to reduce expenditure servicing his 
squadron, the role of Trincomalee was restricted to one of shelter, limited refits by 
squadron artificers and obtaining fuel and water. In his MA thesis Colgate detailed the 
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use of the port from 1746 to 1844, and uncovered the considerable use of Trincomalee 




During his term as commander-in-chief Cornwallis used the anchorage for refit and 
water in October 1789, July to August 1791, September to October 1792 and April and 
May 1793.
52
 However, it is Cornwallis’s comment that best describes his view on 
Trincomalee, ‘The harbour being little better than an uninhabited one’.53 Rainier also 
used the anchorage with squadron artificers carrying out repairs in 1797 and he returned 
the following summer. Rainier realised the need to provide a storeship if Trincomalee 
was to be a useful repair location.
54
 The port was still occasionally used by Rainier 
during the rest of his tenure as commander-in-chief, but his successors appear to have 
ignored Trincomalee. This would seem to have resulted from an increase in the use of 
Penang, the use of Calcutta for docking ships and the centring of activities at Madras. 
However, with the departure of Pellew, Trincomalee was to become with Bombay one 
of the principal naval yards in the east. 
 
Figure 7m shows the position of Trincomalee relative to Madras and the bases that were 
used in the Andamans Islands before Trincomalee was captured. Figure 7n provides a 
detailed view of the various anchorages at Trincomalee relative to the large bay that 
allowed access to the very sheltered waters of the inner anchorage. 
 
Drury’s determination to turn Trincomalee from a mere anchorage into a major naval 
base was a combination of dissatisfaction with his dealings with the East India 
Company, and the expense and dislike of the attitude of the officials and merchants he 
encountered. Apart from the attractions of the harbour and Trincomalee’s strategic 
position, Ceylon was a crown colony and its governor Maitland, was a very willing ally 
in creating a naval base on the island. Drury stated his intention to the Admiralty in May 
1809 and by December reported he was settling artificers from southern India at 
Trincomalee, with Maitland allocating land for their families.
55
 By March 1810 Drury 
was able to update the Admiralty that 30 families of shipwrights and smiths had been 
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moved to Trincomalee together with 50 Chinese labours, and that the erection of 





Figure 7n: Map of Trincomalee showing bays and inner harbour 
 
Drury was without orders from the Admiralty to spend money or effort on a new naval 
base, but proceeded indicating the considerable freedom of action available to a 
commander-in-chief. The Admiralty approved of the admiral’s actions, but only 
instructed him to prepare estimates.
57
 Drury continued to paint a rosy picture of the 
advantages of moving all shore naval departments to Trincomalee and the assistance 
being given by colonial officials to further his great plan.
58
 This caused the Admiralty to 
take him at his word, but they instructed him to restrict spending to the £3000 estimated 
by the local engineer.
59
 The Admiralty were excited at the prospect of being able to 
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Figure 7p: Puget’s sketch of Trincomalee harbour showing proposed dockyard61 
 
Governor Maitland continued to offer support to Drury, including the provision of a 
civil engineer, Atkinson. Amongst the plans this engineer produced, was a set of 
drawings to build dry docks at the head of Nicholson Cove.
62
 Drury proceeded with his 
plan to refit ships at Trincomalee and deployed the unserviceable Blanche to the 
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harbour as a receiving and hauling down ship. This astute measure offset the delay in 
the stores houses being built by Maitland, but unfortunately came to grief with 
Blanche’s subsequent running aground and loss.63  
 
It was not until Puget arrived at Trincomalee on 2
nd
 September 1811 that the Admiralty 
were provided with a detailed report on the practicality of building a dockyard, and 
centralising all civil naval departments at that port.
64
 Puget’s experience as a surveyor 
on Vancouver’s voyage lent credence to his views on the suitability of the harbour and 
its capacity, but it is in his other assessments of Trincomalee that the most value can be 
derived.  
 
Figure 7p is one of the sketches that Puget sent to the Admiralty that he referenced in 
his October dispatch. He provided details of the suitability of Nicholson Cove as a site 
for a dockyard, shown as a blue parallelogram, the current state of construction of the 
buildings commissioned by Drury, shown as GH, and a proposed site for the victualling 
department, shown in yellow. Puget strengthened the case to move from Madras by his 
evaluation of the ability to water and victual the squadron from Trincomalee, outlining 
how the existing contractors could be integrated. Puget considered the naval hospital at 
Madras to be one of the finest of its type at any overseas base, but instead recommended 
that a ship be stationed as a hospital at Trincomalee. To accommodate the officers and 
men of vessels being refitted, he recommended ships were used, with only naval yard 
and victualling department staff living on shore. Puget further detailed the civil naval 
organisation required and the nature of the workforce needed. He even detailed what 
and where building materials could be found. Puget’s bottom line was that the ordnance, 
victualling, naval and medical departments, should be moved from Calcutta, Madras 
and Penang to Trincomalee. He considered dry docks would only be required at 
Bombay and that port would remain as the primary repair location, but one final 
consideration, that of adequate military defence needed addressing as he considered it 
was weak.  
 
Governor Maitland expressed his concern regarding land defences against an invading 
force. Maitland wrote to Lord Liverpool, secretary of state for war and the colonies, in 
August 1810, stating that the defences of Trincomalee were weak against a surprise 
attack, which would mean the Eastern squadron would be tied to the port as it had been 
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 His concern for improvement in land defences was also articulated by 
Governor Brownrigg, Maitland’s successor in 1812, with the consequence that two 
towers were built named, Brownrigg and Hood.
66
 Hood’s meeting with the governor to 
improve the defences may have resulted from the Admiralty directing the admiral to 
make Trincomalee the principal refitting port in India and to vacate Madras.
67
 With the 
agreement of Brownrigg to improve the defences of the harbour, Admiral Hood was 





Subsequent activity at Trincomalee included the deployment of Pitt, Puget’s master 
attendant, as the first superintending officer, until ill-health forced his withdrawal. A 
workforce was required especially as a number of the settlers introduced by Drury had 
died from fever at Trincomalee in 1812.
69
 Artificers and labourers were recruited from 
southern India and transported to Trincomalee in the late spring and summer of 1813. 
This was a considerable workforce of carpenters, smiths, masons, bricklayers, caulkers 
and labourers, as shown in the contemporary paylists.
70
 They were all crown employees, 
giving complete independence from the East India Company. Nearly 300 artificers and 
labourers were taken by Wellington, the master shipwright, at the beginning of June 
1813 to Trincomalee to build the establishment.
71
 It was not only a master builder that 
was sent, but also William Taylor, Puget’s naval storekeeper, as the administrative 
officer.
72
 All that was needed now were the plans and decisions on what and where to 
build. 
 
While waiting for clear directions from the Admiralty, Hood directed Puget to retain 
Drury’s storehouses and have plans drawn for numerous buildings, including a 
careening wharf, capstan house, mast house, sail loft, boat house, and accommodation 
for a crew of a 74 gun ship.
73
 Many of these building plans have survived at the 
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Figure 7q: Plan of Trincomalee naval yard – May 181575 
                                                 
75
 A Plan of His Majesty’s Naval Yard at Trincomalee – May 1815, UKHO, C294. 
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The grand plans for Trincomalee were not to be executed, but it was not until the early 
1820s that they were abandoned. Figure 7q shows the progress that had been made by 
May 1815, with building having taken place in the area adjacent to Drury’s storehouses. 
Nicholson Cove was never to receive the dry docks, or careening wharf with capstan 
house. Instead the receiving ship at Bombay, Arrogant, was sent, arriving in June 1817 
to act as a sheer hulk and to assist in careening.  
 
The buildings required to move the civil departments from Madras were still not 
complete by September 1815 when Puget was forced, against his better judgement, to 
vacate Madras. It is Puget’s letter to the Navy Board that best describes his exasperation 
with the lack of direction from London. He pointed out that three commanders-in-chief 
had died during the five years of his appointment, all with different ideas for 
Trincomalee and at no time had he received any directions from the Navy Board. He 
further pointed out that the Admiralty had not provided positive orders with regard to 
the victualling and medical departments, especially as these departments had excellent 
facilities at Madras.
76
 Puget’s plea to the Navy Board was a result of the orders he had 
received from Burlton, the new commander-in-chief. Puget had earlier delayed the 
move as the military defences had not been completed, but more importantly the 
storehouses were incomplete, causing the stores moved from Madras by Admiral 
Burlton, to be damaged by white ants and rain. However, the work had progressed 
sufficiently to transfer the civil naval departments to Trincomalee in 1816, with the 




7.4.6 Port Jackson, New South Wales 
 
The reasons Britain established a penal colony and strategic base at Port Jackson have 
been the subject of many books and articles. This very short examination is to study if 
the colony was sufficiently mature to offer refitting and repair capability for the British 
navy in the French Wars. New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land were both part of 
the vast East Indies Station and fell within the remit of the commander-in-chief in the 
East Indies. 
 
Port Jackson was established in one of the finest anchorages in the world and in 1788 
was Britain’s toehold on a continent. Survival was the first necessity and the tapping of 
local resources was at first limited, causing food and materials to be transported to the 
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colony for some time. Soon the colony was able to build small vessels and to harness 
the use of local materials, but the Navy Board continued to send naval stores.
78
 A ship 
yard at Port Jackson is recorded as early as 1796, with Thomas Moore being appointed 
master boatbuilder. His later tasks included the survey and purchase of timber in New 
South Wales for naval purposes.
79
 Commercial ship builders were also at Port Jackson, 
with James Underwood building many colonial vessels including the 200 ton ship 
rigged King George in the first decade of the nineteenth century.
80
 All this indicates that 
resources and skills were available to assist in refitting naval vessels. 
 
In January 1812, the Navy Board instructed Commissioner Puget to purchase 2500 
Pagodas, convert them into Spanish dollars and transport them to the governor of New 
South Wales.
81
 Puget requested a vessel for the voyage from Admiral Hood who 




The sloop arrived safely at Port Jackson in November 1812, after experiencing very 
severe weather and delivered the treasure to the governor. The sloop was then placed 
under maintenance by the artificers of the vessel, resulting in considerable caulking 
being carried out. On completion, the Samarang sailed in January, but sprung a 
dangerous leak soon after clearing the harbour making four and a half feet of water an 
hour. She returned to Port Jackson and went to Sydney Cove, had her stores and guns 
removed and was surveyed by the ship’s carpenter, local shipbuilders and the recently 
resigned agent of the navy. The captain of the sloop explained there were very limited 
resources at the port for refitting and no naval stores that could be purchased as they 
were all reserved for colonial vessels.
83
 The sloop could not be repaired and was 
subsequently sold, but this left the crew stranded. Hood briefed Puget on what had 
occurred and requested he arrange for Palmer and Co., who regularly traded between 
Calcutta and New South Wales, to bring back the Samarang’s crew.84 
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As this occurred almost 25 years after the colony was established, it would be safe to 
conclude that Port Jackson’s resources were only scaled to service colonial 
requirements, and that the navy did not regard the port as a naval refitting location, but 
as a safe anchorage. 
 
7.5 Exploiting the shipbuilding potential of the East Indies 
 
The East Indies is unique in a study of British overseas stations, as the local economy 
provided ships that contributed to Britain’s seapower to a greater degree than in any 
other area. Access to plentiful materials, a large skilled labour force in the Company’s 
and private merchants’ employment, together with financial capital had created a 
burgeoning shipbuilding industry. In addition, the Admiralty was interested in tapping 
the shipbuilding potential of India, with this resulting in considerable activity by the 
Navy Board’s officers in India.  
  
Henderson in his history of the operations of Britain’s frigates and small ships in the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has suggested that the East Indies command relied 
on locally built vessels for sloops and cutters. He considered that these vessels had 
insufficient storage capacity to cope with the six month voyage from Europe.
85
 
Examination of the Admiralty’s ship lists indicates a different, but even more interesting 
development in tapping Indian shipbuilding resources. The ship list records of the 
Admiralty
86
 provide not only the names of the vessels deployed, but also the dates when 
they sailed from England hence indicating if a vessel was obtained in the East Indies. 
These records show that sloops, gun brigs and cutters were almost exclusively sent from 
England. However, it confirms that vessels built or captured in the East Indies were 
frequently purchased and commissioned into the British navy.  In 1796 five East India 
Company vessels had been purchased to strengthen the navy, being fitted as 64 gun 
ships, four of which were at the Battle of Camberdown, but these were ships built in 
British shipyards.
87
 After 1803 the Admiralty again called on Company ships, but this 
time on vessels that had been built in India. Table 7a lists these India built vessels 
purchased for the British navy. 
 
As president of the Board of Control, Henry Dundas had championed exploiting the 
shipbuilding resources of India which was also explored by St. Vincent while first lord 
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Table 7a: Indian built ships purchased for the British navy
88
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of the Admiralty. However, purchase of vessels in 1804 have a hint of panic. This may 
have resulted from St.Vincent’s disastrous handing of civil naval affairs and his run 
down of the navy resulting in a temporary shortage of ships.
89





 it was the first action of his successor, Melville, to issue 
instructions to India to purchase escort vessels. This appears to have been an urgent 
order, as the letters to Rainier were sent via the overland route. The Admiralty’s first 
letter requested, ‘purchase without loss of time upon the best and cheapest terms in your 
power four ships fit for His Majesty’s service capable of carrying 36 to 40 guns’.91 It 
added that Rainier was to fit out the ships, with the Admiralty sending officers and men 
for them. On the heels of that letter came another, naming two additional ships to be 
purchased, the Sir Edward Hughes and Cornwallis and added, that the Ordnance Board 
would be sending out 18 pdr. cannon and carriages for these ships.
92
 Copies of these 
orders were also sent to Pellew, who is usually credited with the purchase of these 
vessels, but Rainier again, in his quiet way, had probably already prepared the ground. 
 
These nine fifth rate Indian built ships, purchased from the Company or Indian 
merchants, were a small contribution to naval strength, but compared to the number of 
such frigates stationed in the East Indies, they was significant. In the 1808 to 1811 
period, approximately 15 fifth rates were in the squadron, so on balance these 
emergency purchases contributed over 50 percent of the force.
93
 If one includes the two 
frigates ordered from Bombay, Doris and Salsette, together with the Penang built 
frigate, Malacca, this contribution figure increases to 75 percent. In reality some of 
these purchased ships were soon relegated to auxiliary roles as storeships, but Ceylon, 
Dover, Cornwallis and the Sir Francis Drake all gave service in the east from their 
purchase and continually throughout the critical years of 1805 to 1811. The Dover was 
lost in 1811 but the Navy Board had instructed, before being notified of her lost, that 
Dover, Sir Francis Drake, and Akbar (ex. Cornwallis) were to be sent to England. It 
further stated that, if they were not suitable as warships, but in a sound condition, they 
were to be sent home to become storeships.
94
 This was to be the case for Sir Francis 
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As the nine Indian built frigates exemplify, the sub-continent was able to build 
European style ocean-going ships mainly from indigenous sources. The ability of the 
Bombay Presidency to build ships of high quality had been known from the Company’s 
earliest occupation. Table 7a illustrates that the Calcutta shipbuilders were also able to 
build large ships. It was in this period that Calcutta overtook Bombay as the principal 
shipbuilding location in India. Milburn observed in his 1813 survey of oriental 
commerce that, ‘Bombay [..] has always been famous for shipbuilding, and formally 
supplied Bengal and other parts of India with shipping, and when any considerable 
repairs were wanting, they were obliged to proceed to Bombay to have them effected. 
Many fine ships have lately been built at Bengal, so that branch of commerce at 
Bombay has rather diminished.’96 This growth in local shipbuilding appears to have 
been a consequence of the need for country trade vessels. These ships traded within the 
East Indies and hence were not subject to the Company monopoly. The increase in the 
wealth of individuals in India provided the capital required for these ships while the 
outbreak of the Revolutionary War in 1793, limited the availability of ships from 




Appendix 7d shows that although Bombay was still a major shipbuilding location in the 
first two decades of the nineteenth century, it had been overtaken by Calcutta in both the 
numbers of ships and in total tonnage constructed. What is also noticeable is that 
Rangoon in Burma, a non-East India Company controlled area, contributed ships for 
country trade merchants. With the exception of Bombay dockyard, the contribution of 
other shipbuilding ports for building warships was minimal. However, this burgeoning 
of indigenous shipbuilding confirms the presence of a plentiful skilled workforce and 
the availability of building materials. Figure 7r shows the locations of the principal 
shipbuilding areas within India in the first two decades of the nineteenth century and 
confirms, that apart from Coringa, the activity was concentrated in three areas. 
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Appendix 7d shows that the number of ships built at Bombay from 1800 to 1819 was 
exceeded in number by both Rangoon and Chittagong, but Bombay exceeded them in 
total tonnage. The chief reason for this was the specialised nature of the ships built at 
Bombay, particularly the warships constructed for the British navy. Between 1804 and 
1819 five ships of the line, five frigates, two sloops and two gun brigs were ordered 
from Bombay dockyard, together with a number of duplicate frames being transported 
to British dockyards for completion. It would seem that two factors played a part in the 
British government entering into an experiment with Indian built ships. Firstly, a 
combination of a shortage of British oak and other European timber and secondly, to 
capitalise on the cooperation between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors to 
utilise Bombay’s potential. What is significant is that knowledge of the potential of 
Indian shipbuilding grew considerably during the Napoleonic War. A parliamentary 
report, published in 1805,
99
 a letter from the master builder of the Bengal Marine in 
1808,
100
 together with a manuscript report in 1810 from the marine superintendent at 
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 followed by his later published work in 1811,
102
 provides considerable 
contemporary evidence on the shipbuilding potential of the East Indies. It was to 
Bombay however that attention was initially drawn for building vessels for His 
Majesty’s fleet. 
 
In July 1801 St. Vincent, the newly appointed first lord of the Admiralty, wrote to 
Henry Dundas, a long time chairman of the Board of Control, on the subject of building 
ships for the navy at Bombay. Dundas replied he had discussed the issue with Baring 
and that the Court of Directors had no objections.
103
 This line of thought on warship 
building in India was pursued by St. Vincent, one reason being timber shortages in 
Britain. St. Vincent wrote to the chairman and deputy chairman of the Court of 
Directors in March 1802, requesting that the Company limit the tonnage of vessels built 
for the Company in Britain to 800 tons, thus preserving all timber of a large size for the 
Royal Navy. It was in the second part of this letter that St. Vincent broached the subject 





This seems to have been agreed by the Company officials as St. Vincent informed the 
prime minister a few days later that Nepean, secretary of the Admiralty, would consult 
him on building ships at Bombay.
105
 The first lord wrote again to the Company 
requesting an overland dispatch was sent to the Bombay government asking that they 
collect and prepare timber to the ships. Nepean formally told the Navy Board of the 
agreement to build warships at Bombay in May 1802, requiring them to consult with the 
Company on what items would be required at Bombay for these vessels.
106
 Ramsay, the 
secretary of the East India Company, wrote to the Bombay government asking them to 
comment on the practicality of annually building 74 and 36 gun ships at Bombay. It was 
not until June 1803 that Ramsay was able to confirm to the Admiralty, the Bombay 
government’s agreement. The shipbuilders at Bombay requested that the Navy Board 
supplied upper masts and spars, copper and iron items and drawings, but that lower 
                                                 
101
 Money to Duncan, Governor of Bombay Presidency, TNA, ADM 106/2008, 22
nd
 January 1810. 
102
 Money, W., Observations on the Expediency of Shipbuilding at Bombay for the service of His Majesty, 
and the East India Company, (London, 1811). 
103
 Dundas to St. Vincent, 14
th
 July 1801, Bonner Smith, D. (ed.), Letters of Admiral of the Fleet Earl St. 
Vincent whilst First Lord Admiralty – Vol. 1, NRS, (London, 1922), 301. 
104
 St. Vincent to chairman and deputy chairman of East India Company, 31
st
 March 1802, Bonner Smith, 
D. (ed.), Letters of Admiral of the Fleet Earl St. Vincent whilst First Lord Admiralty – Vol. 2, NRS, 
(1927), 241-242. 
105
 St. Vincent to Addington, 3
rd
 April 1802, Bonner Smith, D. (ed), Letters of Admiral of the Fleet Earl 
St. Vincent whilst First Lord Admiralty – Vol. 2, 242-243. 
106
 Nepean to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 106/3123, 12
th
 May 1802. 
300 
masts of teak would be locally supplied.
107
 A frigate was subsequently laid down with 
her launch in January 1805, followed by her commissioning as Salsette. She was 
followed by another 36 gun frigate being laid down in April 1806 and her subsequent 




The building of the 74 gun ship encountered problems before being laid down as 
Bombay practice was to build large ships in dry docks, rather than on slipways, 
meaning a new dry dock would be required to ensure the squadron always had access to 
a dry dock for its battleships. To accommodate the construction of the ship, Duncan 
dock had to be built before the 74 gun ship Minden had her keel laid in December 
1807.
109
 She was not floated out and sent to England for completion until 1810. A 
further problem was whether timber of sufficient size could be found. Extracts of letters 
from Ramsay illustrate this problem, with the Bombay superintendent of marine, 
reporting the difficulty of obtaining timber for a 74 gun ship.
110
 This timber problem 
was overcome, but supply was hand to mouth throughout the period. 
 
Salsette, Doris and Minden completed the initial building phase and it was not until July 
1810 that the next ship was requested. This was for a 74 gun ship to be named 
Cornwallis which was built after Minden had been launched. The Admiralty also 
directed that timber was collected and prepared for another 74 gun vessel. This kit of 
parts was to be shipped home in the Cornwallis for assembly in Britain.
111
 However, the 
order for this vessel did not proceed smoothly. The Navy Board enquired, of the 
Admiralty, on what contractual terms should the vessel be built. Would this be, as 
before, with the Company paying for construction and then being paid on completion? 
If so, they pointed out, Commissioner Dundas would have no control over costs. The 
Navy Board wanted this control, as they reported the Bombay built frigate Salsette had 
cost £20667, excluding supplied items, whereas a British merchant built frigate of 




The method of payment for the Cornwallis disclosed the poor financial state of the East 
India Company and provided the navy with another method of funding shipbuilding and 
supplying the East Indies squadron with stores. Firstly, the Admiralty stated, the method 
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used regarding payment for Minden was to be continued for Cornwallis;
113
 secondly, 
the Company had been provided with £1.5 million by Act of Parliament in June 1810;
114
 
thirdly, the commissioner at Bombay was to keep a detailed record of all naval 




A temporary cancellation of the project by the Admiralty occurred when Commissioner 
Dundas reported that the Bombay government had released timber, collected for naval 
vessels, to build merchant ships.
116
 However, the Court of Directors assured the 
Admiralty they would pull the Bombay authorities into line and the order was 
recommenced. The prompt action of the commissioner, ensured that the ship was built 
with his role being one of naval overseer ensuring that value for money was 
delivered.
117
 The progress on Cornwallis continued apace and can be traced in the 
weekly reports of the master builder to the commissioner, with examples surviving 




When Commissioner Dundas returned home from Bombay on health grounds, it 
provided the Admiralty with an opportunity to obtain first hand experience from a navy 
official, of the building potential at Bombay. The Admiralty asked the Navy Board to 
obtain Dundas’s views on building brigs of 382 tons or gun-brigs at Bombay.119 The 
Navy Board replied that two brigs of 382 tons and two lesser vessels of 179 tons could 
be built at the same time, and that Commissioner Dundas was of opinion they could be 
built at a lower cost provided a large ship or frigate was also being built.
120
 Armed with 
this information, the Admiralty placed another order with the Company on 2
nd
 October 
1812 for a 74 gun ship, two brig sloops of 382 tons, two brigantines of 237 tons with 
frames for a further five ships to be brought home in these vessels.
121
 This was quickly 
followed by more orders that month for two frigates, Amphitrite, and Trincomalee, to be 
built.
122
 Further orders for a third rate and a fifth rate frigate were made in September 
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 but October 1812 was the high water mark in the experiment in overseas 




 of William Taylor Money, published in 1811, influenced the 
Admiralty? Money, the ex marine superintendent and naval storekeeper at Bombay, 
wrote on the advantages to Britain of building a fleet at Bombay. It would be mere 
conjecture to suggest this, but Money presented a detailed argument for such a fleet. 
Not only did he point out the advantages of teak, the quality of the ships built at 
Bombay and the growing shortage of British oak timber, but also produced a proposal 
based on through-life hull costs for such a fleet. His model compared the longevity of 
vessels with teak, to those with oak for their hulls. Using as an example, a fleet designed 
for service in Eastern or West Indian waters, he postulated that over a fifty year period 
the oak ships would have a life of only 15 years, and hence would have to be renewed 
three times, whereas the teak vessels would last the full period. His calculations showed 
a teak fleet was approximately 21 percent of the cost of a force constructed of oak.
125
 A 
brief look at the subsequent careers of the Bombay built vessels shows that Money was 
not over optimistic on the life time of such teak ships.  
 
From 1800 Calcutta was the principal area for shipbuilding in India, but no orders were 
placed there for naval vessels. As the private shipyards were engaged in commercial 
work perhaps there was little spare capacity for naval contracts; besides that, Calcutta 
was seen as a very expensive refitting location by naval officials in London and the east. 
Both these factors would work against naval contracts, a case of naval work only arising 
from customer necessity on an already busy market, resulting in commercial suppliers 
being able to inflict high charges. Another factor was the limited knowledge of the 
ability of Calcutta to build ships, or support the navy. At Drury’s request James Kyd, 
the master builder of the Bengal Marine, wrote a long dispatch in 1808, in which he 
detailed many aspects of Bengal shipbuilding, especially the sources of materials and 
whether they could be supplied from the east, or depended on imports. The chief 
difference between Bombay and Calcutta built vessels was the construction material of 
the ship’s hulls. The Calcutta ships used saul126 timber, a product of Bengal, for every 
part of the hull except the deck and outside planks, which were of teak imported from 
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Pegu, Burma. Bombay ships’ hulls were teak throughout.127 Kyd’s letter did not result 
in Drury commissioning work from Calcutta, but it greatly increased his understanding, 





The merchants of Calcutta offered to fund and built a 74 gun ship to demonstrate their 
ability to construct such a vessel at that port.
129
 Hood reported the Calcutta merchants’ 
proposal to the Admiralty in January 1814. The Admiralty stated it had no objection to 
this project but that on arrival in Britain the ship would be surveyed before it was 
agreed to purchase her for the navy.
130
 This ship was to become the Hastings, launched 
in January 1818 and hence outside the period covered by this thesis. However, she was 
unique in two ways. Firstly, she was built of Bengal saul with teak planking; secondly, 
she was constructed on a slip-way and launched in conventional manner, the first time 
in India for a vessel of this size.
131
 The Calcutta merchants were unsuccessful in 
obtaining orders from the Admiralty, a case of too little too late, but they demonstrated 
the potential of Bengal. The second Viscount Melville, first lord of the Admiralty, 
stated regarding ships for the navy from that port, ‘Calcutta and the means of building 
there is not very tempting particularly as to the timber. The saul which they offer us at 
Calcutta may be equal to the Malabar teak; but we have most favourable experience of 
the one and none of the other.’132 
 
It was not only Bombay and Calcutta where the navy had warships built for them in the 
east during these wars, as Prince of Wales Island, Penang also constructed a frigate. As 
detailed earlier in this chapter, the building of warships at Penang was part of a larger 
plan and strategy to turn Prince of Wales Island into a naval base, for a reconfigured 
command structure in the East Indies.  
 
7.6 Naval Stores – Potential and exploitation of East Indian resources 
 
‘Hearts of oak are our ships’133 is the opening words of the chorus to the Royal Navy’s 
official march and reminded Britons that their victories of 1759 were based on British 
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oak and valour. The threat to British naval power from a shortage of shipbuilding timber 
interested the historian, R. G. Albion
134
 early in the last century and gave rise to many 




The growth of native oak and elm trees in Britain was promoted by the British state, 
together with the search for sources of foreign oak and other timber. In emergencies, 
alternatives to seasoned oak were available and unseasoned oak, fir and pine ships were 
built. This was an expensive strategy, as the life of these vessels was short, but they 
could still operate effectively. 
 
Although alternatives were available for hulls, which still allowed a ship to be effective, 
if sub-standard materials were used for masts and spars then the performance of a vessel 
could be seriously affected. European and American pine was the preferred material, 
with shortages of large diameter timber being compensated for by the construction of 
composite masts (made masts). The pine from the Baltic and North America was the 
favoured material because it combined strength with light weight, compared with most 
other substitutes that were tried. European and American pine was reliable, had known 
properties and was therefore predictable in performance. 
 
The investigation of the quantities of timber available, their individual properties and 
availability for both local consumption and export from the East Indies and the Cape of 
Good Hope are studied later in this chapter. However, it was the efforts made to harness 
the potential of the East Indies to provide hemp that could have made a significant 
contribution to Britain’s war effort. 
 
7.6.1 Cordage  
 
The items used to hold the masts in position, to raise and lower upper masts and spars, 
to ‘work the ship’ and harness the wind, all demanded hemp. Unlike the hulls and to a 
lesser extent the masts and spars, there was not a satisfactory substitute, in sufficient 
quantities, to hemp based products. 
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The finest hemp came from Russia and was used to make cables and ropes (cordage) 
and canvas. By using the best material available, the strongest, lightest and most reliable 
sails, anchor cables and ships’ rigging could be manufactured. By using these high 
quality items, the ships could be sailed with confidence and with the maximum 
operational efficiency. The use of lower quality material reduced the effectiveness of 
ships and probably contributed to lower moral, as lives depended on the strength of the 
materials. 
 
Figure 2b in chapter two illustrated the dependence on Russia for the supply of hemp, 
with at least 95 percent of that vital commodity coming from that state between 1797 
and 1806. The Commission of Naval Revision’s fifteenth report also stated only two 
percent of hemp imports came from British controlled territory. Without access to 
Russian raw material, the canvas, ropes and cables required for the British naval and 
merchant fleets would not be available at the quality and quantity necessary to maintain 
trade or defend the realm. This overwhelming dependence on Russia for this critical 
commodity caused both the British government and the East India Company to look to 
the east to reduce their reliance on these Baltic supplies. There were two imperatives to 
the reduction, or possibly removal, of the use of Russian hemp, commercial and 
strategic.  
 
For the Company, the ability to exploit the hemp growing in India could provide an 
income from the raw material, or from finished products. Market forces ruled that the 
quality of the manufactured goods and raw hemp produced had to reach a similar 
standard to Russian material with a comparable price. During peace-time Indian hemp 
was unlikely to be competitive, as there was unhindered access to the plentiful Baltic 
supplies, but during war the economics of the venture made sense. It was therefore 
during crises in wartime, that the strategic and commercial imperatives drove British 
authorities to the exploitation of Indian hemp or other East Indian cordage substitutes. 
Two such crises occurred, the first during the Second League of Armed Neutrality from 
1800 to 1801 and the second following the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. 
 
In 1791 it was first suggested by the Board of Trade that hemp was cultivated in the 
Bengal Presidency with items manufactured locally for sale in Britain.
136
 The Court of 
Directors saw the potential of this proposal, including the possibility of reducing its use 
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 However, it was not long before it was realised that the quality 
of Bengal (sunn) hemp was poor, causing the Company to explore methods to improve 
the cultivation and processing of the raw material.
138
 Bengal was not the only area 
where hemp was available in India, as the Court of Directors were informed that high 




It was in this light that the first crisis occurred, causing the cost of Russian hemp to 
escalate from £23-10s-0d per ton in 1792 to £61 in 1800, with this rise in price boosting 
the opportunity for Company hemp.
140
 By 1802 the Navy Board obtained samples of 
sunn hemp, canvas and cordage, and carried out tests on these items to determine their 
suitability for use in service. The trials appear successful, as the Navy Board informed 
their storekeepers at Bombay and Madras that they fully expected the East Indies 
squadron could be supplied with locally manufactured cordage and canvas.
141
 This 
would have been a desirable outcome for the Navy Board as it would have removed the 
need to send out transport ships with European stores. By 1807 manufacture of hemp 
cordage in India had still not occurred, in spite of the Navy Board sending out 
machinery for that purpose, but with the Treaty of Tilsit the necessity of Indian 
manufacture changed from desirable to urgent in the minds of the British. 
 
 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 
Europe (£) 512327 619911 639462 214240 719239 750834 
Asia (£) 5995 404 3794 1780 8524 60132 
Total (£) 520127 621757 645063 217828 729572 812776 
 




Table 7b shows the immediate influence of the Tilsit Treaty and subsequent war with 
Russia. Imports of European hemp dropped in 1808 to approximately a third of that in 
1806 and 1807, but it was not until 1810, that a significant quantity of hemp arrived 
from Asia. The table also shows that it was not hemp from Asia that saved Britain from 
a critical shortage, as methods were found to circumvent Napoleon’s Continental 
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Blockade. The use of diplomacy, neutrals and forged paperwork backed by a powerful 
Baltic fleet were the methods employed by Britain to maintain their supplies of hemp 




The Navy Board could not assume in late 1807 that access to Russian hemp could be 
maintained, causing them to look for methods to mitigate this potential disaster. Their 
recommendations to the Admiralty were two-pronged regarding Indian hemp and the 
East Indies squadron. To obtain material for the rope-yards in Britain they 
recommended 20000 tons of sunn hemp was imported at a cost of £31 per ton by 
1811.
144
 Their second recommendation was to halt supplies of European cordage and 
canvas to the East Indies and instead to direct Pellew, the commander-in-chief, to obtain 
his squadron’s needs by using local raw materials and manufacturing capability.145 
 
Pellew complied with the Admiralty’s directions resulting in two rope-walks being 
commissioned, one at the newly re-built Madras hospital and the other at Bombay. 
Considerable investment was made in the attempt to obtain locally manufactured 
cordage from sunn hemp at Madras over the next four years, but the ropes obtained 
were of poor quality and potentially dangerous in use. The cordage manufactured at the 
Bombay rope-walk could produce acceptable cordage as it used higher quality hemp, 
salsette, but inadequate control of the hemp purchased frequently resulted in 
unacceptable rope.  
 
The commitment of the Navy Board to manufacturing cordage at Madras and Bombay 
extended to sending ropemakers, hemp dressers and spinners from Britain.
146
 These 
artificers arrived in January 1811, but although they could increase production, they 
were unable to improve the quality of the rope manufactured at Madras. The Madras 
artificers were sent home in early 1812 and rope-making abandoned. Sunn hemp was an 
unsuitable material and could not make acceptable rope.
147
 The cordage manufactured 
from salsette hemp appeared to be more successful with Commissioner Dundas 
purchasing a rope-walk to increase production.
148
 Unfortunately the cordage supplied to 
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the navy failed in service. On investigation it was found that poor quality control 
standards had contributed to unsatisfactory rope being manufactured. Admiral Hood on 
examining the operation considered that Dundas had unwisely purchased the rope-walk 





Of the Navy Board’s recommendations in 1807, both failed, but of the two the 
importation of sunn hemp was more unsatisfactory. By 1811 the Navy Board had paid 
the Company £268394 for only 2311 tons, all of which was unusable. On attempting to 
cancel the contract and return the hemp, they were instructed by the Treasury to 
advance to the Company another £100000.
150
 At least in India rope-walks were 
commissioned and some useful cordage had been produced. 
 
Although the exploitation of Indian hemp for cordage had been unsuccessful, the canvas 
that was produced at Calcutta proved satisfactory in service. Other substitutes for 
European cordage were available in the east, but only for limited purposes and only 
available in small quantities.  The local cordage material most mentioned in 
contemporary reviews of Indian shipbuilding was coir. Coir
151
 was both light and 
elastic, used primarily for running rigging and it was particularly good when wet in 
seawater making it very suitable for cables. Its greatest disadvantages were the limited 
amount of processed raw material, it rotted in fresh water and was not suitable for 
standing rigging.
152
 However, Maria Graham records in her journal that whilst coir rope 
rotted in fresh water, it was used for standing rigging being protected by wax cloth and 
hempen yarn.
153
 Kyd and Graham record other local substitutes, such as ejoo, plantain 
and imports of Manila rope, but these were only available in very limited quantities.  
 
Puget on his arrival in India wrote to the Navy Board in January 1811 and gave them an 
informed view on local cordage and canvas supplies. Coir cables and ropes, for use only 
as running rigging, were being obtained for the East Indies squadron. Imports of high 
quality rope from Manila were being obtained with Puget commenting that although 
this rope swelled when wet, with consequent shrinkage on drying, it was strong and 
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durable. In spite of this local supply Puget recommended that regular supplies of 
cordage and canvas were still sent from Britain. He suggested another 18 months was 
required so the quality of the manufactured cordage could be assessed and advantageous 
contracts arranged with the merchants at Calcutta.
154
 The plan, by the Navy Board, to 
make the East Indies squadron independent of European supplies was eventually 




Exploitation of the timber resources of the Indian Ocean had more success. Imports of 
masts and spars were required from Britain, in spite of the hopes that India, New 
Zealand, Norfolk Island and New South Wales could supply these items. The 
dependence on European and North American for these articles was well known, with 
Money and Kyd in their letters detailing this fact.
155
 Lower masts could be made of teak 
and for some light upper masts and spars, local poon
156
 timber could be utilised, 
although European and North American pine was preferred. Navy Board and local 
storekeeper letters frequently referred to the supply of masts and spars of European 
origin throughout the period, indicating that dependence on this source never ended. 
 
The search for timber resources in the East Indies and across the southern ocean was 
ever present in this period. This ranged from kauri spars from New Zealand,
157
 the 
hoped for pine masts from Norfolk Island,
158
 timber from Madagascar and the Cape of 
Good Hope in the southern seas to Java, Burma, Ceylon and the forests of India in the 
East Indies. The organisation established to record what was available and to report on 
the ease of exploitation is impressive. For the territories under Company control, 
officials were appointed as conservers of the forests and together with other employees 
such as Kyd and Money they provided a working knowledge of the resources available. 
For Ceylon the colonial government and British naval officials recorded the potential,
159
 
but for areas such as Burma it became more difficult. Burmese teak was widely used in 
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Calcutta shipbuilding and was considered plentiful, as even though accurate estimates 
were not available, timber could always be obtained. With the capture of Java, 
numerous reports were sent on the island’s potential for shipbuilding timber.160 
 
New Zealand was to become a supplier of highly regarded masts and spars, but this was 
of minimal importance in this period. For Madagascar, Stopford the commander-in-
chief at the Cape, reported to a query from the Admiralty that although good timber 
could be obtained, the climate was unhealthy for six months of the year subsequently 
concluding the timber that could be removed was not worth the lives of the Europeans 
involved.
161
 However, considerable effort was made to obtain timber from Plettenberg 
Forest at the Cape of Good Hope. The master shipwright at the Cape in 1798 reported 
that fine shipbuilding timber was available in Plettenberg Forest. Following the re-
occupation of the Cape in 1806, the idea to obtain this timber was revived. It was left to 
Commissioner Shield to progress this project in 1809, resulting in the export of 
stinkwood logs and planks to Britain. To expedite the export of this timber, the Navy 
Board in 1811, sent Mr. A. F. Jones, a quarterman of shipwrights at Portsmouth, to act 
as purveyor of Plettenberg Forest. The efforts of Shield and Jones to survey, plan and 
remove timber for export can be followed in detail providing an understanding of the 
role of a purveyor and the difficulties encountered at such remote locations.
162
 
Following the survey and plans required to remove the timber it was realised it was an 
uneconomic source for the navy. It was at this point in 1813 that the project was 
abandoned with Jones returning to Britain. 
 
Until 1812, the knowledge of the resources of India resided with Company employees 
and private individuals. With the arrival of Matthew Wellington as master shipwright at 
Madras, Hood took the opportunity to use a public servant to determine the available 
resources.  
 
Puget informed Matthew Wellington in October 1812 that Hood had requested the 
master shipwright accompany him to Bombay. Hood wished to determine to what 
extent Indian and Ceylon’s timber and hemp could be depended upon for shipbuilding 
and repair. Puget’s directions to Wellington are instructive as he directed him to look 
for masts and spars, equal to the requirement of squadrons of differing numbers and 
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composition. Wellington was to consider the potential growth of both the teak and poon 
trees together with the facilities available for moving timber from the felling and 
preparation grounds to a beach. This was even to include the practicality of a railway to 
move timber, as well as labour requirements and likely wage rates. Puget also wanted 
statistics on quantity and quality on the trees available, together with their local uses. He 
requested samples of black ebony, satin wood and iron wood for dispatch to Britain. On 
arrival at Bombay, Wellington not only reported on the timber and hemp of Ceylon and 
the Malabar Coast, but of the timber that was being prepared for export to Britain. 
Included in his Bombay investigations was the quality of the ships being built plus the 
methods used by the native builder and artificers, to ascertain their knowledge of the 




Wellington’s report to Puget was comprehensive providing valuable information and 
opinion on the trees and hemp around Trincomalee, Point de Galle and the regions 
adjacent to the ports of the coast of Malabar.
164
 The master shipwright detailed the type 
and number of trees he had found, together with their size and local uses. Concerning 
the hope to supply the squadron with masts and spars from Ceylon, Wellington was 
pessimistic commenting; ‘I am of opinion that the resources of Ceylon is not sufficient 
for supplying masts and yards for the squadron at present employed in these seas’.165 
Only limited time was available for Wellington’s inspection of the Malabar Coast, but 
he was able to determine that timber purchased direct from Baliapatam, rather than from 
Bombay was half the cost. He also reported on the hemp grown, concluding 
encouragement would be needed to obtain good quality material, as the samples of 
hemp he obtained on that coast were of very poor quality. Wellington reported on his 
activities at Bombay, having spent two months at the dockyard inspecting timber, 
shipbuilding practice and the skills of the master builder and artificers.
166
 Armed with 
the master shipwright’s report, Hood, Puget, Johnston and the Navy Board had 
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7.7 Supply of medical care to the East Indies squadron 
 
The necessity to maintain the health of the crews in the East Indies squadron was 
essential, especially if the number of European sailors on board Britain’s ships was to 
remain at a high level. Replacement of European losses could only be obtained from 
either extra sailors being sent from Britain, or pressing seamen from East Indiamen. 
This latter measure, whilst resorted to, was fraught with political repercussions. Sending 
replacements from Britain took a minimum of a year to arrive from initial request and 
only with Admiralty agreement. The alternative to maintain manning levels was to take 
care of the men already in the east. This highlights the role of victualling the squadron, 
especially with fresh provisions and the issue of lemon juice as a preventative to scurvy.  
However, when officers and men were injured or ill, medical care on board ship or at 
hospitals was needed. 
 
Providing medicines to ship’s surgeons, together with hospital care to the East India 
squadron went through many stages during the French wars. As with repair and refitting 
of naval ships the East India Company provided access to their hospitals throughout the 
period.  By 1815, hospital care for the squadron had been provided by an official naval 
hospital at Madras, a British army hospital at Ceylon, a contracted hospital at Bombay, 
a naval hospital ship at Penang, and contract care at Company hospitals at Calcutta. 
Obtaining medical necessities in the east also varied from the payment of an allowance 
to ship’s surgeons for the purchase such stores on the open market, to the official 
Madras hospital issuing these items. 
 
The decision to reduce reliance on the Company for hospitals by establishing its own at 
Madras can be traced to Elphinstone writing to the Sick and Hurt Board in 1794 
requesting approval to build such a facility.
167
 This board wrote to the Admiralty for 
guidance in March 1795 so it is unlikely that approval would have arrived at Madras 
until 1796. Until a naval hospital was obtained at Madras, Rainier used the Company 
hospital but complained to the governor on treatment and care.
168
 This possibly caused 
him to take such care under his control. Rainier is credited with obtaining a building at 
Madras and providing a naval hospital. He placed the establishment under the command 
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of Captain William Taylor as governor of the hospital.
169
 The admiral informed the 
Admiralty of his actions in August 1797 with the hospital remaining the most important 
medical facility available to the navy throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars.  
 
Pellew confirmed Rainier’s actions to purchase and establish the hospital, without any 
directions from the Sick and Hurt Board, in February 1808. In this letter Pellew states 
that although medical staff had been sent out, guidance on managing such a facility had 
not been received. It was the severe damage to the existing hospital building in 
December 1807, which caused Pellew his greatest problem as the existing building was 
so damaged that parts of it had to be pulled down. A new building was urgently needed, 
with the commander-in-chief informing the Admiralty he was having estimates and 
plans produced to build a new hospital. The admiral stated he intended building without 
waiting for approval.
170
 The admiral defended his action as this measure would keep the 
number of European invalids returned to Britain to a minimum.  
 
In May 1808 Pellew was able to report that he had a plan and estimate for a new 
hospital which consisted of a facility with a capacity for 200 patients, with separate 
officer and men buildings, staff accommodation and offices. This Pellew had agreed 
with expectation that the hospital would be ready in October and in time for the winter 
monsoon.
171
 The admiral was able to report in October that the hospital was nearing 
completion and would soon receive its first patients.
172
 As with all such facilities snags 
were identified requiring expenditure. The changes required included additional baths, 




The organisation of the Madras hospital included posts, which were in addition to those 
found at the Cape of Good Hope hospital. Apart from the surgeon, agent and dispenser, 
as found detailed in the posts defined in the reports of the Commission of Naval 
Revision, this hospital also had a governor and lieutenant-governor, being respectively a 
naval captain and lieutenant. This indicates that the hospital was of serious concern to 
the respective commanders-in-chief, having placed the facility under naval command. 
On arrival Commissioner Puget became increasing occupied with medical department 
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activities and briefed the Transport Board that with Broughton’s approval, he had taken 
control of the hospital.
174
 Hood, the new commander-in-chief, on his arrival concurred 
with Puget’s proposals for the regulation of the hospital, including his appointment as 
governor.
175
 By these actions the commissioner was officially placed at the head of 
naval medical service, and was operating as suggested in the reports of the Commission 
of Naval Revision. The Madras naval hospital
176
 was the major such facility in the east, 
but Bombay also had a naval hospital. 
 
The number of naval ships visiting Bombay was considerably less than Madras, with a 
consequent change in medical provision. This was provided by utilising the services of 
Company personnel and the use of a building on shore as a hospital. Drury was not in 
favour of this arrangement stating, ‘the grave of our sailors is Bombay hospital’. He 
wanted to commission the local receiving ship as a hospital.
177
 Commissioner Dundas 
did not agree, and had ensured that the ship’s role could not be changed. The 
commissioner also backed up his belief that the existing arrangement was acceptable, 
stating in the last 12 months 607 sailors had been admitted with only two deaths. This 
statistic does not suggest the shore hospital was the grave of sailors. Dundas further 
pointed out that the medical contract with the Company provided accommodation, 
victualling, attendance of the surgeon, medicines and washing of clothes, all for the 
payment of one Rupee per day per patient.
178
 It can be of no surprise that this 
arrangement met with much favour with the Admiralty as it meant an agent, surgeon, 
dispenser, assistants and nurses required for a regular establishment was not needed.  
 
Although the existing arrangement was both economic and effective, proposals to build 
a naval hospital on Old Woman’s Island or Butcher Island was considered. Both 
Commodore Broughton and Admiral Hood disliked the location of the hospital at 
Bombay, but realised removal to an island in the harbour was too expensive. Instead 
another building in Bombay was found and the hospital moved.
179
 Hood was content 
with the contracted care arrangement, commenting to the Admiralty, ‘it cannot be 
carried on so regularly as in an established hospital but the men appear equally 
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comfortable as well taken care of […] The whole cost of this establishment has been 
extremely reasonable’.180 The final nail in an official naval hospital being established at 
Bombay came in July 1814, with the Admiralty stating they saw no need for such a 




If the necessity for an establishment naval hospital at Bombay was questionable, then it 
was not surprising that the Admiralty directed the Sick and Hurt Board to discontinue 
such an establishment at Calcutta in 1803. Instead, the Admiralty directed the men 
housed at this temporary hospital were moved into the Company facility as had 
previously been the arrangement.
182
 Calcutta was used as little as possible by successive 
commanders-in-chief and was considered an extremely unhealthy place, not an ideal 
hospital location. As naval vessels were still, occasionally, to call at Calcutta, the need 
for medical care for sailors was sometimes required, resulting in contract care at a 
Company hospital. 
 
Where there was no official shore establishment available, captains had been placing 
their sick crews into private houses and paying for their care. This was a logical solution 
for returning seamen to health, but caused administrative problems for the Transport 
Board (Sick and Hurt) as it provided an opportunity for fraud. They closed this loop 
hole in 1811, with the issue of instructions and forms to cover this ad hoc medical 
provision. The Transport Board was concerned regarding the lack of evidence of 
expenditure incurred. Accordingly the Admiralty directed that sending men on shore to 




It was not only shore hospitals that were used, as it was considered healthier by many to 
keep men on board a ship than ashore. Drury championed this method, as did 
Broughton, Hood and Puget, but the only such vessel commissioned as such, was the 
Wilhelmina at Penang, placed there by Admiral Pellew. Pellew informed the Admiralty 
of his decision in May 1808, when he reported that on finding Wilhelmina in an 
uneconomic state of repair, had re-allocated her to Penang as a combined receiving and 
hospital ship under the command of Captain Flint.
184
 She was to remain in this role until 
the establishment was closed in late 1812, when she was sold. 
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The plan to create a naval yard and base at Trincomalee also considered what medical 
provision should be provided. In his October 1811 report to the Admiralty, Puget stated 
that the general opinion was the use of an old battleship was a better place to recover in 
tropical areas than on land. This caused him to recommend a hospital ship was 
provided, rather than a shore establishment.
185
 Instead the navy obtained medical aid 
from the military. 
 
Obtaining care of its sick and wounded from the military authorities on Ceylon was a 
sensible method of medical provision rather than building a naval hospital. Puget 
renegotiated the costs of medical care with the lieutenant-governor of Ceylon, Major 
General Wilson, in July 1811, confirming to the Transport Broad that the military 
medical services provided victualling, accommodation and care for seamen landed at 
Ceylon. Hood in his discussions with Brownrigg on the building of a naval yard at 
Ceylon also continued the agreement for medical provision from the army, stating that 




The use of military medical services at Trincomalee, contract services from the 
Company at Bombay, Calcutta and other ports together with the investment in its own 
medical services at Madras hospital plus the hospital ship at Penang, showed the British 
navy had a flexible approach to caring for its officers and men. Madras was the major 
concentration point for her naval forces
187
 so the establishment of its own hospital was 
the logical, economic and most effective measure. Establishing its own hospital ship at 
Penang was also sound as the colony was probably not large enough to provide 
indigenous support to a desired level. Bombay and particularly Calcutta were well 
established areas with significant medical needs for their respective Company armies 
and hence had hospitals and surgeons. The British navy frequently used Bombay and 
occasionally Calcutta, but they were not major rendezvous ports so the number of men 
likely to need medical services was small. This indicates contract care was the most 
economic choice. With the use of military medical personnel and facilities at Ceylon, 
rather than duplicating this service, the Admiralty again followed an effective and 
economic course. 
 
                                                 
185
 Puget to Admiralty, TNA, ADM 1/3441, 3
rd
 October 1811. 
186
 Hood to Puget, RMC of Canada, DA88.1.H66A4 1809 V2, 22
nd
 December 1812. 
187
 Puget recorded on arrival in 1811 that 75% of the naval squadron used Madras. 
317 
The overall impression of the British navy’s provision of medical care to the East Indies 
squadron was one where it was considered of great importance, but where pragmatism 




The East Indies station covered the greatest expanse of ocean held under the command 
of a British admiral during the Great Wars with France. It was an isolated command 
with urgent communications usually taking three to four months, via the land route, 
with routine dispatches by sea taking at least four to six months. The time required for a 
request for naval stores to be answered was considerable; delivery within a year was 
remarkable. 
 
The East Indies squadron was never large and rarely exceeded seven percent of the 
ships available to the Admiralty. The composition of the squadron reflected its main 
role, that of trade protection, with frigates and sloops being its principal constituents. 
Given the sea area to cover and the trade to protect, there were never enough vessels 
available. Third rate ships were always part of the squadron to counter any deployment 
by the French on trade or conquest missions.  
 
Given the area to protect, the limited numbers of ships available and its isolation, the 
East Indies squadron depended heavily on its shore naval departments and the resources 
of the east to maximise its numbers. All naval commands depended on their local naval 
bases and economies, but none to the degree of the East Indies as it was at the end of the 
Admiralty’s longest logistics chain. The make-up of the squadron with its battleships 
together with the distance from Britain, necessitated the provision of docking facilities 
that were absent from the other overseas commands. 
 
Being more isolated from Britain created specific challenges. The political 
circumstances, strategic necessities, geographic constraints, climatic conditions, 
seasonal wind directions and diseases created a special set of conditions. This shaped 
the decisions on the location of the naval bases, the facilities that were provided, the 
workforce used and the utilisation of indigenous materials. 
 
The climatic conditions particularly influenced the locations of Britain’s naval bases. 
During the summer monsoon, the wind came from the south-west and during the winter 
monsoon, from the north-east. Apart from Trincomalee, the coast of eastern India 
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lacked a secure anchorage, resulting in vessels only being supplied or repaired for part 
of the year. Bombay, on the western Indian coast, was protected in the winter months 
and not overly affected by the summer monsoon, and subsequently became the primary 
refitting base.  
 
Unfortunately the critical area of operations was the Bay of Bengal and the route 
through the Straits of Malacca to China. Bombay was too distant to supply the squadron 
on the eastern side of India, so bases near the Bay and the Straits were essential. The 
choices initially available were Calcutta, Madras and Penang, as these were occupied by 
the Company. Until the capture of Trincomalee in 1795, investment was made in the 
Andamans to offer shelter and limited provision of supplies. All the choices on the 
eastern side of India had merits, but all had severe disadvantages. Madras had all the 
virtues required of a perfect base except for one. It was close to the area of operations, 
militarily and politically secure, able to supply medical services, water, fresh and 
preserved food, and a skilled workforce; it only lacked a harbour and safe anchorage. 
Calcutta was the commercial and political centre of the Company, had the ability to 
deliver provisions and access to a developing shipbuilding and repair industry. 
Regrettably Calcutta was not close to the area of operations, especially during the south-
west monsoon, was tortuous to reach up the winding Hooghly River, unhealthy and 
expensive. Penang had great strategic potential, being close to the Straits of Malacca 
and able to cover China trade ships. It was unaffected by the direction of the monsoons, 
but required considerable investment to make it a useful naval base. Melville recognised 
Penang’s potential, as he attempted to turn the island into a Company shipbuilding 
centre with a naval squadron being hosted at the dockyard. The lack of finance, local 
labour force and immature economy, together with the death of the governor and 
disgrace of its progenitor, ensured the project was still born.  
 
Trincomalee was blessed with two over-riding advantages over the other locations on 
the eastern side of India. It had a large, safe anchorage, was close to the area of 
operations and in a position to defend both coasts of India. The drawbacks were its 
complete lack of all the facilities available at Madras and being militarily insecure. As 
Ceylon was a crown possession the rectifying of the shortcomings of Trincomalee was 
solely in the hands of the British government and did not depend on the actions of the 
Company. Eventually Trincomalee was chosen as the home of the East Indies squadron, 
but even after its facilities were available in the post war years, the dry docks at 
Bombay were still required. 
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Where the East Indies differed from other overseas areas was in the scope and scale of 
the facilities and resources available, together with the management methods used to 
deliver the services. These differences resulted in the Admiralty altering its refit and 
supply strategy and seeking to exploit the potential of India for ships and naval stores.  
 
Britain’s access to timber and naval stores was heavily dependent on limited supplies of 
British oak, plus imports from North America and Europe, with supplies of timber and 
hemp from the Baltic, being essential to the maintenance of her seapower. The 
Admiralty’s strategy was, if possible, to make the East Indies squadron self-sufficient in 
ship refitting and naval stores. The British state hoped to build warships from Indian 
timber, import timber if possible and break the dependence on hemp from Russia by 
importing raw material from the east. These aims were only partially met. Squadron 
self-sufficiency was met for ship refits and in part for naval stores, but while the supply 
of limited numbers of ships and of timber was successful, the faith and money invested 
in obtaining hemp was not.  
 
Chief amongst the factors that altered the refitting strategy of the Admiralty was the 
presence of the East India Company and the dry docks available at Bombay. This port 
was the home of the Bombay Marine and dockyard. The dockyard initially provided a 
dry dock capable of accommodating three vessels for refit, one of which could be a 74 
gun ship. By 1810 another dry dock had been built that allowed vessels of 74 guns to be 
constructed, together with another such vessel being refitted. The presence of a skilled 
native workforce and master builder at Bombay made the presence of a workforce from 
Britain unnecessary. As the Bombay Marine provided a Company management team, a 
conventional Navy Board yard organisation was redundant unless other factors than 
providing services became important. Foremost in the reasons to create its own 
management and employ its own workforce, was one of control to improve 
accountability, effectiveness and economy. It was not until the post Trafalgar era and 
the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of Naval Revision that 
this occurred. 
 
Madras was the primary naval supply base during the wars with France. Provisions, 
water, fuel and naval supplies were all available at this location with crews also able to 
recover in the naval hospital. Limited refits were also available in Madras Roads, as 
ship’s companies could be supplemented by Indian artificers obtained from the 
Company. A Company master attendant’s office was also available and as at Bombay 
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officers of this organisation were frequently used to administer the purchase, order, and 
issue of naval stores. 
 
The principal difference between the delivery of shore services in the East Indies and 
the other overseas commands was therefore the dependence on the Company rather than 
autonomous control. This reliance was progressively reduced until by 1812, the delivery 
of all services was now aligned to those at the other overseas bases.  
 
Rainier concentrated on the services concerned with the needs of his men. He put in 
place, an effective victualling contract and dispensed with an agent victualler by 
personally managing the contractor. This method continued throughout the wars with 
only a change in contractor and in the role performed by the resident commissioner to 
reduce costs. Rainier’s establishment of Madras naval hospital and contract care in 
Company hospitals at Bombay and Calcutta was also effective. The appointment of 
resident commissioners to Bombay in 1809 and the arrival of Commissioner Puget in 
January 1811 ensured that alignment with all of Britain’s overseas naval bases occurred. 
Prior to these appointments, the commander-in-chief was frequently the only 
government servant overseeing the affairs of Company employees, providing 
opportunities for fraud and inefficiency. 
 
The challenges of maintaining the East Indies squadron throughout the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars were all met. With the presence of the East India Company and 
the mature economy of India, the provisions, refit facilities, raw materials, and skilled 
workforce were available. Private individuals existed to administer and deliver 
challenging victualling contracts and to refit ships at Calcutta. Management expertise 
and local knowledge was available from Company employees, at a price, until the 
Admiralty invested in its own management. The East Indies naval bases were the last to 
come under the management of resident commissioners, with the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Commission of Naval Revision. The strategy previously in 
place to support her eastern squadron was pragmatic: the ships and men received what 
was required, the service had been stretched, but had not broken. Appointing the 
resident commissioners merely delivered the goal of all organisations, obtaining more 




By the abdication of Napoleon in April 1814 a network of British naval bases 
encompassed the world and protected her trade and empire, but what would be needed 
in peacetime and was this affordable? This was a question that was essentially driven by 
foreign policy, but the first lord of the Admiralty asked for an opinion on this issue from 
the Navy Board.   
 
The official who replied to Lord Melville’s request on what overseas naval 
establishments would be necessary to keep in a profound peace was William Shield, by 
then the deputy controller of the Navy Board. Shield had experience as a resident 
commissioner at the Cape of Good Hope and had been at the Navy Board in London for 
over 12 months. Shield’s letter was written before Napoleon was incarcerated on St. 
Helena and the war with the United States had ended, but he presented an informed 
opinion of Britain’s needs with economy being his watchword.188 
 
Shield’s opinion was that only one naval base was required in India and that it should be 
established at Bombay. Jamaica and Antigua naval establishments were the only ones 
necessary in the West Indies, whilst the establishment at Malta would suffice for the 
Mediterranean. For the defence of British North America he considered that the Halifax 
base was necessary. These were Britain’s mature naval bases where considerable 
investment had been made in buildings, careening wharfs and in the case of Bombay, 
dry docks. This would seem a very low cost option, as all the vital command areas were 
covered with no additional investment required. Shield considered the establishment at 
Madras should be closed and all functions moved to Bombay. The bases at Gibraltar, 
Bermuda, Trincomalee and the Cape of Good Hope he recommended were put on a care 
and maintenance basis. 
 
The deputy controller seemed to assume that building work at Trincomalee, Bermuda 
and Simon’s Town would be halted recommending the investment already made was 
protected by ‘mothballing’ the existing buildings. He suggested an agent of buildings 
was appointed at Gibraltar, Bermuda, Trincomalee and the Cape of Good Hope to keep 
the shore establishments in a satisfactory condition. These mothballed establishments 
were to be visited by a resident commissioner once a year. While Gibraltar, 
Trincomalee and Bermuda could be covered by a relatively local commissioner, Shield 
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suggested that the senior captain of the squadron at the Cape of Good Hope report on 
that location. Barbados was not forgotten, with Shield proposing that the resident 
commissioner at Antigua, Commissioner Lewis, inspect the buildings and report if they 
should be retained or sold. 
 
These were sensible and economic suggestions from Shield, but they were not wholly 
adopted. By 1820 Madras had been shut, with investment at Trincomalee to create 
Britain’s eastern naval base. Halifax naval base had been shut in 1819 and mothballed, 
whilst Kingston on Lake Ontario, had become the only Canadian naval base. Bermuda 
had become the principal North American base, in place of Halifax, with naval facilities 
being built. The naval establishments at Jamaica and Antigua were retained, while 
Malta had become the principal Mediterranean naval base with Gibraltar under care and 
maintenance. Simon’s Town at the Cape was still supporting a naval squadron as 
Napoleon was imprisoned on St. Helena, but all was to change with the Emperor’s 




Building at Trincomalee ceased, with the base to become a backwater, especially when 
operations moved to China with the acquisition of Hong Kong in 1841. With 
Napoleon’s death, the need for a garrison on St. Helena and a naval squadron at the 
Cape became unnecessary and the establishment at Simon’s Town was mothballed, with 
the withdrawal of the commissioner, and principal officers of the various departments. 
Investment continued at Bermuda, but it was many years before this was finished. The 
need for a naval base on the Great Lakes was removed in the 1830s, as more faith was 
put in diplomacy regarding relationships with the United States.
190
 In the light of events 
Shield’s advice appears prescient, especially as economic pressures were to cause a 
depression in Britain in the following decade. 
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The introduction to this thesis posed Kipling’s honest men191 as the methodology for 
studying the purpose and role of Britain’s overseas naval bases. It asked when, where 
and why naval bases were necessary, what services were delivered, who provided the 
support and how the bases were managed and developed. Of these ‘honest men’ why 
Britain placed faith in such bases is the key question, especially when compared with 
Spain, France and the Dutch. These nations also invested in overseas bases but none 
with the energy or success of Britain. 
 
The ability to maintain a naval squadron in a critical operational area by replenishing 
ships and providing a secure location for refits maximised the effectiveness of the 
deployed vessels. The presence of a world-wide network of naval bases was later also to 
influence the design philosophy of British warships, especially when their motive power 
changed from wind to coal and oil. Solving the conflicting requirements for space and 
weight ensured a warship designer compromised between weapons carried, sea keeping 
ability, endurance and accommodation. Britain’s system of overseas bases, particularly 
from the mid nineteenth century and into the 1950s, allowed naval constructors to 
design ships with limited endurance as repair, refuelling and re-supply locations were 
always at hand. It was only with the loss of Singapore in 1942 and the vast distances 
involved in the Indian Ocean, together with later operations required of the British 
Pacific Fleet, that the design philosophy limited the projection of naval power. 
 
The location of Britain’s overseas naval bases and when they were acquired followed 
strategic necessities and tactical opportunities. By 1815 the Admiralty had not only 
developed a comprehensive web of world-wide bases, but had removed the potential for 
European nations to create a similar facility by occupying the most advantageous 
harbours. What services these naval bases could deliver and who should supply the 
support underwent considerable development from the capture of Jamaica in 1655 to the 
end of the Napoleonic War.  
 
This thesis has examined the contribution made by Britain’s overseas bases to the 
support of naval forces at key strategic areas, with particular attention being paid to the 
East Indies and the Cape of Good Hope commands during the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. These latter areas were the most distant from Admiralty control at a 
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time when parliament was demanding reforms and probity in its public bodies. How the 
Admiralty changed from issuing commands and laying down rules and regulations to 
ensuring their instructions were enacted is shown in this thesis.  The solution was a 
mixture of increased centralised control by common codified instructions, appointment 
of all civil officers and placing empowered representatives at distant stations. 
 
How the naval bases were managed and staffed throughout the eighteenth century was 
studied in this thesis. This shows that many options were used to deliver military 
effectiveness with economy always being important. Other nations’ ports, informal 
utilisation of commercial facilities and contracted labour were used throughout the 
eighteenth century. But in the Indian Ocean after 1795 the Admiralty created state 
owned, manned and operated naval yards. This latter option was undertaken to reduce 
risk and to deliver greater effectiveness at an acceptable price.  
 
The role for Britain’s overseas bases changed from only providing an anchorage for 
ships as a rendezvous, to a location where the needs of ships and their crews could be 
met. Fresh water and fuel together with access to local fresh food was available from 
many neutral and allied ports, but the naval bases were to provide much more. The 
various elements of a naval base consisted of a naval yard, a naval hospital and a 
victualling organisation. Collectively these facilities enabled vessels to remain in an 
area of operations for a longer time than if ships had to return to Britain, providing the 
Admiralty with a tactical and strategic advantage over enemy forces. 
 
Diplomacy was always an important tool in obtaining bases and frequently enabled 
Britain to maintain a naval force close to an area of operations when a sovereign base 
was not available. Early examples of the use of other nation’s facilities were Cadiz in 
1694, and Leghorn and Lisbon at various times during the eighteenth century. There 
were many advantages to this arrangement, as it removed the necessity to build and 
maintain a facility which was economical and convenient for operations. However, the 
port could only be used with permission; with a change in political circumstances their 
value was always threatened. This was particularly true for the Indian Ocean region 
where access to the Cape of Good Hope and Trincomalee for British ships was available 
until the late eighteenth century. Britain discovered in the American War of 
Independence that, if these locations were in the hands of an enemy fleet, then her trade 
and possessions in the east were under severe threat. 
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Access to Trincomalee and the Cape was obtained following the American War, but the 
possibility of these Dutch colonies being used by the French resulted in both locations 
being taken by British forces in 1795. The capture of the Cape was a considerable 
logistical achievement and, with a squadron based there, enhanced the Admiralty’s 
ability to launch naval power into the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. A French or 
Dutch squadron venturing into the Indian Ocean would always have the British Cape 
squadron at their backs. However, the British considered Trincomalee the more valuable 
location, although not initially for British use, rather from the lesson learnt in the 
American War. This consideration resulted in Trincomalee being retained as a crown 
colony and the Cape being returned to the Dutch in 1803. With war recommencing that 
year the strategic importance of the Cape again resulted in re-conquest by Britain in 
1806.  
 
Other locations that were used as naval bases were acquired during the wars with 
France.  At the start of the Revolutionary War in 1793 the Admiralty only possessed 
four overseas naval bases at Halifax, Jamaica, Antigua and Gibraltar with the East India 
Company supplying facilities for the Eastern squadron. By 1814 Britain had created a 
comprehensive network of 14 overseas naval bases with Malta’s acquisition and 
Bermuda’s development being significant additions. The 14 bases occupied strategic 
points on the globe and locked out potential European enemies from the eastern empire 
that was being built.  
 
It was not only in the number of bases, or in the global reach they provided, that had 
altered during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as the management of the 
organisation underwent fundamental change. This was most noticeable in the East 
Indies and the Cape of Good Hope commands which ensured naval control of the Indian 
Ocean. Although the Admiralty had been deploying ships in the Indian Ocean since the 
1740s, it was not until the capture of the Cape of Good Hope in 1795 that a squadron 
was stationed at that location. The Cape and East Indies squadrons were the Admiralty’s 
most remote commands with correspondence to the former taking a minimum of two 
months to arrive, while letters for Madras took at least three months to be delivered 
overland. Communication delay was but one difficulty, as the logistics required for 
these commands were also challenging. 
 
From the first deployment of British naval ships to the East Indies, the Admiralty was 
faced with a different problem regarding the refit and repair of its vessels compared to 
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other overseas locations. The time required for a ship to return from the East Indies 
station was upwards of four to six months, with those in an unsound condition unlikely 
to arrive home. Therefore, unlike other vessels stationed overseas, for ships in the East 
Indies it was not practical to return to Britain to be docked and receive a major refit. The 
Admiralty’s initial solution was not to build its own facility, but to encourage the East 
India Company in the late 1740s to build a dry dock at Bombay. This dock was later 
lengthened to enable British ships of up to 74 guns in size to be accommodated. The 
option chosen to support Britain’s ships in the East Indies was unique as it was 
completely reliant on a commercial organisation to provide ports, dry docks, skilled 
artificers and managers. This provided for the needs of the ships, but victualling and 
medical care was also required. How these latter requirements were met show the policy 
by which Admiralty management evolved from dependence on the Company to one of 
autonomy. 
 
Initially during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars the Cape and East Indies 
squadrons were supported in different ways, but by the end of the period the Admiralty 
had obtained centralised control with locally empowered civil naval administration. The 
path to Admiralty rule in the East Indies was more complicated than at the Cape. The 
search for a base to station ships to defend the east coast of India, the Bay of Bengal and 
the route to China required solution, and the relationship with the East India Company 
was always a factor to be considered. 
 
While Trincomalee was in Dutch possession the East India Company established a 
settlement at Penang and took possession of the Andaman Islands where the British 
navy established a base at Port Cornwallis. With the capture of Trincomalee the 
Andaman station was abandoned. As Trincomalee’s superb anchorage and strategic 
position covered both coasts of India and the Bay of Bengal, it would seem to have 
answered the Admiralty’s requirement for its primary headquarters in South Asia. As 
Ceylon became a crown colony in 1802, rather than coming under the control of the 
Company, it would seem to have been the perfect place to build a naval base. 
Trincomalee had great advantages, but it was only an anchorage surrounded by jungle, 
without an indigenous labour force or an economy to support the victualling of a 
squadron. All the fixed facilities required would have to be built and a labour force 
recruited and settled. 
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The investment required by the Admiralty to turn this wilderness into a naval base 
would have been considerable, so instead in 1804 the first lord of the Admiralty 
proposed a joint venture with the East India Company as part funders and hosts.  Henry 
Dundas had great faith in the Company and wished to create a copy of Bombay 
dockyard at Penang. This would provide another shipbuilding centre for large warships 
and a naval dockyard to station a squadron serving the Bay of Bengal and the route to 
China. This was a visionary project and if successful would have resulted in 
Trincomalee never being developed, but Penang proved an expensive place to build 
ships and suffered from a starvation of funds from the Company in India. This resulted 
in Admiral Drury, the commander-in-chief, lobbying for a base at Trincomalee and 
independence from the Company. However the Admiralty delayed full approval until 
1812 resulting in the base not becoming available until after the Napoleonic War ended, 
but a future home for Britain’s Eastern squadron had been found. 
 
Although Bombay was the major refitting port, Madras was the chief supply and 
rendezvous location for Britain’s navy.  Madras did not have a port, was a dangerous 
anchorage and completely unsuitable as an assembly point, but it was militarily and 
politically secure. Madras’s greatest advantages were its location in southern India, the 
presence of the Company and the economic maturity of the region. This latter factor 
allowed the victualling contractor to easily supply ships from Madras and for labour and 
materials to be available. 
 
During the American War the victualling of Britain’s Eastern fleet relied on the 
Company. They were to ship preserved stores to India and supply them together with 
local produce to the navy where needed.
192
 Admiral Hughes, the commander-in-chief, 
found fault with this victualling arrangement and it was subsequently changed, 
especially following the criticism of the Fees Commissioners in 1788 regarding the lack 
of oversight and excessive costs.
193
 The Admiralty’s decision to dispense with the 
Company for victualling and instead place this vital service to a contractor in 1789 was 
the first sign of the navy’s independence in India. Victualling by contract continued 
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throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and, despite accounting issues with 
Basil Cochrane,
194
 can be considered a successful state and private partnership. 
 
The East India Company had hospitals for its army and marine at all its presidencies 
with the British navy having access to these facilities. The arrangements made by the 
Admiralty for the care of its sick sailors during this period were more nuanced than has 
been previously suggested.
195
 The main rendezvous location for the navy was Madras, 
and in 1794, before Elphinstone’s departure as commander-in-chief to India, he 
suggested a Sick and Hurt Board hospital was established at that location. An Admiralty 
controlled hospital was authorised for Madras with Rainier ensuring it was ready and 
under his control in 1797. However, the Company still supplied medical care at Bombay 
and Calcutta. Admiral Drury, the commander-in-chief from 1808 to 1811, reported that 
Bombay was a graveyard for British sailors and wished to replace the existing 
arrangement of Company medical care at Bombay with a naval hospital. The presence 
of the recently arrived resident commissioner, George Dundas, was to stop this plan as 
he demonstrated to the Admiralty that the Company Marine hospital was not a death 





As recruitment of European sailors in the east was negligible, to take responsibility for 
the care of those already serving was a logical step for the Admiralty. By establishing 
the naval hospital at Madras, which was the major rendezvous for the squadron, the 
Admiralty provided a facility and staff where it would do the most good.  As adequate 
medical provision could be obtained in Company hospitals at Bombay or Calcutta, the 
Admiralty ensured it controlled the care of its sick by the most effective and economic 
means. 
 
Although dependence on the Company for victualling had been eliminated and 
appropriately scaled for medical care, it was not until the arrival of Admiralty appointed 
resident commissioners to India in 1809 that a path to naval self-reliance was found. 
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The changes introduced by the Commission of Naval Revision resulted in the 
convergence of the management of shore services in both India and the Cape.  
 
During the first occupation of the Cape of Good Hope from 1795 to 1803 the naval base 
created followed the guidelines that had been established over the eighteenth century. 
The commander-in-chief set up the shore services he considered necessary, appointed 
the principal officers of the naval yard, an agent victualler and established a naval 
hospital. Unlike the East Indies command, access to a large skilled labour force and dry 
docks could only be obtained in England. However minor repairs to ships could be 
performed by the artificers and crews of the squadron, with the naval yard establishment 
being only constituted as a supply organisation. The only intervention the Admiralty 
made in the commander-in-chief’s arrangements was to replace the naval storekeeper 
with their own appointee. Naval commanders in the Revolutionary War were left to 
make their own shore supply arrangements, a case of considerable autonomy and little 
central control.  
 
Following the re-capture of the Cape in January 1806, the Admiralty demonstrated that 
the period of autonomy for commanders-in-chief had ended. As in 1795 the naval 
commander re-established the shore naval establishments and appointed the principal 
officers of the naval yard, an agent victualler and surgeon of the hospital. The Admiralty 
reassessed the facilities required at the Cape and the officers to send, as they quickly 
replaced the temporary naval storekeeper, master attendant, master shipwright and agent 
victualler with their own appointees. Appointing these officers was only one element of 
increased central control as the Admiralty used these individuals for advice on 
workforce composition and facilities required, a task previously required of the 
commander-in-chief. This resulted in artificers being sent from Britain to form a core 
naval yard workforce. These changes showed the direction the Admiralty was travelling 
to obtain central control. 
 
Although this thesis has shown the naval yard element of the overseas base was for two 
functions, to undertake minor repairs and supply naval stores to the ships of the attached 
squadron, it was the dispute between a commander-in-chief and resident commissioner 
that confirmed this role. The overseas naval yards were not to repeat the capabilities of 
the home dockyards, but to compliment them. This was undoubtedly the most economic 
arrangement regarding investment in fixed infrastructure such as store buildings and 
careening equipment, but also the most effective in the use of manpower and naval 
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stores. It was in the use of the stores, that the Admiralty’s role for overseas naval yards 
becomes particularly rational. By directing that ships only received minor repairs and 
maintenance, the consumption of items shipped from Britain was reduced, with 
consequent savings in the use of transports and of strategic naval stores. This 
arrangement allowed for a predictable outlay in stores ensuring ships could always be 
maintained or issued with items for use at sea. If major repairs were undertaken there 
was a risk that naval stores would be reduced to such a level that vessels on station 
could not be maintained. This was the Admiralty’s policy for overseas naval yards, but 
whilst they controlled the deployment of ships and men, the operational demands of 
commanders could break this strategy, unless a local restraint could be placed on them. 
 
Naval history has traditionally concentrated on the priorities of operational commanders 
and presents the actions of the Admiralty and shore naval establishments as obstacles to 
be overcome. Although the records of commanders of ships have been analysed, the 
thoughts and actions of service providers have either been ignored, been too difficult to 
interpret, or not available. This thesis has examined a naval campaign from the 
viewpoint of the Admiralty towards the shore services at the Cape of Good Hope and 
the commander-in-chief.  
 
The campaign was the blockade of Mauritius and Bourbon Islands from 1809 to their 
capture in December 1810. This campaign was only one call on the resources of the 
Admiralty, examination of ship deployment records demonstrating that there were many 
calls on vessels. These records show the Admiralty’s clear strategy to change the 
composition of the squadron to provide a suitable force, and to deliver an overwhelming 
number of ships to coincide with the invasion fleet from India. Although this was the 
Admiralty’s strategy, ensuring the commander-in-chief’s actions were subordinated to 
this, produced conflict between the naval commander, Admiral Bertie, and supplier of 
shore services, Commissioner Shield, at the Cape.  
 
Analysis of this dispute through the correspondence of the commander-in-chief, resident 
commissioner and the Admiralty revealed the coherent strategy of the latter for ship 
deployment, ship repair and shore support services. The naval commander ignored 
directions from the Admiralty, changed the role of the naval yard to perform major 
refits and pursued campaign objectives without regard to cost, or the suitability of his 
squadron for its task. Unlike previous campaigns, the Admiralty had sent a resident 
commissioner to the Cape to superintend their shore departments, with strict 
331 
instructions to deliver their policies and economies. Their nominee, Commissioner 
Shield, was successful in delivering the Admiralty’s wishes, but at the cost of a 
harmonious relationship with the commander-in-chief - and the misunderstanding by an 
historian of the role of an overseas naval yard.
197
 The resident commissioner also 
delivered economies and compliance to Admiralty regulations at the naval hospital and 
victualling department.  
 
The presence of a commissioner at the Cape and of his contemporaries at Madras and 
Bombay was the result of a reform process started in the 1780s.  Britain’s defeat and the 
loss of North American colonies in the War of American Independence had a 
catastrophic affect on her self-confidence and on the exchequer. Carrying out 
government business, as had always been done, was no longer acceptable with 
parliament demanding reform. This clamour for change resulted in many parliamentary 
commissions and enquiries but their influence on Britain’s overseas naval departments 
has been generally ignored by historians.
198
 The Commission on Fees in 1788 produced 
a report dedicated to improving naval shore services at overseas locations. In common 
with the other reports of the Fees Commissioners they recommended a change in the 
payment conditions of employees, with considerable impact on the culture of 
employment. However, their most important proposal was for the appointment of a 
senior manager to key overseas headquarters. The Fees Commissioners concluded that 
the regulations and instructions in place for individuals were sound; they merely had to 
be enacted. They thought that with the presence of a resident commissioner 
superintending activity, all fraud and poor practices would be stifled at source. They 
also considered that the power of swearing an affidavit to the truthfulness of an officer’s 
accounts and actions should not be underestimated. 
 
Although resident commissioners were increasingly appointed during the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars, it was not until the implementation of the Commission of Naval 
Revision’s recommendations in 1808 that the Admiralty was to gain complete control at 
overseas bases. For the first time the Admiralty appointed resident commissioners to the 
Cape of Good Hope and of more significance to the East Indies. These individuals were 
not only to manage the naval yard, but to superintend the financial and contracting 
affairs of the naval hospital and victualling department. 
                                                 
197
 Taylor, S., Storm and Conquest, 246-7, 327. 
198
 Breihan, J. R., ‘William Pitt and the Commission on Fees, 1785-1801’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 
27, No. 1, (1984), 59-81; Haas, J., A Management Odyssey, The Royal Dockyards 1714-1914, (London, 
1994); Morriss, R., Naval Power and British Culture, 1760-1850, (Aldershot, 2004). 
332 
 
Resident commissioners were appointed to Bombay and Madras in 1809 but, while the 
Bombay commissioner gave the Admiralty a presence where naval ships were being 
built, the arrival of Commissioner Puget at Madras on the 1
st
 January 1811 completely 
changed the British navy’s relationship with the East India Company. Puget, unlike 
Dundas his Bombay colleague, developed a good working relationship with successive 
commanders-in-chief and was given control of affairs at Calcutta, Penang and 
Trincomalee, in addition to Madras. He was also asked to assume responsibility for 
ordnance supply from the East India Company. When Dundas returned to Britain in 
January 1812, Puget was also given control of Bombay until March 1813 when 
Dundas’s replacement arrived. Puget, with commander-in-chief approval, appointed a 
master attendant, replaced Company and agent naval storekeepers with crown servants, 
and persuaded the Admiralty to send a master shipwright from Britain. This created in 
the East Indies the naval yard management structure that was in place at all other naval 
bases. Apart from the necessity for access to the dry docks at Bombay dependence on 
the Company was finally broken. Puget employed artificers and introduced a training 
system for local youths, rather than hiring Company employees. 
 
The Admiralty subsequently replaced the Company naval storekeeper at Bombay in 
1812 with a crown employee, following this up with the appointment of a master 
shipwright and master attendant. The actions of Puget and those of the Admiralty had 
removed dependence on the Company, reduced costs and improved effectiveness. A 
further benefit was the presence of specialists employed by the Admiralty to provide 
first-hand advice on the raw materials and shipbuilding techniques of India. 
 
A legacy left for continued British presence in the Indian Ocean at the end of the 
Napoleonic War was the establishment of a naval headquarters at Trincomalee, together 
with the rationalisation of naval facilities at the Cape of Good Hope to a permanent 
home at Simon’s Town. The retention of Mauritius at the end of the war removed that 
island from again becoming a threat to British trade. Credit for the establishment at 
Trincomalee has been given to Admiral Hood as commander-in-chief,
199
 but Admiral 
Drury deserves this accolade as he initiated the plan. However, the person who 
surveyed, planned in detail, obtained the workforce and managed the building of the 
establishment was Commissioner Puget until Commissioner Upton replaced him in 
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1817. Similarly, Commissioner Shield has not been credited with the initiative to re-
locate all facilities at the Cape to Simon’s Town. He initially planned the move and 
continued guidance of the project when on the Navy Board.  
 
The presence of Britain’s overseas naval bases throughout the eighteenth century 
enabled the attached squadrons to defend British colonies, British trade and contribute 
to the defeat of her enemies. Their efficiency experienced a dramatic increase from 
1809.  This occurred with the introduction of the Commission of Naval Revision’s 
recommendations. This thesis is not unique in observing the improvement in naval 
administration resulting from the reforms introduced in the 1790s and 1800s, or the 
importance of the Commission of Naval Revision.
200
 However, this thesis has shown 
that the crucial link required by the Admiralty to deliver the improvements at the Cape 
and East Indies bases was the presence of resident commissioners.  These individuals 
gave the Admiralty representatives who could concentrate on delivering their policies 
and give advice on improving shores facilities and services.  
 
The Admiralty had great faith in the role of a senior manager at their overseas 
headquarters and in the individuals selected. This is demonstrated in figure 3e which 
shows the Admiralty created a cadre of officers who repeatedly served as resident 
commissioners, or in other civil naval posts. A professional class of industrial managers 
and supervisors had been established by the Admiralty in the first decades of the 
nineteenth century. By the presence of these managers the Admiralty had reconciled the 
domestic demands for economy with the military necessity for effectiveness. These 
managers subsequently had their title changed to Captain or Admiral Superintendent 
and were not phased out until the 1960s. Similarly the naval base at Simon’s Town did 
not lower the white ensign for the final time until 1957. The changes brought about in 
the 1800s lasted for over a 150 years. 
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Appendix 2a:   Business Processes at Overseas Naval Yards derived from ninth report 




The following diagrams have been drawn to explain, in a graphical manner, the 
activities of the overseas naval yards. For those unfamiliar with business process
1
 
diagrams they may at first be difficult to interpret, hence an explanation of their purpose 
and structure is required. 
 
The origins of examining how organisations, governmental, manufacturing or service 
industries, function is probably as old as their existence, but an early published example 
of an investigation into a manufacturing process is in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.2 
Smith’s description of the operations to produce a pin provides the flow of the 
interacting activities. He also described how output could be greatly increased by the 
use of allocating single tasks to individuals within the production process. Network 
scheduling, a graphical representation of activities with a time being allocated to each 
activity, not only provides a mechanism to examine the logical relationships between 
the activities, but also the minimum time that the overall task can be completed via 
Critical Path Analysis. These workflow examples are but one aspect of modelling, with 
the diagrams below being an analysis tool for examining a business. 
 
The method used below merely identifies the activities described in the ninth report of 
the Commission on Fees. What becomes evident is whilst there were links between the 
activities that would be shown in a work flow diagram the activities fell into distinct 
categories. Five categories, or parent processes, were chosen with the activities found in 
the ninth report aligned to one of these areas. These areas were:     a) Management of all 
the activities of the naval yard; b) Stores provision; c) People (management of the 
workforce); d) Work done by the workforce; and e) Reporting on all aspects of the 
yard’s operation. This method of analysis not only mapped the operations of the yard 
but indentified gaps, missing activities, and links between tasks.                             . 
                                                 
1
 Business Process Definition: A set of tasks that can cross organisational boundaries to achieve a defined 
business outcome for a known customer, Changing Business Processes, Gartner, Exp Premier Reports, 
(2005), 5; Business Process Definition: A series of logically related activities or tasks (such as planning, 
production, or sales) performed together to produce a defined set of results, Business Dictionary.com, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/business-process.html , accessed 2nd August 2011 
2
 Smith, A., An inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (1776) 
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A progress of the works carrying on in the yard. 
Cash accounts and vouchers. 
Accounts of warrants unexecuted, and abstracts of letters to the Navy Board 
unanswered. 
Abstract of yard and ship musters. 





Accounts of old or unserviceable stores sold. 
Charge incurred on ships and works in the yard. 
Issue and remains, including masts &c. and muster paper. 
Store accounts. 
Yard pay books. 
Demands of stores, accompanied by remains. 





Works and estimates proposed for the ensuing year, with the 
state of the works in hand at that time. 








List of artificers entered, dead, or discharged. Their rate of pay 
Return of negroes. Their rate of pay 
List of advertisements, tenders, and bargains, and hire of 
artificers. 
 
Monthly rate of exchange, and bills drawn within the year.  
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Instructions proposed for Charles Sterling Esq. Commissioner of HM Navy appointed 





For Charles Henry Lane Esq. Commissioner of the Navy appointed to reside at Antigua. 
 
1. Upon your arrival at Jamaica you are to enquire into the state and condition of 
His Majesty’s stores there particularly Masts, Sails and Cordage to inform yourself in 
what manner they are lodged and how secured from the injury of the weather and 
Embezzlement, and what houses proper for lodging of stores, for receiving items when 
landed, and issuing them when the service requires it, can be occasionally hire in 
convenient situations near the works of the Careering Wharf and timely to hire all such 
as you foresee may be wanted those purposes upon the best and cheapest terms you care 
for His Majesty taking care to provide no more then shall be absolutely necessary and to 
give orders to the Naval Officer at Jamaica to pay for them quarterly or otherwise 
according to your agreements and to take Receipts for the said payment and you are to 
consult with the Naval Officer and consider whether if be necessary to Erect any 
additional buildings for lodging of stores and, if so, in what place or places they may be 
most properly built to answer the services with what materials, where such materials 
can be had, and how the whole of those Erections may be completed with all possible 
good husbandry. 
And if the Flag or other Sea Officers Commanding in Chief at Jamaica be in port 
you are to communicate the same to him for his opinion and you are to transmit to the 
Navy Board by the first opportunity plans of the additional buildings proposed to be 
created with Estimates of the Expenses there of with such further particulars as you 
shall judge necessary in order that the same may be laid before the Lord Commissioners 
of the Admiral. 
 
2. You are as soon as possible to procure an account of the state and condition of 
all HM Ships and vessels employed at and about Jamaica and of their Masts, Furniture 
and Stores, and to get the best information you can of the times when they may be 
respectively expected at that Island to be careened, cleaned and refitted, and there to 
consult with the proper officers, and consider how the same may be executed to the best 
                                                 
1
 Proposed instructions by Admiralty to resident commissioners at Jamaica and Antigua, TNA, ADM 
1/3368, 31
st
 December 1803 
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advantage and what stores and workmen may be wanted. You are strictly to charge the 
officers to make timely and proper demands of stores, that [?] the service may not at any 
time be in want, and with their demands to mention the particulars of Remains in stores. 
And you are to inform yourself what stores can be purchased and brought to Jamaica 
upon reasonable terms, not only on any Emergency but at all times to furnish the 
magazines with such as you foresee may be wanted there, and to procure all such 
workmen in addition to those sent from England as there may be occasion for or you 
shall foresee the want of but never to purchase any stores, or hire any workmen beyond 
the Establishment without an absolute want thereof.  
 
3. You are to take care to procure good lodging for such workmen as are in want 
there of and are entitled to it, and to see that the same be as near the works as possible, 
and in the most healthy part. 
 
4. Your are likewise to take great care to have at all times proper Careening Gear 
of every kind and sheds or such convenience for securing the Blocks, [?] from injury by 
the weather, as shall be judged necessary 
 
5. If you find it necessary you are to purchase a vessel for a Pitch Boat and to order 
her to be sheathed and properly fitted for that service. 
 
6. You are to cause the Boatswains and Carpenters store of all ships and vessels 
which come into port to be carefully surveyed and the state of them as well as the stores 
in the magazines to be considered before any supplies are ordered and to take care and 
consider likewise the wants of the ships in port, or which you may expect there to refit 
and present your supplies so as that the stores may be issued to ships that are most in 
want of them and to cause the rigging, cables, and sails to be surveyed on Board before 
the ship is dismantled as is practised in the King’s Yards in England. 
 
7. You are to see that great care be taken in the husbanding of such materials as are 
used in refitting and cleaning of all H M ships, that not any be wasted, embezzled, or 
misapplied and that the remains be secured for future service letting the person 
concerned know that any extravagant expense either charged on the ships by the Naval 
Officers, or made by the officers of ships will not be allowed of upon making either of 
their, accounts. 
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8. You are to appoint proper watchmen to secure the stores from Embezzlement or 
any accident by fire. 
 
9. You are to take care that all ships and vessels to be careened be fitted in all 
respects proper for it, particularly so as to secure their masts and that proper provision 
of  water casks or otherwise be made to prevent as much as possible their straining their 
masts and hulls. 
 
10. To the end that these services may be carried on with the utmost dispatch, 
safety, and good husbandry, you are to see that the methods used in the King’s Yards, in 
cleaning and refitting H M ships and supplying them with stores and accounting for the 
(same) be observed at the place where you reside so far as the said services will admit 
of its calling upon the officers under your directions for copies of their instructions for 
your guidance therein. 
 
11. That the works may be well and expeditiously performed you are to see that no 
more ships be taken in hand to be cleaned, refitted, or stored at a time than you have 
hands and conveniences to dispatch. So as one may not hinder another and always to 
inform yourself from the Flag or other Sea Officers Commanding in Chief which ships 
the services require first to be dispatched, and to give preference to them accordingly. 
 
12. You are to exact the attendance and assistance of the officers and companies of 
the said ships, in the cleaning, refitting and storing of them, according to their duties 
respectively and if any of them shall be wanting therein, to give an account of it to the 
flag or other sea officer commanding in chief, that he may give such directions there 
upon as he shall judge necessary for as much as if the said officers and companies do 
not do their parts, the above mentioned works will become very changeable and dilatory 
and the Service will necessarily suffer very greatly thereby. 
 
13. You are particularly to exact the attendance of the carpenters and their crews and 
also of the sail makers of the said ships without any other allowances for the said [?] 
what is mentioned in the 50
th
 and 51st Articles of the Captain’s general Printed 
Instructions, Viz’, one shilling and sixpence per day2. But in case the Carpenters and 
Sail makers of any other ships shall be called upon to assist in the works of ships to 
which they do not belong, you are then to cause them to be made an allowance of three 
                                                 
2
 Antigua station only 1 shilling per day 




 and as the service shall call for each assistance you are to apply for 
the same to the Flag (or other sea officer) Commanding in Chief, and where any such 
shall be granted to order the Naval Officer to keep lists of the names of Persons 
appointed for that service, to muster them thereby, and weekly, or monthly, to cause 
those lists to be cast up and the said persons paid what may be due them either by your 
order thereon to him, and the Master Shipwright, or in your own presence taking care in 
the later case to give certificates thereof that the Payments may be properly vouched by 
those orders, or certificates, and the Receipts of the Parties to who whom payments 
shall be made. 
 
14. When any ship is to be careened you are to give orders to the Master Shipwright, 
to cause the needful bulkheads upon the Deck to be made, and the Upper works within 
and without board well (seemed) and caulked, the pumps in the hold to be properly 
placed and everything else to be timely provided for performance thereof, and in 
Caulking the said ships, and putting in pieces where necessary to take particular care not 
to strip or (unbind) the works further then may be absolutely necessary. 
 
15. You are to procure from the Navy Office and to take along with you a copy of 
the General Establishment of the proportion of stores for all HM Ships for your better 
guidance in examining and correcting the officers demand which is one principal matter 
requiring your care, and you are therefore from time to time inform yourself by survey 
or otherwise of the necessity of [using parts ? of] such demands before you order the 
supply thereof, and never to direct any more to be issued than shall be agreeable to the 
Rules of the Navy and appear to be absolutely necessary. 
 
16. You are to cause all such ships as shall be laden with naval stores and come to 
Jamaica to be unloaded without delay in order to prevent the charge of demurrages. 
 
17. You are to take care that all such burning stuff and other materials and stores of 
any such, as shall from time to time be wanting and can be had in those parts for 
carrying on the service be timely provided on the best terms that may be ordering such 
stores to be received and Bills made out for their value agreeable to the method of the 
Navy and when those Bills shall be signed by you are to give your orders thereof to the 
Naval Officer to Pay them. 
                                                 
3
 Antigua station only 2 shillings per day 
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18. That no money may be taken up by the Naval Officer, or Bills of Exchange 
drawn by him upon the Naval Board unnecessarily, you are to underwrite your approval 
of such as it might be requisite for him to draw agreeably to the 13
th
 Article of his 
instructions and to give the said Board the earliest advice of them, with the occasion and 
services that called for the money for which they are respectively drawn and to see that 
the Naval Officer takes up the Money for his Bills by Public advertisement agreeably to 
his instructions and that the Premium, if any, be brought to Public account, and the 
same be certified upon each Respective case. 
 
19. When any ships come in for stores you are not to over press the storekeeper (or 
Naval Officer) with demands at any one time, but to let him have leisure to make his 
issues by degree, to any one or two ships at once, as he can dispatch them. 
 
20. You are to order the Naval Officer to send home his muster Books as often as 
conveniently may be for checking his Pay Books, and victualling books of the ships 
when they come Home, and as delays frequently happen in the Captains not 
transmitting the Muster Books, You are to impress upon them the necessity of their 
complying with their Instructions on this Head. 
 
21. You are to order the Naval Officer to state and send home likewise his accounts 
of Disbursements with his vouchers for the same as often as he possibly can, and you 
are to direct him to send home in like manner his accounts of the issues of stores and the 
vouchers relative thereto, And as after your arrival the Naval Officer is not to make any 
payment whatsoever, but by your order. You are to signify the same to him and before 
you authorise such payments you will inform yourself fully of the necessity thereof and 
see that the vouchers conformable to his instructions (a copy of which will be furnished 
to you by the Navy Board) are produced. You will observe that the 13
th
 Article of these 
Instructions as it stands in the Printed Copy, is framed upon a general principle 
applicable in some parts to Naval Officers at one place, and others to Naval Officers in 
other places. You will therefore apply it according to the circumstances at the Place 
where you are Resident at. And as money is taken up at Jamaica by Public 
Advertisement and the lowest tender is to be approved by you, and transmitted to the 
Navy Board with the Naval Officer’s letter of advice it is unnecessary for him to 
transmit the monthly certificates of the exchange from town merchants because as all 
payments are made at the rate of £140 Currency for £100 Sterling (agreeable to a law of 
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the Colonial Assembly) the rate of exchange at which he actually takes up money, has 
no relation to the Rates at which he makes and charges his payments. You will be 
careful not to authorize any payment for Bounty to seamen, nor suffer any Merchant 
Vessel to be repaired not any stores supplied to her, without particular directions from 
us for so doing. Anything in the 13
th
 Articles of the Instructions to the Storekeeper 
(page 17) to the contract not withstanding. 
 
22. You are to see that the business of every office under your direction whether 
within the Naval or any other department of Government be done at, and the expense 
thereof be brought and the charge of such offices respectively; And that the officers of 
one department be not troubled upon business relating to another. You are to see that 
the officers and companies of the ships do fetch their own stores and water and ballast 
them with their own Boats, without any extraordinary expense to His Majesty. 
 
23. If at any time the works shall require more hands than the standing workmen 
and the assistance to be procured from the ships in Port can dispatch in time you are to 
hire as many more hands as shall be absolutely necessary and care be had at the place at 
which you Reside upon the best terms you can, taking care they are kept no longer than 
the Service Requires ordering the Naval Officer to keep lists of them and causing them 
to be paid in the manner directed by the 15
th
 Article of the General Printed Instructions 
for the Officers at the Foreign Yards. 
 
24. You are to keep and send to the Navy Board monthly, or as often as you can, an 
account of every ship that has been Careened and Refitted with any particulars relative 
there to which may be necessary for their information. 
 
25. When there shall not be any ships of War in want of cleaning, or refitting , or not 
so many as will employ the workmen you are not to suffer them to be idle, but to see 
that they are employed on the repairs of any of the King’s vessels belonging to the Port, 
or of any Buildings, Boats and Masts that may stand in need of it; And also on such 
other works as shall be most for His Majesty’s advantage and to be particularly careful 
that not any Boats or Masts be “cast” that can be repaired be made serviceable again. 
And that everything be husbanded to the best advantage. 
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26. You are to examine the Books and Pay lists of the Dockyard, particularly the 
Muster Books so as to satisfy yourself of their correctness before they are regularly 
signed by the Respective Officers. 
And as the Naval Officers are directed to receive into their charge all Muster 
Books accounts of Warrant officers Reports of survey on stores, and other papers 
necessary for keeping their accounts, and forward these to the Navy Board from time to 
time as opportunities may offer, informing the Board not only of the time, but of the 
ships or vessels by which they may be transmitted and to give Receipts to the parties for 
all such Accounts Reports and as they may receive from them into their charge. You are 
particularly required to see that this duty be punctually attended to. 
 
27. You are to keep a constant correspondence with the Navy Board in the same 
manner as is done by the Commissioners of the Out Ports in England, and to manage 
affairs and to act accordingly. 
 
28. To prevent any differences of opinion which might otherwise arise between you 
and the Commander-in-Chief of HM Ships at Jamaica, respecting the appointment of 
persons to any vacancies which may happen amongst the officers of HM`s Yard 
______, you are hereby authorised and empowered to appoint proper persons to fill any 
such vacancies until the some shall have been reported to the Navy Board and directions 
given there upon: but in the appointment to any vacant office, except the storekeeper 
such as Master Shipwright, Master Attendant or Boatswain you are to take the 
Recommendation of such Commander in Chief. 
Lastly 
It being  very material that the Quarterly Returns (No 6) of the remains of and demands 
for stores should be made up within the period prescribed by the Navy Board and 
forwarded to England by the first proper opportunity afterwards, you are to see that the 
same is done, or that satisfactory reasons are assigned for not doing it; And in order to 
keep this matter in your memory you are to order the Officers to report to you Monthly, 
when the last Return of the before mentioned kind was completed, when forwarded to 









 November. They are to acquaint you whether the Return in question 
for the preceding Quarter is completed, or will be completed by the prescribed period or 
what cause will prevent it.  
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1 Dockyards (Home) – Instructions 
for Resident Commissioner and 
Principal Officers.  
13/6/1805 4/2/1806 4/7/1805 
2 Dockyards (Home) – Instructions 
for inferior officers. 
6/2/1806 3/4/1806 11/2/1807 
3 Dockyards (Home) – Instructions 
and duties for Surveyors and 
Assistants; Education of 
shipwrights; Construction of ships; 
Payment methods of workforce. 
24/6/1806 16/7/1806 20/9/1809 
4 Navy Office. 9/7/1806 11/4/1809 28/10/1807 
5 Dockyards (Foreign) – Instructions 
for Resident Commissioner and 
Principal Officers. 
2/8/1806 11/4/1809 14/9/1808 
6 Out Ports – Instructions for Naval 
Storekeepers at Deal, Harwich, 
Leith, Falmouth, Kinsale. 
4/12/1806 11/4/1809 14/9/1808 
7 Hospitals (Home). 26/2/1807 11/4/1809 14/9/1808 
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9 Transport Office. 25/6/1807 11/4/1809 14/9/1808 
10 Victualling Office. 11/8/1807 11/4/1809 14/9/1808 
11 Victualling establishments (Home). 22/12/1807 11/4/1809 14/9/1808 
12 Victualling establishments 
(Foreign). 
22/12/1807 11/4/1809 14/9/1808 
13 Transport organisation (Home and 
Foreign). 
22/12/1807 11/4/1809 14/9/1808 
14
4
 Timber – sources of supply from 
Britain and many areas of the world 
(manuscript copy). 
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on various projects. Includes 
thinking on strategic materials 
supply and manufacture. Also 
special projects, e.g. Plymouth 
Breakwater and Northfleet 
dockyard (manuscript copy). 
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Present Salaries Proposed 







Gibraltar, Jamaica and Antigua    
Commissioner 1200 1200 1400 
1
st
 Clerk 240 200 250 
2
nd
 Clerk 120 100 120 
Naval Storekeeper 600 500 600 
1
st
 Clerk 240 200 250 
2
nd
 Clerk 120 100 120 
3
rd
 Clerk (if necessary)    
Master Attendant 300 250 400 
Clerk (if necessary) 120  120 
Master Shipwright 360 300 400 
Clerk 120 100 120 
Halifax    
Commissioner 1200 1200 1200 
1
st
 Clerk 180 150 180 
2
nd
 Clerk 120 100 120 
Naval Storekeeper 480 400 450 
1
st
 Clerk 180 150 180 
2
nd
 Clerk 120 100 120 
Master Attendant 240 200 350 
Clerk (if necessary)   120 
Master Shipwright 360 300 350 
Clerk 120 100 120 
Malta    
Commissioner 1200 1200 1400 
1
st
 Clerk 240 200 250 
2
nd
 Clerk 120 100 120 
Naval Storekeeper 600 500 600 
1
st
 Clerk 240 200 250 
2
nd
 Clerk 120 100 120 
Master Attendant 300 250 400 
Clerk (if necessary) 120 100 120 
Master Shipwright 360 300 400 
Clerk 120 100 120 





Present Salaries Proposed 







Cape of Good Hope    
Commissioner   1400 
1
st
 Clerk   250 
2
nd
 Clerk   120 
Naval Storekeeper 600 500 600 
1
st
 Clerk 240  250 
2
nd
 Clerk 200  120 
Master Attendant 300 250 400 
Clerk (if necessary) 120 100 120 
Master Shipwright 360 300 400 
Clerk 120 100 120 
Bermuda    
Naval Storekeeper 300  300 
Clerk 100  100 
Madras and Bombay    
Commissioner   2000 
1
st
 Clerk   350 
2
nd
 Clerk   180 
Naval Storekeeper 200 + 3d per 
£ on his 
disbursements 
200 + 3d per 





 Clerk   350 
2
nd
 Clerk   180 
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Gibraltar    
Agent Victualler 600 800 600 
1
st
 clerk 240 350 250 
2
nd
 clerk 120 180 120 
3
rd
 clerk (if necessary) 100 120 120 
Malta    
Agent Victualler 400 700 500 
1
st
 clerk 90 300 220 
2
nd
 clerk 75 150 120 
3
rd
 clerk (if necessary) 60 100 100 
Cape of Good Hope    
Agent Victualler 600 700 600 
1
st
 clerk 240 300 240 
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In chapter two it was noted that those familiar with the practice of management 
consultants would find themselves on recognizable ground on reading the reports of the 
Commission on Fees. This is also true for those who have familiarity with the 
introduction of ISO 9001 (International Organization for Standardization 9001)
1
 into 
their organisations and the process and output of the Commissioner of Naval Revision. 
A brief examination of ISO 9001 actions illustrates this comparison with one important 
exception that of actively facilitating continual improvement. Both ISO 9001 and the 
Commission of Revision lay down the following, a) a set of procedures that cover all 
key processes in the business; b) monitoring processes to ensure they are effective; c) 
keeping adequate records; and d) checking output for defects, with appropriate and 
corrective action where necessary. 
 
The work and output of the Commission of Naval Revision was impressive for any 
organisation attempting to have all of its business operating in the same way. Examples 
of this are in the many forms that were produced to ensure that work was carried out 
with the same objectives. A particular feature of this is the 187 forms to be found in the 
first report. The language of the report also reflects the principles of clear instructions 
via the use of shall and will as opposed to should and may to ensure that the instruction 
is an order rather than a request. 
 
Appendix 2a examined the underlying activities derived from the ninth report of the 
Commission on Fees drawn as business process diagrams. These diagrams were used to 
examine the core activities of the overseas yards and provide a method to visualise the 
grouping of activities. This approach is continued in this appendix to determine if the 
detailed instructions of the fifth report can be mapped to those already established. This 
also allowed a comparison to be made to determine if there had been changes in tasks or 
additional tasks had been detailed in the fifth report. 
 
The same method has been used in describing the main procedures and the tasks within 
these areas to enable the development within these areas to be clearly seen. Where a 
process has been added or more detail expressed it has been shown in green. What  
 
                                                 
1
 Good Management Practice, International Organization for Standardization, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/management_standards.htm  
Appendix 2f:  Business Processes at Overseas Naval Yards derived from fifth report of 
the Commission of Naval Revision (From September 1808) 
370 
becomes evident is the procedural areas of management, stores, people, work and 
reporting were correctly captured from the ninth report of the Fees commission. When 
these areas are further examined a more detailed picture emerges. This could be for a 
combination of two reasons firstly, the procedures were already present but could not be 
obtained from the Fees Commissioners’ report; and secondly, new procedures were 
needed. Although all the areas have been provided with additional activities, those 
concerning stores and the workforce and staff of the naval yard had been considerably 
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The naval facilities at Point Frederick, Kingston about 1815 viewed near Point Henry
2
 
                                                 
1
 Gardiner, R. (ed), The Naval War of 1812, 106. 
2
 Part of a watercolour by Irvine, H., National Archives of Canada, C145247,  Gardiner, R. (ed), The 
Naval War of 1812, 110. 
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A plan of Point Frederick showing location of dockyard buildings descriptions
3
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  Kingston Dockyard around 1815, UKHO, Ae1. 
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Detail of Kingston dockyard showing building slips and ships at their berths
4
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 Kingston Dockyard around 1815, UKHO, Ae1. 
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The following graphs have been drawn to determine the planned location of British 
naval ships at overseas stations during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and to 
determine the anticipated peak refit workload at overseas commands.  
 
Figures 3bi shows the strength of the British navy over 21 years commencing in 1792. 
This shows the navy peaked in numbers of ships in 1809 with 732 vessels. The graph 
shows the individual commands, both at home and overseas, and includes the vessels 
that were awaiting assignment.  
 
Figure 3bii more clearly shows the number of ships allocated to the overseas commands 
during the Great Wars with France. The Jamaican and Leeward Island commands have 
been combined as the West Indies with the North American, Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland stations represented as North America. This graph also indicates the 
maximum number of ships deployed occurred in 1809. 
 
Figures 3bi and 3bii did not identify the type of vessel deployed to the individual 
stations, but to more easily understand the vessels supported at the overseas stations 
figures 3biii, 3biv and 3bv have been drawn. These graphs show the deployments for 
January and June 1809 and January 1810 to coincide with the year when naval strength 
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Figure 3bi: Planned ship deployment for all theatres, 1792-1813 
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Figure 3bii: Planned ship deployments at overseas stations – 1792 to 1813 
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Figure 3biii: Planned deployments by vessel type in January 1809 
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Figure 3biv: Planned deployments by vessel type in June 1809 
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Figure 3bv:  Planned deployments by vessel type in January 1810 
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Appendix 4a Explanation of primary and secondary categories for Table 4d and how 
and why selected. 
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The categories evolved and in a sense selected themselves, but initially a hierarchy of 
classification was attempted. This consisted of identifying strategic and top level 
organisational matters, separating out the department specific correspondence, such as 
victualling and hospital areas, leaving the majority as naval yard letters. This gave a 
good first indication of the concerns of the correspondents, but further categories were 
evident. Although the letters could be allocated into the initial classifications an 
opportunity was available to provide a thematic approach. The themes chosen were 
people, transports, buildings, hydrography and stores, to allow for further examination. 
What has been noteworthy for the Cape of Good Hope station has been the letters 
concerning blockade and strategic issues. The exploitation of local timber from 
Plettenberg Bay was found by this method of category selection, as was the importance 
and availability of boats. A secondary category of government slaves and their use was 
introduced in the people primary category to highlight this issue in the post abolition of 
the slave trade era.  
 
Having the initial classification it presented the opportunity to further identify themes 
for examination. These secondary categories, or activities, followed a similar process to 
the primary classification selection, with ship repair being subdivided by the following 
logic:  
 Survey: to ascertain work required, cost estimates and recommendation for 
location of refit; 
 Planning: priority of refit, when and where repair was to be done; 
 People: request for assistance from squadron; 
 Transport and stores: transport and stores required for refit; 
 Refit: work under way; 
 Lessons learnt: how to do it better next time. 
 
This exercise not only clarified the important activities, but also uncovered the 
underlying and rarely changing logic of business processes. The commercial and 
financial themes were now more clearly evident as were the areas where suspected 
fraud was taking place. As these civil departments were engaged in a logistics operation 
it is noticeable, as with all organisations, that the effective use of resources was 
paramount, of which the human resource is particularly evident in this classification 
exercise.  






















£4 5s 4d per 
month 
Increased to £1800 on 
appeal by William 






 Clerk 300   Pay Lists 
RC 2
nd





£1 5s 0d per 
month 








 Clerk 250   Pay Lists 
Store 2
nd
 Clerk 200   Pay Lists 
Store 3
rd
 Clerk 150   Pay Lists 
Store 4
th
 Clerk 150   Pay Lists 
Master 





MS Clerk 120   Pay Lists 
Master 
Attendant 400 100 













 ADM2/937, 20/12/1808. 




 ADM2/937, 20/12/1808. 




 Shield and NB question 
Admiralty if yard 
Principal Officers should 























60 to 90  
 Pay Lists 
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 Fifth Report of Commission of Naval Revision recommended £1400 for the post, 7. 
2
 Shield to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 106/2004, 9
th
 Jan 1811; Navy Board to Shield, TNA, ADM 
106/2482, 17
th
 April 1811. 
3
 Shield to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 106/2004, 3
rd
 Apr 1811. 








Monday to Saturday 0600 to 1800  
Breakfast 30 minutes 
Dinner 90 minutes 
 
Artificers from Britain 
Home Pay 32 shillings per month (Sterling) 
Extra time to be allowed at double time 
Term of appointment three years 
Apprentices – allowed an apprentice after three years if conduct has been suitable with a 
certificate provided. If they return home they can have an apprentice on producing 
certificate. If they remain at the yard after three years they are to receive an extra 




Type Day Rate Extra 
Rate 
Allowances Notes 
Store Porters 5s 0d (Curr.)   
 














Coxswain 4s 6d (Cur.)   ADM42/2007 Pay 
Lists   
Quarter Master 4s 6d (Cur.)   ADM42/2007 Pay 
Lists   
Seaman 4s 0d (Curr.)   ADM42/2007 Pay 















  1s 6d per day 
victualling 
Reply to Shield letter 
(ADM106/2004) of 
25/9/10. 






















4s 0d 6 & 7   




                                                 
1
 Navy Board to Commissioner Shield, TNA, ADM 106/2481, 12
th
 June 1810. 
2
 Home Pay of 36 shillings per month (Sterling). 









   No chip money. 






Notes payment of 
hurt pay if incurred 
in work: 3s 9d per 
week after six weeks. 




   1s 0d per day 







1809 for chip money. 
Pay lists for day rates 




   1s 0d per day 
victualling 
ADM42/2007 Pay 
Lists 2s 0d (Ster.) 2s 0d 
(Ster.) 









  Increased from 6/- 
per day by Shield. 











  1s 0d per day 
victualling. 









7s 0d (Cur.)   ADM42/2007 Pay 
Lists   
Extra Caulker 7s 0d (Cur.)   ADM42/2007 Pay 





  Chip money 4d 





June 1810 2s 0d (Ster.)  




  Chip money 4d 





June 1810 1s 8d (Ster.)  
Foreman of 
Coopers 
6s 6d (Ster.)   Pay Lists  
ADM 113/3 
Cooper 5s 6d (Ster.)   Pay Lists  
ADM 113/3 
 
                                                 
3
 Chip money was only to be paid for up to six days in any week unless they are especially employed on 
Sundays. On 24
th
 Oct 1810 the Navy Board changed the rules that chip money was only paid to 
individuals who had already received this privilege all new artificers were not to receive the allowance. 
4




















4s 0d to 7s 
0d (Curr.) 





6s 0d (Curr.) 
to 10s 0d 
(Curr.) 

















6s 0d Curr.) 
to 
8s 0d (Curr.) 
  ADM113/3  
Pay Lists 
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The Naval Storekeeper was to compile a list in annex 11 form to record the work of HM 




Payments to Officers and Men of HM Ships – Working Parties 
 
Description 
In what rank to be 
paid 






Lieutenants of the 
navy 






Captain of Marines Lieutenants of the 
navy 




Master’s Mates and 
Midshipmen 






Lt. of Marines Midshipmen of the 
navy 










Boatswain’s mates 9d 1s 3d ADM123/41 15th 
March 1813 


























Master of the navy Lieutenants of the 
navy 






 Master of the 
navy 




Boatswain Midshipmen of the 
navy 




Gunner Midshipmen of the 
navy 













 Instruction of Fifth Report of Commission of Naval Revision, House of Parliaments, 1806, 13-14. 
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Payments to Officers and Men of HM Ships – Artificers 
 
Description 
In what rank to be 
paid 








































Sawyers Carpenter’s Mates 1s 6d 2s 0d ADM123/41 15th 
March 1813 
Plumbers Carpenter’s Mates 1s 6d 2s 0d ADM123/41 15th 
March 1813 
Painters Carpenter’s Mates 1s 6d 2s 0d ADM123/41 15th 
March 1813 
Bricklayers Carpenter’s Mates 1s 6d 2s 0d ADM123/41 15th 
March 1813 


















of sailmakers or 
ropemakers 





                                                 
2
 Fifth Report of Commission of Naval Revision, House of Parliaments, 1806, 13-14. 
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1.  Seamen employed as artificers to be paid as such. 
 
2.  King’s officers and men of HM Storeships to be paid for loading and unloading 
ships. Does not apply to hired men. 
 
3. Artificers employed on own ship with work from other ships to be paid at own ship 
rate. 
 
4. Double pay not to be paid on Sundays or other reason. 
 
5. Extra pay not eligible to artificers for following work on own ship: Making 
Topsails, Yards, Jib booms, Fishing bowsprits, refitting half ports and gratings, and 
caulking from time to time. Nor is any to be allowed except during careening or 
other considerable repair or general refit. 
 
6. Commanding Officer of HM Ship to ensure that men lent to his ship to be entered as 
supernumeraries on the ship’s books during time employed. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Principal Officers of Navy Board to Naval Storekeepers, TNA, ADM 123/41, 15
th
 March 1813. 
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Survey of HMS Boadicea – Carpenter’s Defects1 
 
The wales topsides and decks want caulking. The copper much wore and broke in a 
number of places. Two of the fore castle beams broke and one knee. The main deck 
much worn and four strakes under the fore castle want shifting. The main deck, the 2
nd
 
beam from forward broke three knees in general work very much. The quarter galleys 
and [?] want repair. A cistern wanted for the larboard quarter galley and pipe. 
 
The fore bulkhead for the captain’s cabin wanted and lockers aft. A Bulkhead wanted 
for the gun room and offices cabin out of repair. The fore chains want repair. The 
bowsprit shot and fished. The fore yard sprung and fished. The cross jack yard arm 
broke. The mizzen mast fished. The ship has been on shore and it appears the false keel 
is injured. Glass broke in different parts of the ship. 
 
The ship in general in a very weak state and works very much and in my opinion not fit 
to remain a cruising ship and would recommend her to a Dock as she cannot receive the 
repairs at this arsenal which are required 
  
 
 George Collom Acting Master Shipwright 
 5
th
 January 1811 
                                                 
1
 Acting Master Shipwright Collom to Commissioner Shield, TNA, ADM 106/2004, 5
th
 Jan. 1811. 
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The commissioning of two French prizes at the Cape was to provide considerable 
evidence for the Admiralty’s directions not to commission ships abroad. If major repairs 
were required on a captured ship it would not be the most effective use of stores and 
labour at overseas yards. Comparing the refits of Caledon and Inconstant provides 
evidence of the Admiralty’s stores and repair policy. If a resident commissioner had 
been present it is unlikely that the Caledon would have been commissioned for service 
at the Cape. The saving of the damaged frigate Inconstant illustrates the effective use of 





The commissioning of Caledon at Cape Town in December 1808 was carried out by 
Admiral Bertie to mitigate the loss of a sixth rate frigate to the French in September 
1808. Given his determination to place Mauritius and Bourbon under blockade, and the 
composition of his squadron this appears a sound decision. However, a different 
impression emerges when the commissioning and subsequent refits of the Caledon is 
investigated. Examination of the naval yard paylists provides a numeric explanation for 
the Admiralty to call for an inquiry into the circumstances of her being purchased into 
service. From December 1808, the month of Caledon’s commissioning, to her leaving 
for England in mid 1810 a grand total of 1195 days of shipwright work was undertaken 
on-board the vessel. Apart from Raisonable, an old and worn out ship that was retained 
by the commander-in-chief in spite of the Admiralty’s request for her return, no ship 
approached the effort expended on Caledon. 
 
In April 1809, shortly after the completion of her refit, Bertie reported to the Admiralty 
that Caledon had returned to the Cape as a result of damage from a gale. The repairs 
required appeared to the Admiralty to be incompatible with a ship that had been recently 
commissioned.
2
 The inquiry initiated by the Navy Board asked what was found when 
the sloop was beached, and what work was done.
3
 Commissioner Shield had already 
reported on ‘the wretched little Caledon’ concerning her depleting the arsenal of stores, 
but the yard officer’s report indicated she was also an unsound ship. They found on 
                                                 
1
 An examination of La Bourbonaise’s and Inconstant’s refits was presented in MA, Day, J., ‘The role of 
the resident commissioner at the Cape of Good Hope’, 60-64. This appendix provides additional 
information on these refits together with the addition of an examination of Caledon’s commissioning. 
This appendix strengthens the case made in the MA for the correctness of the commissioner’s actions. 
2
 Bertie to Admiralty, TNA, ADM 1/61, 13
th
 April 1809; This letter has an Admiralty note to Navy Board 
asking for a report from the master shipwright on Caledon, 13
th
 July 1809. 
3
 Navy Board to Shield, TNA, ADM 106/2480, 27
th
 July 1809. 
Appendix 5a Major refits of HMS Caledon, HMS La Bourbonaise and HMS 




surveying Caledon at Simon’s Town that under the copper sheathing was decayed 
wood, corroded nuts, bolts and iron work. The sloop was subsequently repaired, re-






The yard officers’ report was received by the Navy Board on the 12th April 1810. 
Following examination of this report the Navy Board informed the yard officers they 
had been instructed by the Admiralty to ascertain on what principle they had 
recommended Caledon being taken into service.
5
 Replying to this order in October 1810 
the yard officers stated they had no principle for bringing the vessel into service, in fact 
they had stated she was not a fit ship. However, the commander-in-chief had over-ruled 
the yard officers and directed them to repair the sloop for HM service. The yard officers 
considered the value of the vessel was less than the cost required for refitting her for 




As can be seen the commander-in-chief had the power to make local decisions that were 
not based on economic considerations. This also demonstrates why the refitting and 
overseas commissioning policy of the Admiralty had been for only limited repairs and 
returning prizes to Britain. It was not however, only this policy that Bertie ignored 
concerning Caledon as he sent her to Bombay for docking, an order Commissioner 
Shield was unable to explain. The master builder and commissioner at Bombay reported 
she was not worthy of repair and sent her back to the Cape. Shield stated it was his 
opinion that purchasing Caledon was a waste of public money, with the yard officers’ 
report of November 1808 confirming she should not have been purchased.
7
 The 
Caledon was now sent to Britain were she was examined and subsequently broken up. It 
is unlikely that the Caledon would have been brought into service if Commissioner 
Shield had been at the Cape in November 1808. This is demonstrated by comparing 
Caledon’s purchase and the fates of the French prize ships Caroline and Grappler in 
October 1809. 
 
The raid in September 1809 by Commodore Rowley’s squadron and Lt. Col. Keating’s 
troops on St. Paul’s resulted in the capture of the French frigate Caroline and corvette 
                                                 
4
 Naval yard officers at Cape of Good Hope to Navy Board, TNA, 30
th
 December 1809. 
5
 Navy Board to Naval yard officers, TNA, 12
th
 May 1810. 
6
 Yard officers to Navy Board, TNA, 8
th





November 1808 between yard officers and commander-in-chief. 
7
 Shield to Navy Board, TNA, 23
rd
 February 1810.  
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Grappler, together with the re-taking of several East Indiamen. Captain Corbet in the 
Nereide brought back the two French warships to the Cape of Good Hope in mid 
October, where all three ships required attention from the naval yard. Bertie requested 
an examination of the Grappler for purchase into the navy, but she was found 
unsuitable on inspection. 
 
It was not only the return of these ships to the Cape that occupied the local authorities at 
this time. The Madras Mutiny and the influence on the Cape of Good Hope’s armed 
forces was tangential to its main role in 1809, but Governor Lord Caledon, General 
Grey, commander of land forces, and Admiral Bertie became increasing involved in 
sending a military force to Madras. Caledon consulted both individuals on what military 
force could be sent together with what transport was available. Grey considered he 
could dispatch over 2000 troops. Bertie detailed what transport ships were available 
from his resources, and what could be obtained from East India Company sources. 
Shield became involved in an organisational role causing him to comment in his journal 
on 27
th
 October, ‘Governor General and Admiral requested me to equipment of the 
ships for taking troops to India as if there not enough to do’.8  
 
Bertie considered the blockade was his most important task, and was concerned he had 
insufficient escort vessels for the Madras force. However, Caledon forced his hand by 
stating it was pointless to chance the loss of India for the continuation of the blockade.
9
 
Bertie considered the escort needed to be strong and promised the Nereide and La 
Bourbonaise, but the stand made by Shield and his yard offices on the non-practicality 
of refitting her for service put Bertie to considerable embarrassment. This situation was 
saved when news reached the Cape that the mutiny has been suppressed. 
 
The bringing of La Bourbonaise into HM Service would have provided Bertie with a 40 
gun frigate, and provided him with prize money. Figure 5f indicates the effort expended 
on this ship, but that was only for ensuring her safe return to England. The initial survey 
undertaken by the yard officers reported that the ship could be taken into service, but the 
resources of the yard were too limited to refit her at the Cape. If done the refit would 
exhaust the naval stores in the arsenal, prevent the support of other vessels, and entail 
                                                 
8
 Journal of William Shield at Cape of Good Hope, (1809-1813), DRO, 74B/MFS 30, 27
th
 October 1809. 
9
 Caledon to Bertie, 17
th
 October 1809, Theal, G., (Ed.), Records of Cape Colony from May 1809 to 
March 1811, Vol. 7, 1900, (London), 200-201. 
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considerable expenditure. Their survey reported that 30 shipwrights and caulkers, four 
smiths and ten sailmakers were needed. It would require fifty days to complete the task 
of refitting and storing the frigate for eight months at a cost of £7000 to £8000.  
 
Bertie would not accept this view, and ordered Shield to repair her for local service. 
Admiral Bertie placed Captain Corbet
10
 in command of La Bourbonaise, a man who 
had similar views to the commander-in-chief on Shield’s obstructive manner. There 
were considerable discussions and changes of mind by Bertie on the destination and 
refit required for the frigate; sending her to India, to the blockading squadron, and 
eventually giving in to the commissioner’s view of returning her to Britain. Shield 
commented to the Navy Board, ‘After a great variety of reports, and counter requests, 
the Admiral at last came to the resolution of sending La Bourbonaise to England, a 
measure there should never have been the least resistance on, but the Admiral’s agents 
were very anxious for her being retained on the station.’11 The agents were Maude and 
Robinson who also had the existing victualling contract, and were under investigation 
by Shield for the Admiralty.  
 
Bertie’s letter of 8th December to the Admiralty provided a clear defence of his views 
for bringing the prize into service. In this he states his clear disagreement with Shield 
and the yard officers. He said the argument to not refit the La Bourbonaise because it 
would strip the arsenal could have been avoided by purchasing local materials. He had 
consulted a local ship builder, Mr Osmond, who stated he could repair her in three 
weeks for only £1000. Bertie further argued that the ship would have been of 
considerable value to his squadron, and having to send her home with a captain and 
crew he could ill afford to lose was putting his ability to support operations at risk. 
 
The entries in Shield’s journal in November 1809 provide an insight into the reaction of 
Bertie, ‘War again with the Admiral on the subject of Bourbonaise he is inconsistent 
without any Principle of Justice’.12 This was not the only reason that the admiral was 
annoyed with the commissioner. Shield also wrote concerning suspicion of fraud by the 
                                                 
10
 J. K. Laugton, (rev. Tom Wareham), ‘Corbet, Robert, (d. 1810)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, (2004), accessed 10
th
 June 2011. 
11
 Shield to Navy Board, TNA, ADM106/2004, 8th December 1809. 
12
 Journal of William Shield at the Cape of Good Hope, DRO, 74B/MFS 30, 11th November 1809. 
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agent of the hospital causing him to comment in his journal, ‘Violent communication 
from the Admiral inconsistent and troublesome to a degree’.13 
 
Shield’s letter to the Navy Board of the 18th November outlined the problems regarding 
the refit of Bourbonaise. Bertie refused to accept the judgement of the yard officers and 
Shield to only refit Bourbonaise for enable her sail for Britain. With the escort mission 
Bertie envisaged, he considered sending her to India to refit was the best policy. With 
the abandonment of this operation he eventually gave in to the views of the naval yard. 
The commissioner’s letter arrived at the Navy Board in January 1810, together with the 
survey reports of the yard officers. The letter was annotated by the Navy Board with a 
note dated 30
th
 January and forwarded to the Admiralty with their professional opinion; 
‘acquaint their Lordships that if the commander in chief upon foreign stations do order 
ships taken from the enemy to be fitted out and equipped from the arsenals abroad those 
magazines must inevitably be distressed for the stores which have been provided for the 
ships of the squadron stationed there’. This gives an unambiguous official view of the 







In the Admiralty’s reply to Bertie’s letter of 16th November informing them of the 
commissioning of Caroline as the La Bourbonaise, they notified the admiral of their 
disapproval and that it was in direct violation of his instructions.
15
 This was but one of 
the letters the Admiralty wrote to Bertie in January and February 1810 that showed their 
continuing frustration with his actions regarding refitting of ships. The action of the 
admiral concerning the hire of a hulk for the refit of Raisonable also disapproved of, 
especially as he had paid £500 for the service, a sum they considered excessive; in 
future the Admiralty directed Bertie to leave such matters to the naval storekeeper.
16
 
Their lordships also reminded him not to send ships to Bombay for refit instead as 




La Bourbonaise’s very short commission came to an end on her arrival at Plymouth in 
early February 1810 with her being paid off, never to return to service. With all the 
                                                 
13
 Journal of William Shield, DRO, 74B/MFS 30, 25th November 1809. 
14
 Admiralty to Bertie, TNA, ADM 2/937, 12
th
 September 1809. 
15
 Admiralty to Bertie, TNA, ADM 2/937, 13
th
 February 1810. 
16
 Admiralty to Bertie, TNA, ADM 2/937, 16
th
 January 1810. 
17
 Admiralty to Bertie, TNA, ADM 2/937, 8
th
 February 1810. 
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resources of a home dockyard La Bourbonaise was not considered in a suitable state to 
be refitted for service, as presumably the effort and stores required were better expended 
on other vessels. Thus ended La Bourbonaise’s life and fully justified the actions of 
Shield, his yard officers, the Navy Board and the Admiralty. The Admiralty had been 
consistent with their policy for overseas yards with their role being one as a supply 
depot and minor repairs for the ships on station. 
 
The Admiralty ship deployment records show that Inconstant was allocated and sent to 
the Cape of Good Hope on 27
th
 December 1809. She had been recently re-
commissioned in June of that year after a long refit at Portsmouth. She was a 36 gun, 18 
pounder frigate having additionally been fitted with twelve 32 pounder carronades on 
her quarter deck, thus making her a strong addition to the squadron. This ship had been 
ordered in 1781, but was not commissioned until 1790 making her a vessel that had 
been in service for twenty years.  
 
Shield records in his journal that Inconstant arrived on the 13
th
 March, ‘in great distress 
having been on shore on Darin Island’. The subsequent actions of Bertie and Shield and 
their reports to the Admiralty and Navy Board concerning the Inconstant were again to 
display their appalling relationship. 
 
The master shipwright surveyed the damaged ship recommending Inconstant was 
careened. The work required before careening was critical as she needed rapid 
unloading and a considerable increase in the number of shipwrights and carpenters to 
effect temporary repairs. Shield immediately hired an additional six shipwrights, as can 
be confirmed in the yard pay lists. He requested all the squadron’s carpenters were 
released and placed under the master shipwright, and finally the squadron’s boats and 
men to assist in removing stores.  
 
The commissioner ordered all the yard’s shipwrights, caulkers and ship carpenters to 
report onboard the Inconstant on the 18
th
 March, but assistance from the squadron was 
intermittent. Shield’s efforts to obtain support to save the Inconstant caused the 
relationship between him and Bertie to descend into insults. Bertie’s position was his 
squadron had more important priorities, that of the frigates returning to the blockade 
and the Raisonable to convoy vessels to St Helena. Shield appears to have forced the 
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admiral into action by the following statement, ‘the only chance of her preservation rest 
entirely with you; you have the power and means of saving the ship for the King’s 
Service and you only.’18 The admiral complied but attempted to embarrass the master 
shipwright and master attendant by initiating an enquiry by three post captains into the 
yard officers’ direction of the saving of Inconstant. 
 
Commissioner Shield’s reply to this enquiry and Bertie’s letters was damning.19 He 
pointed out the Inconstant arrived in a sinking state on the 13
th
 March; Bertie had a ship 
of the line, three frigates, two sloops and three transports at his disposal, but Inconstant 
was not ready for heaving down until 20
th
. It should have been done in 48 hours. Bertie 
had decided to hold two court-martials on board a sinking ship and hence work had to 
be done to ensure the safety of everyone on board. The enquiry agreed with Shield’s 
observation that ship’s boats were being diverted from the task of saving the Inconstant. 
Shield goes on to state the ship was being saved by the efforts of his officers, but Bertie 
needed to supply the means they were asking for, namely the assistance of ships’ crews 
in the bay. The argument was won by Shield as the ships delayed their departure for St 
Helena, and the boats he needed were released to assist the refit. The correspondence 
again showed stark differences between Shield’s and Bertie’s approach. The 
commissioner had been completely focused on saving the ship. He used all the 
resources he had available with his requests to Bertie for support, starting with requests 
that became increasingly insistent, until he showed his absolute contempt for the 
admiral’s actions.  
 
Both Bertie and Shield wrote to the Admiralty and the Navy Board regarding the 
circumstances of Inconstant’s refit. Commissioner Shield sent his report in late March, 
in which he copied details of the correspondence that had occurred between himself and 
Bertie, and the reports from his yard officers regarding the support supplied by the 
squadron. 
 
The Navy Board annotated Shield’s letters on 17th July and forwarded these letters to 
the Admiralty with two significant comments. The first of these concerned the 
‘unwarrantable’ interference of the admiral with the dockyard which was saving the 
Inconstant. The second comment was probably the more damaging. This indicated that 
                                                 
18
 Shield to Commander-in-chief, DRO, 74B/MFS2, 20th March 1810. 
19
 Shield to Commander-in-chief, DRO, 74B/MFS2, 22nd March 1810. 
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The admiral also wrote a series of letters to the Admiralty regarding his actions 
concerning the Inconstant and the disagreement with Shield, pointing out the difficulty 
he had working with the commissioner.
21
 Unfortunately for the commander-in-chief the 
Admiralty agreed with their commissioner. The Navy Board’s letter of 1st August to the 
commissioner informed him they had forwarded his letters to the Admiralty with a note 
backing him.
22
 Bertie’s actions of holding two court-martials on the sinking Inconstant 
were considered by the Admiralty to have retarded the refit, another black mark against 
him.
23
 The timing of this episode may be significant, as a letter from Bertie was about to 
land on the desk of Secretary Croker that gave the Admiralty an excuse to withdraw the 
admiral and replace him with Robert Stopford. 
 
The refits of Caledon, Bourbonaise and Inconstant together with the retention of 
Raisonable have shown in detail the reasons for the Admiralty’s policy for overseas 
naval yards, that of minimal refits. Their reasons were ones of economy as well as 
effectiveness as their policies enabled a coherent logistics structure to be maintained. 
The overseas yards were maintenance and supply bases rather than major refitting 
locations, but they still had sufficient resources to save valuable units of the British 
navy. Without the presence of a strong representative of their policies the Admiralty’s 
rationale was at risk from a campaign focused commander-in-chief. 
                                                 
20
 Shield to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 106/2004, 30
th
 March 1810. 
21




 March 1810. 
22
 Navy Board to Shield, TNA, ADM 106/2481, 1
st
 August 1810. 
23
 Admiralty to Bertie, TNA, ADM 2/937, 15
th
 August 1810. 
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Commissioner Shield took his responsibility for superintendence of the victualling 
department seriously, and recorded in his journal the problems he was finding. His 
journal
1
 is littered with references to his involvement with the victualling department, 
ranging from the inspection and purchase of casks of meat from prizes, to paying the 
establishment staff. What is also evident was his dissatisfaction with the running of the 
department, ‘Had much to find with the victualling department, it is certainly very bad’ 
on 5
th
 July, ‘no attention by the victualling department to the lemon juice’ on 14th July 
and the timekeeping and quality of the staff was to become an obsession. ‘Went to the 
victualler department to pay that department at seven o’clock office shut up no one to 
receive me. Paid one clerk and cooper remainder at 12 o’clock’ on 3rd August and 
‘Victualling clerks very inattentive shameful’ on 29th July.  
 
As the victualling yard was next door to the commissioner’s home it was not unusual 
for Shield to frequently check the victualling office. In September similar observations 
were made, ‘No one at the victualling office at seven o’clock no work done at 
victualling house at quarter past seven’, on 5th September and on the 6th September, ‘No 
first clerk at the victualling office at half past seven’. By November Shield was still 
having trouble with the clerks of the victualling department with him recording he was 
dissatisfied with both the first and second clerks, especially when he records being 
verbally attacked by the second clerk. It was evident that the commissioner did not have 
the respect of the staff or authority to remove them, but the disputes with Bertie 
regarding this department was at the root of this inability to act radically.  
 
The behaviour that Shield was uncovering indicates that the management and example 
set by the agent victualler and first clerk was suspect. Henry Pallister, the agent 
victualler, and his first clerk, James Howell, were appointed in Britain to manage the 
victualling department, arriving at the Cape in August 1806. 
2
 Shield’s journal continues 
to record problems concerning behaviour, timekeeping and the operation of the 
department until both Pallister and Howell were removed in mid 1810. With the 
appointment of a new agent and establishment of a new victualling contract, 
accomplished in the teeth of opposition from Admiral Bertie, the journal remains silent 
on these issues with the exception of frequent dining with the new agent. The arguments 
                                                 
1
 Journal of William Shield, DRO, 74B/MFS 30. 
2
 Philip, P., British Residents at the Cape 1795-181, (Cape Town, 1981), 314. 
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that Shield and Bertie had concerning victualling are worth examination, as they not 
only illustrate the problems of divided control, caused by the framing of article 
nineteen, but add further weight to the withdrawal of the admiral. 
 
How the interaction between Bertie, Shield and the agent victualler, Pallister, developed 
during the next year shows the problems of article nineteen. If Shield had a direction or 
task he wished the agent to perform he had to ask Bertie to issue the order. This varied 
from directing Pallister to purchase items, to providing the accounts for Shield to 
examine. Considerable discussion occurred in August 1809 on who had authority to 
appoint a new agent if the existing one retired due to ill health, but Bertie and Shield 
could not agree on who had authority. They agreed that Bertie was to write to the 
Admiralty for direction for such appointments, and until informed the status quo 
remained. The admiral’s letter to the Admiralty of 15th September requesting who had 





In early September 1809 a complaint regarding the poor quality of the victualling stores 
being supplied to the blockading squadron was received from Commodore Rowley. 
Shield agreed with Rowley’s observations and wrote to Bertie, ‘the general carelessness 
in the carrying on every point of the victualling concern and the daily opposition I met 
with, is a constant source of vexation to me, and nothing can be expected efficient from 
it unless some change takes place’.4 Bertie’s reaction to this letter was agreement and a 
wish to discuss matters rather than write letters, but his subsequent actions concerning 
improvements stopped at anything that could help, in fact the reverse was to occur.  
 
With Mr. Pallister’s health deteriorating the first clerk took over the management of the 
victualling office from September 1809, but it was not long before an example of 
appalling practice occurred. The victualling office appears to have been in the habit of 
keeping large sums of money to hand as Howell came to the commissioner to report the 
loss, presumed to be theft, of 2000 dollars from his office. Shield’s reaction was swift, 
he reported to Bertie that Howell had given a lame excuse, and recommended that 
Howell be immediately directed to deposit the remaining money into the Lombard 
                                                 
3
 Admiralty to Bertie, TNA, ADM 2/937, 14
th
 December 1809. 
4
 Shield to Bertie, DRO, 74B/MFS 2, 2
nd
 September 1809. 
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Bank. This was followed by the suggestion that money only be drawn out when 
required, and only with Shield’s authorisation. 5 Bertie’s reaction was immediate with 
agreement to the banking and authorisation suggestions. The subsequent investigation 
into the theft caused considerable activity to find the thief with encouragement from the 
Admiralty, but the culprit was not found. Howell found the measures imposed by 
Shield’s approval process very restrictive causing him to write to the admiral for a 
relaxation. In this he was unsuccessful.
6
 Money management was now under the control 
of Shield who only allowed a small petty cash of 100 Rix dollars to be kept in the 
victualling office, but the relationship with Howell and Pallister became even worse.  
 
To perform his audit role Shield requested the books of the department for 
authorisation. This resulted in considerable opposition from Howell and Pallister, with 
Shield having to ask the admiral to direct them to allow him access to the department’s 
documentation.
7
 Bertie’s direction to Howell was insufficient to overcome his 
reluctance to allow Shield access to the account books. This caused the commissioner to 
quote his authority with an extract of a letter to Pallister from the Victualling Board 
dated 9
th
 January 1809 which stated; ‘We therefore direct you in addition to compliance 
necessary due to the naval commander in chief to comply with all such directions as you 
may from time to time receive from the commissioner, allowing him access when he 
requires it, to all your accounts, and furnishing him with all information respecting our 
public transactions that he may require’.8 This still did not result in access to the 
documents. When Shield went to the office he was told the books were needed by 
Pallister and had been sent out of town, causing Shield to comment in his journal, ‘that 
[I] might not see it’.9  
 
These actions, together with the general running of the department, caused Shield to 
write a long letter to the admiral demanding a complete re-organisation, especially as 
the first clerk was declining to act in the absence agent’s role. He pointed out in this 
letter that his opinion of Howell was very low, and he was still awaiting access to the 
department books. However, the admiral was still backing Pringle and Howell. Shield 
                                                 
5
 Shield to Bertie, DRO, 74B/MFS 2, 25
th
 October 1809. 
6
 Howell to Bertie, TNA, ADM 1/62, 20
th
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7
 Shield to Bertie, DRO, 74B/MFS 2, 13
th
 January 1810. 
8
 Shield to Bertie, DRO, 74B/MFS 2, 16
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9
 Journal of William Shield, DRO, 74B/MFS 30, 18
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continues to record strange behaviour concerning the victualling department in his 
journal with such examples as, ‘Victualling people behaving very ill and negligent’ on 
11
th
 April; ‘Sale of the victualling stores. Shameful conduct of the agent in offering for 
sale serviceable provisions.’ on 28th April; ‘Victualling goes on wretchedly’ on 30th 
April; ‘Violent and threatening letters from the agent victualler’ on 5th May; and ‘Paid 
victualling the agent made disbursements in direct contradiction to my protest’ on 7th 
May.  
 
The numbers of clerks in the victualling department also exercised Shield’s pen with his 
belief that only five were necessary, hence a reduction of two. This Shield would have 
achieved by concentrating business at Cape Town, but also ensuring they worked the 
hours for which they were paid. Figure 4q in chapter four shows he was not successful 
in this endeavour until the new agent victualler took up his post. 
 
The methods and manner used by Shield to improve performance caused Bertie to 
object. The argument they had in August 1809 not only concerned a ‘turf war’ on who 
had power of appointment, but on the size and make up of the victualling department. 
The language used in these letters bordered on the insulting with Shield saying, ‘I by no 
means hold myself accountable to you for any part of my conduct’, his argument was 
that the department was not working effectively or economically and that checks and 
restraints were necessary. Shield held that his measures were, ‘irksome to the parties 
who no longer reap the benefit they had been accustomed to from the profligacy of 
those who care it should have been to have prevented such abuses’.10  As Shield’s 
journal records the admiral was unhappy with the controls being put in place, ‘admiral 
did not speak to me at open war at least I’m [comfortable?] with it’.11 
 
Shield’s next manoeuvre on applying pressure was obtained by his attempts to obtain 
oaths and bonds from the agent and his clerks as required by the Admiralty. To obtain 
these he used the admiral to direct the staff to undertake these conditions of 
employment.
12
 However, Bertie seems to consider his authority was under threat 
concerning the victualling and transport departments and entered into an attack on 
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 Shield to Bertie, DRO, 74B/MFS 2, 17
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 August 1809. 
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 Journal of William Shield, DRO, 74B/MFS 30, 14
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Shield and his method of superintendence. Bertie wrote to the commissioner on the 1
st
 
October that he considered Shield had exceeded his authority contained in his 
instructions, and that he was informing the Admiralty.
13
 Shield frustration with the 
commander-in-chief is evident in his reply to this letter and is worth quoting at some 
length. ‘I most sincerely lament that such as I have found it absolutely necessary to 
exert over the agents and clerks, of the different departments, in order to prevent a 
reoccurrence of the peculations and wicked expenditure of the Public money hereto 
practiced in this colony, should have drawn jealousy instead of support as it cannot fail 
to impede me most materially in the execution of the unpleasant duties it has fallen to 
my lot to perform and which I find the utmost difficulty in getting through with owing 
to the want of support and to the determined hostility and opposition I daily meet with – 
the unsettled accounts of Messr Maude, Robinson, Hopley and co and the infamous 
conduct of the existing agent of the hospital point strongly to the futility of my sitting in 
my office until the accounts of the respective agents are laid before me for examination 
and approval.’14 He concludes his letter with the following ‘much satisfaction at the 
determination you have taken to refer the charges you have been pleased to form against 
me to the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty, having full reliance in their Lordships 
viewing with eyes of indulgence and approbation my earnest and anxious endeavours to 
perform a new duty in the way it appears to me most conducive to the good of His 
Majesty’s service.’ Bertie’s reply to Shield denied he had put any obstacles in Shield’s 
way, merely that he was operating to the new instructions and that the Admiralty would 
understand his tone rather than the commissioner. 
 
The Admiralty and Victualling Boards concurred with Commissioner Shield’s view as 
they removed Pallister and appointed a new agent victualler. This together with the 
Admiralty’s directions to re-tender the victualling contract was to create a more 
effective organisation at the Cape. 
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 Bertie to Shield, DRO, 74B/MFS 1, 1
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 Maude and Robinson Contract 
Quantity 
Received 
Description Unit Cost 
currency 
Total Cost 
Rd Sc St 
886762 Biscuit (lbs) 4
1
/2 d 83133 7 83133.9 
84103 Wine 9 month warranty (Gallon) 3s 6d 73590 1 73590.1 
14691 Wine 6 month warranty (Gallon) 3s 0d 11018 5 11018.3 
6729 Vinegar (Gallon) 11
1
/4 d 1576 2 1577.11 
65011 Raisins (lbs) 5
3
/4d 7787 6 7787.78 
2792 English Pease (Bushel) 16s 11169 0 11168 
546 Cape Calavance (Bushel) 14s 1911 0 1911 
11173 Cocoa (lbs) 1s 6d 4189 7 4189.88 
19498 Tea (lbs) 4s 0d 19498 4 19498 
1064 Roasted coffee (1.5 lb) 4s 0d 709 2 709.333 
Total (Calculation) 214584 2 0 




 Mr. W. Bird’s Tender 
Quantity 
Received 
Description Unit Cost 
currency 
Total Cost 
Rd Sc St 
886762 Biscuit (lbs) 5
3
/4 d 106226 5 3.5 
84103 Wine 9 month warranty (Gallon) 3s 11d 82350 6 5 
14691 Wine 6 month warranty (Gallon) 2s 7d 9488 2 0 
6729 Vinegar (Gallon) 11
1
/4 d 1576 2 4 
65011 Raisins (lbs) 6
3
/4d 9142 1 4 
2792 English Pease (Bushel) 12s 8367 6 0 
546 Cape Calavance (Bushel) 11s 1638 0 0 
11173 Cocoa (lbs) 11d 2560 3 5 
19498 Tea (lbs) 3s 0d 14623 7 0 
1064 Roasted coffee (1.5 lb) 3s 0d 532 0 0 
Total (Calculation) 236506 3 3.5 




 Rd Sc St 
Mr. Bird tender 236515 3 4
1
/2 
Maude & Robinson 214584 4 
1
/4 






 One Rix dollar = Four shilling currency; Six stivers = one schelling; 
Eight schillings = one Rix Dollar 
                                                          
1
 Burchell, W., Travels in the interior of South Africa, Vol. 1,(1822) 78-79 
Source:http://www.tokencoins.com/history.htm 
Appendix 6a Naval yard labour costs for fitting of colonial schooner Isabella 
415 




Cost in sterling 
 




133.75 7s 7.5d £50 19s 10.25d £73 18s 9.25d 
Sailmakers 59.75 6s 5.5d £19 5s 10.5d £27 19s 6d 
Foreman of Smiths 36 12s 11.5d £22 14s 6d £32 19s 0.25d 
Smiths 106.5 7s 5.5d £39 14s 3.75d £57 11s 8.75d 
Blacksmiths 76 3s £11 8s 0d £16 10s 7.25d 
Sawyer (Top man) 2.5 6s 5.5d 16s 1.75d £1 3s 5d 
Sawyer (Bottom man) 2.5 5s 9.5d 14s 5.75d £1 1s 0d 
Black caulkers 105.5 3s £15 15s 6d £22 18s 11d 
Black labourers 80 3s £12 £17 
Ship carpenters 120.5 7s (c)  £29 1s 8.75d £42 3s 6d 
Ship carpenters’ chip 
money 
 4d (s) £2 0s 2d £2 18s 2.75d 
Caulkers 26 7s (c) £6 5s 6.25d £9 2s 0d 
Caulkers’ chip money  4d (s) 8s 8d 12s 6.75d 
Masons 2.5 6s (c) 10s 4.25 15s 0d 
Gatekeeper 2.75 5s (c) 9s 5.75d 13s 9d 
Seamen 47.75 4s (c) £6 11s 8.75d £9 11s 0d 
Quartermaster 3.75 6s (c) 15s 7.75d £1 2s 6d 
Labour total £219 13s 0.5d £318 1s 5d 
Rebate for materials wasted by artificers £1 19s 10.75d £2 17s 10.25d 




The exchange rate applied above for sterling to currency = 145% 
 
Stores and material costs = £711 6s 7
1




The charge for materials and labour was determined from the rates directed by a Navy 
Board warrant of the 19
th
 November 1796. 
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Cape Town was the major settlement at the Cape colony and the site of the principal 
shore naval facilities until they were moved to Simon’s Town.  An impression of the 
small size of this colonial town and where the naval establishment was located can only 
be visualised via contemporary paintings, drawings and charts.  
 
Figure 6bi is a fine picture by William Hodges of Cape Town representing his visit in 
1772, but another image of Cape Town by J. Wells in 1787, figure 6bii, shows more 
detail of the water front. In both pictures the castle and church are clearly shown and 
provide a context in which figures 6biii, 6biv and 6bv can be placed.  
 
In 1807 Captain Beaufort
1
 made an uncompleted survey of Table Bay on which he drew 
the layout of Cape Town. Figure 6biii shows this chart with figure 6biv being an 
enlargement of the town detailing the positions of the admiral’s house (later the 
commissioner’s accommodation), the naval yard, town wharf and victualling premises. 
The orderly layout of Cape Town is plainly evident in the plan but also shown is the 
small nature of the settlement. The regular and neat arrangement of Cape Town is also 
noticeable in figure 6biv. Figure 6bv shows a view of Cape Town from Signal Hill and 
dates from around 1780. From this picture the topography of the town and position of 
the main buildings detailed in table 6bi, in conjunction with Beaufort’s plan, is evident. 
 
Simon’s Town ‘raison d'être’ was for the support of vessels. The settlement was 
established in the 1740s with the building of a combined hospital and store building to 
sustain ships of the Dutch VOC
2
 sheltering in the bay.
3
 Figures 6bvi to 6bxi show the 
transformation that occurred to turn Simon’s Town into a home of Britain’s navy. The 
view presented in all these pictures is the very small nature of Simon’s Town, even after 
the facilities and civilian staff were transferred. Figure 6bvi illustrates the buildings the 
Dutch had built prior to 1789 and shows it was a small settlement. 
 
In June 1812, shortly before the order from the Admiralty to move to Simon’s Town, 
the master of Danmark carried out a trigonometrical survey of Simon’s Bay. This 
survey was accompanied by a watercolour picture shown in figure 6bvii and 6bviii. 
Figure 6bvii shows the bearings made by the master with descriptions of the buildings 
                                                 
1
 Captain Beaufort was commander of Woolwich at this time but was to become future Hydrographer of 
the navy. 
2
 Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC in Dutch, literally "United 
East Indian Company"). 
3
 Brock, B.B. & Brock, B.G, (eds), Historical Simon’s Town, 22. 
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in Simon’s Town. By using these indicators the detail in figure 6biii is more clearly 
understood. When the general plan of Simon’s Town, shown in figure 6biv, is viewed in 
conjunction with Salmond’s painting the layout of the naval establishment becomes 
plain. 
 
In 1817 the naval establishment building work at Simon’s Town was completed. Mary 
Brenton, the sister of the commissioner, painted many pictures at the Cape including 
one of the Simon’s Town in 1816. A black and white image of her watercolour is shown 
as figure 6bx with 6bxi provided a key identifying the official buildings. 
 
All the illustrations demonstrate the small nature of Simon’s Town, with very few 
buildings not connected with supporting either the VOC or the British Navy. The 
settlement was without a church until the naval establishment was built and was very 
much a colonial backwater. It can be of little wonder that encouragement was required 
to retain a workforce. 
 
 
Figure 6bi:  A view of the Cape of Good Hope, taken on the spot, from on board the 
Resolution, Capt. Cook, November 1772
4
 
                                                 
4
 W. Hodges, Official artist on Captain Cook’s second voyage, NMM, BHC 1778_700.   




Figure 6bii:  A View of the Table Mountain and Cape Town, at the Cape of Good Hope
5
  
                                                 
5
 J. Wells, after W. Hodges, NMM, PAH2821. 
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 Beaufort’s sketch used by Dalrymple to produce Admiralty chart, UKHO, r89, accessed October 2009. 
Appendix 6b: The naval establishment at Cape Town and Simon’s Town 
420 
 
Figure 6biv: Detail of Captain Beaufort sketch of Table Bay and Cape Town (1807)
7
 
                                                 
7
 Beaufort’s sketch used by Dalrymple to produce Admiralty chart, UKHO, r89, accessed October 2009 






1 Green Point and Battery mounting 4 guns in embrasures and 5 en 
barbette. 
2 Mouille Battery – 4 barbette guns. It stands rather high on the sand hills 
commanding the other low batteries and round the coast. It has two flag 
staffs. 
3 A mound of sand behind which are 2 mortars. 
4 Chaverine Battery, guardhouse, magazine, forge and flag staff. 30 
embrasures and 6 barbette. 
5 Magazine 
6 Amsterdam Battery, barracks, magazine, forges, and well of bad water, 
mounts 14 embrasure guns and 12 en barbette, with a tier of portholes 
underneath, which are now built up and prisoners kept there. 
7 A house for boiling whale oil. 
8 Burying ground 
9 Rogge Battery, 13 guns in embrasures and 2 barbette. 
10 Lutheran church. 
11 Naval Hospital. 
12 Hottentot square. 
13 Theatre. 
14 Guard houses. 
15 Mount Nelson. Mr. Maude’s house and garden. 
16 Not used. 
17 Menagerie. 
18 Governor’s Gardens, a Public Walk. 
19 Governor’s House. 
20 Public Library. 
21 Church with Spire. 
22 Square and Green Market. 
23 Fountain. 
24 Mrs. Vanscou’s Lodging house, on the north side of which is a small 
terrace to which my room opened and which I found a very convenient 
place for observations & co. 
25 The Prison. 
26 The Admiral’s house, with door opening to the Dockyard. 
27 Victualling Office. 
28 Dockyard, storehouses, offices, flagstaff and co. but very confined. 
29 An old barracks burned down. This would be a convenient place to erect 
Victualling or other storehouse which are now up in the town. 
30 Parade. 
31 Barracks for cavalry and infantry. 
32 Gates into the Citadel, a fortified pentagon with dry and wet ditch and 
mounting upwards of 80 guns. 
33 Artillery mess house & co. 
34 General’s apartments, together with all the Military Offices. 
 






35 Barracks for the garrison of the Citadel. 
36 Wooden Pier, supported on piles about 400 feet long and 24 feet broad 
37 Road to the country branching off to the left to Hottentot Holland, and to 
the right to Constantia and Simon’s Bay. 
38 Line wall mounting cannon here and there. 
39 Military Hospital. 
40 Knocke Fort – 6 guns on embrasures but surrounded by ditch with draw 
bridge. 
41 Craig’s Battery of 5 barbette guns, and a small town commanding it. 
42 Prince of Wale’s blockhouse, about 480 feet above the level of the sea. 
43 York blockhouse, about 930 feet above the sea: And battery below it. 
44 King’s blockhouse, about 1330 feet above the sea. 
45 Water Mill, the road up to Table hill lies by this mill. 
46 Commissary general Murray’s house. 
47 Guardhouse. The road round the Lion’s Head to Green Point lies by this 
Guardhouse. 
48 Lion’s Head or Sugar Loaf, with Signal Post and hut, inaccessible but by 
one path and by the assistance of ropes in two places which are 
perpendicular. Its elevation above the sea is about 2320 feet. 
49 Lion’s Rump with Signal Post and lookout house about 1080 feet high. 
50 Three Anchor battery somewhat about this point with an easterly wind 
there is (I have been told) good landing there. 
 
Table 6bi: Building descriptions shown on figures 6g and 6h. 
 
 




                                                 
8
 Worden, N., van Heyningen, E., and Bickford-Smith, V., Cape Town - The Making of a City, 
(Claremont (South Africa), 1998), 46-47; picture attributed to Johannes Schumacher. 
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Figure 6bvi: View of the Anchorage at Simon’s Town in 17899 
                                                 
9
 Brock, B.B. & Brock, B.G, (eds), Historical Simon’s Town, 18-19. 
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Figure 6bvii: Perspective view of Simon’s Town by Lt. Salmond in 181410  
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 Part of a trigonometrical survey of Simons Bay by Thomas Curtis, Master of  Danmark, June 1814, 
Admiralty Library, Vz 814. 
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Figure 6bviii: Detail of Lt. Salmond’s perspective view of Simon’s Town 




Figure 6bix: Plan of Simon’s Town in 181511 
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 Brock, B.B. & Brock, B.G, (eds), Historical Simon’s Town, 32-33. 
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Figure 6bx: Simon’s Town in 181612 
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 Brock, B.B. & Brock, B.G, (eds), Historical Simon’s Town, 80 
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Figure 6bxi: Key to Figure 6bx
13
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 Brock, B.B. & Brock, B.G, (eds), Historical Simon’s Town, 81 
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This appendix has been written to clarify who occupied the post of Superintendent of 
the Bombay Marine during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as there are 
inconsistent statements in a number of books. Low’s History of the Indian Navy states 
the post of Superintendent of the Marine was re-established on 1
st
 August 1798 with 
Philip Dundas being appointed.
1
 Wadia states the post was also reactivated in August 
1798.
2
 It becomes more confusing as Parkinson states Dundas had obtained the well 




Neither the master attendant nor the superintendent post was insignificant as the 
superintendent reported to the government of Bombay and was chairman of the Marine 
Board. This board consisted of the master attendant, the commodore and two senior 
captains of the Bombay Marine. As stated in chapter seven Philip Dundas was also 
appointed by Elphinstone to serve as Bombay naval storekeeper in January 1796. For 
this post the Admiralty allowed a salary of £200 and 3d in the pound sterling on his 
disbursements.
4
 This he received in addition to his Company salary. Dundas served in 
both posts until he asked to be released as naval storekeeper in 1801.
5
 This was also to 
be the case for William Taylor Money who held both posts from 1808 to 1810. 
 
Name Dates in Post 
Philip Dundas 1794 to 1801 
Robert Anderson 1802 to 1804 
William Taylor Money 1805 to 1810 
Post not recorded 1810 to 1812 
Henry Meriton 1813 to 1824 
 




Table 7bi provides a list of the superintendent of the Bombay Marine. Philip Dundas 
and Robert Anderson had both held the post of master attendant of the marine before 
becoming superintendent. 
                                                 
1
 Low, C., History of Indian Navy Volume 1, 214-215. 
2
 Wadia, R., The Bombay Dockyard and the Wadia Master Shipbuilders, 79-80. 
3
 Parkinson, C., War in the Eastern Seas, 290. 
4
 Admiralty to Elphinstone, TNA, ADM 2/937, 8
th
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5
 Admiralty to Rainier, TNA, ADM 2/937, 3
rd
 March 1802. 
6
 Provisional list provided by M. Packer, Map Collection Manager, British Library, 10
th
 March 2011. 





By 1815 Bombay had two dry docks. Chapter one detailed the history of the original 
dock with it being in use in July 1750 and twice extended to create a facility capable of 
accommodating three ships. Duncan dock was constructed in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century to enable the dockyard to construct 74 gun ships for the British navy, 
and increase its capacity to accommodate such vessels. On completion of the inner 
Duncan dock the yard was capable of building a frigate in the inner Bombay dock, a 74 
gun ship in Duncan inner and repairs of sloops, frigates and 74s in the remaining docks. 
Table 7b1 provides the details of the completion dates and physical dimensions of 










Bombay (Inner) 1750 209 47 15 
Bombay (Middle) 1762 183 51 20 
Bombay (Outer) 1773 256 51 20 
Duncan  (Inner) 1807 286 63 23 
Duncan (Outer) 1810 246 63.6 23 
  
Table 7bi: Dimensions and completion dates of Bombay dry docks 
 
Figure 7j in chapter seven provided a layout of Bombay Dockyard in 1816, indicating 
where the multiple docks were divided, figure 7bi below shows a more detailed view of 
where and how partitioned. This contemporary diagram shows a plan of the Duncan 
dock with the divide clearly shown. The cross section view shows the profile of the 
dock with the outline of a 74 gun ship displayed. 
 
Amongst the features introduced at this time were steam engines to pump out water 
from the excavations when constructing Duncan dock, and presumably to empty the 
docks to provide independence from the state of the tide. Wadia states this was a 20 
horse power engine with Graham confirming this was the only such engine on the island 
and that it was for pumping the dock dry.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Wadia, R. A., The Bombay Dockyard and the Wadia Master Shipbuilders, 55-56; Graham, M., Journal 
of a short residence in India, (Edinburgh, 1813), 12. 




Figure 7bi: Plan and elevation of Duncan (New) Docks
2
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 Duncan Dry Dock – Bombay, UKHO, C104 Bf1. 





The existence of dry docks at Calcutta in this period has been hinted at in naval 
histories, but frequently they have been completely ignored or forgotten. Usually the 
facilities at Bombay have received all the attention with the statement they were the 
only dry docks outside of Europe, or more correctly the only docks able to 
accommodate a 74 gun ship. Table 7bii provides a list of the dry docks at Calcutta in 
1822. The capacity and dimensions of these docks have yet to be found, but we know 
that at least one dock was capable of receiving a 38 gun frigate as Phaeton was docked 
in Mr. Smith’s dock in April 1809.3  
 
Date Description 
1790 The East India Company built a dock at Bankshall for their pilot vessels. 
This was the first dock constructed at Calcutta, it was disused and filled up 
about 1808. 
1796-7 A dock was constructed by Mr. Bacon, at Sulkea, on the western side of the 
Hooghly opposite to northern extremity of Calcutta. The frigate Orpheus 
was the first ship hauled into dock. Note: Possibly the 12 pdr fifth rate 
frigate of that name that was stationed in the East Indies at this time. 
1801 A dock constructed by Mr. Gilmore at Sulkea. 
1801 A dock commenced upon by Mr. P.Brady at Howrah, opposite the centre of 
Calcutta, and finished by Messrs Archer and Smith. 
1803 A dock was constructed by Mr. A Waddell at Khidderpore, just below Fort 
William, since the property of Messrs J.& R. Kydd, the Company’s master 
builder. 
1808 A dock larger than any of the above was constructed by Mr. Matthew 
Smith now the property of Mr. F. Vrignon. 
 




It is very unlikely that any of the above docks were capable of receiving a 74 gun ship. 
This would seem to be confirmed as the largest ship built at Calcutta in this period was 
                                                 
3
 Captain Fleetwood Pellew to Rear Admiral Drury, TNA, ADM 1/181, 8
th
 April 1809; Note: Phaeton 
was 141 feet long, over 39 feet wide and nearly 14 feet draught (Winfield, British Warships 1793-1815, 
138). 
4
 Phipps, J., A guide to the commerce of Bengal, 149. 
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the 74 gun ship Hastings, a vessel of 1732 tons, with her construction taking place on a 




Vessel Charge (Rupees) 
Sloop 300 
Frigate 500 
50 Gun Ship 600 
64 Gun Ship 700 
74 Gun Ship 800 
 




Rule Description Charge 
(Rupees) 
1 For pumping out the dock, shoring and the use of shores, stages, 
warps and opening and shutting the dock gates. Note: This does 
not include shores for hanging a ship, to shift the keel, which is 
always an extra charge.  
500 
2 For every ship of 500 tons registered and upwards which comes 
into dock, for however short a period. 
500 
3 For every ship of under 500 tons registered which comes into 
dock, for however short a period. 
400 
4 The above sums are to cover dock hire for a period of eight days, 
from and including the day the ship enters the dock, after which 
for every day a ship remains in dock the following charge. 
50 
The above charges were established by the several proprietors of dry docks, at the 
Port of Calcutta, in March 1822 for the use of their respective docks. 
 




The above indicates that Calcutta was capable of docking and refitting British naval 
vessels up to the size of fifth rates, but it was never to become a favoured refit location. 
Table 7biii shows the Bengal Marine pilotage charges and indicates that large naval 
                                                 
5
 Lee, I., Commodore Sir John Hayes: His Voyage and Life (1767-1831), 239. 
6
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7
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ships had called at Calcutta and that a substantial charge was incurred before a naval 
ship even arrived in that port to be repaired. The fees charged by the private ship repair 
companies was a considerable sum for long refits in dock fees, see table 7biv, in 
addition to the work undertaken. The cost of HM Ships refitting at Calcutta was 
investigated in a parliamentary select committee report in 1805.
8
 However, ships were 
still being sent there for refits later in the decade until Admirals Drury and Hood greatly 




Chapter seven has detailed Melville’s strategy for naval defence of eastern Indian and 
the route to China by encouraging the East India Company to establish a building yard 
and naval base at Penang. Part of this strategy was to construct a dry dock capable of 
accommodating a 74 gun ship, thus providing greater availability of vessels by 
removing the need to return to Bombay for major refits. Modern technology was also 
introduced to construct the facility and to subsequently pump out the dry dock by the 
provision of a steam engine. Boulton and Watt provided this engine with John Rennie 
supplying ancillary machinery. The engine suppliers considered that two 6 horse power 
engines attached to a chain pump would shift 400000 cubic feet of water in less than 24 
hours.
9
 Although this equipment was shipped out construction of the dry dock was 
abandoned.  
 
Drawings and plans of the Penang dry dock have yet to be found by this author but an 
idea of their size, method of construction and the pumping engine configuration is 
suggested by the plans that have survived for the planned docks at Trincomalee. 
 
                                                 
8
 Reports from the Select Committee on papers relating to the repairs of HM Ships Romney and Sensible, 
while under the command of Sir Home-Popham, House of Commons Papers, 1805. 
9
 Boulton and Watt to Navy Board, TNA, ADM 49/89, 24
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 June 1805. 




Figure 7bii: Side elevation view of Penang steam engines 
 
 
Figure 7biii: Plan view of Penang steam engines 
 
 





Unlike Penang this location was to become a significant navy base for the British, but 
Trincomalee was never to have a dry dock constructed. However, considerable 
investigation and planning was undertaken to build these docks. The advantage of 
having access to dry docks at Trincomalee was identical to that at Penang, tactical 
independence from Bombay, but also removing commercial dependence on the 
Company. This later aspect particularly appealed to Admiral Drury. 
 
The site chosen for the proposed dry docks was at the head of Nicholson Cove. The 
civil engineer, Atkinson, produced three plans, for selection. These consisted of a single 
dock for a 74 gun ship, a double dock and finally twin docks capable of accommodating 
74 gun ships. It was not merely the various design configurations that Atkinson supplied 
as he also provided profiles of the cove to show how much material would require 
excavating together with the coffer dam required. Atkinson’s drawings are dated 
January 1811 and include the design and position of a steam engine. Figures 7biv to 




With Drury’s death in March 1811 and the operation to capture Java the progress to 
establish a naval yard at Trincomalee slackened. The newly arrived commissioner at 
Madras, Puget, was busy reorganising and familiarising himself with civil naval affairs 
at Madras, Calcutta and Penang, but in August 1811 he sailed to Trincomalee. Puget 
sent a long report to the Admiralty in October with a part of his dispatch being devoted 
to the proposed dry docks. Puget understood that the suggestion to build the dry docks, 
championed by Drury, had been General Maitland’s idea. The commissioner considered 
the location was ideal but questioned the necessity of building such an expensive 
facility with Bombay docks available. The low rise in tide would necessitate a steam 
engine and pumping gear, and together with the labour and masonry costs Puget 
considered a careening wharf would be a better option.
 11
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Figure 7biv: Proposed configuration for one dock and position of coffer dam 
 
 
Figure 7bv: Cross-section of coffer dam 




Figure 7bvi: Proposed twin dock design with position of coffer dam 
 
 
Figure 7bvii: Twin dock design on completion 




Figure 7bviii: Proposed docks showing, plan and sectional views 
 
 
Figure 7bix: Design of steam engine, well and pump 








However it was another option that Puget suggested that was much later to be the 
answer at Trincomalee and other overseas bases, a floating dock. This he suggested if 
the Admiralty insisted on Trincomalee being established on a large scale as material and 
labour costs would be much reduced and that the harbour was suited to such a facility. 
For examples of floating docks in service he suggested they examine those already in 




Figure 7bx provides an impression of the configuration of a contemporary dock with the 
typical “U” shaped section. What is more difficult to ascertain is whether this design 
allowed for the dock to be lowered by flooding tanks and raised with a ship in dock by 
pumping out the tanks. This latter operation requires detailed knowledge of weight 
distribution to ensure when pumping out the tanks that a correct trim is maintained. 
With the limited raise and fall of tides at Trincomalee the floating dock referred to in 
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Puget’s dispatch must have been of this type otherwise a ship could not have been put 
into such a dock. 
 
Broughton, the temporary commander-in-chief, agreed with Puget that dry docks at 
Trincomalee were not required as Bombay’s were sufficient.14 However, Hood was in 
favour of Atkinson’s designs for a dry dock. Hood considered Puget’s alternative option 
for a floating dock would incur increasing and continuing costs. The admiral also 
thought the utility of steam engines to off-set the problem of limited tides was well 




Hood did not initially abandon the idea of building dry docks at Nicholson Cove 
informing the Admiralty in January 1813 that Puget was obtaining soil cores and 
soundings in the cove. As only one civil engineer was on the island Hood also asked 
that an engineer was sent out from England to build the docks.
16
 However, by May 
Puget reported to the Navy Board that Hood had halted all work on building docks until 
he had instructions from the Admiralty to proceed.
17
 Instead Hood had agreed with the 
commissioner and Wellington, the master shipwright, that a careening wharf and 




The dry docks were never to be built at Trincomalee and the exact timing of their 
abandonment has yet to be determined, but Mr. John Rennie, the civil engineer 
frequently consulted and used by the Admiralty, can have the last word dated 1
st
 July 
1815. ‘As I am informed that the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty has given up at 
present of establishing dry docks at Trincomalee I am returning the papers your 




The provision of dry docks for the repair, refit and building of ships in the East Indies 
falls into three distinct categories from the mid eighteenth century. Firstly, with 
Bombay’s docks being constructed for military and strategic reasons with the Company 
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also being able to build merchant ships when not needed by the navy; secondly, at 
Calcutta constructed by private concerns for commercial advantage; and finally those 
envisaged at Penang and Trincomalee for strategic reasons. 
 
A significant difference between the dry docks built at Bombay compared with Calcutta 
was their size and reflects their reason and role. Bombay’s first dock was built to 
accommodate a 50 gun ship, a major naval vessel in 1750, to enable the recently 
deployed squadron to be adequately supported. Bombay’s dock was further extended in 
the next 20 years with another two docks to support a larger naval squadron and the 
Bombay Marine. The increase in size of the third dock also reflected that the arbiter in 
naval conflict had moved from small two deckers to 74 gun ships. The size of the docks 
at Bombay was suited for naval purposes and building large ships, but probably too 
large and expensive for small traders. It was hoped that the British navy would always 
have primacy of use and hence restricted use by merchants, but Admiral Rainier had to 
argue for priority.
20
 Bombay docks were conceived to service the defence of East Indian 
trade and hence were a significant national resource. This was also reflected in the 
building of Duncan dock as its purpose was to build 74 gun ships, and increase 
operational flexibility by doubling the capacity to repair such ships. 
 
The driving force for the construction of dry docks at Calcutta was commercial and 
coincided with the growth in shipbuilding occurring in Bengal at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Many of the country trading vessels that were built were of a small 
size, but they were numerous providing an opportunity to supply docking and 
maintenance services. By building small dry docks and providing a flexible charging 
structure the private ship owners could maximise the life of their ships at a reasonable 
cost. This costing structure probably did not suit the requirements of the British navy as 
it appears to have been constructed for quick turn round maintenance rather than major 
under-water hull work. As the dock owners had constructed their facilities for expected 
numbers of commercial customers it would be unlikely that navy work was necessary. 
If this was the case than the ability of the British navy to negotiate more advantageous 
terms would not be the same as at Bombay. A more detailed study of Calcutta’s docks 
and the work performed in this period is needed to confirm this conjecture. 
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The proposed dry docks at Penang and Trincomalee have been included in this study to 
illustrate the strategy vision of people in London and the east. By including 
Trincomalee in this evaluation an opportunity has been provided to show that coffer 
dams would be required for construction of such docks. The inclusion of the proposal to 
use floating docks was included to show this technology was coming to fruition and 
under consideration. Such docks were later a common feature at overseas yards with 
Bermuda’s first floating dock being a wonder of the age in the 1860s. 
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This appendix is to explain the structure and purpose of the Bengal Marine. It was not a 
military organisation and was separate from the Bombay Marine.  
 
In 1823 the head clerk of the Bengal Marine wrote about his organisation and the 
activities of the region in his book, A guide to the commerce of Bengal.
1
 John Phipps 
intended his book to be of use to merchants, ship owners and officers of ships who 
intended being involved in East Indian activities, particularly Calcutta. What he 
provided was a snap shot of contemporary East Indian affairs and a history of previous 
development. Phipps also published a collection of papers concerning shipbuilding in 




Phipps records the existence of a Marine Board at Bengal with Lee recording that the 
master attendant was a member of the Board.
3
 Phipps provides a list of the holders of 
the various posts in the Bengal Marine. His earliest record of an occupant of the post of 
master attendant was Page Keble who resigned in 1768. Cudbert Thuhill was in post 
from 1785 to April 1809 when Commodore John Hayes replaced him as master 
attendant. Hayes was still in post in 1821 but was to resign to take up active service to 
command Company naval forces in the Burmese War of 1824.
4
 As shown in appendix 
7a there were instances of individuals holding multiple posts including work in a private 
capacity. Hayes had been a senior officer of the Bombay Marine for some time and 
commanded a squadron of ships on the Java expedition in 1811. The deputy master 
attendant was usually a captain in the Bombay Marine with lieutenants of that 
organisation also to be found in the master attendant’s office. Possibly the most 
intriguing instance of dual activity is of James Kyd, the master builder of the Bengal 
Marine. Both James and his brother Robert were trained in shipbuilding in England with 
their father, Lt. Gen. Alexander Kyd, apprenticing them to Mr. Weddell the Company’s 
master builder at Calcutta on their return. On Weddell’s retirement in 1807 the brothers 
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Figure 7ci: The Bengal Marine – Master Attendant Organisation6 
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A vital roll of the marine service at Bengal was piloting vessels to Calcutta up the 
Hooghly River. Phipps provides a list of branch pilots, the senior rank, dated from 1771 
indicating a hierarchy. Table 7ci shows the pilot establishment in 1821, but this was 
probably indicative of the service in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. What 
Phipps also provided was a list of the pilots who received a pension from the Bengal 
Marine. 
 
Rank Number Pay per Monsoon (Sicca 
Rupees 
Branch Pilot 12 700 
Master 24 270 
Mates 24 156 
Second mates 24 60 
Volunteers 70 60 
  
Table 7ci: Bengal Pilot Establishment in 1821 
 
For Royal Navy ships defending the Bay of Bengal if it was decided they should be 
refitted and resupplied from Calcutta, the Bengal Marine charged for pilotage with the 
private dockyards charging for use of their dry docks. These charges are detailed in 
appendix 7b. 
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The following graphs have drawn on John Phipps’s book published in 1840 on 
shipbuilding in India, and Wadia’s work on the Bombay dockyard.1 William Kirk 
published an article in the Mariner’s Mirror in 1953 on this subject and cites Phipps’s 
book as the statistical source for his work.
2
 Phipps had been a clerk in the master 
attendant’s office at Calcutta, a part of the Bengal Marine, and had a detailed 
knowledge of Bengal and its commerce having previously published a book on the 
subject in 1823. Phipps provided tables on ships built at various ports in India, Burma 
and Penang. For Calcutta, Chittagong and Rangoon he gave details on the number of 
ships built each year, the total tonnage and the size of the largest and smallest ship 
built that year from 1800 to 1820. Phipps also gave details on other minor ports but 
these built fewer ships at intermittent intervals. An example of this is Penang as only 
three relatively large vessels were completed there from 1810 to 1813. Phipps did not 
provide comprehensive data on Bombay however, appendix two of Wadia’s book 
details the name, date of completion and tonnage of the vessels ordered from the 
dockyard, and hence completes the data required for a statistical view. 
 
Figure 7di shows the number of vessels built at each port during the period under 
consideration. The graph shows that Calcutta, Chittagong and Rangoon were 
constantly engaged in building relatively large numbers of vessels, whilst Bombay 
was ever present, fewer vessels were built there. This is confirmed in figure 7dii with 
Bombay in fourth place and Calcutta building over three times as many vessels. 
However, the importance of Bombay is demonstrated in figure 7diii because when the 
total tonnage of the ships built is considered that location rises to second place, 
indicating that larger vessels were built there. What becomes evident is the dominance 
of Calcutta for commercial shipbuilding, with that location providing over forty-four 
percent of the total tonnage for southern Asia. Appendix 7b provides information on 
the dry docks at Calcutta with the docking charges, indicating the commercial 
dockyards were also engaged in repair and refit work. Calcutta was hence the 
dominate shipping area, but chapter seven provides evidence on why it was not a 
favoured location for the British navy and so little used.                                          .
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Figure 7di: Shipbuilding in Southern Asia Ports, 1800-1819 
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Figure 7dii: Numbers of Ships built in Southern Asia Ports, 1800 – 1819 














Figure 7diii: Total tonnage of ships built in Southern Asia Ports, 1800-1819 
